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Abstract 
 
How should we understand the economic relationship of the Soviet Union to the 
natural environment? This dissertation explores this broad question through a fine-
grained study of the environmental history of one particular Russian region in the far 
north throughout the entire twentieth century. It emphasizes the commonalities embedded 
in different political economies that existed in Russia: the state capitalism of the late 
imperial era, Soviet communism, and post-Soviet neo-liberalism. It suggests that a 
unified, but deeply political, process of seeking to make the natural world modern 
belongs at the center of an account of Soviet environmental history. It also highlights the 
significant role of the physical environment itself in shaping the trajectories of Soviet 
economic development. 
The study focuses on the Arctic territory of the Kola Peninsula or the Murmansk 
region and considers five different economic branches that emerged there during the 
twentieth century. A discussion of efforts to use a railroad line to enliven a desolate 
periphery and of the difficult experiences of wartime construction elaborates some of the 
overarching methods and visions of modernization. An examination of phosphate mining 
and processing in the Khibiny Mountains stresses the place of the environment in the 
Stalinist system and the anthropocentric holism of many Soviet planners. The campaigns 
to transform reindeer herding into a productive socialist industry and to protect wild 
caribou reveal how diverse ways of knowing nature influenced the behavior of elite and 
marginal actors. An investigation into the development of the Kola nickel industry 
suggests that excessive pollution in the Soviet Union is best accounted for by specific 
historical contexts instead of by structural factors. Finally, a review of the energy 
economy of the Kola Peninsula points to the tremendous transformation of human 
relations with the environment during modernization, while also exposing abiding, 
though reconfigured, connections between nature and society.  
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Introduction: An Environmental History of Soviet Modernization 
 
Dangling out in the White and Barents Seas sat an old, but largely unassimilated, 
territory of the Russian Empire at the beginning of the twentieth century. The Kola 
Peninsula in the far northwest corner of the country mirrored the much larger 
Scandinavian Peninsula, where Russia’s empire gave way to a combined union of 
Sweden and Norway. The Kola Peninsula included several mountain ranges in the 
interior, a large number of fresh water lakes and rivers, and coniferous forests that 
thinned out with altitude and latitude. The entire region, also known as Russian Lapland, 
was north of the Arctic Circle, except for a small portion of the peninsula along the 
eastern side of the southern Tersk coast. This polar location meant that the region 
endured long periods of darkness during the snowy winters and enjoyed weeks of 
perennial light in the brief, but vivacious, summers. Despite its extreme northern position, 
the Gulf Stream current brought warm waters to the northern Murman coast of the Kola 
Peninsula, leaving many of the steep rocky inlets with unfrozen bays year-round. As a 
territory comprised of tundra and taiga lands, the region possessed significantly less 
biomass than temperate or tropical zones. However, it was rich with unique biodiversity, 
including avian species, mammalian fauna, fish, insects, lichen, and various types of 
flora. Fewer than ten thousand representatives of the species Homo sapiens resided on the 
Kola Peninsula at the time. These people lived in a number of coastal settlements, 
including many temporary homes for seasonal migrants and the recently established 
commercial port of Aleksandrovsk. In the interior of the peninsula a group known as the 
Sami dominated in highly disperse settlements, though a recent influx of Komi and 
Nenets was deeply affecting their occupational patterns. Throughout the entire territory 
no cities, military installations, or large industrial enterprises existed. 
By the end of the twentieth century, the Kola Peninsula had become a very 
different place. Campaigns to industrially develop and militarize the region had 
immensely affected the local environment and human society. Extreme seasonal 
fluctuations and the mollifying effect of the Gulf Stream remained, but the physical 
terrain and the collection of life forms there had been transformed radically. Numerous 
dense cities, industrial plants for extracting and processing the mineral wealth below the 
surface, and military testing facilities filled the interior of the peninsula. The mountain 
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ranges now included large hollow areas. Many of the lakes and rivers of the region were 
dammed and regulated; large reservoirs added new areas of surface water to the terrain 
and a nuclear power plant increased the temperature of Lake Imandra by using it as a 
cooling pond. A network of railroad lines and highways cut through and across the 
western section of the peninsula, while the eastern enclaves continued to be difficult for 
humans to access. Pollution and other forms of industrial human influence significantly 
reduced the fish population in many water bodies and denuded large areas of vegetation 
near production units. Considerable biodiversity, nevertheless, flourished in limited 
protected zones. Along the Murman coast an array of objects controlled by the Northern 
Fleet of the Russian Navy, including a myriad of nuclear submarines and closed cities, 
made this space one of the most militarized areas of the world. In the Kola Bay the 
metropolis of Murmansk captured the title of the most populated Arctic city in the world. 
The Kola Peninsula on the whole was the most industrialized and densely populated 
Arctic region with approximately nine hundred thousand human residents (down from 1.1 
million a decade earlier).  
How do we understand the disparity between these two moments? What caused 
the Kola landscape and human life there to change so dramatically? The intervening 
century witnessed two massive military conflicts and the Cold War; global trends of 
population growth, urbanization, and technological advancement; and the rise and fall of 
the world’s first communist state. These overlapping political and sociological 
developments accompanied a rapid process of economic transformation of the natural 
world. For reasons I will explain shortly, I call this reorganization of the relationship 
between humans and nature “modernization.” This dissertation is a study of the 
environmental history of twentieth-century economic modernization in the Soviet Union 
based on an investigation of a single northern region. It aspires to contribute to the 
environmental history of communism, which is a political and economic system that has 
received considerably less attention than capitalism. It does so by comparing Soviet 
socialism with the state capitalism of the preceding late imperial era and the neoliberal 
reform efforts of the post-Soviet Russian Federation. It argues that a continual and 
unified process of attempting to make nature modern that cuts across variations in 
political economy played a pivotal role in reshaping environment and society. 
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Illusions of Modernity and the Influence of Modernization 
Over the past decades the logic of development has been roundly and rightly 
criticized by numerous scholars and theorists who challenge the faulty teleology 
embedded in social evolutionist thinking and point to the complicated manifestations of 
power that have accompanied an insistence on historical directionality toward the 
modern. While public policy remains predicated on analytic frameworks that take 
economic and technological growth as potentially continual, this scholarship raises 
serious doubts about the epistemologies underlying the process of modernization. Such 
critical theorists of modernity often root their arguments in the dynamics of knowledge 
production. They occasionally interrogate the configurations of the natural and the social 
that are entrenched in modernist imagination. This project began as an investigation into 
the campaign of the Soviet Union to overcome the alleged “backwardness” of certain 
forms of treating the natural world and accordingly shares these theorists’ critical 
disposition toward modernization. 
One articulation of this critique of modernity stresses the ambivalence and 
ultimately the totalitarian potential of the extension of the philosophical principles of the 
European Scientific Revolution and the Enlightenment. Influenced by the atrocities of 
Nazism and the Second World War, Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno theorized that 
the dialectic counter of increased science, technology, and economic progress was the 
heightened oppression of human beings. At the root of their philosophy, the impulse to 
attain mastery over nature implies a drive to dominate humankind more fully.1 In the 
1970s, William Leiss elaborated some environmental implications of this perspective of 
the Frankfurt School. For Leiss, “the vision of the human domination of nature becomes a 
fundamental ideology of a social system” in both capitalism and socialism. It “sets for 
itself as a primary task the development of productive forces for the satisfaction of human 
material wants,” but inadvertently leads to environmental destruction and structures of 
oppression.2 In her attempt to diagnose what went wrong with the Soviet Union and 
                                                
1 Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, [1944] 2002). On the philosophy of the Frankfurt School, see Martin 
Jay, The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research, 
1923-1950 (Berkeley: University of California Press, [1973] 1996). 
2 William Leiss, The Domination of Nature (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, [1972] 
1994), 179. 
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brought about its collapse, Susan Buck-Morss similarly points to a pathos embedded in a 
common logic of modernity that applied to communism and capitalism.  
By adopting the capitalist heavy-industry definition of economic modernization, 
however, Soviet socialism had no alternative but to try to produce a utopia out of 
the production process itself. In making this choice, the Soviets missed the 
opportunity to transform the very idea of economic ‘development,’ and of the 
ecological preconditions through which it might be realized.3 
Another approach to the problem of the modern relies on the combined insights of 
post-modern philosophy, post-colonial studies, and cultural anthropology. Carrying 
Michel Foucault-inspired concerns about the ways that discourses of scientific knowledge 
infiltrate power dynamics down to the level of the individual subject and Jacques 
Derrida-influenced skepticism about meta-narratives and historicist universalism, 
scholars such as Johannes Fabian, Maria Todorova, and Dipesh Chakrabarty have 
interrogated the imposition of a modernist temporal ordering on regions and peoples 
outside of mainstream Western Europe. The assignment of a lower rank on a scale of 
development became a technique of European rule in many colonial contexts that 
functioned by justifying hierarchical distancing and promising eventual evolution.4 James 
Ferguson brings similar concerns to an assessment of economic development policies in 
Africa. Focusing both on “modernist metanarrative as dubious theoretical model and 
modernist metanarrative as indubitable ethnographic fact,” Ferguson probes how the 
agonizing experience of Zambians living in the country’s declining copper belt intersect 
                                                
3 Susan Buck-Morss, Dreamworld and Catastrophe: The Passing of Mass Utopia in East and 
West (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2000), 115. 
4 Johannes Fabian, Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes its Object (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1983); Maria Todorova, “The Trap of Backwardness: Modernity, Temporality 
and the Study of Eastern European Nationalism,” Slavic Review 64, no. 1 (Spring 2005): 140-164; Maria 
Todorova, Imagining the Balkans (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); and Dipesh Chakrabarty, 
Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2000). For discussions of temporal ordering in Russian state governance, see Yanni Kotsonis, 
Making Peasants Backward: Agricultural Cooperatives and the Agrarian Question in Russia, 1861-1914 
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999); Esther Kingston-Mann, In Search of the True West: Culture, 
Economics, and Problems of Russian Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999); David C. 
Engerman, Modernization from the Other Shore: American Intellectuals and the Romance of Russian 
Development (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003); Yuri Slezkine, Arctic Mirrors: Russia 
and the Small Peoples of the North (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994); Bruce Grant, In the Soviet 
House of Culture: A Century of Perestroikas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); and Francine 
Hirsch, Empire of Nations: Ethnographic Knowledge and the Making of the Soviet Union (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2005). 
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with earlier mythical promises of industrial modernity.5 These promises had served to 
entrench state power in the de-politicized guise of “development.”6 Nikolai Ssorin-
Chaikov and Niobe Thompson fruitfully explore the life of such modernist 
metanarratives in Arctic Russia, historically and in the present, in articulations of state 
and economic power. They also both highlight the variegated and negotiated uses of local 
ecologies by communities, authorities, experts, and entrepreneurs during moments of 
economic transformation.7 Finally, James Scott offers a more generalist view of the 
governing tactics of states bent on achieving “high-modernism” through social 
engineering projects. While pursuing an “administrative ordering of nature and society” 
that enabled development, modern states classified, simplified, made legible, and overall 
reduced the complexity of social and environmental realities, ultimately to the detriment 
of their own utopian schemes.8   
Theorists who are sometimes classified as post-constructivist or post-humanist 
challenge the ostensible distinction between the “natural” and the “social” that has been a 
fundamental element of the project of modernity.9 They do not stop at calling attention to 
the arbitrary and historically contingent character of this division, but go further in 
advocating for future scholars to surmount it by paying attention to hybrids, quasi-
objects, the agency of non-humans, and networks. Tim Ingold approaches the issue by 
disputing the separation of biological evolution, which applies to all species, and cultural 
change, which only applies to human history. Claiming that there is “no species-specific, 
essential form of humanity, no way of saying what an ‘anatomically modern human’ is 
apart from the manifold ways in which humans actually become,” he endorses 
                                                
5 James Ferguson, Expectations of Modernity: Myth and Meanings of Urban Life on the Zambian 
Copperbelt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 16. 
6 James Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine: “Development,” Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic 
Power in Lesotho (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
7 Nikolai V. Ssorin-Chaikov, The Social Life of the State in Subarctic Siberia (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2003) and Niobe Thompson, Settlers on the Edge: Identity and Modernization on 
Russia’s Arctic Frontier (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2008). 
8 James Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have 
Failed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 88. 
9 Attempts to bring these perspectives into environmental history have recently been advanced: 
Kristin Asdal, “The Problematic Nature of Nature: The Post-Constructivist Challenge to Environmental 
History,” History and Theory 42, no. 4 (December, 2003): 60-74; Sverker Sörlin and Paul Warde, “The 
Problem of the Problem of Environmental History: A Re-reading of the Field,” Environmental History 12, 
no. 1 (January 2007): 107-130; and Sverker Sörlin and Paul Warde, eds., Nature’s End: History and 
Environment (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009).  
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“refocusing on the human-being-in-its-environment” and dispensing with “the opposition 
between species and culture.”10 Bruno Latour extends a similar line of analysis to what he 
supposes was an untenable, and ultimately unstable, classification between objects and 
subjects and between nature and society in the sciences over the past several centuries.11 
He defines modernization as ultimately a project of attempting, but failing, to create this 
separation: 
“The asymmetry between nature and culture then becomes an asymmetry between 
past and future. The past was the confusion of things and men; the future is what 
will no longer confuse them. Modernization consists in continually exiting from 
an obscure age that mingled the needs of society with scientific truth, in order to 
enter a new age that will finally distinguish clearly what belongs to atemporal 
nature and what comes from humans, what depends on things and what belongs to 
signs. Modern temporality arises from a superposition of the difference between 
past and future with another difference, so much more important, between 
mediation and purification.”12   
Timothy Mitchell offers a comparable argument for the inevitable limitations of the 
evolving transcendence of the social over the natural in modernity. “Elements that appear 
incompatible with what is modern, Western, or capitalist are systematically subordinated 
and marginalized, placed in a position outside the unfolding of history. Yet in the very 
processes of their subordination and exclusion, it can be shown, such elements infiltrate 
and compromise that history.”13 In his own research Mitchell demonstrates how the 
“hybrid agency” possessed by the mosquito contributed to and undermined the 
modernization of colonial Egypt.14 
All of these discussions of the relationship between nature and modernity posit 
modernization as a process that generates its influence from human conceptions of the 
world. While the supposed transcendence of modernity should be seen as fictive, as 
Latour and others insist, the changes wrought by modernization have been very real and 
indeed very physical. In order to capture this significant facet of modernization, it is 
                                                
10 Tim Ingold, The Perception of the Environment: Essays in Livelihood, Dwelling, and Skill 
(London: Routledge, 2000), 391. 
11 For the fullest expression of Latour’s views, see Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social: An 
Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
12 Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, trans. Catherine Porter (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1993), 71. 
13 Timothy Mitchell, “Introduction,” in Timothy Mitchell, ed., Questions of Modernity 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2000), xiii. 
14 Timothy Mitchell, Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2002), 19-53. 
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helpful to return, ironic though it may seem, to classic modernization theory of the 1960s 
and 1970s. Its initial advocates saw modernization as a systematic trajectory toward 
industrial expansion, increased education, urbanization, technological innovation, and 
economic development.15 Whatever wavering and nuances in its unfolding, these 
phenomena did create, in environmental historian John McNeill’s words, “something new 
under the sun” in the twentieth century.16 Humans live in very different environments 
because of the material features of these processes of modernization and not only on 
account of altered knowledge, representations, or cultures. The materialist perspective 
that I embrace in this study incorporates both standard structural assessments of 
modernization theory and the views of post-constructivists about nature’s active 
participation in social change. 
However, the claim of some modernization theorists that the process itself was 
largely inevitable and apolitical still deserves to be discarded. The insistence on historical 
directionality misses the role that value-laden knowledge production plays in enabling 
modernization. Abstract assessment about the changes in social hierarchies that occur 
during modernization obscures the conflicts that arise among groups with different 
interests and levels of political influence. As Becky Mansfield shows in the case of 
overfishing in modern industrial fisheries, explanations such as Garrett Hardin’s “tragedy 
of the commons,” which accounts for the over-exploitation of resources by evoking the 
rational and profit-maximizing behavior of individuals in the absence of clearly defined 
property rights, conceal political processes of much greater causal significance. In this 
                                                
15 For examples of modernization theory, see Alex Inkeles and David H. Smith, Becoming 
Modern: Individual Change in Six Developing Countries (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1974) and S. N. Eisenstadt, Tradition, Change, and Modernity (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1973). 
Versions of modernization theory influenced the following works on the Soviet Union: Alexander 
Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1962); Raymond A. Bauer, Alex Inkeles, and Clyde Kluckhohn, How the Soviet System Works: 
Cultural, Psychological, and Social Themes (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1964); Theodore 
H. Von Laue, Why Lenin? Why Stalin? A Reappraisal of the Russian Revolution, 1900-1930 (Philadelphia: 
J. B. Lippincott Company, 1964); and Teodor Shanin, Russia as a ‘Developing Society’ (The Roots of 
Otherness: Russia’s Turn of the Century, Volume One) (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985). For 
critical reviews of this overall approach and its application to the Soviet Union, see Charles Tilly, Big 
Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1984); Ronal´d 
Suni, “Sotsializm, postsotsializm i normativnaia modernost´: Razmyshleniia ob istorii SSSR,” Ab Imperio, 
no 2 (2002): 19-55; and Engerman, Modernization from the Other Shore, 273-285.  
16 J.R. McNeill, Something New Under the Sun: An Environmental History of the Twentieth-
Century World (New York: W. W. Norton, 2000). 
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case the large-scale economic modernization of industrial fisheries was “both envisioned 
and fostered” by a host of governments, international agencies, and businesses.17    
In order to move from illusions of modernity to the influence of modernization, it 
is helpful to turn to the interdisciplinary work of political ecologists. Political ecologists 
seek to unearth the political dimensions of changes in land use, environmental regulation, 
technology, and economy. Geographer Paul Robbins defines political ecology as 
“empirical, research-based explorations to explain the linkages in the condition and 
change of social/environmental systems, with explicit consideration of relations of 
power.”18 The eclectic methods that political ecologists use in their research assess the 
material features of the social/environmental linkages being investigated, but return to 
power dynamics when explaining them. Many political ecologists achieve this form of 
analysis by accepting post-modernist and post-structuralist critiques of Western science 
only to the point in which it is “contended rather than abandoned.”19 As Richard Peet and 
Michael Watts put it, the “social construction of nature” should be balanced by a sense of 
the “natural construction of the social.”20 A focus on illusions should be complimented 
with attention to influential material and social factors that are always being mediated by, 
but are not reducible to, human thought. 
This dissertation treats modernization as a political project to transform relations 
among nature and society. Political power existed in multiple forms. On the most basic 
level, individuals and groups committed to maximizing the economic use of the natural 
world, including dominant state institutions, leaders of industry, the military, and many 
scientists, have held the most sway over the treatment of the environment. This top-down 
form of political power reflects sovereign or quasi-sovereign influence over the 
                                                
17 Becky Mansfield, “‘Modern’ Industrial Fisheries and the Crisis of Overfishing,” in Richard 
Peet, Paul Robbins, and Michael J. Watts, eds., Global Political Ecology (London: Routledge, 2011), 84-
99. See Garrett Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Commons,” Science 168, no. 3859 (December 1968): 1243-
1248. 
18 Paul Robbins, Political Ecology: A Critical Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 
12. Other introductions to the field of political ecology include: Richard Peet and Michael Watts, eds., 
Liberation Ecologies: Environment, Development, Social Movements (London: Routledge, 1996); Karl S. 
Zimmer and Thomas J. Bassett, Political Ecology: An Integrative Approach to Geography and 
Environment-Development Studies (New York: The Guilford Press, 2003); and Aletta Biersack and James 
B. Greenberg, eds., Reimagining Political Ecology (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006). 
19 Richard Peet and Michael Watts, “Liberation Ecology: Development, Sustainability, and 
Environment in an Age of Market Triumphalism,” in Peet and Watts, Liberation Ecologies, 38. 
20 Richard Peet and Michael Watts, “Conclusion: Towards a Theory of Liberation Ecology,” in 
Peet and Watts, Liberation Ecologies, 263. 
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environment. Elite state and industrial actors in twentieth-century capitalism and 
socialism shared a broad and influential, though still contested, consensus about the 
desirability of modernization. Manifestations of sovereign environmental power 
particularly affected control over access to natural resources and the physical 
manipulation of people and environments. 21 This political power has existed since the 
earliest advocacy of regional development and remains present in contemporary 
circumstances.  
Yet, power was also dispersed through society and nature with different actors 
affecting the outcomes of projects of economic transformation at various points. People 
outside of the upper echelons of regional decision makers reacted to the natural and social 
conditions they encountered with an abiding capacity to alter their surroundings. Non-
human agents also modified situations in unanticipated and consequential ways. The 
effects of this type of power emerge from what I would like to call a modernist 
environmentality. Foucault’s theory of governmentality stresses an assemblage of “the 
institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow 
the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power.”22 Applying this concept 
to the natural world, Arun Agrawal evokes the term “environmentality” to capture “the 
knowledges, politics, institutions, and subjectivities that come to be linked together with 
the emergence of the environment as a domain that requires regulation and protection.”23 
A modernist environmentality instead reflects the alignment of “knowledges, politics, 
institutions, and subjectivities” with attempts to use the natural world to enact modernity. 
The material influence of nature affects the contours of modernist environmental 
ideologies and policies and thus contributes to this form of power as well. In order to 
understand these variegated expressions of power, this dissertation examines the 
perceptions of nature that accompanied modernization, the strategies employed by 
                                                
21 I take the phrase “sovereign environmental power” from Richard Peet, Paul Robbins, and 
Michael J. Watts, “Global Nature,” in Peet, Robbins, and Watts, eds., Global Political Ecology, 31-34. The 
authors contrast this form of political power, which is exercised over societies, with environmentality, 
which occurs within them.  
22 Michel Foucault, “Governmentality,” in Graham Burshell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller, eds., 
The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 102. 
23 Arun Agrawal, Environmentality: Technologies of Government and the Making of Subjects 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2005), 226. The term “envrionmentality” was originally coined by 
Timothy Luke. See Timothy W. Luke, Capitalism, Democracy, and Ecology: Departing from Marx 
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1999). 
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industrial planners for managing natural resources, the lived experience of individuals 
working in and coping with the environment, and the physical influence that humans and 
the environment had on each other. 
Histories of the Soviet Environment 
Environmental history aims at placing human interaction with the rest of nature at 
the center of investigations of the past. While the emergence of the field among historians 
of the United States in the 1970s and 1980s cannot be disentangled from the rise of 
environmentalism as a political movement, the ultimate rationale for the type of analysis 
offered by environmental history comes from the ways it enriches explanations of 
historical phenomena often taken to exist on a purely human register. As Ellen Stroud 
argues, the environment is not only an analytic category like race, class, and gender that 
allows us to observe power relationships in society.24 It also has a material character, “the 
dirt of history.”  Stroud insists that by paying attention to this material side of nature 
environmental historians stand in the best position to transform larger historical 
interpretations.25   
This work of Soviet environmental history seeks to address large issues relevant 
for comparative and global scholarship and to respond to specific problems that emerge 
from Russian historiography. A significant portion of modern environmental history 
focuses on the ways that the capitalist economic system changed relationships with nature 
through commodification and the increased treatment of the natural world as a repository 
of resources to be used for accruing profit. As Donald Worster argued in an early and 
celebrated work of the field, a culture of capitalism in the American West crucially 
contributed to the social and environmental tragedy of the 1930s known as the Dust 
Bowl.26 However, much less research has been done on the main alternative economic 
system in the twentieth century: communism. This study reveals what some overviews of 
global environmental history have asserted: that the specificities of centralized command 
                                                
24 Stroud’s argument contrasts with ones offered by Ted Steinberg and Douglas Weiner. Ted 
Steinberg, “Down to Earth: Nature, Agency, and Power in History,” American Historical Review 107, no. 3 
(June 2002): 798-820 and Douglas Weiner, “A Death-Defying Attempt to Articulate a Coherent Definition 
of Environmental History,” Environmental History 10, no. 3. (July 2005): 404-420. 
25 Ellen Stroud, "Does Nature Always Matter?: Following Dirt Through History," History & 
Theory 42, no. 4 (December 2003): 75-81. 
26 Donald Worster, Dust Bowl: The Southern Plains in the 1930s (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, [1979] 2004). 
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economies during communism mattered less than the aggregate changes that resulted 
from pursuing a common process of economic modernization.27 An investigation of the 
distinctions of communist environmental history still bears significance because it 
suggests that the reduction of nature to marketable commodities and the pervasiveness of 
a profit-maximizing culture do not uniquely account for common changes in human-
environmental relationships throughout the world. 
A lot of ink has been spilled assessing, denouncing, and proposing solutions for 
the environmental situation in the former Soviet Union.28 However, environmental 
history has not yet become part of mainstream historical scholarship on Russia.29 Current 
research being produced by a wide array of younger and established historians suggests 
that this situation is on the cusp of changing. For the time being the bulk of the literature 
addresses the history of conservation policy and practice, large-scale technological 
projects and disasters, and the cultural history of representations of nature.30 This 
dissertation advances each of these spheres of Russian environmental history. In two 
authoritative tomes, Douglas Weiner demonstrates the initial vibrancy and heroic 
persistence of scientists advocating for nature protection through the creation of a system 
of reserves throughout the country.31 Stephen Brain and Brian Bonhomme have recently 
                                                
27 McNeill, Something New Under the Sun. 
28 Philip Pryde, Conservation in the Soviet Union (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1972); Boris Komarov [Ze’ev Vol’fson], The Destruction of Nature in the Soviet Union (White Plains: M. 
E. Sharpe, 1980); Joan DeBardeleben, The Environment and Marxism-Leninism: The Soviet and East 
German Experience (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985); Philip Pryde, Environmental Management in the 
Soviet Union (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Murray Feshbach and Alfred Friendly, 
Ecocide in the USSR: Health and Nature Under Siege (New York: Basic Books, 1992); Oleg Yanitsky, 
Russian Environmentalism: Leading Figures, Facts, Opinions (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnyje Otnoshenija 
Publishing House, 1993); D. J. Peterson, Troubled Lands: The Legacy of Soviet Environmental Destruction 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1993); Ann-Mari Sätre Ǻhlander, Environmental Problems in the Shortage 
Economy: The Legacy of Soviet Environmental Policy (Brookfield: Edward Elgar Publishing Company, 
1994); Murray Feshbach, Ecological Disaster: Cleaning Up the Hidden Legacy of the Soviet Regime (New 
York: The Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1995); and Oleg Yanitsky, Russian Greens in a Risk Society: A 
Structural Analysis (Helsinki: Kikimora Publications, 2000). 
29 J. R. McNeill, "Observations on the Nature and Culture of Environmental History," History & 
Theory 42, no. 4 (December 2003): 30. For a volume that endeavors to introduce the field to a Russian 
audience, see Dannil Aleksandrov, Franz-Josef Brüggemeier, and Iuliia Laius, eds., Chelovek i priroda: 
ekologicheskaia istoriia (Saint Petersburg: Aleteiiia, 2008).   
30 Andy Bruno, “Russian Environmental History: Directions and Potentials,” Kritika: Explorations 
in Russian and Eurasian History 8, no. 3 (Summer 2007): 635-650. 
31 Douglas Weiner, Models of Nature: Ecology, Conservation, and Cultural Revolution in Soviet 
Russia (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988) and Douglas Weiner, A Little Corner of Freedom: 
Russian Nature Protection from Stalin to Gorbachev (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999). Also 
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nuanced our understanding of Soviet conservation with studies of state policy toward 
Russia’s forests.32 By taking a regional approach, I unravel some of the competing 
agendas of conservation scientists, economic managers, and local populations that related 
to the entirety of the Kola ecosystem. In numerous works on Soviet science and 
technology, Paul Josephson highlights the hubristic utopianism and unchecked gigantism 
that informed much of Soviet economic development, including the cavalier treatment of 
the natural world.33 I examine massive industrialization at the enterprise-level to advance 
our understanding of how authorities reached distinct decisions in response to specific 
environmental circumstances. Scholarship that has explored the representations of nature 
in the Soviet Union has tended to stress the prominence of the Promethean longings to 
master and control it.34 I complicate this consensus by pointing to distinctions within this 
framework of dominance, the ways that desires for harmony engendered less overtly 
antagonistic portrayals of nature, and the influence of the material world in shaping these 
environmental ideologies. 
History in an Ethnographic Vein 
This dissertation is not a work of ethnography. Though I spent seven months in 
the region and engaged in numerous discussions with people living there, the historical 
                                                                                                                                            
see Feliks Shtilmark, History of the Russian Zapovedniks, 1895-1995, trans. G. H. Harper (Edinburgh: 
Russian Nature Press, 2003). 
32 Stephen Brain, “Stalin’s Environmentalism,” Russian Review 69, no. 1 (January 2010): 93-118; 
Stephen Brain, “The Great Stalin Plan for the Transformation of Nature,” Environmental History 15, no. 4 
(October 2010): 670-700; and Brian Bonhomme, Forests, Peasants, and Revolutionaries: Forest 
Conservation and Organization in Soviet Russia, 1917-1929 (Boulder: East European Monographs, 2005). 
33 Paul R. Josephson, New Atlantis Revisited: The Siberian City of Science (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1997); Paul R. Josephson, Red Atom: Russia’s Nuclear Power Program from Stalin to 
Today (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000); Paul R. Josephson, Industrialized Nature: Brute 
Force Technology and the Transformation of the Natural World (Washington, DC: Island Press, 2002); and 
Paul R. Josephson, Resources under Regimes: Technology, Environment, and the State (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2004). 
34 Arja Rosenholm and Sari Autio-Sarasmo, eds., Understanding Russian Nature: 
Representations, Values and Concepts (Aleksanteri Papers 4/2005); John McCannon, “To Storm the 
Arctic: Soviet Polar Expeditions and Public Visions of Nature in the USSR, 1932-1939,” Ecumene 2, no. 1 
(January 1995): 15-31; Bernd Stevens Richter, “Nature Mastered by Man: Ideology and Water in the Soviet 
Union,” Environment and History 3, no. 1 (1997): 69-96; and Alla Bolotova, “Colonization of Nature in the 
Soviet Union: State Ideology, Public Discourse, and the Experience of Geologists,” Historical Social 
Research 29, no. 3 (2004): 104-123. For works that question this emphasis on the mastery of nature, see 
William Husband, “‘Correcting Nature’s Mistakes’: Transforming the Environment and Soviet Children’s 
Literature, 1928-1941,” Environmental History 11, no. 2 (April 2006): 300-18 and Mark Bassin, “The 
Greening of Utopia: Nature, Social Vision, and Landscape Art in Stalinist Russia,” in James Cracraft and 
Daniel Rowland, eds., Architectures of Russian Identity: 1500 to Present (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2003), 150-171. Also see Jane Costlow and Amy Nelson, eds., Other Animals: Beyond the Human in 
Russian Culture and History (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2010). 
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research I undertook was mostly limited to the written record in archives, libraries, and 
museums. Yet, in another sense my research is deeply ethnographic. Instead of being 
primarily a regional history or a case study of broad phenomena in a particular place, this 
work aspires to address general problems of Soviet environmental history through a fine-
grained analysis of the local. In doing so I follow a certain analytical logic not always 
present in historical scholarship.35 I eschew treating the specific history of the Kola 
Peninsula as directly representative of the entire Soviet Union, while interrogating local 
nuances in order to come to a richer understanding of issues present elsewhere in the 
country. I write in an ethnographic vein precisely by attempting to use deep analysis of 
the peripheral to complicate our picture of the general and offer insights that are often 
unattainable in a broad overview. 
To achieve this depth I investigate a range of economic activities on the Kola 
Peninsula throughout the twentieth century: railroad construction, mining and chemical 
production, reindeer herding, non-ferrous metallurgy, and the energy economy.36 For 
each of these branches of industry I examine enterprise-level documentation to assess 
specific questions about human-nature interaction during successive bouts of economic 
modernization. I supplement these materials with a wide array of newspapers, journals, 
popular and scientific literature, document collections, regional scholarship, and other 
relevant archival sources. With secondary source material providing the larger picture 
and contemporary scientific literature facilitating historical environmental assessments, 
this research allows me to describe and explain social and ecological conditions in 
specific places throughout the century. I organize this dissertation into five chapters that 
treat each of these economic spheres. 
The first chapter examines how distinct ideologies of the colonization and 
                                                
35 A fruitful discussion of the approach I am aspiring to here appears in the volume: Michael 
Burawoy et al., Global Ethnography: Forces, Connections, and Imaginations in a Postmodern 
World (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000). 
36 I do not cover the large fishing industry that has operated out of the port of Murmansk. My 
decision to focus on other economic activities comes from the fact that commercial fishing has involved 
less interaction with the environment of the Kola Peninsula than with the ocean. Furthermore, good 
research on the environmental history of the Murmansk fishing industry already exists. See Julia A. Lajus, 
“Razvitie rybokhoziaistvennykh issledovanii barentseva moria: vzaimootnosheniia nauki i promysla, 1898-
1934 gg.” (PhD diss., Rossiiskaia akademiia nauk: Institut istorii estestvoznaniia i tekhniki, 2004) and 
Alexei Yurchenko and Jens Petter Nielsen, eds., In the North My Nest is Made: Studies in the History of the 
Murman Colonization, 1860-1940 (Saint Petersburg: European University at Saint Petersburg Press, 2006). 
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conquest of nature informed a project to construct a railroad to the new city of Murmansk 
during the First World War. I argue that actual interaction with the natural world 
influenced these environmental ideologies and shaped a militaristic pattern of 
modernization that would be repeated in the Stalinist era. This analysis disaggregates the 
common existence of technocratic and statist ideas in late imperial Russia and the Soviet 
Union from the influence of wartime industrialization. The second chapter explores the 
environmental aspects of the Stalinist construction of socialist cities with the case of the 
phosphate-mining town of Khibinogorsk/Kirovsk. Examining everything from the 
planning and ideology around the project to the lived experience of forced migrants and 
pollution, I argue for the centrality of the environment in Stalinist industrialization. I 
further posit that the project should be understood as an unsuccessful attempt to create 
harmony between humans and the rest of nature instead of as an intentionally hostile 
assault on the environment. 
I then turn to the main agricultural animal in the region: reindeer. In this third 
chapter I discuss the way that diverse forms of knowledge about the natural world—one 
based on imposing legibility and another on practical experience—informed attempts to 
transform the reindeer economy by organizing it ethnically, promoting productivity, and 
protecting wild reindeer. The chapter furthermore highlights how the idea that reindeer 
herding was a tradition that needed to be modernized dominated until the 1970s and then 
the emphasis switched to promoting a discourse of traditionalism. The fourth chapter 
tackles the development of the mining and smelting of metals on the Kola Peninsula as a 
means of directly addressing the inglorious environmental record of communism. I pay 
particular attention to the history of the Severonikel´ and Pechenganikel´ combines, 
which generated pollution that destroyed large territories of vegetation in the region.  I 
discuss several alternative explanations for the high levels of damage caused by Soviet 
pollution such as inherent problems in communist economies, the influence of global 
capitalism, and the history of authoritarianism in Russia, but end up instead stressing the 
significance of the culturally driven process of modernization in bringing about 
environmental deterioration. Finally, I look at the energy economy in the region 
throughout the entire time period to explore further how modernization affected the 
human/nature relationship. Following several theorists who have worked on this problem, 
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I demonstrate that a dual process of dissociation and entanglement of humans and nature 
occurred throughout this period of economic transformation.  
These chapters build on each other to support my overall analysis of the 
environmental history of Soviet modernization. I begin by setting out some of the 
pervasive development strategies and ideologies pursued across the revolutionary divide. 
I then show how extreme versions of these approaches to the natural world became 
manifest in the Stalinist period. Shifting the focus to knowledge about a living animal, I 
demonstrate more thoroughly the participatory role of the natural world in a series of 
tsarist, communist, and capitalist ideas and techniques for modernizing it. The fourth 
chapter turns to the environmental influence of strategies and ideologies of modernization 
by assessing pollution in different political economies. Finally, I return to my theoretical 
discussion of modernization as possessing a transformative, but not transcendent, 
influence on the relationship between people and the environment.  
Burdens of Historiography 
Throughout these chapters, I will be making the persistent case for the relevance 
of environmental history to larger problems in the historiography of Russia. With this 
overt advocacy of a specific historical approach, I primarily aim to shed new light on a 
range of issues that already concern scholars of modern Russia. I also seek to challenge 
historians to take the natural world more seriously in their assessments of the past by 
demonstrating how environmental history can alter our understanding of well-researched 
problems. These interventions weave in and out of the dissertation—sometimes framing 
the main argument of a chapter and elsewhere resting just below the surface of the 
analysis. For this reason it is worth reviewing some of them here. 
Historians of late imperial Russia and the Soviet Union have recently returned to 
an older argument about the continuity between the two regimes. Departing from earlier 
political interpretations of persistent authoritarianism extending back to the sixteenth 
century and social history that stressed the effects of comparative under-development, 
these historians, and Peter Holquist in particular, point instead to the intrusive policies of 
the modern state and the ways that the experience of World War I radicalized the 
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techniques of governance used by all sides.37 My look at an industrial project during the 
war aligns with this emphasis on continuity and the influence of military activities, but 
the focus on nature use causes me to return to another earlier line of analysis that 
explicitly tied the war experience to Stalinism. Indeed, the militarization of the Kola 
Peninsula often overlapped with and affected its modernization. Global geopolitics also 
shaped strategies of military development throughout the twentieth century. 
This continuity argument in the historiography belongs to a broader school of 
research that aims to define the Soviet Union as part of the Enlightenment project of 
modernity. Scholars writing in this mode frequently evoke pan-European comparisons to 
demonstrate how the Soviet experience fit broadly within general trends of Western 
countries, albeit often extreme versions of them.38 Other historians such as Terry Martin 
have countered that to understand the unintended consequences of the policies of the 
modernizing state it is instead best to turn to neo-traditionalism: the argument that the 
pervasiveness of paternalistic and charismatic authority, informal political relationships, 
and primordialism in national identity constitute a divergence from the Weberian model 
of modernity.39 An environmental perspective explains unintended consequences less by 
the re-emergence of tradition than through the ways that the natural world prevented 
human control of it. The protracted debate about the treatment of non-Russian 
nationalities and the question of the Soviet Union’s status as an empire also relate to this 
issue.40 My explorations of the ethnic valances of human-animal relations and of 
                                                
37 Peter Holquist, Making War, Forging Revolution: Russia’s Continuum of Crisis, 1914-1921 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002) and Peter Holquist, “‘Information is the Alpha and 
Omega of Our Work’: Bolshevik Surveillance in its Pan-European Context,” The Journal of Modern 
History 69, no. 3 (September, 1997): 415-450. 
38 David Hoffmann and Yanni Kotsonis, eds., Russian Modernity: Politics, Knowledge, Practices 
(New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000); Stephen Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995); and David Hoffmann, Stalinist Values: The Cultural 
Norms of Soviet Modernity, 1917-1941 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003). 
39 Terry Martin, “Modernization of Neo-traditionalism? Ascribed Nationality and Soviet 
Primordialism,” in Sheila Fitzpatrick, ed., Stalinism: New Directions (London: Routledge, 2000), 348-367; 
Michael David-Fox, “Multiple Modernities vs. Neo-Traditionalism: On Recent Debates in Russian and 
Soviet History,” Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas 55, no. 4 (2006): 535-555; Mathew Lenoe, Closer 
to the Masses: Stalinist Culture, Social Revolution, and Soviet Newspapers (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2004); and Ken Jowitt, New World Disorder: The Leninist Extinction (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1992), 121-158. 
40 Yuri Slezkine, “The USSR as a Communal Apartment, or How a Socialist State Promoted 
Ethnic Particularism,” Slavic Review 53, no. 2 (Summer 1994): 414-452; Ronald Grigor Suny and Terry 
Martin, eds., A State of Nations: Empire and Nation-Making in the Age of Lenin and Stalin (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001); Terry Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in 
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colonization ideologies suggest that imperial strategies of classifying and ordering ethnic 
groups vitally contributed to the Soviet project, but that such policies also led to 
nationality promotion. 
I also intervene in the discussion about how to understand Stalinism. In particular, 
I expand beyond Stephen Kotkin’s approach to Stalinism as a distinct civilization with its 
own norms and culture rooted in an attempt to develop a non-capitalist version of 
Western modernity.41 I instead characterize Stalinism as an ecosystem. I insist that the 
multifarious environmental aspects of the efforts to build new industrial towns 
significantly shaped this distinct manifestation of authoritarian state-socialism. This view 
carries special importance for the various forms of forced labor in modern Russian 
history. The way that these coercive policies resulted in the increased vulnerability of 
forced laborers to natural hazards and the influence of harsh environments in 
exacerbating human misery belong at the center of our interpretations of the social 
history of the Gulag.  
Historical scholarship on the post-Stalin era so far remains less developed, though 
it is rapidly proliferating. This work contributes to several discussions emerging from the 
social scientific literature and other fields. It highlights how the secrecy surrounding 
technologies such as nuclear power served to mask the unacknowledged dependencies on 
nature in the industrialized Soviet Union. This illusion of control over nature fed into the 
Cold War militarization of the country. I also suggest that comparatively high levels of 
pollution in the Soviet Union were historically contingent outcomes of the performance 
of the centralized command economy in struggling circumstances, instead of indices of 
the system’s overall ineffectiveness or a simple lack of environmental concern.42 Finally, 
this study makes the case that the entrenchment of power among actors interested 
primarily in accruing economic value through the industrial use of nature during the 
collapse of the Soviet Union comprises an important continuity between late communism 
and neoliberalism. In doing so, it undermines interpretations that have stressed the role of 
                                                                                                                                            
the Soviet Union, 1923-1939 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001); and Francine Hirsch, Empire of 
Nations: Ethnographic Knowledge and the Making of the Soviet Union (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2005). 
41 Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain. 
42 For a recent argument about inherent deficiencies in the communist economy, see Fiona Hill 
and Clifford Gaddy, The Siberian Curse: How Communist Economic Planners Left Russia Out in the Cold 
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003). 
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civil society, including environmental activism, in bringing down the communist system 
in Russia.43  
                                                
43 Yanitsky, Russian Environmentalism and Jane Dawson, Eco-nationalism: Anti-Nuclear 
Activism and National Identity in Russia, Lithuania, and Ukraine (Durham: Duke University Press, 1996). 
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Chapter 1. The Railroad and Environmental Ideologies of Russian Development 
 
Reminiscing about his military experiences in northern Russia during the Allied 
Intervention in the 1918-1920 Russian Civil War, British Major-General Charles 
Maynard paused to recall his first trip on the recently constructed Murmansk railroad. He 
explicitly connected the social and environmental costs of the project, albeit in a 
somewhat facetious way. “Once more, however, the never-ending forest closes round 
you,” he wrote. “You… devote yourself to a calculation of how many million trees must 
have been felled to clear the way for the line, and how many men must have been 
employed on the work, if it was really completed within sixteen months. Personally I 
reached the sleepy conclusion that half Russia must have slaved at the job, and that each 
man, woman, and child must have felled at least one tree per minute.”1 This reverie, 
hyperbolic though it may be, reflected an insightful appraisal of the construction of the 
Murmansk railroad. It truly was a brutal experience for the under-provisioned prisoners 
of war and workers who built it, thousands of whom perished in the process. The project 
also hastily transformed the northern landscape, draining and filling in marshes, leveling 
hills, and deforesting large swaths of land. 
The Russian and Soviet states in the first half of the twentieth century used 
railroad construction as a modernizing, militarizing, and colonizing tool to gain control 
over naturally harsh sections of the country. In this chapter I concentrate on the 
construction of railroads on the Kola Peninsula: the promotion of a line to the Murman 
coast in late imperial Russia; the construction of the Murmansk railroad during World 
War I; the efforts to use the road as a conduit for economic development in the 1920s; 
and the expansion of the regional railroad system during the Stalinist era. As in many 
places in the world, the introduction of a railroad line to the Kola Peninsula was the first 
major endeavor in a larger process of industrial transformation.  
This chapter has two intertwined goals. It demonstrates certain commonalities in 
the character of development projects pursued during late tsarist state-capitalism and 
Soviet state-socialism. It also elaborates a distinction between the colonization and 
conquest of nature as modern environmental ideologies. I trace two political approaches 
                                                
1 Major-General C. Maynard, The Murmansk Venture (New York: Arno Press and the New York 
Times [1928] 1971), 42. 
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to northern railroad development. One relied on a combination of technocratic and statist 
methods to promote the economic transformation of the region and was particularly 
present in the final years of the tsarist regime and the 1920s. The other involved the use 
of militaristic means for industrialization and connects the era of wars and revolutions 
(1914-1921) to Stalinism. The imperialistic policies and prerogatives of the Russian 
Empire shaped the overall context in which these two development models emerged, but 
they differed sharply in the treatment of the natural world that they promoted. 
Technocratic statism inspired the colonization of nature and militaristic modernization 
aimed at its conquest.  
The colonization and conquest of nature are two related but divergent 
environmental ideologies of modernization. The colonization of nature is the acquisition 
and settlement of a natural environment formerly imagined as unused or improperly used 
by humans. The conquest of nature is the implementation of new technologies or 
economic activities on a natural system previously seen as potentially posing intractable 
limits on human behavior. Conquest relies on militaristic metaphors such as overcoming 
a natural enemy, whereas colonization invites emphasis on the environmental attractions 
of a place, of nature as a treasure chest. These two conceptions of nature did not 
contradict each other. Indeed, they were often part of a general modernist framework that 
promoted industrialization and approached the environment in strictly utilitarian terms. 
They were frequently articulated at the same time and by the same people. However, the 
idea of the colonization of nature found more expression in eras of exploration and overt 
advocacy of regional development. The notion of the conquest of nature, on the other 
hand, dominated in eras when actual industrial development, including railroad 
construction, occurred.  One significant aspect of these vacillations in visions of nature is 
that they were intimately entangled with the physical experience of transforming the 
recalcitrant environment of northern Russia. The materiality of the taiga and tundra 
during modernization influenced that ascent of environmentally antagonistic ideas.  
Forms of Russian Imperialism and the Role of Railroads 
Imperialism played a defining role in nineteenth- and early twentieth-century 
history. As recent scholarship on the Russian Empire has shown, the tsarist government 
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participated in colonial endeavors in at least two distinct ways.2 It incorporated new 
regions on the western and southern borderlands into the empire through the employment 
of violence, assimilation, and settlement policies.3 This form of imperialism mirrors the 
overseas activities of many Western countries. The tsarist government also promoted 
policies that it defined as self-colonization: the settlement of sparsely populated regions, 
which nominally had been part of the country for a long time.4 This form of imperialism 
also occurred within the western United States and northern Canada.5 Russian “self-
colonization” had more to do with the settlement of areas already seen as part of the 
country than the imposition of new administrative structures to rule existing populations. 
Furthermore, application of the term colonization (kolonizatsiia) for these contexts often 
carried a specific connotation of economic development of the region itself, a distinction 
from imperial models based predominately on resource extraction to serve the 
metropole.6 Both types of imperialistic endeavor involved government efforts to assert 
dominance over territories.  
This chapter examines the ecological logics of this second form of imperialism. 
State projects to develop and settle the Kola Peninsula began in the middle of the 
nineteenth century. Though the Russian government had claimed the territory since the 
sixteenth century, it remained disputed for centuries afterwards by neighboring countries, 
                                                
2 Three collections that represent the “new imperial history” in Russian historiography are Jane 
Burbank and David L. Ransel, eds., Imperial Russia: New Histories for the Empire (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1998); Jane Burbank, Mark von Hagen, and Anatolyi Remnev, eds., Russian Empire: 
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6 Willard Sunderland, “The Ministry of Asiatic Russia: The Colonial Office That Never Was But 
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Steppe (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004).  
 22 
which periodically invaded and collected tribute from its inhabitants. As a book later 
produced by the Russian government dramatically put it, “it was a sad sight: the Murman 
coast, politically part of the Russian state, was in actuality at the disposal of Norway.”7 
This situation resembled imperial rule in the Siberian borderland. As Andrei Znamenski 
argues for that location, pre-industrial imperial paternalism based on tribute-taking 
irrespective of religion and ethnicity defined the “ethic of empire” until the late 
nineteenth century. Only after this point did imperial policy turn to “modernization 
measures” such as resettlement.8 Attempts by the Russian government to use economic 
incentives and other benefits to entice settlers to the Kola Peninsula emerged in the 
1860s. These efforts achieved only modest results; the population of the region remained 
under ten thousand by the beginning of the twentieth century. 
The construction of railroads frequently functioned as a major tool for solidifying 
and strengthening state dominance during such projects of self-colonization.9 Railroads 
became a means of settling, economically developing, and asserting military control over 
sparsely populated peripheries in late imperial Russia. They also functioned as a key in 
efforts to overcome the supposed cultural backwardness of Russia. State officials like 
Minister of Finance Sergei Witte, for instance, believed that the introduction of railroads 
could play a distinct role in creating “cultural fermentation among the population,” 
including among the “savage people” of the empire. He further claimed that, “in Russia 
the influence of railroads should be even greater than in western European states” 
because the country had previously “lagged behind its western neighbors in cultural 
attitudes.”10 This mixture of concern about ‘cultural levels’ internally and externally 
reveals some of the tensions in the Russian government’s attempts to play the roles of 
imperial power and self-colonizer, but also highlights the believed utility of railroads. 
                                                
7 Murmanskaia zheleznaia doroga: Kratkii ocherk postroiki zheleznoi dorogi na Murman s 
opisaniem eia raiona (Petrograd, 1916), 101. 
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“Railway Imperialism in Canada, 1847-1865,” in Clarence B. Davis, Kenneth E. Wilburn Jr., and Ronald 
E. Robinson, eds., Railway Imperialism (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1991), 7-24 and Robert G. Angevine, 
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Brokgauz˝ Efron˝, 1912), 344-345. 
 23 
The imperative of peopling and modernizing large parts of Russia’s periphery inspired a 
major expansion of the country’s railroad network beginning in the 1890s.11 For instance, 
the construction of the Trans-Siberian railroad at the time served as an impetus for the 
migration of millions of people to Siberia.12 
Initial ideas to transform the Kola Peninsula by building a railroad line to the 
Murman coast also emerged near the end of the nineteenth century. Segments of the 
tsarist bureaucracy promoted the military and commercial significance of the 
establishment of a large port and railroad connection there. Although Tsar Nicholas II 
decided to abandon the proposal shortly after ascending to the throne in 1894, members 
of the educated public in the broader Arkhangel´sk province (guberniia) enthused about 
the possibilities that a railroad line offered for the Kola Peninsula for the next twenty 
years. After the Central Powers effectively closed Russia’s Baltic and Black Sea ports 
during World War I, state officials rashly pursued the construction of the line for strategic 
purposes. Within two years, hired and conscripted workers and tens of thousands of 
prisoners of war had built about one thousand kilometers of track connecting a new 
Arctic port city on the Kola Bay called Romanov-on-Murman (Murmansk after April 
1917) to Russia’s main railroad network. Thousands of these prisoners and workers lost 
their lives because of this construction. During the Russian Civil War, British and 
American forces occupied northwest Russia and made moderate efforts to improve the 
functioning of the poorly constructed railroad. After the Bolsheviks gained control over 
the Kola Peninsula in the early 1920s, state efforts turned to using the Murmansk railroad 
as a tool for regional development. Offers of incentives to settlers and the organization of 
a variety of economic opportunities in the region attracted only a slightly greater number 
of individuals than tsarist efforts in the second half of the nineteenth century had. Only in 
the 1930s, when the Soviet state returned to forced migrations for the purpose of 
industrializing the region, did the population of the Kola Peninsula rise dramatically. The 
establishment of new railroad lines in the Stalinist era advanced through militaristic 
means akin to earlier wartime practices. 
                                                
11 Inspiration for this phrase came from the collection, Breyfogle, Schrader, and Sunderland, eds., 
Peopling the Russian Periphery. 
12 Treadgold, The Great Siberian Migration, 32-34, 107-149 and Steven G. Marks, Road to 
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Technocratic Statism and the Colonization of Nature 
The history of railroads on the Kola Peninsula reveals deep environmental and 
social similarities in the ways that the autocratic state of the late imperial era and the 
socialist Soviet Union approached economic modernization. One common sphere was the 
emergence and sustained reliance on overbearing methods of state-sponsored 
development. What I am calling technocratic statism involved an effort of activists in the 
early twentieth century to promote and manage the country’s modernization. These 
activists primarily consisted of representatives of the state bureaucracy who had a vested 
interest in economic development, but also included regional boosters, scientists, and 
independent businesspeople. They promoted a version of modernization that was 
technocratic in that it took the employment of scientific expertise and new technologies 
as the primary drivers of development and was statist in that they sought to use the 
central government apparatus to guide and regulate the process. This Russian 
technocratic statism belonged to part of a broader trend of the twentieth-century world. 
As political theorist Timothy Mitchell has noted, “the politics of national development 
and economic growth was a politics of techno-science, which claimed to bring the 
expertise of modern engineering, technology, and social science to improve the defects of 
nature, to transform peasant agriculture, to repair the ills of society, and to fix the 
economy.”13 The global scale of this phenomenon should be kept in mind. Modern 
economic development often relied on such technocratic impulses, regardless of whether 
or not countries embraced market mechanisms and private property. 
It is important to make this distinction because of another theme in Russian 
historiography that advances a similar critique. A number of authors suggest that the 
hostility to private property among technocrats shaped Russian political culture across the 
revolutionary divide.14 In contrast to these historians, however, I do not treat the common 
                                                
13 Timothy Mitchell, Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity (Berkeley: University of 
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apprehensiveness about unregulated markets as somehow out of touch with a natural 
economic order. In some of this work the very fact and extent of state involvement in the 
economy is treated as a matter requiring significant explanation, as if the null hypothesis 
of a modern economic order is minimal government regulation of corporate behavior, 
trade, and prices.15 As economic sociology and anthropology have long established, even 
capitalistic markets are social institutions that almost always depend on state support.16 
Additionally, I am more interested in the ways that economic modernization—whether 
based on private or state initiative—was taken as an imperative and what this meant for 
human interaction with the natural environment. 
In late imperial Russia and the Soviet Union the colonization of sparsely 
populated realms of the country was high on the agenda for advocates of technocratic 
statism. These advocates included various representatives of educated society and the 
tsarist bureaucracy such as the Ministry of Finance, certain governorships, and the 
Resettlement Administration (under the Land Department of the Ministry of the Interior 
from 1896 to 1905, the Main Administration of Land Management and Agriculture from 
1905 to 1915, and the Ministry of Agriculture after 1915). Despite conflicts over the 
specific methods of colonization, these technocratic statists were united in promoting 
plans to rationally settle and develop new territories through government guidance and 
the application of scientific expertise.  
Historian Peter Holquist has recently examined the institutional culture of the 
Resettlement Administration. He argues that members of this body embraced a 
technocratic worldview that crossed the revolutionary divide. They subscribed to an 
ideology that “championed technocratic knowledge, advocated forms of scientized state 
intervention, and emphasized ‘productive’ labor over ‘speculation.’”17  Some of the most 
prominent officials in the Resettlement Administration such as Vladimir Voshchinin, 
                                                                                                                                            
2010): 151-179. Another interesting exploration of the concept of property in late imperial Russia is 
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15 Thomas C. Owen, Russian Corporate Capitalism from Peter the Great to Perestroika (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1995) and Marks, Road to Power. 
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Ivan Iamzin, and Genadii Chirkin went on to work for the Soviet government. 
Voshchinin and Chirkin became active in the Murmansk region specifically. These 
officials understood colonization as “a process of settlement and the use of productive 
forces of under-populated and economically underdeveloped territories by a significant 
mass of people emigrating from more densely populated regions.”18 That is, they saw 
colonization as a means of economic modernization through in-migration. 
The resettlement efforts of technocratic statists entailed a conviction in the 
colonization of nature. This colonization ideology regarded the natural world in a 
quintessentially utilitarian way: it emphasized the usefulness of nature. The focus in the 
discussion of environments shifted from the impediments they imposed to the 
opportunities they offered. In the process, nature became imagined as a set of resources 
that simply needed productive labor to release their value and allow for regional 
modernization. While this vision of the colonization of nature of the Kola Peninsula 
appealed to adherents of top-down planning and management, there also existed 
limitations on the extent of environmental transformation in it. The ideology of the 
colonization of nature included an implicit acceptance that a given natural system only 
possessed a discrete array of potential uses. Advocates of it sought to maximize these 
uses as a means of facilitating permanent settlement and economic development. The 
goal was the long-term transformation and improvement of certain regions. However, in 
the colonization vision, utilizing nature did not necessarily imply subsuming it 
completely. 
Murman Colonization before the Railroad 
From the beginning of official colonization efforts of the Murman coast in the 
1860s, individuals promoting regional development debated strategies of nature use and 
the desired national composition of settlers. The initial incentive structure sought to apply 
a model of development that had succeeded in the northern Norwegian region of 
Finmark, which was adjacent to the Kola Peninsula. Government officials such as 
Russian General Consul in Christiania (Oslo) Leo Mechelin and Arkhangel´sk Governor 
Nikolai Arandarenko stressed that the Kola Peninsula’s comparable environmental 
                                                
18 I. L. Iamzin and V. P. Voshchinin, Uchenie o kolonizatsii i pereseleniiakh (Moscow: 
Gosudarstvennoe isdatel´stvo, 1926), 4. 
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conditions meant that it could undergo a similar transformation. They also successfully 
advocated for the extension of colonization benefits to foreigners and not just the Russian 
Pomors, who already migrated seasonally to the Murman coast for summer fishing. These 
officials hoped that the Norwegian fishermen would exert a positive influence on the 
Pomors by helping them abandon their ‘backward’ fishing practices. This plan for 
permanent settlement of the Murman coast also included a proposal to develop a single 
concentrated port town in the Kola Bay.19 In these initial plans and policies we see certain 
features that would become essential elements of the technocratic statist approach to 
colonization: the interest in using foreign experiences as a model; an emphasis on the 
utility of science even before it had been applied; the intended role of the state in 
coordinating the settlement process; and a conception of northern nature as valuable. 
Other individuals involved in promoting Murman colonization disagreed sharply 
with parts of these government efforts and instead posited a more nationalistic and 
entrepreneurial model. Embodying what economic historian Thomas Owen has called 
“Slavophile capitalism,” pan-Slavist philosopher Nikolai Danilevskii elaborated a unique 
vision of Murman development.20 It depended on a minimal role of the state in building 
infrastructure to expand markets and charging protectionist tariffs, limitations on foreign 
settlement and economic activities in the region, and private investment of Russians 
concerned for their Pomor brethren. This more nationalist and less managerial proposal 
for colonization included distinct ideas about the proper economic activities for the 
region and forms of nature use. In particular, advocates of Slavophile capitalist 
colonization idealized rural and decentralized communities that engaged in ‘traditional’ 
livelihoods, oceanic fishing in the case of the Murman coast.21 Moscow businessman 
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Fedor Chizhov attempted to enable this form of development in the region by creating a 
company that offered steamship service between Arkhangel´sk and the Murman coast. 
Not expecting to make a profit, Chizhov was inspired by a desire to enliven the region 
and believed that a Russian-owned shipping company would provide an essential service 
to help strengthen Pomor industry.22 Nationalist concerns would continue to frame the 
debates about colonization and economic development of the Kola Peninsula until the 
Soviet era. Both sides of this dispute—technocratic statists and Slavophile capitalists—
nevertheless shared an appreciation for the economic opportunities that the Kola 
environment offered. 
State Attempts at Railroad Development 
In the final decade of the nineteenth century, ambitious projects to use railroads as 
a colonizing tool first received serious consideration in Russia. This more transformative 
vision of northern development found support at the highest levels of the tsarist 
bureaucracy. The initial settlement campaigns had only attracted a few thousand 
permanent residents to the Murman coast by this time and consensus emerged in certain 
government circles that more intensive state activity would be necessary to further 
development.23 As Steven Marks argues in the case of the Trans-Siberian line, railroad 
construction in this era represented a turn toward state intervention as a means of 
economic transformation and the colonization of sparsely populated regions.24 The 
Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Transportation supported extending this 
development strategy to the Kola Peninsula in the 1890s. Military concerns also became 
entwined with the economic modernization of the Kola Peninsula for the first time. 
Indeed, the primary source of state interest in the Murman coast came out of a search for 
a location for a new naval base. Such a port required natural and geographic specificities 
that would make it usable year-round and resistant to blockades. Minister of Finance, 
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Sergei Witte, and the Governor of the Arkhangel´sk province, Aleksandr Engel´gardt 
actively endorsed the Ekaterina harbor on the Murman coast as the ideal site for this new 
port. 
As part of the assessment of suitable options for the new port, the government 
arranged for several expeditions to the Kola Peninsula. This process of exploration 
played a significant role in shifting impressions of the territory from desolate, harsh, and 
inhospitable to rich, valuable, and enticing. The combination of travel, science, and 
economic surveying created a specific environmental experience for those on the 
expeditions, which reinforced a colonial mentality toward northern nature. They wanted 
to be impressed by the possibilities of the area and found natural features to emphasize in 
support of this point. A representative of the Ministry of Finance who traveled there in 
1894 declared, “the importance of Murman lies in its splendid natural harbors that sit on 
the open ocean and do not freeze all winter.”25 Witte left this voyage convinced that the 
Ekaterina harbor was “remarkable.” 26 Upon his return to the capital, he gave a report to 
Tsar Alexander III urging the construction of a naval and commercial port in the 
Ekaterina harbor and the establishment of a railroad line to connect it to the center.  
Travel experience also informed Engel´gardt’s more elaborate promotion of 
regional development and emphasis on the natural treasures of the Kola Peninsula. He 
justified the desirability of a railroad line to the Murman coast as a needed investment to 
integrate the entire complex of the area’s natural environment into the economy. During a 
trip in 1895, he surveyed the natural and human resources of the Kola Peninsula. The 
book he published upon his return espoused a full vision of colonizing Kola nature: 
resources such as fish, forests, and mineral ore could “not only develop and strengthen 
the welfare of the local population, but also benefit the entire state.”27 Reflecting the 
importance of exploration for this environmental ideology, Engel´gardt used his actual 
observations of the region to refute claims that the natural conditions there were too harsh 
for development: “While studying the issue of Murman, its climatic conditions, and the 
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colonization of the Murman coast, we have quite often read and heard that one cannot 
live on Murman, that colonization of it is impossible, that its harsh climate prevents a 
healthy existence, etc. The above data testify to precisely the opposite.”28 He concluded, 
“the time is already not far off when Murman will finally receive its proper commercial 
and political significance, which nature itself has specified.”29 
These late nineteenth-century development plans for the Kola Peninsula were 
unsuccessful. Shortly after he came to power, Tsar Nicholas II chose the option for the 
new port that was being advocated by the War Ministry and Naval Ministry: the Latvian 
city of Libau (Liepāja) on the Baltic Sea, which already possessed a railroad connection. 
Witte eventually convinced the new tsar to approve the construction of a railroad line 
from Saint Petersburg to Petrozavodsk, which stalled until just before World War I, and 
the creation of a new commercial port and city called Aleksandrovsk in the Ekaterina 
harbor in 1899.30 The inability of this new port town to function as a conduit for 
colonization was not only due to the fact that it lacked a railroad connection. What James 
Scott has outlined as a simplifying approach to natural environments in high-modernist 
state planning also played a role here.31 In their enthusiasm for colonizing nature, state 
officials overestimated the natural advantages of the Ekaterina harbor. The Gulf Stream 
current mollified the climate there like most locations on the Murman coast, preventing 
the waters from freezing in the winter for the most part. However, strong winds and the 
port’s distance from fishing grounds inhibited it from becoming a center for commercial 
fishing. The lands surrounding the harbor were almost exclusively steep rocky tundra 
without meadows or forests that could serve settlers’ livelihoods in other ways. Most 
remarkably, the water in the harbor at the time did occasionally freeze in the winter.32 
These impediments limited the growth of Aleksandrovsk for the next fifteen years and 
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resulted in a later decision to place the terminal station of the Murmansk railroad 
elsewhere. 
Technocratic Dreams in the North 
The technocratic statist ideas of northern development spread in the early 
twentieth century. Activists in the tsarist administration and regional society became 
more concerned with the issue and desirous of using their scientific skills and new 
technologies to facilitate modernization. Numerous explorations of the region occurred in 
the decades before World War I for the expressed purpose of gaining economically useful 
scientific knowledge.33 Members of the imperial Resettlement Administration also 
became more active in trying to direct the expansion of the railroad network toward the 
goal of colonization. Chirkin used the journal he co-edited, Problems of Colonization, 
and his position in the government to advance the idea that railroad lines needed to 
connect to locations of desired resettlement and not only existing economic centers.34 The 
tumultuousness of early twentieth-century politics in Russia—the Russo-Japanese war, 
the 1905 Revolution, the establishment of a limited constitutional monarchy, and the 
dramatic land reforms of Prime Minister Petr Stolypin—inhibited the advance of the 
plans for railroad lines to northwest Russia. However, these same transformations also 
inspired ambitious state thinking and by 1912 plans for a railroad line to the Murman 
coast were again being pursued.35 
Regional boosters of this era also articulated a heightened sense of the value of 
northern nature, referring to it frequently as diverse, inexhaustible, and a treasure chest.36 
Nature’s deficiencies resulted, many of them asserted, from an insufficient number of 
humans to use it economically. As the editors of a new journal and regional organization 
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centered in Arkhangel´sk put it: “The enlivening of the North can only stand on solid 
ground after a period of exploiting its resources.” They continued that “the colonization 
system should be focused directly on the exploitation of natural resources of the North” 
and not “one-sided goals.”37 Specifically addressing the Kola Peninsula, another article 
highlighted the need for colonization to enable total nature use: “the size of the current 
population of Murman does not correspond to its natural resources. A continual and 
significant influx of new forces and working hands is urgently required for the successful 
expansion” of their use.38 Many of these local advocates agreed with individuals in the 
Resettlement Administration that the construction of the delayed railroad line could solve 
these labor shortages.  “The rich forests along the railroad would be objects of industrial 
extraction,” wrote another journalist, “Life on the Murman and other coasts then would 
be turned toward vigorous labor and trading; mineral resources would not be left without 
exploitation.”39 Similar to Witte and Engel´gardt, these boosters believed that regional 
settlement depended on the colonization of nature. 
Even some nationalists who were hostile to foreign science and remained attached 
to a romanticized traditionalism supported plans for using a railroad to settle the Kola 
Peninsula.  Widespread ambivalence about the desirability of economic modernization 
existed among sections of state and society in late imperial Russia. Many of the critics of 
modernization came from an avowedly conservative stance. They often rejected 
technocratic solutions but not necessarily statist ones. Representatives of this mentality, 
who were concerned with issues of the north, criticized the activities of foreign trawling 
ships for depressing the economy of the Pomors, and they viewed the influence of foreign 
colonists on the Murman coast as tragic. They tended to reject calls for the adoption of 
new fishing technologies as a solution.40 However, they also praised northern nature as 
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rich and believed that proper railroad development could help Russify the territory.41 This 
consensus assured broad support among regional advocates during the wartime 
construction of the line. 
During the wars, revolutions, and construction of the Murmansk railroad, the 
ideas of technocratic statists were put into action.42 The Resettlement Administration 
turned its efforts to regulating the food supply during the wars; Chirkin, who now headed 
it, also became interested in long term plans for the colonization of northern Russia.43 
The actual militaristic modernization of the Kola Peninsula involved a shift to an 
environmental ideology that stressed the conquest of nature (which I will address later in 
the chapter). However, the desire to colonize nature abided and found expression as a 
future possibility. A propaganda publication commemorating the completion of the line 
in 1916 noted that “the introduction of a railroad here opens up the brightest 
possibilities,” including “for the development of productive forces.” “In terms of the 
colonization of the vast Murman region—the current population of which does not 
correspond to its enormous natural resources—the railroad is destined to have a 
prominent role.”44 Although this book took the construction of the line as a wartime 
necessity, it posited that the natural richness of the region justified the investment in the 
long run. 
The Railroad as a Colonizer 
After the Bolsheviks re-captured the Kola Peninsula in early 1920, fertile ground 
existed for the implementation of colonization schemes innovated in late imperial Russia. 
The devastated economy of the country and the largely destroyed condition of the 
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Murmansk railroad, however, impeded an immediate renewal of colonization efforts. In 
fact, several central government agencies in the early 1920s proposed closing the railroad 
for the time being and only restoring it to a functioning condition at some point in the 
future. The leaders of the new Karelian Labor Commune—Finnish communists hoping 
for an eventual re-unification of the newly independent Finland after the anticipated 
proletarian revolution there—supported renovating the railroad, but resisted the 
imposition of any development schemes that challenged their regional autonomy or de-
nationalized the population of Karelia.45 Officials in charge of the Murmansk railroad, 
members of the new State Colonization Institute, and the central People’s Commissariats 
of the Navy, the Military, and Transportation pushed through a plan to transform the 
railroad into a self-sustaining “industrial-colonization-transportation” combine. With 
support from Vladimir Lenin and Felix Dzerzhinskii, the Council of Labor and Defense 
(STO) passed a resolution officially re-organizing the Murmansk railroad in this direction 
on May 25, 1923 and allocating huge sections of land to its administration. Most of the 
241,000 square kilometers under the purview of the Murmansk railroad were located on 
the Kola Peninsula.46 
The technocrats from the tsarist era who proposed this development scheme 
believed that the transformation of nature would allow it to be self-financing. Supporters 
claimed that land allocation could substitute for state subsidies from the central 
government. Timber from the region would fuel the railroad, provide local building 
materials, and generate profits from exports. The fishing industry and the efforts to 
develop agriculture in the far north would feed the new settlers. What Chirkin called “a 
whole treasure chest of untouched nature” could help fund initial colonization; the 
economic activity of human settlers with this nature would then unleash “productive 
forces” and “enliven” the region.47 Chirkin extolled the role of the railroad here, 
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comparing it to the example of Canadian development, and its potential to benefit the 
country as a whole. “On the basis of ‘Canada-ization’,” he wrote, the “pioneering role of 
the Murmansk railroad brings about the urgent necessity of using the natural resources 
that lie in this region for the economic revival of the ruined Russian interior. Because of 
the barrenness of the region it is impossible to bring to life the industrial colonization of 
the territory without the assistance of the road.”48 This vision of making the entire 
territory industrially productive through the colonization of nature expanded throughout 
the 1920s, in no small part aided by the expeditions of tsarist-era geochemist Aleksandr 
Fersman that began to reveal the mineral wealth of the region.49 
To a notable degree this model for the Murmansk railroad shaped the strategy for 
exploiting natural resources locally through the end of the 1920s. The railroad 
administration managed subsidiary enterprises—Zhelles, Zhelryba, Zhelstroi, Zhelsilikat, 
and others—that organized timber collection and processing, fishing, construction, and 
brick-making respectively.50 Income from deforestation and investments from private and 
regional groups allowed for the quick restoration of the railroad line to working 
condition.51  Throughout the era of the New Economic Policy (1921-1928), the timber 
harvest of the railroad grew. Zhelles went from gathering 720,000 cubic meters of forest 
materials in 1924 to 1,460,000 cubic meters for the 1928-1929 accounting year, and 
felled a total of 5,857,000 cubic meters of forest in these years.52 Most of the higher 
quality forest material came from Karelia; Kola wood almost exclusively served as 
railroad fuel. The railroad administration also took over the Murmansk port in 1924 and 
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expanded commercial trawl fishing out of it.53 Zhelryba took in 16,483 tons of fish from 
1923 to 1929.54 Finally, with a large amount of territory on the Kola Peninsula under its 
control the Murmansk railroad looked for new ways to use the marshy and tundra lands.55 
In part this endeavor included examining the potential of expanding productive forces by 
creating a network of hydroelectric power stations, modernizing reindeer herding, and 
surveying mineral deposits.56 It also entailed work by the colonization department of the 
railroad on land reclamation, planting trees in certain areas, and preparing parcels into 
potential homesteads.57 
If the Murmansk railroad administration succeeded to a significant extent in 
colonizing nature in the 1920s, it had a much more spotty record with human 
colonization. It offered land and employment options to settlers, but had a hard time 
convincing people to come and to stay. In the first few years, only several hundred 
moved to homesteads near railroad stations on the Kola Peninsula and many of these 
settlers left after a short period of time. Great numbers of the colonists re-located to 
Karelia. But even here the new labor force was insufficient for the timber operations of 
the railroad, which continued to employ thousands of seasonal workers throughout the 
decade and began again relying on prisoners by the late 1920s.58 Embarrassed by the lack 
of progress of the colonization department, the head of the Murmansk railroad 
administration, A. M. Arnol´dov, defensively wrote in 1925: “Such resettlement does not 
have a dominant significance but a functional (sluzhebnoe) one; it is a means, not a goal, 
and it is only one of the elements of the colonization process. … The task of colonization 
work is the organization of an entire range of enterprises for the industrial use of the 
natural resources of the colonized region.”59 This rationale re-affirmed that the 
colonization of the Kola Peninsula for the technocrats in the railroad administration 
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meant above all the colonization of its nature. Reflections of an expanded desire to 
highlight the natural attractiveness of the place appeared in publications around this time, 
including articles that now stressed the potential of the Kola forest industry.60  
The overall economic development facilitated by the Murmansk railroad 
combined with its deliberate colonization efforts made more headway by the end of the 
decade. In 1929 Chirkin boasted that the Murmansk region had grown in population from 
14,500 to 23,000 since 1923.61 But these positive results in no way altered the transition 
in Soviet development models from ones based on colonization to ones emphasizing 
conquest. Throughout 1930, the Murmansk railroad relinquished its role in regional 
settlement and by September it lost its status as an “industrial-colonization-
transportation” combine.62 The word colonization (kolonizatsiia) itself, disputed but 
accepted in the 1920s, became increasingly marginalized in Soviet discourse with the 
rapid industrialization of the first five-year plan.63 Techniques of industrialization and 
regional settlement more closely resembling wartime modernization replaced tsarist-era 
technocrats’ efforts to colonize the Kola Peninsula. 
 
Commonalities in the articulation and implementation of technocratic ideas of 
using the railroad as a tool of colonization in the late imperial and early Soviet eras 
should not obscure the fact that alternatives to development practices were possible in 
both periods. Unlike some other scholars who emphasize the continuum of war and 
revolution, I do not believe that the existence of heavy-handed state development models 
curtailed any possibility of more humane and environmentally sound versions of 
socialism.64 Proponents of using Murmansk railroad to colonize the Kola Peninsula were 
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acutely aware of the history of forced labor in the construction of the line and wanted to 
attract settlers with incentives instead of coercion.65 They turned away from this 
hesitation in the latter part of the 1920s when their colonization ideology became 
overshadowed by other notions of regional development.66 Furthermore, the 
environmental costs of the colonization activities of the Murmansk railroad were dwarfed 
by the next phase of Soviet industrialization. The vision of the colonization of nature 
included limitations on nature use—a resistance to some activities seen as plundering and 
predatory—that desires of conquest did not. My point here is not to defend technocratic 
statism, but simply to distinguish it from a more nefarious form of development: 
militaristic modernization. 
Militaristic Modernization and the Conquest of Nature 
Russian wartime modernization in the far north was catastrophic. It involved the 
careless treatment of humans and nature, which created vulnerable conditions and led to 
the loss of many lives. The pattern of urgent and rushed industrialization undertaken with 
the building of the Murmansk railroad resembled essential characteristics of railroad 
construction in the Stalinist era. Impossible time schedules, chaotic planning, major 
constraints in acquiring adequate supplies and finances, the use of prison labor for 
construction, and shortsighted methods of nature use that undermine land health and 
subsequent economic growth all characterized a form of development that I call 
militaristic modernization. Despite distinct sets of political and ideological justifications, 
the militarized practices of railroad construction on the Kola Peninsula during World War 
I and from 1928 to 1953 comprised overarching connections between these two areas.67 
By emphasizing common approaches to economic development that emerged out of 
World War I, I complement, yet slightly diverge from, Holquist’s arguments about the 
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appearance of modern political practices in this era.68 The actual establishment of railroad 
lines, unlike political practices such as surveillance and colonization programs, became 
brutal more because of a martial approach to the natural world than the pursuit of 
technocratic impulses. 
The construction of the Murmansk railroad also reveals how geopolitics helped 
first intertwine the processes of modernization and militarization on the Kola Peninsula.69 
An international context of urgency, mass mobilization, and sweeping social and 
economic transformations shaped the actions of the warring powers in Europe at the time. 
The need for an accessible port that had not been closed by the activities of foreign navies 
impelled Russia to embark on this project of rapid industrialization. Additionally, the 
involvement of a plurality of governments and countries helped forge the heavy-handed 
practices of militaristic modernization. The United States, Britain, and France all 
participated in the construction of the Murmansk railroad from the beginning and later 
oversaw sections of the line during the Russian Civil War. Austro-Hungarian soldiers and 
Chinese workers helped actually build the road. The international context of the history 
of its construction suggests that militaristic industrialization practices extended beyond a 
particular political regime or ideology. As one of the worst wartime projects in terms of 
human suffering and mortality, the building of the Murmansk railroad puts some of these 
connections into sharper view.70 
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Militaristic modernization relied rhetorically on the language of conquering 
nature and materially on antagonistic and shortsighted environmental practices. The 
conquest of nature entailed viewing the environment as a set of obstacles to be overcome 
through industrial transformation. As such the natural environment was narrated with a 
set of militaristic metaphors, including portrayals of it as an enemy, incorporation of it 
into heroic tales of successful industrial action, and propagandistic posturing of it as an 
ally. The wartime context obviously influenced the ideology of conquering nature by 
positing the environment as another front. In contrast to the colonization of nature, the 
conquest of it focused on economic activities themselves—the means of modernization—
instead of the attractiveness of a new industrialized world—the end of modernity. Related 
to this distinction, conquest rhetoric tended to become more frequent in descriptions of 
actual transformation while colonization discourse imbued surveys of economic potential. 
Thus, beyond the wartime context, tangible interaction with the natural world influenced 
the articulation of modern environmental ideologies. A more radical way to put this idea 
is that the recalcitrance of environments to anthropogenic manipulation helped lead to 
more frequent evocations of the conquest of nature.  
A pre-war example of this phenomenon in the history of Kola railroad 
construction supports this point. During the opening of the port city of Aleksandrovsk in 
1899, the newspaper The Light (Svet) cheered: “Russia celebrated a big victory over the 
stepmother of geography. …The newest Russian victory over northern nature is called 
the new city of Aleksandrovsk in the Ekaterina harbor.”71 The celebration of a “victory” 
over nature incorporated it into a heroic conception of conquest. This rhetoric appeared 
only in response to an economic transformation of an environment seen as an obstacle. 
Therefore, not only did ideas of conquest influence environmental practice, but nature’s 
intractability also helped engender those very ideas.  
Wartime Urgency and the Beginning of Construction 
From the outset the construction of a railroad line to the Murman coast possessed 
strategic military significance. These concerns had been high on the agenda during 
Witte’s abortive effort in the 1890s and remained important as government officials and 
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private entrepreneurs renewed preliminary planning for a railroad connection several 
times in the decade before the outbreak of the First World War.72 In 1912 the regional 
government of the Olonets province cooperated with central state agencies to form a 
private company to build a connection from Saint Petersburg to Petrozavodsk. The 
Olonets railroad sought investments from Russian and foreign sources and began 
construction on the line by the summer of 1914.73 At the time, members of the 
government and the educated public floated various ideas for a further expansion to the 
north, including several options for a railroad to Murman and the possibility of by-
passing the Kola Peninsula and running the line through the Grand Duchy of Finland.74    
Strategic calculations changed dramatically with the commencement of the war. 
During the first few months of the conflict, the navies of the Central Powers effectively 
closed Russia’s Baltic and Black Sea ports, thereby cutting off the most accessible trade 
hubs for the Allies. These developments left Russia with the distant Pacific port of 
Vladivostok and one in Arkhangel´sk, which closed for five months in the winter.75 The 
urgent need for greater access to foreign supplies inspired the government to go forth 
with a plan to build a railroad line to the Murman coast rapidly.76 Accepting that 
Aleksandrovsk had been an inappropriate location for a major port, officials initially 
designated the town of Kola as the terminus of the railroad and then moved it north about 
eleven kilometers to the Semenov bight –the future site of Murmansk—where the bay 
water remained unfrozen in the winter.77 
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With the help of foreign supplies, capital, and laborers, over one thousand 
kilometers of railroad track connecting Petrozadovsk and the Semenov bight were laid 
during 1915 and 1916. Such a bout of break-neck industrialization exemplified a key 
element of militaristic modernization: hastiness in construction that results in chaos. To 
expedite the process, Russian officials arranged, through Ambassador George Buchanan, 
for British financiers and construction companies to build part of the line. The Pauling 
Company hired several hundred Canadian railroad workers to lay part of the line on the 
Kola Peninsula. The protests of these workers over the conditions that greeted them 
exacerbated the souring relationship between the Pauling Company and the 
administration of the Murmansk railroad. Foreign firms withdrew from the construction 
altogether in February 1916, leaving it to Russian management.78 However, the railroad 
administration continued as previously to rely heavily on imported equipment, including 
rails, locomotives, and wagons.79 
The single line track of the Murmansk railroad traversed north from Petrozadovsk 
along Lake Onega and then up to Soroka on the southern shore of the White Sea. The line 
then went through an extremely marshy area in northern Karelia up to Kandalaksha in the 
southeast corner of the Kola Peninsula. On the Kola Peninsula the railroad line followed 
a valley that paralleled Lake Imandra and eventually extended up to the Kola Bay.80 
Pomors had historically used this route for making the trek to summer fishing grounds, as 
did Sami coachmen for carrying mail, goods, and travelers through the region. These 
three segments of the railroad—Petrozavodsk to Soroka, Soroka to Kandalaksha, and 
Kandalaksha to Kola—were the main sections around which building activities were 
arranged. The actual construction of the line began in the spring of 1915 and was 
completed for the Petrozavodsk-Soroka and Kandalaksha-Kola segments a year later.81 In 
June 1916 the new port city of Romanov-on-Murman opened with a martial celebration.82 
With a massive influx of POW labor during that summer, construction of the final 
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section—the difficult Soroka-Kandalaksha segment—was finished by the end of the 
year.83  
Conquering Natural Obstacles 
During the construction of the Murmansk railroad the people involved in the 
project approached the natural environment belligerently and heedlessly. The martial 
character of the project contributed to these actions and ideas. However, the environment 
also resisted these modes of manipulation. Certain stable environmental features created 
difficulties for the project from the outset. On the Kola Peninsula, for instance, the long, 
dark, and snowy winter severely limited the times of the year that work could be done 
there. The abundance of marshes and rocky ground in the region as a whole forced 
considerable extra work: a total of 250 verst (a versta is roughly equivalent to a 
kilometer) went through marsh, including a continuous fifty-two versty section from 
Soroka to the town of Kem, requiring numerous bridges and curves in the track and the 
dredging of many swamps.84 The inability to grow many crops required a greater 
dependence on the imported food supply system than in agriculturally fertile regions.85 
Finally, the materials available for construction and fuel along the line were limited. 
Forests in the north became sparser and only usable for fuel and not as sleepers or for 
buildings.86 There was also a general lack of sandy land along parts of the line to use as 
ballast for the embankments.87  
Impediments also arose in response to destructive efforts to transform the 
landscape. Supporters of the project classified many of these difficulties as technical, but 
the complete anthropogenic control implied by this term was largely illusionary.88 Nature 
repeatedly “bit back” in ways unpredictable at the time.89 For instance, in many places 
builders used rocks and logs to lay the roadbed of the track through marshy areas. 
                                                
83 Nachtigal, Die Murmanbahn 1915 bis 1919, 71-75. 
84 Press, “Istoriia sooruzheniia Murmanskoi zheleznoi dorogi,” in Proizvoditel´nye sily raiona 
Murmanskoi zheleznoi dorogi, 20; Nachtigal, Die Murmanbahn 1915 bis 1919, 198; and Bentley Historical 
Library, Russia Route Zone A: Murman Railway and Kola Peninsula, Copy No. 706, (Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Office, 1918), 25. 
85 Murmanskaia zheleznaia doroga, 46-65. 
86 Murmanskaia zheleznaia doroga, 31 and Nachtigal, Die Murmanbahn 1915 bis 1919, 39. 
87 Khabarov, Magistral´, 18. 
88 Murmanskaia zheleznaia doroga, 43. 
89 I take this phrase and idea from Zsuzsa Gille, From the Cult of Waste to the Trash Heap of 
History: The Politics of Waste in Socialist and Postsocialist Hungary (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 2007). 
 44 
Elsewhere workers attempted to drill into frozen rock that splintered in the process.90 The 
roadbeds required approximately 15,000 cubic meters of land per versta and ended up 
using 10 million cubic meters of excavated earth, including over one million that had 
been blown up with dynamite.91 Nevertheless, these roadbeds often sank under the newly 
placed track. In locations near the White Sea at Soroka and the Kandalaksha Bay, the tide 
would outright flood the high embankments until engineers invented a means to let the 
water drain out.92 Additionally, shipments of supplies from abroad often had trouble 
reaching the worksites in part because the frozen White Sea closed the Arkhangel´sk port 
and because of the inaccessibility of northern areas of the line.93 Imported animals 
intended to assist in transportation and provisioning the labor forces suffered from the 
cold and malnourishment and died in large numbers in several instances.94  
Finally, de-forestation from felling huge areas for laying the track and acquiring 
fuel and by fires from industrial activity exacerbated the lack of energy resources in the 
region.95 The administration of the railroad desperately attempted to ration wood and 
arrange for fire prevention services.96 These measures achieved little in terms of 
increasing the pace of construction, limiting forest destruction, or preventing human 
suffering. By 1918 no dried wood usable for locomotive fuel remained in the region of 
the railroad and the trains relied entirely on imported coal from England.97 In a July 4, 
1916 report, British Major-General Alfred Knox grouped these various obstacles as 
“natural difficulties of construction” and correctly predicted that combined with a 
prioritization of the rapid completion of the project these difficulties would result in the 
line operating at less than half of its intended capacity.98 
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The experience with these material features that inhibited railroad construction 
played into a fully militarized expression of the conquest of nature. Typical mentions in 
the press in the immediate aftermath of the construction of the Murmansk railroad 
described it as “a struggle with harsh and primordial northern nature” and “an 
uninterrupted struggle with elemental obstacles.”99 Such militaristic language often was 
elaborated with explanations of the multiple ways that the environment challenged 
modernization work. For instance, the 1916 book published by the Russian government 
celebrating the line’s completion categorized the work on the Murmansk railroad: 
This is a grandiose war with elemental forces and economic obstacles. The 
elemental obstacles were the local conditions. The conditions of the worksite 
included a harsh climate, the continuous polar night for a month and a half, the 
short summer construction period, a negligible population, the absence of 
housing, the absence of transportation and a local means of transit, the distance 
and isolation of the road construction from the railroad network, and the lack of 
local medical help and hospitals because of the severe climate, etc.100 
Most of these spontaneous obstacles clearly related to the natural conditions of the 
region. Echoes of this theme of construction work as a war appeared in many places, 
including the standard letters of congratulations sent by Tsar Nicholas II to the 
administration of the Murmansk railroad after completion of different segments of the 
line and the entire road. The tsar made a point to mention “the technical difficulties and 
harsh local conditions” of the project.101 After the completion of the line the conquest of 
nature rhetoric could take a heroic tone, though the ongoing conflict seemed to mitigate 
such revelry. On the eve of the collapse of the monarchy in early 1917, a journalist 
referenced a litany of aggravating natural conditions—the darkness and cold in the winter 
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and the rapacious insects in the summer—before triumphantly praising the workers on 
the Murmansk railroad, “you defeated the harsh north.”102  
Militaristic Modernization and Brutal Work Conditions 
This treatment of the natural environment contributed significantly to the 
miserable experience of the thousands of individuals forced to build the Murmansk 
railroad. The efforts of the leadership of the railroad to recruit a workforce failed to 
produce sufficient workers; few people lived in the region and the demands of the 
Russian army severely diminished the potential labor pool.103 Data are elusive, but 
according to its Chief Engineer, Vladimir Goriachkovskii, in January 1917, the 
administration of the Murmansk Railroad employed approximately 32,000 Russian 
citizens, which included ethnic Russians, Pomors, Sami, Buryats, and Caucasians, and 
8,000 Chinese workers on the project.104 Many hired workers refused to renew their 
initial six and a half month contracts.105 Faced with these limitations, the Russian 
government decided to rely primarily on the punitive labor of prisoners of war with 
disastrous results. German historian Reinhard Nachtigal, who has extensively researched 
the Murmansk railroad, declares that it was “one of the worst horrors of captivity in 
Russia during World War I.”106 Peter Gatrell and Alon Rachamimov agree.107 According 
to the (likely inflated) estimates of Red Cross nurse Elsa Brändström, who lived with 
POWs in Russia during the war, 25,000 of 70,000 POWs sent to work on the Murmansk 
railroad died as a result. “Of the remaining 45,000 there were, in the autumn of 1916,” 
wrote Brändström, “32,000 sick of scurvy, tuberculosis, rheumatism, and diarrhea.”108 
This horrific outcome for the people subjected to the work conditions on the Murmansk 
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railroad, like the technical difficulties of the project, need to be understood in relation to 
the natural context.  
The weather conditions, the lack of food and shelter, and diseases aggravated the 
experience of the workers on the Murmansk railroad. All of these elements were 
environmental at a significant level: the frozen dark winter and constantly light summers 
with ravenous mosquitoes led to several tragedies and increased workers’ exhaustion; 
nutritional deficiencies related to foods that could not grow in the region caused 
avitaminosis; and crowded and unhygienic sanitary conditions allowed for viral and 
bacterial pathogens to thrive epidemically. Overall, the barren polar Kola Peninsula 
experienced some of the worst work conditions. The vulnerability of the labor force to 
these natural elements, however, obviously arose from deliberate decisions to build the 
railroad in this way and the militaristic character of the industrialization project. Political 
and social processes made POWs and hired workers vulnerable to natural hazards.109 
Political ecologist Piers Blaikie and several of his colleagues have elaborated a set of 
general vulnerability-creating processes for biological hazards related to human action: 
conditions of the micro-environment such as diet, shelter, sanitation, and the water 
supply; migration and especially forced displacements; and the degradation and limited 
capacities of a physical environment.110 All of these processes played a role in the 
construction of the Murmansk railroad. In this specific case political and economic 
activities comprised what we have been calling militaristic modernization: the pursuit of 
recklessly urgent industrialization at a moment of limited capacities to obtain necessary 
materials and supplies. The conquest of nature ideology supported this vulnerability-
creating process of militaristic modernization by justifying a struggle with the 
environment as part of the war. 
The POWs building the railroad line suffered from an array of harsh conditions 
and deprivations. In late 1915 the Governor of the Arkhangel´sk province, Sergei 
Bibikov, wrote to the Minister of Transportation, Aleksei Trepov, about the dire 
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conditions on the line and advocated for the government to arrange an evacuation through 
Finland.111 After an inspection in the summer of 1916, Bibikov filed an impassioned 
report surveying the desperate situation. “The majority of the barracks,” he wrote, “do not 
account for the hygienic conditions of the harsh northern climate.” Lacking walls, 
adequate floors, windows, and sufficient kitchens, they were “completely unfit for the 
winter.”  The dense marshes, where the barracks were located, also now kept them filthy: 
full of dirty water, waste, and insects.  Without adequate drinking water, bathing 
facilities, and medical help, diseases among the workers proliferated. Bibikov also 
highlighted the sanitary problems and cold that resulted from a lack of clothing and noted 
that the pitiful food provisions, which mostly consisted of rye flour, led to scurvy 
outbreaks.112  
By this time, scurvy and other diseases like typhus gripped the population of 
POWs and hired workers. While certainly a low priority for the tsarist state, government 
officials and railroad administrators tried to ameliorate the situation by arranging for 
shipments of foodstuffs believed to prevent and cure scurvy and for evacuations of the 
ill.113 The head of the Russian Sanitation and Evacuation Section, Prince Aleksandr 
Oldenburg, considered the conditions illegal and informed the administration of the 
railroad that it was responsible for the “sanitary well-being” of the POWs and hired 
workers.114 The wartime conditions also elicited a more callous response. Since the 
beginning of construction, the railroad administration set prices for wood, kerosene, and 
food and prioritized supplying hired laborers, especially Russian ones, over POWs. The 
outbreaks of diseases forced a revision in these policies, but it maintained heavy-handed 
restrictions on trade and acceptable provisions.115 Furthermore, the administration of the 
Murmansk railroad initially responded to the spread of diseases in March 1916 by 
attempting to reinforce labor discipline and restrictions on leaving the construction site to 
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seek medical help.116 Considerable numbers did flee; some preferred to take their chances 
with the eastern front instead of with the northern environment. Finally, during the first 
evacuations from the area in the summer of 1916, a large influx of laborers also arrived to 
complete the line.117 At this point the condition of the POWs grew into a diplomatic 
dispute and the Central Powers used threats and limited acts of reprisal to secure the 
evacuation of many POWs from the Murmansk railroad by the autumn of 1916.118  
A particularly illustrative episode of militaristic modernization occurred on the 
Kola Peninsula at a subsidiary project of the Murmansk railroad. Here we see how 
natural obstacles stymied construction and negatively affected human well-being. In 
March 1916, the Naval Ministry contracted the Murmansk railroad administration to 
build a military port at Iokanga on the eastern end of the Murman coast.119 A lack of 
adequate supplies and food greeted the workers sent to build the facility. The on-site 
engineer responsible for the Iokanga port wrote desperate telegrams outlining the 
conditions in the summer of 1916: the workers slept in wet clothes in the cold; they had 
no accessible wood to use for fuel; they were falling ill from parasites; and they lacked 
sufficient food.120 The engineer purchased reindeer hides and venison to attempt to 
ameliorate the situation.121 However, a strike broke out in the middle of October and the 
leaders of the project made arrangements to evacuate the port for the winter.122 When 
explaining the halt in construction, officials repeatedly referred to the “climatic 
conditions” of the winter, in particular the “frosts, fogs, and short days.”123 The efforts of 
the Provisional Government the next year to operate the construction of the Iokanga base 
more humanely failed to prevent a scurvy outbreak and the need to abandon the port 
during the winter.124 
The diplomatic conflict between the Central Powers and the Russian Empire over 
the POWs on the Murmansk railroad opened way for expression of different sides of the 
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conquest of nature ideology. In large part the tsarist government attempted to respond to 
the grievous conditions on the line out of fear of reprisals against their own POWs.125 In 
addition to their chaotic attempts to evacuate some of the sick, part of this effort included 
wartime propaganda to portray more benevolent construction practices that 
accommodated natural limitations. For instance, an official government publication 
discusses how the polar day posed a perilous threat to Muslim workers who were 
observing a summer Ramadan fast, when they could only eat after the sun set. In 
response personnel on the railroad had these individuals transferred to a section further 
south so they would have a brief window for eating.126 Whether or not it was true, 
evocation of this story aimed to emphasize rational and flexible human control over 
nature. The most positive theme of the conquest of nature that emerged in the aftermath 
of public knowledge about the POWs on the line was the representation of both the 
prisoners and nature as transformed allies.127 Leading up to a sympathetic account of an 
Austrian POW who now cursed the Germans for starting the war, one journalist also 
flipped the logic of northern nature as an enemy. “But here in the North the winter helps 
the summer and the summer helps the winter,” wrote the author, explaining that the 
summer allowed for access to materials for erecting embankments and bridges and the 
winter provided strong ground to reach less accessible sections.128  
The Murmansk Railroad as a War Zone 
Months after the announced completion of the Murmansk railroad, the tsarist 
regime ceased to exist. The socialist revolution of October 1917 followed the liberal one 
in February. The Civil War that came the next year turned the Kola Peninsula into part of 
the northern front of this conflict. The efforts of various powers—the Provisional 
Government, the Bolsheviks, the White Army, and British, American, and French 
forces—to exert authority over this area included repeated attempts to bring the line up to 
operating condition. The status of the Kola Peninsula as a war zone inhibited the 
replacement of temporary structures with permanent ones and made the line largely 
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nonfunctional by the end of the conflict. The wartime economic practices of these 
international and ideologically diverse actors shared certain common features: continued 
use of POW labor; hasty and chaotic approaches to immediate difficulties; a pattern of 
shortsighted and destructive nature use; and an antagonistic view toward the northern 
environment. These common practices among revolutionary Russian liberals and 
socialists, internal opponents of the Bolsheviks, and the ambivalent Allied Powers reveal 
the overarching impact of the military imperatives of this economic modernization over 
specific political ideologies. 
The decision of the Provisional Government to prolong the First World War 
influenced the continuation of practices on the Murmansk railroad that had been 
disavowed. Journalists writing exposés on the brutal construction of the railroad and 
government ministers now overseeing the line evoked the February Revolution as a 
transformative break with the disgraced tsarist regime.129 The new port city of Romanov-
on-Murman was renamed Murmansk in April 1917.130 However, throughout the year and 
into the era of Bolshevik rule, the government continued to employ large numbers of 
POWs to work on the Murmansk railroad. The deprivations these prisoners faced again 
led to scurvy outbreaks.131 The railroad administration attempted to manage the situation 
and keep the road operating by using familiar tactics such as regulating food prices, 
imposing sanitation rules, soliciting limited medical help, and trying to enforce discipline 
and surveillance over workers and prisoners.132 The intensified efforts to clean and 
disinfect the train wagons, stations, and material storehouses speak to the effects of the 
human pollution in making these places filthy and, in turn, keeping people vulnerable to 
bacterial diseases.133 The “difficult climatic conditions” once more convinced authorities 
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to abandon work on the Iokanga base for the winter.134 Rampant de-forestation persisted 
and again under-fed and unsheltered livestock perished.135 From the time the Bolsheviks 
gained control of the government in November 1917 to the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, 
which ended the country’s involvement in World War I in March 1918, they managed the 
railroad similarly.136 Some POWs remained on the Murmansk railroad through the spring 
of 1918.137 
The road then turned into a war zone during the Russian Civil War. British 
marines first landed in Murmansk with the initial acceptance of Bolshevik leaders 
immediately after the signing of the peace treaty of Brest-Litovsk. The Allied forces 
officially sought to protect large stores of munitions and the railroad line there from a 
potential Central Power invasion, but had tentative plans to confront the Bolsheviks if the 
conflict unraveled in particular ways. With the support of the Murmansk Regional Soviet, 
which disobeyed orders from the Bolsheviks in the center to terminate cooperation in the 
spring of 1918, large forces of foreign troops intervened the following summer. 
Increasingly ambivalent about being involved in the Civil War after the November 1918 
armistice ended World War I, the foreign interventionists, including specific American 
military companies focused on maintaining the Murmansk railroad, remained in the area 
until the fall of 1919. The Bolsheviks then captured the Kola Peninsula in February and 
March 1920 after the remaining anti-Bolshevik forces retreated.138 A prominent part of 
the military confrontation in the region during the Russian Civil War was the repeated 
bombings of railroad bridges by the Red Army and the repair of them by the Allies.139 
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All sides involved in the Russian Civil War treated the natural environment as a 
wartime obstacle and expressed elements of the conquest of nature ideology. 
Coordinating first with the socialist government under the renowned former 
revolutionary, Nikolai Chaikovskii, in Arkhangel´sk and then with the White leader in the 
north, General Evgenyi Miller, the Allied Powers effectively ruled the Kola Peninsula 
during the first years of the Civil War.140 They imposed their own food rationing system 
on Murmansk, not just for their troops but also as a means of gaining and maintaining the 
loyalty of the local population. Due to greater available provisions in these countries, the 
Allies succeeded in obtaining enough to feed the population in spite of delays and 
conflicts between the British and American governments about the issue.141 Delivery of 
food beyond Murmansk remained difficult because of natural factors. The frozen waters 
made Arkhangel´sk inaccessible and caused much alarm within the U.S. government, 
particularly about the women who had to deal with the harsh climate.142 The military 
sought to use the Murmansk railroad to bring supplies down to the White Sea coast, but 
the spring thaws flooded and destroyed much of the track and made it unreliable.143 Such 
impediments fostered deprecating discussion of the environment. One American soldier, 
who worked on repairing the Murmansk railroad and in general described the region as 
“bleak and dreary,” joked in a letter home: “The only excitement to-day was a train 
leaving for Murmanska. We call it the North Pole Limited or the Tri-weekly. It goes up 
one week and trys (sic) to get back the next.”144 At the same time the ideas of the Allies 
about the harsh Kola environment could reflect the “conquest of nature” in a way that 
emphasized the defensive security it provided. A pamphlet of the American War 
Department given to soldiers noted that the “topographical conditions of the Murman 
region are such that in the north an enemy would have little chance of seizing the 
railroad.”145  
The Bolshevik forces on the southern part of the Murmansk railroad faced more 
miserable conditions during the Civil War. Desperate to supply other areas of the country 
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with fuel but lacking skilled cadres of loggers and necessary equipment, the “Office of 
Forest and Peat Development” of the Murmansk railroad carelessly ravaged the Karelian 
forests in an attempt to meet immediate needs. Despite continued difficulties transporting 
the wood, felling went well beyond what had been intended.146 Agents at the railroad 
referred to the trees as “inexhaustible forest resources” and the People’s Commissariat of 
Transport re-defined “rational” forestry as using “heroic measures” to obtain the most 
wood possible.147 After capturing the Kola Peninsula in early 1920, officials now sought 
to use all wood available just to operate the trains and bring food provisions to the 
famine-stricken area. This wartime pillaging responded, of course, to military needs and 
produced a level of chaos that undermined the prerogatives of economic modernization in 
the immediate term and created vulnerability to famine and disease among the 
population. Complaining about the rationed norms days before the Civil War ended in the 
north, one engineer on the Murmansk railroad wrote: “This is a real famine emerging 
among the population and the railroad workers (more than 60% of their families live in 
horror).” He also predicted yet another scurvy outbreak.148  
In the midst of the conflict, the Reds and the Whites and their allies responded to 
difficult circumstances in comparable ways. They both treated captured prisoners 
brutally: the Bolsheviks renewed the use of POWs on the railroad and the White Guard 
sent individuals to a prison at Iokanga in the fall of 1919, where 100 people died.149 
While the Allies worried about spring thaws, the Bolsheviks encountered snowdrifts and 
avalanches in their attempt to keep their portion of the railroad operating.150 Here it is 
clear that the actual difficulties caused by snow during these desperate times inspired 
more aggressive descriptions of northern nature.  The appropriate response to the 
“distressing situation” created by the inability to manage snow was “to combat snow 
drifts.”151 Such economic actions and the responses to a recalcitrant environment expose 
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the common pattern of militaristic modernization practiced by the different governments 
involved in the construction and early operation of the Murmansk railroad.  
The Stalinist Embrace of Militaristic Modernization and the Conquest of Nature 
 The Soviet government in the 1930s embarked on one of the most rapid and 
disruptive episodes of industrialization ever undertaken.152 While officially justified as a 
step toward socialism, the practices of Stalinist industrialization closely resembled the 
militaristic modernization of the construction of the Murmansk railroad. Though the 
threat of war lingered over the 1930s, no immediate conflict accounted for the embrace of 
chaotic economic development masked by a veneer of state planning. The rationale of the 
Stalinist state for pursuing these modernization practices will be addressed in the 
following chapters.  
The resemblances between the impact of railroad construction in the far north on 
people and nature during World War I and the Russian Civil War and during Stalinist 
industrialization are striking. Determined to meet breakneck goals of rapid construction, 
projects went forward with inadequate supplies, provisions, and labor. In part as a means 
of overcoming a dearth of construction materials, industrialization relied on improvident 
and environmentally destructive uses of local natural resources, which made little 
economic sense outside of a context of wartime necessity. Continuing a tradition of using 
prisoner labor to build railroads that extended at least back to the Trans-Siberian railroad 
of the early twentieth century and became entrenched during World War I, almost every 
new railroad branch on the Kola Peninsula until the death of Stalin in 1953 relied on 
some form of coerced labor: Gulag prisoners, forced peasant migrants known as special 
settlers, and POWs.153 The decisions to rely on marginalized and coerced labor in the 
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pursuit of hasty modernization led to the acute vulnerability of these under-provisioned 
and barely sheltered workers to natural elements. 
The era of Stalinist industrialization also saw a renewal of the aggressive 
articulation of the conquest of nature ideology. Expressions such as the “struggle with 
nature” and “the conquest of nature,” which attempted to narrate industrial activity as a 
military campaign, pervaded popular sources in the 1930s.154 One Soviet propagandist 
echoed the forceful descriptions of the tsarist government during the construction of the 
Murmansk railroad when he wrote about socialist industrialization in the Khibiny 
Mountains: “the railroad and the automobile, electricity and radio, scientific thought, and 
Bolshevik perseverance regenerated this ‘land of fearless birds.’”155 Fersman depicted 
these early road construction efforts in the Khibiny Mountains in similar language.156  
The initial return to militaristic modernization occurred with the establishment of 
an enterprise, the Apatit trust, focused on the mining and processing of the phosphorous-
rich material apatite for chemical fertilizers and the accompanying socialist city of 
Khibinogorsk (later Kirovsk). Upon the final decision to begin the project in September 
1929, Soviet planners ordered the construction of a railroad branch connecting the 
mainline of the Murmansk railroad to the new worksite in the Khibiny Mountains. At the 
outset, they scheduled the new branch for completion by August 1930 and specified that 
the labor could come from inmates of the Solovki prison camp.157 By the end of 1930 
about 2,000 prisoners worked on the railroad as the harsh winter approached and the 
project, like most of the construction in the Khibiny Mountains in these years, languished 
behind schedule.158 Similar diseases broke out among the workers as during the 
construction of the Murmansk railroad—typhus, tuberculosis, and scurvy—because of 
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the unhygienic environment and natural deprivations.159 Furthermore, when 
approximately five thousand Gulag prisoners—a number of whom built a road to Ena—
arrived at the site of the future mining city of Kovdor, they quickly chopped down all the 
trees in the area to set up camp and shelter.160 Throughout the early 1930s, the Murmansk 
railroad itself also remained tangentially dependent on a different group of forced 
laborers for its most significant upgrade of the era. Forced peasant migrants, who had 
been subject to de-kulakization (“special settlers” in Soviet terminology) and faced 
conditions comparable to the Solovki prisoners, built the Niva Hydroelectric Station that 
enabled electrification of the sections of the railroad.161 
The construction of an extension line from the Murmansk railroad to an emerging 
center for nickel mining and smelting, Monchegorsk, also reveals how this development 
model and the ideology of conquering nature affected Stalinist industrialization. In 
August 1935, the newly established Severonikel´ combine contracted with the fourteenth 
department of the White Sea-Baltic Combine (BBK), a Gulag organ, to build a line from 
the new nickel works to the Olen´ia railroad station north of Lake Imandra.162 Economic 
planners initially hoped to have the line operational by November 1935, but work 
dragged on into the summer of 1936. The prison camp leaders declared the project 
finished in April 1936, but the road was still unusable and workers from the Severonikel´ 
combine needed to repair it over the next several months.163 The several thousand 
prisoners who labored on the railroad during 1935-1936 faced horrendously insufficient 
supplies of equipment, food, and housing. The administration of the fourteenth 
department of the BBK primarily provided military tents as housing, which required 
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prisoners to sit and lie directly on the snow. One prisoner bitterly described these 
accommodations: “it was as filthy in them as a barnyard and often there was no hot 
water.”164 Food rations for them were unreliably shipped to the camps from Kola. The 
cold, filth, and lack of nutrition took its toll as apparently almost a tenth of the prisoners 
working on the railroad line perished.165  
Interaction with the surrounding environment during the founding of this railroad 
mirrored wartime construction as well. Workers quickly chopped down any trees nearby 
to clear space for the track, supply firewood, and use as sleepers for the road. They also 
gathered sand along the road to erect embankments for the roadbed.166 This nature use 
hastily transformed the environment, but failed to adequately construct the road. The lack 
of material used for the roadbed and insufficient number of sleepers resulted in such 
sloppy construction that the spring thaws quickly destroyed the railroad.167 The irate head 
of Severonikel´, Vasilii Kondrikov, described how nature retaliated in this instance: “The 
situation with the railroad branch is very distressing: the snow came off and clearly 
revealed the disgraceful work of the fourteenth department on the line. In essence there is 
no branch since along almost the entire length it proceeds at ground level and through 
swamps.”168 Approached as an object of urgent conquest, the natural world demonstrated 
its resistance to manipulation when haphazardly treated. 
Finally, the militarization of the regional economy in the years approaching 
World War II and the rebuilding of it after wartime devastation continued this pattern. 
The application of Gulag labor for assorted railroad repair and construction projects 
increased with the outbreak of the Winter War between Finland and the Soviet Union in 
late 1939 and remained the norm in the 1940s and early 1950s.169 Additionally, prisoners 
of war during and after World War II helped with a variety of construction projects, 
including work on railroads and the redevelopment of the Pechenga region.170 Efforts to 
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lay down a railroad line to link the nickel deposits of the Pechenga territory to the 
mainline of the Murmansk railroad commenced in the early 1950s, but yet again the 
natural conditions of the region—the rocky and swampy landscape and seasonal 
fluctuations in weather, which undid previous work—caused significant delays. In this 
case the lines connecting the Pechenga region to Kola only opened at the end of 1960.171 
The end of the Stalinist era, nevertheless, brought reprieve from this arduous 
modernization strategy that had been innovated during World War I and revamped in the 
1930s. 
 
Modernization based on conquering natural environments and transforming them 
with militaristic practices led to atrocious results for humans and nature in projects 
ostensibly aimed in part at development and improvement. In partial contrast to 
colonization efforts, militaristic modernization entailed a vicious cycle of reckless nature 
use, environmental impediments thwarting human economic activity, and the increased 
articulation of antagonistic environmental ideologies. The conquest of nature as an idea 
predated the First World War, but as inspiration for militaristic modernization it grew out 
of the context of total war. Numerous sides participated in the creation of these policies 
during the war, but the Soviet Union under Stalin adapted them to peacetime 
modernization. However, it was militarism, and not technocratic statism exacerbated 
during wartime, that exerted a deeper influence on the environmental and economic 
practices of Stalinism. 
Conclusion 
Commonalities in economic development strategies and practices united late 
imperial Russia and the Soviet Union, as seen in the case of railroads on the Kola 
Peninsula. These similarities did not emerge out of deep-seated authoritarian politics or 
out of inherent inclinations of socialism, but instead out of a combined conviction in the 
necessity of rendering the economy modern and in military prerogatives. Imperialistic 
urges for colonization and development fed into hasty industrialization justified by war or 
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the fear of war. However, disaggregating technocratic statism and militaristic 
modernization helps explain the varied outcomes shared by the early twentieth century 
and the 1920s and common to the World War I era and Stalinism. 
A focus on the environmental ideologies that accompanied these modernization 
projects demonstrates diversity within utilitarian approaches to nature that took the 
natural environment purely as an economic asset. It also shows how the environment did 
not simply play a passive role in human culture; the physical difficulties it posed 
intensified the hostility towards nature present in modernist ideas. The results of pursuing 
the conquest of nature were clearly worse for people and the environment in the short 
term, but, as we will see, the totalistic view of natural resources in the colonization of 
nature ideology may have had a more profound effect on the economic use of the 
environment in the long run. 
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Chapter 2. Stalinism as an Ecosystem 
 
The Stalinist construction of socialist cities organized the relationship between 
human beings and the natural environment in specific ways. As part of the project of 
building socialism in one country and as a key feature of the social, political, and 
economic system known as “Stalinism,” industrial towns have served as sites of micro-
historical analysis for scholars interested in examining the social history of the Soviet 
Union. Beyond excavating socialist cities for insights into how the Stalinist system 
functioned as a civilization, this chapter examines the multifarious relations among 
people and other elements of nature during the forced modernization of the 1930s. I insist 
that the Stalinist system possessed a deep and intricate relationship with the environment. 
I also argue that Stalinism was an extreme method of creating a modern economic 
relationship with the environment that simultaneously strove for a new level of 
ascendance of humans over nature and for socialist harmony among humans and their 
environment. 
In the previous chapter we saw that the Russian Empire was already apt to use 
coerced labor and exploit natural resources carelessly in order to complete pressing 
industrial projects in peripheral places. An environmental ideology that stressed the 
conquest of nature accompanied both the wartime construction of the Murmansk railroad 
and the building of railroad branches in the 1930s and 1940s. Beyond the commonalities, 
what, then, distinguished this Stalinist variant of militaristic modernization? As many 
scholars have noted, this important period in Soviet history combined a renewed 
revolutionary zeal, chaotic attempts at centralized planning, and coercive solutions to 
supplying labor for industrialization. 1 The infusion of revolutionary enthusiasm into 
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militaristic economic practices led to an approach to the environment that eclipsed 
technocratic statism and militaristic modernization. Instead of just colonizing and 
conquering nature, the Stalinist state also aspired to transform environments to fit a vision 
of holistic socialism. Accordingly, Stalinism cannot be characterized by pure hostility 
toward nature. State planners grappled with trying to make the natural world more 
economically useful and suitable for human settlement, while also hoping to prevent 
excessive destruction of nature. Nevertheless, this militant attempt to turn inhospitable 
natural environments into realms where humans and nature can abide in harmony 
precipitated new social and environmental tragedies. 
This examination of the creation of an enterprise to mine and process apatite-
nepheline ore and the accompanying socialist city of Khibinogorsk (Kirovsk after 
December 1934) on the Kola Peninsula endeavors to treat Stalinism as an ecosystem 
instead of just as a civilization. The civilization approach to understanding the Stalinist 
Soviet Union began to be elaborated in the 1990s by historians who benefited from 
greater access to the primary sources of social history. Stephen Kotkin’s study of the 
socialist city of Magnitogorsk argues against interpretations that claimed that Stalinism 
was simply a form of despotism or the result of counter-revolution. Instead, he defines it 
as “a specifically socialist civilization based on the rejection of capitalism.”2 In order to 
understand the system’s social history, Kotkin positions the Soviet project as a radical 
new embodiment of the European Enlightenment and insists on the relevance of 
Foucauldian power dynamics. His concentration on the minutiae of daily life and use of 
micro-history unite his approach with other historians of Stalinism, who sometimes 
diverge on interpretative issues but share Kotkin’s concern with understanding Stalinism 
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as a specific type of society.3 For the most part, this scholarship either eschews 
environmental issues or treats them as evidentiary support for social, political, or cultural 
analysis instead of as a primary realm of investigation. 
I use the concept of an ecosystem to capture the web of interaction among the 
actors: people, other living organisms, climate, geological processes, and inanimate 
matter. Though this borrowed term from ecology might seem imprecise in this work of 
environmental history, it serves my analysis here in two important ways. First, it shifts 
the discussion toward the totality of a natural system in a given area, pointing to issues 
beyond pollution, environmental management, and conservation efforts in the history of 
this enterprise and city. I will highlight human health and habitat, population dynamics, 
seasonal variation in climate, the properties of mined material, and local flora and fauna 
as inherently environmental features of this history. This inclusive focus encompasses all 
aspects of a “civilization” approach and adds unaddressed factors especially pertinent for 
understanding the creation of a new industrial world. The term ecosystem also allows me 
to stress the potency of nature as a set of actors without digressing into debates about 
nature’s agency.4 Instead, I assume that in a natural system all beings and forces act on, 
influence, and modify each other.  
This discussion of the political ecology of Stalinism focuses on the era of the first 
and second five-year plans (1928-1937). I trace the emergence of a Stalinist form of 
modernization in the Khibiny project and analyze the place of the environment in urban 
and industrial planning and in the culture of socialist construction. I also probe how the 
natural world shaped the social experience of participants in this industrial project. The 
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later sections of the chapter address the strategies of enterprise planners to confront 
environmental impediments and curb pollution. Finally, I show how these Stalinist efforts 
to create environmental harmony often failed to come to fruition. 
The Discovery of Apatite 
Geological processes created the Khibiny Mountains and supplied them with the 
phosphorous-rich material apatite, but humans sought to convert this rock formation into 
a source for realizing economic modernity. This process began with the scientific 
exploration of the area that eventually led to the opening up of large veins of apatite-
nepheline ore in several of the mountains of the massif. This form of learning about the 
natural world and promoting the potential wealth of resources fit squarely within the 
colonization approach to the environment that had been innovated by late imperial 
technocrats. The activities of geologists in the 1920s also later functioned as foundation 
myths of the heroic feats of regional pioneers.  
Foreign scientists began exploring the Khibiny Mountains in the nineteenth 
century, but focused more on geological questions than the potential uses of minerals like 
apatite. Apatite is a form of calcium phosphate (Ca5(PO4)3) with an extra ion of fluorine, 
hydroxyl (OH), or chlorine. Along with other types of mineral ore and bat guano, apatite 
could be processed into a material called superphosphate and used as a chemical 
fertilizer. Until the proliferation of nitrogen-fixating technologies after World War II, 
superphosphate was the dominant product of the chemical fertilizer industry worldwide.5 
In the late nineteenth century researchers from abroad proposed a rough date for the 
origin of the Khibiny Mountains and described the crystallization process of the 
pervasive nepheline-syenite rock. After these initial endeavors, geological research on the 
Khibiny halted in the first couple of decades of the twentieth century.6 
After the Bolshevik victory over White Army forces and their foreign allies in 
northwest Russia in the first months of 1920, scientists with a longstanding interest in 
putting their sophisticated knowledge to practical economic use for the state renewed 
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geological surveying on the Kola Peninsula. In May of that year the Petrograd Soviet 
Executive Committee formed a commission of the Academy of Sciences to inspect the 
postwar condition of the Murmansk railroad. During a brief trip with the commission up 
to the Kola Peninsula, Aleksandr Fersman became excited at the presence of unknown 
minerals in the Khibiny Mountains. Soon after returning he arranged a full geological 
expedition of the massif.7 This surveying of the Khibiny region in the fall of 1920 
commenced a period of intensive study of the range's mineral resources and would 
eventually lay the groundwork for the industrialization of the Kola Peninsula.   
Fersman was a moderately progressive intellectual from the liberal tradition of 
imperial Russia. His academic advisor, collaborator in geochemical research and public 
service, and lifelong interlocutor, Vladimir Vernadskii had helped form the Constitutional 
Democrat Party (Kadets) during the 1905 Revolution and remained an active member 
through the November 1917 Bolshevik takeover.8 Despite their occasionally fierce 
opposition to the autocracy of tsarist Russia and the socialism of the Soviet era and their 
preference for capitalist democracy, scientists with such liberal proclivities tended to be 
technocratic statists. They supported modernization guided by a beneficent government 
and believed in their personal obligation to use their expertise to assist national interests. 
Accordingly, starting in 1915 Fersman helped organize expeditions to locate militarily 
strategic mineral deposits during the First World War. He continued his willingness to 
find practical applications for his mineralogical knowledge, especially when it could help 
fund fieldwork, almost without interruption into the Soviet era.  
During the early 1920s, the Fersman expeditions discovered large sections of 
green apatite ore on Mount Kukisvumchorr and Mount Iuksporr of the Khibiny 
Mountains. The quantity of the material remained a mystery, but its potential utility as a 
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source for phosphoric acid was immediately apparent to the researchers.9 Soon afterward 
a new stage of research began that was more focused on assessing the capacity of these 
apatite deposits. The results of this surveying rapidly increased the estimates of the 
apatite reserves in the Khibiny and opened new deposits.10 After an expedition in 1928, 
the agencies involved in the project unanimously agreed about the industrial significance 
of the apatite deposits.11 Simultaneously, experiments with apatite samples from the 
Khibiny established the ability to enrich the ore to above a 36% concentration of 
phosphorous pentoxide (P2O5), the active substance in superphosphate fertilizers.12 
The reflections of geological surveyors in the Khibiny Mountains at the time 
contributed to what would become a local cult of scientific explorers in later periods. 
Boris Kupletskii characterized the region during a 1922 trip with the following stanza: 
“The landscape is dejected. Severe nature / Only provided the north with dull tones: / 
Scorched forest, a boulder, sad marshes, / Melancholic rain and a dim moon.” 13 Another 
researcher, A. N. Labunstov, evoked the natural calamities of the area when describing 
how his team overcame “Khibiny weather” in August 1925 by huddling in their cold tent 
during a frigid summer downpour.14 In addition to highlighting the struggle of these 
scientists with hardship, he also publicly insisted that “Khibiny apatite” and other 
minerals of the range would serve “as a new factor in the colonization and revival of the 
Murmansk Region.”15  
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The Creation of a Stalinist Enterprise 
The turn from studying the Khibiny to mining and processing phosphates for 
fertilizer there occurred as part of the Soviet Union’s massive campaign to create a 
modern economy and propel the country closer to socialism and communism. In 1928-
1929 a political-economic system called Stalinism emerged in the Soviet Union. Billed as 
the “great break,” the Stalinist revolution ushered in the first five-year plan and the 
collectivization of agriculture. Initial plans for the industrial and urban development of 
the Khibiny region were modest, but expanded, in Fersman’s words, to “an 
unprecedented scale for work undertaken in a polar realm.”16 The evolution of Soviet 
designs for the area involved decisions to build an entire socialist city in the region, a 
willingness to use forced laborers, bureaucratic disputes connected to national politics, 
and an expansive vision of natural resource use.  
Several of the economic and regional factors surrounding the advent of Stalinism 
carried special relevance for the creation of a chemical industry in the Murmansk region. 
The New Economic Policy of the 1920s in many ways helped the country’s economy 
recover, but agricultural production remained depressed. The lack of grain surpluses 
hindered the growth of foreign trade and the ability of the state to fund industrial 
development.17 This situation influenced the decision to mine Khibiny apatite by creating 
strong incentives to reduce imports (the Soviet Union had been importing superphosphate 
from Morocco) and increase fertilizer consumption as a means of improving agricultural 
yields.18 In terms of spatial organization, the Khibiny region enjoyed several features that 
appealed to industrial planners, despite its location in the sparsely populated polar tundra. 
Above all, its proximity to a functioning railroad line that connected it to Leningrad and 
the Murmansk port rendered it a cheaper source of phosphorous material than other 
deposits. The administrative organization of the territory also made it an ideal place to 
treat as an extraction colony. After the Civil War the Kola Peninsula became its own 
independent regional unit, the Murmansk province (guberniia), but in 1927 it was 
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downgraded to a county (okrug) of the Leningrad region (oblast´).19 Under this 
jurisdiction, the Khibiny Mountains could be subjected to the plans of one of the most 
powerful regional administrations in the country. 
Government and scientific planning organs in 1928 and 1929 initially envisioned 
using the Khibiny exclusively for mining and extracting apatite-nepheline ore with 
minimal construction of accompanying settlements. With this option on the horizon more 
geological expeditions raised the confirmed apatite reserves to 90 million tons and 
research agencies—the Scientific Institute for Fertilizer (NIU) and the Institute of 
Mechanical Processing of Mineral Resources (Mekhanobr)—devised methods for 
producing superphosphate from Khibiny apatite.20 In December 1928, the Supreme 
Council of the National Economy (VSNKh) outlined a possible first five-year plan for the 
chemical industry in the Leningrad Region.  This document highlighted the expediency 
of building the superphosphate factory in Leningrad and not “directly at the Khibiny 
deposits of apatite.”21 Planners also proposed research on the potential to use the small 
White River for hydroelectric energy and on the best path for connecting the deposits to 
the mainline of the railroad. They presumably believed that labor would be supplied by a 
combination of invigorated colonization efforts of the Murmansk Railroad and continued 
seasonal hires.22  
This limited development model was soon replaced with another strategy of 
modernization that is properly called Stalinist. This shift from simple extraction to the 
construction of an enrichment factory to produce apatite concentrate and a large 
accompanying city entailed a different vision of nature use. Instead of peripheral resource 
extraction predominately for the sake of bolstering the economy of the country overall, 
this emergent model of modernization sought also to use the minerals of the north as a 
means of creating a new, ostensibly socialist, urban environment. This type of socialism 
in theory would feature prosperous workers, who had a thriving modern collectivist 
culture and lived in accord with their subjugated natural surroundings.  
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The turn to Stalinist modernization began in the fall of 1929 with discussions 
about moving the proposed enrichment factory to the Khibiny region from Leningrad.23 It 
also coincided with a request that the Unified State Political Organization (OGPU, the 
secret police) arrange a labor force partially based on the Solovki prison camp 
(USLON).24 VSNKh rejected the OGPU’s bid for the project; its representatives claimed 
that the great potential for the chemical industry in the north necessitated oversight by an 
economic organization and agreed to contract out some labor from USLON.25 On 
November 13, 1929, VSNKh, following earlier resolutions by the State Planning 
Committee (Gosplan) of the USSR and the Economic Council of the Russian Republic 
(RSFSR), officially created the Apatit trust and appointed Vasilii Kondrikov as its 
temporary manager.26 An under-educated but hard-working enthusiast for socialist 
industrialization, Kondrikov would lead many of the enterprises involved in the economic 
transformation of the Kola Peninsula until 1937.27 
Conflicts over the basic methods of how to organize the project, how much to 
fund it, how to supply labor, and how to meet production quotas defined the first year of 
existence of the Apatit trust. The main sides of these disputes revolved around 
Kondrikov, who was being supported and tutored by First Party Secretary Sergei Kirov of 
the Leningrad region and Fersman, and the members of the reputed “right” deviation at 
the All-Union Association of the Chemical Industry (Vsekhimprom) of the VSNKh, who 
were in charge of the trust. Vsekhimprom’s leader, Mikhail Tomskii—a Politburo 
member and the former head of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions—
opposed Stalin’s plans for forced collectivization and rapid industrialization.28 Along 
with Nikolai Bukharin and Aleksei Rykov, Tomskii promoted a more gradual method of 
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economic development that would not have required a total rejection of NEP nor funded 
industrial buildup by forcefully increasing taxation of the peasantry and reducing real 
wages for workers.29 Kondrikov and his patrons, in contrast, represented the enthusiastic 
embrace of Stalinist industrialization. 
At a meeting of the commission on apatite of Vsekhimprom on December 23, 
1929, the different factions quarreled about the Khibiny project. At the time the Apatit 
trust had drawn up a plan to mine 400,000 tons of ore and requested a budget of 
approximately 13 million rubles.  Kondrikov annoyed Tomskii by raising the question of 
the economic viability of processing nepheline tailings when the intended agenda of the 
meeting was the use of USLON labor. Fersman’s influence here was clear. He had 
already encouraged Kondrikov to believe that the optimal way to process mineral ore 
included the maximal conversion of the nepheline-rich wastes into economically valuable 
substances.30 Kondrikov also proposed that by mining on three different mountains at 
once, they would be able to extract 3.5 million tons by the end of the first five-year plan. 
The enterprise would construct a hydroelectric dam on the Niva River and an enrichment 
factory. At this scale the project would require “colonization” of the region and 
necessitate housing construction and a permanent work force. Kondrikov believed that 
they could rely on a combination of temporary prison labor from USLON and hired 
laborers. Tomskii responded to this model of development by rejecting the idea of 
“colonization” as too expensive and questioning the arrangement of a combined labor 
force.31 Tomskii’s criticism of Kondrikov’s plan reflected an ideological rift in the Soviet 
leadership about the correct method of industrialization. Justifying the Stalinist position, 
Kondrikov argued, “I am a maximalist: either nothing or a very large management. You 
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cannot create a small business in the Khibiny, even if you want. We came there not to 
waste our time on trifles. The Kola Peninsula should be a son of industry.”32  
This conflict with Vsekhimprom followed Apatit throughout much of the chaotic 
year of 1930. As the central government retreated somewhat in March from the violent 
collectivization campaign that it had begun at the beginning of the year, industrial 
enterprises throughout the country found themselves incapable of obtaining necessary 
supplies, funds, and labor. The result was that by the middle of the year industrial 
production in the country had started to decline at a moment intended to be one of 
massive expansion.33 Apatit predictably staggered in this period. On February 6, 1930, 
Vsekhimprom slashed Apatit’s annual budget for 1929/1930 in half.34 This cut further 
paralyzed urban planning, ore extraction, and construction of the enrichment factory. In 
May 1930, however, VSNKh and the Council of Labor and Defense (STO) forced 
Vsekhimprom to reverse the earlier budget reductions.35 This restored funding required 
Apatit to increase its quota of extracted ore for 1929-1930 to 250,000 tons, which it 
reportedly fulfilled, and to expand to mining one million tons the next year.36 With the 
decisions to plan a permanent socialist city and to use de-kulakized peasants for the bulk 
of the labor force that also came about this year, the basic model for Stalinist 
modernization in the Khibiny Mountains had overtaken the earlier possibilities for the 
economic transformation of the northern environment. 
Planning a City in the North 
The creation of a new urban area where not even a village had existed demanded 
that planners deal with natural conditions and attempt to organize an ideal arrangement of 
the necessary infrastructure. During the 1930s the Soviet Union built several of these new 
industry towns, including Magnitogorsk, Novokuznetsk, Komsomolsk-on-Amur, and 
others. The construction plans for the city of Khibinogorsk on the Kola Peninsula reveal 
many of the ambitions for arranging optimal relations with the environment. A look at the 
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planning process also shows the ways that nature was not passive in the process, but 
could act and occasionally stymie some attempts at human manipulation.  
Some of the earliest proposals for the urban design of the new industrial site 
overlooked the Khibiny region’s environmental conditions. In what was probably part of 
Kondrikov’s initial plan to Vsekhimprom, a section on housing construction suggested 
building half of the living quarters for a 1100-person workforce and their families (3300 
people total) during the first year plus an array of infrastructure such as a hospital, school, 
movie theater, bakery, cafeteria, and other items. Not only did this proposal impractically 
estimate costs, it would have meant leaving many individuals without adequate housing 
during the first snowy winter. And this construction would have served only a fraction of 
the 14,700 who actually lived in the Khibiny at the end of the first economic accounting 
year in November 1930 when the second cold season began.37 
But soon the multifarious environmental factors affecting urban construction 
attracted greater consideration from planners. In January 1930 a commission began to 
investigate options for building a “socialist city” for approximately 20,000 workers for 
the Apatit trust that would have modern cultural-enlightenment and domestic services, 
free workers from individual economic concerns, and allow room for expansion. Major 
considerations in choosing a location were access to the worksite, climatic and 
topographical conditions, and the organization of a sewer system and water supply. The 
commission evaluated four possibilities: on Mount Kukisvumchorr; in a section of a 
valley along the Iuksproik River; near the Apatity station of the Murmansk railroad; and 
on the south side of the Great Vud˝iavr Lake.  The option near the main mining site on 
Mount Kukisvumchorr had particularly poor climatic conditions such as strong winds and 
snowdrifts and lacked the possibility of arranging a sewage system “without pollution of 
Vud˝iavr which is the single source of a water supply.” The valley of the Iuksproik River 
would have similar problems with sewage but would offer protection from pollution 
winds (stochnykh vetrov). The commission also rejected the idea of building the city at 
the railroad station because its distance from the mines, despite its superior climatic 
conditions, made it unacceptable. The commission concluded that a modern socialist city 
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on the south side of the Great Vud˝iavr would be the most ideal, since three separate 
mining settlements would be irrational and this location optimized transportation, 
climatic, and sewage considerations. Acknowledging the strong winds and heavy snow 
cover in this location, the commission instead chose to emphasize the “comparatively” 
level surface on a dry area, the cover of fir trees on sandy soil, the sufficient effect of the 
sun, and the possibility of using the White River for dumping wastes while maintaining 
Great Vud˝iavr for the water supply.38 
In March 1930 the Apatit trust modified this option to position the city a few 
kilometers deeper into the mountains, though still along Great Vud˝iavr. At this 
extremely confused moment of planning, given their recent budget cut, the enterprise 
wanted to reduce the distance from the town to the mining areas and place the enrichment 
factory where the lake flowed out into the White River.39 Further outside evaluations in 
June heaped criticism on this potential location. One report encouraged an urban design 
that would establish “good sanitary conditions on account of the self-purifying properties 
of water, soil, and air.” But it noted that the proposed area would create tremendous 
difficulties with street design due to the steep inclines, winds, and green sections, which 
should be preserved. Another evaluation agreed with the main objection of the last report 
that building infrastructure for the sewer system would be impossible.40 In response to 
these criticisms the Apatit trust again slightly altered its plan.41 
Since the design of the city and the enterprise occurred simultaneously, and under 
the management of the trust, the location of industrial objects determined much of the 
layout. For Apatit the main item that required choosing a location was the enrichment 
factory. In February 1930, a commission to determine the location of the enrichment 
factory created a list of eight factors to consider: the conditions for delivering the ore 
from the mines; safety during explosions at the mines; safety during avalanches; the 
possibility of developing a loading route; the possibility of positioning the equipment in a 
cascade; the presence of an adequate water supply; the conditions for the diversion of 
tailings; and the quality of the ground. This commission evaluated three potential 
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locations that overlapped with some of the options for the city: on the southern incline of 
Mount Iuksporr; in the Iuksporr valley on the northeast shore of Great Vud˝iavr; and on 
the southern shore of Great Vud˝iavr. Of all of the factors mentioned, the ability to 
dispose of tailings without polluting Great Vud˝iavr predominated in their decision to 
recommend the final location at the mouth of the White River on lower ground than the 
lake. The interest in maintaining the lake arose from the need to have an industrial and 
drinking water supply for both the city and the enterprise and the desire to avoid 
immediate expenditures on water purification. The White River in this model would 
serve as an industrial sewer and trust employees developed estimates of the maximum 
loads of tailings that could be dumped in the river.42 
Neither pure recklessness nor genuine antipathy toward nature inspired this 
environmentally destructive decision about what to do with industrial waste. Instead, 
enterprise leaders felt confident in the ability to create harmony between industrial 
modernity and the natural environment in the future. They saw pollution of the White 
River as only a temporary problem. After the construction of the enrichment factory had 
already begun, a foreign consultant offered another objection to its proposed location in 
August 1930. He suggested several reasons why building it in the mountains would be 
better, including the cost of the project, transportation issues, and the dumping of tailings 
in the White River. In a reply letter the head of the enrichment factory, Nikolai 
Vorontsov, defended their decision against the consultant’s objections, dwelling a bit on 
the “most substantial” one about polluting the river. Vorontsov insisted that in the future 
the wastes from apatite enrichment would be reused to produce a variety of materials and 
this further processing would reduce the amount of tailings being dumped.43  
Overall, the architectural vision for the Khibiny revealed a desire to harmonize 
nature. Vorontsov made a point of mentioning the beauty of the settlement areas when 
giving a summary of the separate mining settlements and the new socialist city.44 When 
outlining the overall features for the new city, the main architect, O. R. Munts, detailed 
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the desired type of urban environment. The project demanded that a “wild, almost 
uninhabited, region will need to be transformed into a populated one and will need to 
supply its population with the satisfaction of all the requirements of a normal and 
cultured existence in the unique conditions of the far north.”45 To do so, Munts sketched 
out how housing for workers, a transportation network, illumination, heating, telephone 
service, a water supply, a sewer system, and various municipal services could be built. 
Munts also envisioned three parks in the city that would preserve the forest sections 
remaining on the site and serve the sanitary purpose of protecting the city from noise and 
dust generated by the enrichment factory. Admitting the current difficulties of cultivating 
plants in a polar region, the architect proposed that in the future acclimatization could be 
used to create green belts throughout the city connecting the parks.46 “It is necessary,” 
Munts concluded, “that man, simultaneously with a victory over nature and the 
disturbance of its majestic tranquility, is able to accord his labor with its eternal 
beauty.”47 
Cultural Transformation 
An outpouring of cultural commentary, activities, and institutions accompanied 
the creation of Khibinogorsk and apatite mining. A general radicalization of Soviet 
culture during the first five-year plan that highlighted the revolutionary potential of 
Stalinist modernization inspired much of this enthusiasm.48 This official culture in the 
Khibiny region relied on local Communist Party newspapers, popular literature by both 
renowned and relatively unknown authors extolling the project, and new establishments 
created by the state for its propagation.49 Applied to the environments of inhospitable 
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peripheries, the rigidly confined cultural productions of the era frequently emphasized 
heroic narratives of Soviet citizens overcoming natural obstacles. Yet, Stalinist 
representations of nature were less uniformly antagonistic to nature than posited in some 
of the historiography.50 The place of the natural world in this local culture seems better 
characterized as a transformative and holistic vision of humans’ relationship to the 
environment. Anthropocentric in essence, this vision subsumed narratives of conquest but 
maintained room for divergent discourses about nature. This analysis of the contours of 
the Stalinist representations of the Khibiny environment demonstrates this holistic logic 
by outlining descriptions of the natural world as incomplete and meaningless before 
human interference, as a source of transformation during modernization, and as a feature 
of socialist harmony in the future. 
During the first five-year plan, the Khibiny region as it existed before socialist 
construction was portrayed as lacking significance. Commentary on the sparse and 
desolate character of the territory was common among travelers to the region in late 
imperial Russia and the early 1920s.51 These remarks often carried some positive 
connotations as well: the beauty of pristine nature, the enticing exoticism of the far north, 
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and a sense of nationhood that incorporated the “meagerness” of Russian nature into its 
landscape aesthetic.52 For instance, a moniker that Mikhail Prishvin coined for the north 
in the early twentieth century —“the land of fearless birds”—was designed to inspire awe 
at the uniqueness of isolated patches of wilderness putatively beyond human influence.53 
In the 1930s, however, the local press used this phrase to refer derisively to the region 
before Bolshevik transformation.54 The revolutionary culture of Stalinist modernization 
used the desolateness of northern nature more exclusively to mark something that needed 
to be changed. 
Two main Soviet modes of characterizing nature’s incompleteness before 
industrialization highlighted temporal lags and purposelessness. Undeveloped territories 
symbolized the country’s supposed backwardness. Concern over “backwardness” was a 
long-standing issue in Russia. “Backwardness” was a category that encompassed a whole 
range of contemporaneously existing groups of people, conditions, beliefs, and places and 
relegated them to a diminutive spot on an imagined temporal hierarchy. This temporal 
hierarchy functioned primarily through spatial comparisons that took foreign countries 
with industrial economies as advanced and modern. Describing the development of an 
apatite industry in the Khibiny in 1933, B. I. Kagan and M. M. Kossov wrote, “The Kola 
Peninsula (the Murmansk district) in old times was one of the most neglected and 
backward borderlands.”55 This characterization implied that the pre-industrial 
environment of the Khibiny region was deficient in time. The authors continued, 
expanding on their notion of backwardness, that “wild conservatism, sluggishness, and 
the Asiatic tempos of the Tsarist government kept this huge region untouched and 
unstudied.”56 In this formulation and the words of other contemporary commentators on 
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the status of the Khibiny territory in the pre-Soviet era, slow industrial development 
deprived such peripheral landscapes of their potential significance.57 
This notion of the meaninglessness of unused nature is another strand that often 
appeared in representations of the pre-industrial north. The logic here reflected a deeply 
utilitarian and anthropocentric environmental worldview with clear connections to 
Marxist labor theories of value. Productive forces embedded in nature could only be 
released by conscious human activity that rendered such elements of the environment 
economically useful. The low population density of the region became a key element of a 
rhetoric that highlighted the insignificance of nature. Many authors would make this 
point by giving an arbitrary estimate of the number of people per square kilometer in the 
tsarist era.58  Other writers also employed cartographic imagery in referring to the 
territory as a “blank spot on the map,” emphasizing an ostensible emptiness that elided 
the populations of pastoralists and fishers and the complex natural systems that existed 
there.59 During his tour of the far north, Maksim Gor´kii lamented the “meaningless work 
of the elemental forces of nature” of the Kola Peninsula. Nowhere else provided such “a 
picture of premature chaos than this peculiarly beautiful and severe region. Here you get 
the impression that “nature” wanted to do something, but only sowed this enormous 
space of the earth with rocks.”60 For Gor´kii polar nature was unable even to fulfill its 
own intentions and thus required the “reasonable activity of people” to correct its 
mistakes. 
This past played the role of setting the stage for what socialist construction would 
transform, would complete, would make whole. Descriptions of the process of 
industrializing the Khibiny in Stalinist culture concentrated on the manipulation, 
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subjugation, and improvement of the natural environment by humans. These ideas often 
fit into a dialectic of re-forging—“Man, in changing nature, changes himself” in the 
frequently cited epigraph to The History of the Construction of the Stalin White Sea-
Baltic Canal—that implied that through the mastery of nature, industrial labor, and 
education, prisoners and former “kulaks” could become proper Soviet people.61 This 
impulse to totally transform nature and people and to ultimately eliminate conflict 
between them helps capture the place of the environment in the culture of Stalinist 
modernization. The re-education efforts among forced peasant migrants to the Khibiny 
region, for instance, included activities like participation in greening campaigns.62 
Commentators on the transformation of the area combined militaristic metaphors of 
conquest with more variegated portrayals of nature that romanticized work in an extreme 
northern environment, venerated the natural resources of the region, and drew attention to 
the role of science in enabling industrial development. 
As discussed in the first chapter, the ideology of the conquest of nature found 
frequent expression during the militaristic modernization of the Stalinist period. The 
process of socialist construction in the Khibiny was often lauded by the catchphrase “the 
Bolsheviks defeat the tundra.”63 As in the case of railroad construction, nature’s 
recalcitrance during initial industrial development helped evoke descriptions of the 
hardnosed treatment of the environment. Confrontations with such obstacles were used to 
establish the heroic qualities of the geologists, volunteer workers, and local party and 
industrial leaders in the endeavor.64 Though corresponding with difficult, chaotic, and 
reckless moments of interaction with the environment, the conquest of nature did not 
imply its intentional destruction. In Stalinist culture the environment usually only played 
the role of an enemy to the extent that it helped positively define human action. The 
diverse contextual uses of the conquest theme help demonstrate this point. Sometimes, as 
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in a song by A. Reshetov called “Hello Conquerors,” authors made an analogy between 
actual military experiences during the Russian Revolution and the Russian Civil War and 
the work of industrializing the Khibiny.65 Elsewhere, such as in articles in the local party 
newspaper Khibinogorsk Worker, the language of conquest served to align economic 
development in the north with Stalin’s dominant faction in the central party apparatus.66 
A key idea in the Stalinist version of the conquest of nature was that it would lead to the 
mutual improvement of humans and territories. As M. Maizel´ wrote, “the courageous 
Bolshevik work on the assimilation of the mineral resources of the Khibiny” brings about 
“the creation of the new man who in the struggle with nature transforms himself into an 
active builder of a classless socialist society.”67  
Representations of Khibiny nature in discussions of the process of 
industrialization also depicted it as extreme. Descriptions of northern nature as distant, 
harsh, cold, snowy, windy, barren, dark, and dangerous fit into romantic narratives of 
economically developing the region. From the beginning of geological research in the 
Khibiny region, participants in the expeditions to this polar, uninhabited, and alpine 
terrain became mythologized as pioneers and discoverers of new deposits.68 Reflecting on 
exploration in the Khibiny sponsored by the NIU in the spring of 1929, Grigorii 
Pronchenko wrote, “the remoteness of the region with its alluring nature and the unusual 
conditions of life in the north did not frighten several young members of the NIU but on 
the contrary attracted [them] (a manili) with its novelty and interest.”69 This enthusiasm 
for work in potentially frightening nature found widespread expression. Authors often 
dwelt on the formidable difficulties and dangers posed by nature when establishing 
narratives of heroism. Take, for instance, this fragment of Lev Oshanin’s poem about 
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shock workers at the Kukisvumchorr mine from 1932: “The all-out wind blows along the 
ledges, / Thundering on the grounds, sliding on the slopes. / One might freeze under a 
wolf-skin coat, / But must never simply stand before the wind.” 70 In this lyric it was the 
threatening wind and frost that set up the conditions for the personal transformation of the 
miners into heroes of industrialization. 
Commentators on the creation of a mining and processing enterprise in the 
Khibiny also effused about the wealth of the mineral resources on the Kola Peninsula. 
Continuing to express the colonization of the nature ideology that extended back to the 
late imperial era and dominated in the 1920s, they referred to the substances in the depths 
of the earth as a treasure chest filled with inexhaustible mineral resources and assigned 
value and potency to the land holding such materials.71 Writer Aleksei Tolstoi 
exaggerated, “If these mountains were pure gold, they would not be so precious.”72 For 
Tolstoi this feature of the northern environment helped it be transformed into a new 
mainland (materik) for industry.73 Another striking aspect of this adoration of the 
minerals below the earth’s surface was the stress on the interconnection between 
inorganic and organic materials.  Related to the geochemistry practiced by some of the 
scientists involved in the project and the symbolic veneration of metal in Soviet culture, 
apatite became praised as the “stone of fertility.”74 Such a moniker attributed animate 
properties to this rock, extending the claimed worth of mined materials beyond the 
treasure chest metaphor. The “stone of fertility” implied an ability of apatite to create not 
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just wealth but life itself. To unleash this power, of course, required extracting it from the 
mountains. 
Another category of depiction of the natural world in the Khibiny region during 
the first years of Soviet industrialization involved a scientific perspective. The main 
desire of many of the scientists working in the Khibiny was to comprehend nature fully in 
this peripheral place. This stated aim of their research was common in modernizing states 
and continued an element of the scientific culture from the pre-Soviet era that 
emphasized “pure science.” Science in these years became more wedded to specific 
service to the state, but individuals working in the north, such as Fersman, accepted this 
change.75 A practical focus opened new research opportunities in certain fields and 
helped lead to the creation of the Khibiny Mountain Station of the Soviet Academy of 
Sciences in 1932.76 Researchers also came under pressure to popularize their scientific 
research for the sake of cultural enlightenment.77 These political pressures on scientists 
did not change the basic understanding of nature as an object of study for many of the 
people working in the Khibiny.78 However, they did require putting generalizations into a 
more Bolshevik language. Even in such proclamations we can see a focus on justifying 
expanded research and seeking total comprehension of nature. Fersman wrote “that the 
path to economic, industrial, and cultural assimilation of distinct territories lies above all 
on the scientific mastery of them and the conquest of all sides of nature, life, and man not 
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in separation, but in complete envelopment of all the complex economic and social 
diversity of their mutual relationship.”79 Nature as represented here was not just an object 
of conquest, but also a complex entity that could only be comprehended through 
“complete envelopment” with human beings. 
Lastly, the vision for the future socialist city included a harmonious relationship 
between the transformed Arctic tundra and new Soviet people. In this cultural logic 
Stalinist industrialization would have fulfilled an incomplete landscape through a process 
of mutual re-forging and made it a beautiful monument to socialist modernity. Through 
the creation of schools, research institutions, pioneer camps, red corners, cinemas, 
theaters, conservatories, clubs, libraries, parks and health facilities and with the aid of 
mass enlightenment campaigns and anti-religious propaganda in the newspapers, the area 
would go from being “held in the pincers (kleshchakh) of ignorance, a lack of culture, 
and darkness” to a “blossoming industrial and cultural region.”80 From the perspective of 
Stalinist modernity, a habitat that included these cultural and industrial installations 
provided an inherently better-suited ecosystem in which humans could thrive than the 
desolate tundra. The idea of this transformation also opened way for a renewed stress on 
the beauty of elements of the Khibiny environment, including previously existing features 
like the mountain relief, the lakes, and the polar night as well as new facilities such as 
parks and buildings.81  
New ways for people to experience and take advantage of polar nature through 
sport and tourism began to be emphasized. Besides following many of the contours of the 
physical cultural movement in the country, athletics in the Khibiny predictably enough 
focused on skiing and other winter sports.82 Events started to be organized in the early 
1930s and by the time the annual Holiday of the North began on the Kola Peninsula in 
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March 1934, the area had become a center of downhill skiing in the northwest part of the 
Soviet Union.83 During the 1937 ski season, a newspaper article urged Kirovsk residents 
to “fully use the splendid topographical and climatic setting of their city.”84 These distinct 
characteristics of polar nature also became important in efforts to promote tourist 
excursions to the Khibiny Mountains.85 In making the case for the Khibiny as an 
attractive place to vacation, one writer declared: 
I would not exchange the nature of the north for even a section of the Caucasus... 
It would be much nicer to relax here on the shore of a river or, having climbed up 
one of the high mountains, to rest with real pleasure after the descent. This 
tempers and strengthens the organism of a person well, promoting energetic work 
immediately upon return from the excursion. From the north you always arrive 
vigorous and strong.86 
Northern nature under Soviet control could serve to replenish workers in the other parts 
of country, increasing these highly valued traits of strength and vigor. In this ideal the 
modernized environment not only became more hospitable but also acted to improve 
human life beyond what had been possible in a pre-industrial territory.  
Forced Labor in the Tundra 
During the height of these optimistic cultural expressions about finding industrial 
harmony with nature, the social history of the Khibiny Mountains was turning in a more 
ominous direction. From the beginning state planners considered using some form of 
forced labor for mining in the Khibiny, continuing a precedent begun by the wartime 
tsarist government with the construction of the Murmansk railroad. Though initial 
suggestions of handing over the entire project to the prison camp administration were 
rejected for the sake of building a new socialist city in the far north, the government and 
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enterprise leaders remained uncertain about how to supply labor for the project. An 
impetuous decision in the spring of 1930 to send millions of peasants stripped of their 
property during collectivization to settlements around the country determined the 
dominant strategy for peopling the Khibiny project.  
Apatit was born during the first major drive to collectivize agriculture. The twin 
policies of collectivization and de-kulakization aimed at giving the state control of 
agricultural output. As part of a mass collectivization campaign during the winter of 
1929-1930, millions of comparatively well-off peasants became targeted as class 
enemies, or kulaks. They were stripped of their property and excluded from membership 
in the new collective farms. The government slated a huge portion of these households 
for exile. Deportations began in the winter of 1930 at a time when there was no clear plan 
for resettlement, but only a general idea of using these de-kulakized peasants to exploit 
natural resources in distant peripheries. This episode of forced resettlement included 918 
individuals who arrived in the Khibiny region in mid-March.87 Families arrived in new, 
inhospitable, and unfamiliar environments with minimal accommodations arranged.88  
In order to try to help solve a severe labor shortage in the early 1930s, the Soviet 
state chose to use these de-kulakized peasant migrants, who were known by the 
euphemism “special settlers,” in the economic development of the peripheral regions. In 
April 1930, OGPU head Genrikh Iagoda outlined the idea of turning these camps into 
more or less permanent, self-sustaining “colonization settlements.”  Relocated peasants 
would work in timber, agriculture, and mining and help “colonize the North in the 
shortest possible time.”89 This agency also specifically believed it was “impossible” to 
meet the needs of the Apatit trust by “hiring a free labor supply” because of the 
“remoteness and natural wildness of the Khibiny.”90 In a request to hire USLON 
prisoners as technical specialists, Kondrikov similarly complained that “the severe 
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climate” of the region inhibited the enterprise’s ability to recruit experts.91 Indeed, labor 
recruitment proved exceedingly difficult for Apatit. The trust recruited groups of skilled 
workers, including ‘enthusiastic’ communists and Komsomol members from Leningrad, 
but many new voluntary migrants would leave soon after encountering the conditions 
there.92 Given this overall shortage, the special settlers provided an extra source of 
workers that cheapened labor costs in the first year and helped make the industrial project 
possible.93  
The special settlers occupied an intermediate status between citizens and labor 
camp prisoners, being deprived of mobility and civil rights but contractually entitled to 
wages and (frequently unfulfilled) amenities. In the summer of 1931, the Apatit trust 
signed a contract with the OGPU for a contingent of up to 15,000 special settlers. This 
agreement stipulated that the Apatit trust would supply the special settlers with equivalent 
levels of food, material provisions, and wages (except for the 15% that would be paid to 
the camp administration) as offered to other workers. It would also be responsible for 
providing housing, sanitation infrastructure, medical facilities, and schools. The OGPU 
would offer funds for heating, illumination, and certain communal services. On the more 
punitive side, the contract prohibited special settlers from going on vacation, demanded 
that they live in separate areas or buildings, limited their ability to serve in administrative 
positions without the approval of the OGPU commandant’s office, and put the OGPU 
commandant in charge of disciplinary issues.94  
The special settlers became the main source of labor at this industrial site in the 
Khibiny Mountains. Mortality, escapes, and mass exodus of recruited laborers make it 
difficult to trace the precise population fluctuations during the 1930s. However, we can 
estimate that in this period more than 45,000 special settlers came to the Kola Peninsula, 
which only had a total population of 27,000 in 1927. All but a few thousand of them 
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directly served the apatite works.95 In comparison to the majority of special settlers who 
worked in small isolated settlements serving the forest industry, the labor needs of this 
project required greater integration of these forced migrants with the new socialist city of 
Khibinogorsk. Though initially the special settlers primarily lived in separate settlements 
outside the city (see Table 1), close to 20,000 of them resided in Khibinogorsk by 1933.96 
The special settlers came from numerous places in the country, but the largest percentage 
of them was relocated from parts of the Leningrad region. Excluding the construction site 
of the Niva Hydroelectric Station, special settlers made up 69% of the total population 
(25,485) in the Khibiny region in October 1931. At this point the gender ratio was near 
equal (48.9% were women) and 32% were under sixteen years old.97  
Table 1. Population of Special Settlers in the Khibiny Region on October 25, 193198 
 
Settlement Population of special 
settlers 
Percentage of the 
population that were 
special settlers 
Khibinogorsk 1340 38% 
Mining Settlement No. 1 (the 
25 kilometer mark from the 
Murmansk Railroad) 
3277 56% 
Iuksporiok (Mining 
Settlement No. 2) 
724 80% 
Settlement at the 20-21 
kilometer mark 
7195 82% 
Settlement at the 18 kilometer 
mark 
3018 99% 
Settlements at the 6,13, 14, 16 
kilometer marks 
1601 88% 
The state farm Industriia and 
the Closed Workers’ 
Cooperative 
591 67% 
“Apatity” station of the 
Murmansk Railroad 
31 6% 
Nepheline administration 37 54% 
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Human Ecology in the Khibiny Mountains 
The species of fauna known as Homo sapiens did not thrive in this habitat created 
by Stalinist industrialization and forced deportations. The visions for making 
Khibinogorsk a place where life and work would overcome obstacles posed by nature and 
people would coexist peacefully with this new tamed environment contrasted sharply 
with the situation on the ground. On the whole, Stalinist modernization did not initially 
lead to a functioning socialist city above the polar circle, but to a profound human and 
natural tragedy in which disease, hunger, filth, coldness, de-forestation, pollution, and 
disorder raged. The disastrous situation partially reflected a deeply disharmonious 
relationship with the environment created, contrary to intention, by the state’s 
industrialization drive. As in the case of the construction of the Murmansk railroad, 
political decisions to undertake rapid industrialization with forced labor heightened the 
vulnerability of migrants to an array of natural hazards, while a perilous environment 
remained outside state control.  
It makes sense to examine the abysmal living conditions that the special settlers 
encountered in the Khibiny region from an environmental perspective.99 Issues of 
housing, clothing, food, and hygiene, for instance, have obvious natural dimensions. 
Plants and animals nourish humans and supply materials; climatic phenomena and 
geographical features shape the needs, limitations, and possibilities of habitation. In the 
case of the Khibiny Mountains the long and snowy polar winter, the limited presence of 
building materials, the infertility of the soil, the dearth of flora and fauna for human 
foraging, the steep mountain relief of the worksite, the unsuitable system of waterways, 
and the distance of the region from supply sources significantly affected the housing 
situation, the availability of basic domestic supplies, and special setters’ access to food 
and water. Nature occasionally exacerbated the situation as industrial activities caused 
environmental changes such as pollution and increased avalanches. 
The habitat that first greeted the forced migrants to the Khibiny region consisted 
of snowy mountain tundra with ad hoc housing of tents, mud huts, and barn-like 
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structures built with thin boards and wood beams called shalmany. A hierarchical 
allocation of better accommodations first to freely recruited laborers meant that special 
settlers lived in these temporary dwellings the longest. At one point in late 1930 after the 
winter had begun, close to 12,000 of 14,000 residents in the Khibinogorsk region lived in 
these types of houses.100 As numerous families crowded into these dirty living spaces, 
pathogens causing diseases such as measles, typhus, typhoid fever, and tuberculosis 
spread throughout the population. A condemning report from December 1930 by the 
regional inspector of housing and communal sanitation, I. A. Tikhomirov, claimed that 
the large portion of the current housing stock that “consists of shalmanov, mud huts, and 
tents that act as surrogates of housing is unacceptable for the conditions of the polar 
winter.” Tihkomirov’s overall assessment was that “the housing conditions of the 
population, particularly during an epidemic situation, are extremely unfavorable.” The 
mud huts seem not to have survived the winter of 1931 here, but the other housing types 
and extremely crowded conditions lasted through the first five-year plan.101 In 1934, 
Kirov wrote that special settlers in the Khibiny region only had 1.9 square meters of 
space per person, considerably less than the desired three square meters per person.102 
Polar nature further complicated the housing situation in the Khibiny Mountains. 
It exacerbated the endemic problems the Soviet state had in providing basic supplies to 
new industrial sites. The lack of suitable forest materials on the Kola Peninsula led the 
city to import wood from the Arkhang´elsk region.103 The Apatit trust also continually 
failed to fulfill its own plans for housing construction.104 Kondrikov described the role of 
the Kola environment in inhibiting construction: “Unfortunately, large supplies of 
limestone on the Kola Peninsula have still not been found, there is comparatively little 
wood, the renewal period of which extends here up to 200 years, and until very recently 
there was a large deficit of clay.”105 Trust leaders also explained their failures in housing 
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construction as partially due to the “harsh climate of the polar tundra” and “the mountain 
relief of the location with rocky ground.”106  
Moreover, special settlers who attempted to construct their own housing could not 
find adequate supplies. One report from 1934 summarized the situation for the special 
settlers: “there are no funds and also no construction materials—this means that there are 
no houses.”107 The frequent forest fires along the Murmansk railroad and the near 
exhaustion of the limited wood supply near Little Vud˝iavr Lake also limited special 
settlers’ options for remedying the housing shortage themselves. After the production of 
concentrated apatite began in the fall of 1931, dust from the enrichment factory started 
destroying local flora, which reduced available building materials even further.108 
For the eight to nine months of the year when temperatures in the Khibiny 
Mountains were below freezing, snow acted as a dangerous environmental influence. The 
area had an annual average of over 160 days of snowstorms a year and significantly 
greater snow cover than other parts of the Kola Peninsula.109 The mountainous terrain 
already made the potential for avalanches and rockslides especially great. The use of 
industrial explosions in the mines during the long winter heightened this risk.110 A major 
avalanche from Mount Iuksporr on 5 December 1935 destroyed two buildings, which 
housed 249 people, and killed eighty-nine individuals, including forty-six special 
settlers.111 State and industrial planners clearly contributed to making the migrants 
vulnerable to this disaster by deciding to place the settlement in an area known to be 
avalanche-prone.112 This catastrophe inspired an active campaign in the city to monitor 
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and prevent avalanches, but their continued threat limited the locations of new 
settlements in the long run.113 
The special settlers also often lacked basic items necessary for survival in such a 
cold climate. The government had stripped them of most of their property except for a bit 
of money and some clothing and equipment for agriculture, construction, and cooking. 
The frequently violent expropriations of the de-kulakization campaign left many peasant 
families with much less than the sanctioned norms.114 To augment the clothing and tools 
brought by the migrants, the trust and the city government petitioned for special winter 
clothing, set up occasional open fairs, and established a few stores. The supply system in 
the Khibiny region managed to procure a somewhat reasonable level of some of the 
required clothing such as leather shoes, felt boots, underwear, suits, coats, bags, sheets, 
and hats by late 1930.115 However, as forced and voluntary migrants continued to flow to 
the worksite, these efforts failed to overcome the chronic lack of sufficient items needed 
for living, working, and staying warm in the tundra. As special settler F. B. Zubkova later 
summarized it succinctly: “In material terms we lived poorly.”116 
Food shortages characterized life in the Khibiny region throughout the 1930s. 
They occurred despite the contractual obligations of the trust and the secret police to 
supply the special settlers with sufficient food provisions and the settlement’s proximity 
to the Murmansk railroad, which facilitated food shipments.117 The state and party organs 
in Khibinogorsk attempted to procure foodstuffs through several organizations including 
a Closed Workers’ Cooperative and a special trust to manage imports. Like elsewhere in 
the country, they also set up a network of cafeterias where people ate most of their meals. 
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Far short of supplying the state-sanctioned rations, these institutions were only minimally 
effective in helping to prevent the population from starving.118 
The natural conditions of this rocky polar land inhibited efforts to feed the special 
settlers adequately. The infertility of the soil, the region’s alpine elevation, and the short 
growing season characteristic of such latitudes made agriculture nearly impossible here. 
Indeed, scientists only conclusively established the possibility of growing certain 
vegetables in the 1920s and grain cultivation never became a viable option.119 Given 
these environmental constraints, it is hardly surprising that the initial attempts of the 
Apatit trust to organize local agriculture were largely unsuccessful. The state farm 
Industriia, where a number of special settlers worked, spent its first years on land 
reclamation, farming only a few hectares of land. The meat and milk economy of the 
state farm also suffered from a lack of shelters for livestock, which caused many animals 
to freeze to death. 120  
Some special settlers in the Khibiny region dealt with these shortages by making 
use of natural elements familiar to them in a new environment. The migrants caught 
freshwater fish in the nearby lakes and rivers and collected mushrooms and berries in the 
summer. One special settler, L. D. Zverev, later described the tactics employed by his 
family at the time: 
Father made nets. We had ponds around home and there were many fish. He was 
a craftsman and made nets. He went into the mountains where there were already 
pools and caught fish. He goes out for mushrooms and fetches netting and fish. 
The fish is good. And there was perch where the airdrome is. He also goes there 
and catches. In the White River there used to be a lot of fish, only they've gone 
away. In this way we didn't starve.121 
In the first years after their arrival many families supplemented their diets with aquatic 
fauna that they obtained outside of the state-sponsored distribution system. However, in 
the fall of 1931 Apatit began dumping massive amounts of wastewater from enrichment 
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processing into the White River.122 This industrial pollution would soon kill off the fish 
there and eliminate this source of food for the special settlers.123 
A famine in 1932-1933 hit the grain-producing regions of the country, especially 
Ukraine, the hardest. However, the special settlements also suffered terribly from the lack 
of food and ruthless government action. An immediate response of the central authorities 
was to reduce food rations for special settlers, thereby guaranteeing the further suffering 
of this population.124 A 1934 report of the Khibinogorsk City Council, after ration levels 
had been restored, revealed a continued insufficiency in the diets of workers and their 
families. The lack of food led some to flee; others died of starvation. Food shortage also 
resulted in widespread incidents of diseases caused by malnourishment. Specific 
conditions of the Khibiny environment played a role here in the scurvy outbreaks and the 
fact that 70% of children suffered from rickets in 1934. The lack of local fruits and 
vegetables inhibited vitamin C intake, causing scurvy, and the long sunless months and 
insufficient dairy consumption likely led to vitamin D deficiencies, giving rise to 
rickets.125 
The situation with water was no better. The problem here was not so much a 
dearth of the substance as a lack of the infrastructure needed to arrange a clean water 
supply and remove sewage. Regardless of whatever ideas urban and enterprise planners 
had for the use of the region’s water bodies, the first migrants in 1930 immediately began 
drawing water from the closest sources to their settlements for drinking, cooking, 
cleaning, bathing, and extinguishing fires. They often filled barrels with water from lakes 
and rivers or built temporary pipes that froze in the winter. Furthermore, in what became 
a chronic problem for many years in the Khibiny region, various sources of human 
contamination from laundry, trash receptacles, cesspits, and used water from the 
bathhouses began to pollute the water supply. Even without industrial dumping, these 
everyday forms of pollution already made the unpurified water far from clean. As 
sanitation inspector Tikhomirov wrote at the end of 1930:  
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Independent of the results of the study [on the bacteriologic content of the water] 
one can already now count all of the available sources of a water supply as to a 
greater or lesser degree contaminated, the mountain character of the place with a 
sharp incline represents an almost insuperable obstacle to the protection of them 
from pollution.126  
As diseases connected to contaminated water gripped Khibinogorsk and its 
outlying settlements in 1931-1932, the local government attempted to regulate migrants’ 
use of water. They often relied on draconian measures that sought to place the burden of 
environmental protection on the forced migrants instead of the industrial enterprise or the 
city’s administration. One resolution of the Khibinogorsk City Council from 1931 created 
a fifty-meter territory around Great Vud˝iavr Lake that was to be on a “strict regime” of 
reduced human activity and construction for the sake of preserving this water source.127 
Another resolution of the City Council from 21 August 1931 aimed at sanitary protection 
of the water supply. One hundred copies of it were printed and presumably posted around 
the area. The decree prohibited dumping wastes on the ground; placing cafeterias, 
bathhouses, cesspits, lavatories, stables, and pigsties within fifty meters of any water 
body; doing laundry in living quarters; and taking water from a specific lake and river for 
any reason besides housing construction.128 Eventually, the city began onsite chlorination 
of drinking water drawn from a water body that was already polluted.129 In later years the 
authorities tried to limit the number of trips special settlers made to the bathhouses and 
accused individuals who reused their tickets of subversive behavior.130 
The steep tundra mountains and the existing water system of the area confounded 
industrialists’ schemes for organizing the territory’s hydrology to their maximum benefit. 
The regime’s unwillingness to prioritize sewer construction and the effects of industrial 
pollution added to the difficulties with arranging a water supply for the new settlement. 
At the end of 1930 the Apatit trust still intended to begin construction on a sewer system, 
water pipe, and a purification station during 1931; the drinking water source in this plan 
would come from the river Loparki and not Great Vud˝iavr, which would only be the 
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industrial water source.131 However, as the enterprise lagged in its production quotas, 
such basic municipal expenditures as the provision of safe water service were repeatedly 
deferred.132 
This postponement delayed the construction of a sewer system until after Apatit 
had polluted the water of the White River and Great Vud˝iavr with byproducts from 
enrichment. This pollution changed the chemical character of the water and made it even 
less suitable for domestic use.133 Furthermore, without a pipe system to supply water, the 
ability to extinguish fires that arose at industrial sites or in crowded wooded housing was 
virtually non-existent.134 As a City Council report put it in 1934: “There are a lot of 
unsanitary conditions and the fire prevention situation is unsatisfactory—there is no 
water.”135 By this point the party leaders in Leningrad had also become somewhat more 
attentive to the problems with water in the Khibiny region. Kirov wrote to the People’s 
Commissariat of Heavy Industry (NKTP) and Gosplan in 1934:  
In Khibinogorsk and its settlements there is a complete lack of a sewer system and 
it does not have an independent system of municipal water supply—the supply of 
the city is produced with unpurified water from Great Vud˝iavr Lake through a 
pumping station of the industrial water supply. Further postponing the urgent 
construction of the sewer system might bring the population to mass diseases of 
an epidemic character.136  
Construction of these services did finally begin the next year, but only near the end of the 
decade did they even approach completion.137 
The overall picture of life during the construction of this new socialist city is one 
in which crowded dwellings, the cold, hunger, filth, darkness, and inadequate water 
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pervaded. The sum of this situation from the proximate cesspits to the ill person sleeping 
on the floor nearby was a sanitary nightmare. As one special settler, Aleksandra 
Iablonskaia, recalled decades later: “Only at night could I find a place. If you arrived late, 
you would sleep on the edge in the cold. … I crept among the sick in the cold and 
dirt.”138 A meeting of doctors in Khibinogorsk on September 11, 1931 proposed limiting 
the number of people per tent to 40 or 45 based on their overall assessment of the 
situation at the settlement at the 18-kilometer mark: “The contamination of the settlement 
with garbage, overcrowding, the absence of a basic stock of everyday items and the 
dirtiness of the area undoubtedly is a favorable atmosphere for the development of 
disease.”139 
The local environment combined with the oppressive development model of the 
Soviet state to produce conditions of widespread disease and death among those 
individuals who did not escape. Children suffered disproportionately. The new residents 
in the Khibiny region fell ill with similar diseases that hit other special settlements in the 
north such as typhus, typhoid fever, tuberculosis, scurvy, and measles.140 The available 
data of the incidents of these diseases are largely anecdotal. Over 175 children died from 
measles in September and October 1930, doctors reported fifty-five new cases of typhoid 
fever in the late summer of 1931 at one of the outlying settlements, and twenty children 
in Iablonskaia’s shalman died of typhus.141 These diseases raged throughout the area into 
1932 and then began to subside. Starting in this year doctors in the area managed to 
administer thousands of inoculations against typhoid, small pox, and diphtheria, which 
primarily accounted for the improvement despite the continued lack of the municipal 
infrastructure necessary for urban sanitation.142  
For many special settlers the final outcome of all of these natural phenomena of 
disease, hunger, cold, and filth in the Khibiny region was death. Special settler V. M. 
Lebedik later drew connections among these factors: “It is hard to say how many people 
lived in this barrack. There was no thought about hygiene. Diseases began and every 
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morning we brought out the dead.”143 In 1935 a health inspector in the region, A. G. 
Friliand, noted that the mortality rate, especially for children, at this new site of socialist 
modernity was considerably higher than the Soviet average.144 Aggregate figures 
showing overall deaths in the Khibiny region remain elusive. However, historian Viktor 
Shashkov has pieced together some demographic data for the city of Khibinogorsk, the 
population of which had a smaller percentage of special settlers than the other settlements 
in the region. The figures for the surrounding settlements were almost certainly worse. 
Table 2. Demography of Khibinogorsk/Kirovsk145 
Date Total 
pop. 
Special 
settler 
pop. 
Total 
births 
 
Special 
settler 
births 
 
Total 
deaths 
 
Special 
settler 
deaths 
 
Deaths 
of 
children 
 
Jan. 1, 
1932 
24,485 17,756 564 420 999 864 589 
Jan. 1, 
1933 
28,500 19,172 856 506 860 657 339 
Jan. 1, 
1934 
34,332 19,731 717 374 850 518 352 
Jan. 1, 
1935 
36,957 21,325 718 310 620 401 192 
 
Table 3. Birth and Death Rates in Khibinogorsk/Kirovsk146 
Year Special 
settler birth 
rate 
Non-
special 
settler birth 
rate 
Total 
birth 
rate 
Special 
settler 
death rate 
Non-
special 
settler 
death rate 
Total 
death 
rate 
1931 2.4% 2.1% 2.3% 4.9% 2.0% 4.1% 
1932 2.6% 3.8% 3.0% 3.4% 2.2% 3.0% 
1933 1.9% 2.3% 2.1% 2.6% 2.3% 2.5% 
1934 1.5% 2.6% 1.9% 1.9% 1.4% 1.7% 
 
The data in Table 2 show a total of 3329 deaths, 2440 from the population of 
special settlers and 1472 children, from 1931 through 1934 in Khibinogorsk. Children 
made up 44.2% of those who perished in these years, though this percentage declined 
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from a particularly dreadful 59.0% for 1931 to 31.0% for 1934. The figures in Table 3 
also reveal a general trend of improvement in the rate of mortality. Interestingly, over this 
period both the birth rate and death rate of settlers gradually declined. The death rates of 
4.9% for the special settlers for 1931 and 3.4% for 1932, compared with the 2.0% for the 
remaining population for 1931 and 2.2% for 1932, demonstrate the disproportional 
suffering of these forced migrants over freely recruited laborers and enterprise 
administrators.  
Scales of Growth 
Over the next decade the establishment of stable mining and enrichment 
operations in Khibinogorsk and its outskirts involved several spatial scales of industrial 
development and environmental transformation. Internationally, technicians at Apatit 
relied on foreign equipment and methods to devise a model for industrial operations and 
the company struggled to make its apatite concentrate into a viable export product. 
Within the Soviet Union, Apatit became the main supplier of material for chemical 
fertilizers. Regionally, the Kola phosphate industry served as a foundation upon which to 
expand local mining and transform the area into an industrial center. On each of these 
scales existed diverse understandings of the economic aspects of nature and the different 
roles played by the material world. 
The interactions of Apatit with foreign companies and their representatives relied 
on vacillations between appreciative dependence and assertive competition. Seeking the 
means of getting mineral matter to do what they wanted it to do, engineers and scientists 
made use of techniques already devised in “advanced” Western countries while 
simultaneously claiming the superiority of socialist industrialization at conquering nature 
in extreme realms. The project scheme for the enrichment factory in particular utilized 
information obtained from abroad. The initial plan of fully constructing this object during 
1930 quickly staggered as chemists at Mekhanobr and NIU realized that they could not 
produce high enough concentrations of phosphorous pentoxide from apatite-nepheline 
ore for superphosphate through selective crushing: a method in which only specific, 
apatite-rich segments of the mined material underwent additional chemical processing to 
make superphosphate. Enterprise and state planners therefore turned to an enrichment 
technique based on the flotation method, which involved pulverizing most of the 
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removed ore and then separating the contents in liquid solutions.147 In order to figure out 
the specifics of this technique, Apatit sent V. Iu. Brandt and G. F. Smirnov to a 
consultation visit with General Engineering Company—a copper company in Salt Lake 
City. Relying on international expertise and purchases of foreign equipment, the Apatit 
trust brought the first phase of the enrichment factory into operation in September 1931 
and the second phase in 1934.148 
Yet, when faced with criticism or competition from abroad, industrial planners in 
the Khibiny insisted on the superiority of socialist industrialization over capitalism. The 
apatite operations in the Khibiny region allowed the Soviet Union to transition from an 
importer to a major exporter of superphosphate, but not without controversy.149 For 
instance, in July 1930 a shipment from the Kola Peninsula arrived with contaminated 
apatite and caused foreign buyers to cancel their orders.150 Around the same time a 
German specialist on phosphates named Krügel questioned whether it would actually be 
possible to enrich Khibiny apatite into usable superphosphate and discouraged foreign 
companies from buying from the Soviet Union.151 The Kola press responded by 
denouncing Krügel as a “bourgeois specialist” who “defends Moroccan phosphorous.”152 
The successful enrichment of Khibiny apatite allowed newspapers to claim a unique 
ability of the Soviet state to industrialize extreme environments. In October 1932 
Khibinogorsk Worker proclaimed, “Overcoming the ‘unfavorable climate,’ we 
successfully capture the natural resources wasting away in the earth above the polar 
circle. We build a large mining and chemical industry in the far north.”153 
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Within the Soviet Union as a whole the new industrial settlement on the Kola 
Peninsula began to fulfill its role as an extraction periphery. Nature on this spatial scale 
functioned primarily as a production unit: a resource to be taken from the earth at 
maximally increasing levels and put to use elsewhere in the country. In this case 
phosphorous-rich apatite mined and processed in the Khibiny supplied fertilizer factories 
throughout the country such as the ones in Leningrad, Vinnitsk, Odessa, and 
Konstantinovsk, and then farms applied these fertilizers in agricultural regions.154 In 
1934, 77% of the superphospate used in the Soviet Union came from apatite.155 In 
contrast to capitalist economies, the form of state-socialist economic organization being 
innovated by the Soviet Union in this period relied less on revenue accrued by an 
enterprise than on gross production. This privileging of output over profitability was 
especially pronounced in new industry towns like Khibinogorsk/Kirovsk where the entire 
project was designed to achieve self-sufficiency in a certain economic sector.156 
The Apatit trust attempted to implement this use of the Khibiny to serve the 
national economy by stridently increasing production output to meet rising quotas during 
the next two five-year plans. This expansion included building the second and third 
phases of the enrichment factory. At the mine it also entailed mechanizing work with 
drills powered by compressed air, rearranging the transportation scheme from the mines 
to the enrichment factory, commencing underground mining, and undertaking 
preliminary efforts to ventilate these new shafts.157 In the late 1930s Apatit also began 
small-scale mining and enrichment of radioactive lovchorrite, titanium, and nepheline.158 
Though the enterprise failed to meet production quotas in 1931 and 1932 and never 
matched the tempo of some of the early projections, it did raise output consistently 
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throughout the 1930s (see Table 4).159 By the end of the decade, miners had extracted 
over 13.5 million tons of apatite-nepheline ore and the enrichment factory had produced 
6.5 million tons of apatite concentrate. 
Table 4. Reported Annual Production Output of Apatit in the 1930s160 
 1929-
1930 
1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 
Apatite-
nepheline 
ore mined 
(1,000 
tons) 
 
250 
 
416 
 
385 
 
687 
 
1,117 
 
1,600 
 
2,001 
 
2,121 
 
2,303 
 
2,627 
Apatite 
concentrate 
produced  
(1,000 
tons) 
 
-- 
 
18.3 
 
157.3 
 
213 
 
400 
 
768 
 
1,049 
 
1,157 
 
>1,300 
 
1,460 
 
Within the context of the Kola Peninsula the expansion of Apatit helped direct the 
process of regional development—a continuation of the campaign to transform the 
territory from a supposedly wild and backward hinterland to a strategic industrial center. 
Over the decade the population of the Kola Peninsula rose to almost 300,000, the fishing 
industry out of the Murmansk port grew astronomically, the government established the 
Northern Fleet of the Soviet Navy on the Barents Sea in 1934, and the corridor of the 
Murmansk Railroad on the Kola Peninsula became a center of mining, non-ferrous 
metallurgy, hydroelectricity, and chemical processing. Apatit provided the foundation for 
this latter development.161 Through the first half of the 1930s, the trust managed the 
initial projects for a chemical and aluminum processing plant in Kandalaksha on the 
White Sea, a nickel mining and smelting combine called Severonikel´ on the west side of 
Lake Imandra, and hydroelectric power plants along the Niva and Tuloma rivers.162 
Kondrikov himself directed most of these entities for a period and in 1936 headed a new 
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enterprise called Kol´stroi, which was solely focused on regional construction for 
industry. Of course, his tenure here and as director of the nearby Severonikel´ combine 
was short. Like many of the local party and industry leaders he was arrested and shot 
during 1937. 163 
Environmental Impediments  
From the very beginning the organizers of mining in the Khibiny Mountains 
grappled with the obstacles posed by the polar-alpine environment. The agricultural 
infertility of the land, darkness of the polar night, the seasonal influx of mosquitoes, and 
meteorological occurrences such as heavy snowfall and avalanches concerned the leaders 
of the Apatit trust and others involved in the Khibiny economy. Their attempts to 
overcome these hindrances and the ways that nature could foil their efforts reveal a 
complex field of interaction. These impediments of the polar environment often occurred 
with some semblance of predictability and their consequences could be extremely 
dangerous. Human efforts to ameliorate hazards and accommodate distinct natural 
limitations sometimes succeeded and sometimes floundered.     
The Soviet state managed to establish the cultivation of certain crops north of the 
Arctic Circle. In late imperial Russia many people suspected that the cultivation of 
grains, vegetables, and grasses needed for feeding livestock was impossible at such 
latitudes.164 This conviction found support in common sense about the lack of farming in 
these territories. The theories of Vasilii Dokuchaev about vegetation zones and Austrian 
botanist Gottlieb Haberlandt about the minimal exposure to warmth required for many 
plants to grow also dissuaded people of the possibility of polar agriculture and limited 
experimentation.165 In the early 1920s the Khibiny Experimental Agricultural Point was 
organized under the leadership of Iogan Eikhfel´d in order to establish the possibility of 
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cultivating crops in the north.166 Their tests quickly refuted the hypothesis about warmth 
as a limiting factor and suggested that a lack of moisture and suitable soil on the rocky 
Kola Peninsula played a much larger role in curtailing the region’s agricultural 
development. The station succeeded in growing a few types of a variety of crops: 
potatoes, cereals, grains, grasses, cabbage, peas, lettuce, and others.167 It also assisted 
Apatit by helping establish the suitability of Khibiny minerals as fertilizers.168  
Apatit also created the state farm Industriia to help provide food for the new 
northern settlement. Acknowledging that growing grains was not a viable option, 
Industriia concentrated on milk and vegetable production. Both of these tasks required 
that the state farm transform the land of the Kola Peninsula. During the 1930s, the 
agricultural establishments of the Khibiny region performed land reclamation on a large 
territory of marshland, put 1634.9 hectares under cultivation, and yielded a harvest of 
6295 tons of potatoes, vegetables, and edible roots in 1939.169 Furthermore, the 
development of non-pastoral animal husbandry depended on the creation of grassland 
pastures. To this end agricultural organizations in the Khibiny drained marshes and 
planted 1244.4 hectares of grass during the 1930s, which allowed Industriia to keep 
cattle, horses, and pigs.170 These experiments with local food production, nevertheless, 
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remained of secondary importance in the overall scheme of regional economic 
development. The possibility of the comparatively cheap importation of food combined 
with the environmental impediments to agriculture in the polar north limited the 
transformation of land for this purpose. 
The Polar-Alpine Botanical Garden also endeavored to make the Khibiny 
environment more accommodating to human use. Created in 1932 and led by Nikolai 
Avrorin, this institution had the specific goal of introducing new flora to the region. The 
botanical garden concentrated on characteristics that made the region’s environment 
unique—its polarity and high altitude—and began testing different species of plants, 
trees, and bushes to see if and under what conditions they could grow there.171 An astute 
promoter of the practical value of his research, Avrorin from the beginning stressed the 
garden’s cultural value. He argued that the botanical garden was part of “a wide front of 
the struggle for succulent meadows (tuchnye pokosy), unprecedented berry gardens, 
splendid parks, and a healthy and comfortable life for the laborers of the socialist 
north!”172 Throughout the next few decades, the botanical garden put particular effort into 
the greening of Kirovsk through the introduction of acclimatized species.173 In a 1941 
handbook outlining how cities in the polar north could create green spaces, Avrorin 
specifically connected the research of the Polar-Alpine Botanical Garden to the 
Lamarckian science of agronomist Trofim Lysenko.174  
Responses to environmental impediments related to seasonal variation came more 
in the form of attempts to accommodate nature rather than transform it. Every year the 
Khibiny region experienced several weeks around the winter solstice when the sun did 
not rise above the horizon and over a month and half in the summer without darkness at 
                                                
171 N. A. Avrorin, Poliarno-al´piiskii botanicheskii sad v khibinakh (proekt) (Leningrad: 
Izdatel´stvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1931); Petrova, Salimova, and Podgorbunskaia, eds., Kirovsk v 
dokumentakh i faktakh,, 81-83; and N. A. Avrorin, “Poliarno-al´piiskii botanicheskii sad,” in Fersman and 
Kupletskii, eds., Khibinskaia gornaia stantsiia, 49-58. 
172 N. A. Avrorin, “Poliarnyi botanicheskii sad v zapoliarnoi tundre,” in Geber, Maizel´, and 
Sedlis, eds., Bol´sheviki pobedili tundru, 170. 
173 Kalinnikov and Vinogradov, “Stanovlenie i razvitie Kol´skogo nauchnogo tsentra RAN kak 
istoricheskii opyt Rossiiskogo puti promyshlennoi tsivilizatsiia severnykh territorii v XX veke,” in 
Kalinnikov, ed., Prirodopol´zovanie v Evro-Arkticheskom regione, 5-6; N. A. Avrorin, Chem ozeleniat´ 
goroda i poselki Murmanskoi oblasti i severnykh raionov Karelo-Finskoi SSR (Kirovsk: Izdanie 
Ispolnitel´nogo Komiteta Murmanskogo oblastnogo Soveta deputatov trudiashchikhsia, 1941); and GAMO, 
f. 773, op. 1, d. 52, l. 506. 
174 Avrorin, Chem ozeleniat´ goroda i poselki Murmanskoi oblasti i severnykh raionov Karelo-
Finskoi SSR, 4. 
 105 
night. Party and enterprise leaders wanted to figure out how to utilize the advantages of 
the fluctuations in daylight and cope with the disadvantages. The Apatit trust 
concentrated mining work in open pits during the summer in the first year and later 
implemented a regime of three work shifts a day to maintain constant mining.175 In the 
winter the trust and the city relied extensively on artificial light sources, including simple 
torches before a temporary steam-based electric station began to operate in 1931.176 
Regional leaders also sought to understand the effects of such extreme seasonal variation 
on the human population. As part of a health inspection report in 1935, Friliand presented 
preliminary data on the acclimatization of humans to the climatic and geographical 
conditions of Kirovsk. Noting theories that the polar night can cause depression and the 
polar day can lead to insomnia, the inspector rejected the claim that polar seasonality 
harmed human health. He dismissed reported incidents of adverse conditions during these 
periods as part of the process of adaptation.177  
In the late summer and fall mosquitoes caused a great nuisance. As V. Iu. Fridolin 
put it: the mosquitoes of the Khibiny Mountains were “one of the biggest obstacles for 
the colonization of the region” and have been known to kill horses and small children 
through excessive blood loss.178 The mosquitoes in the area were indeed ravenous 
creatures whose brief life span in the Arctic required them to forage and mate quickly and 
aggressively when the opportunity arose.179 A prime concern about mosquitoes, however, 
was the role that they might play in spreading malaria. As a countermeasure the Apatit 
trust and the Malaria Commission of the Zoological Museum of the Academy of Sciences 
sponsored research beginning in the summer of 1930. Fridolin led this study and sought 
to assess the entirety of the mosquito habitat in the Khibiny and the relationship of the 
insects with predators and prey. He argued against a standard belief at the time that the 
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draining of marshes was the primary tactic in the ‘struggle with mosquitoes.’ Fridolin 
showed that drainage of certain peat bogs and marshes could alter the hydrology of the 
area and cause new moist zones to emerge. The drainage of black poplar marshes, in 
particular, could actually increase the mosquito population by destroying the larvae of 
dragonflies, one of the few local predators.180 The main finding of this research on 
Khibiny mosquitoes, however, was that they do not carry malaria.181 The inability of the 
protozoan parasites that cause the disease to thrive in such cold environments ameliorated 
this threat to industrial projects on the Kola Peninsula.182 
As mentioned earlier, avalanches plagued the Khibiny region in the 1930s. From 
1933 to 1938 observers recorded about three hundred avalanches of 200 cubic meters or 
more.183 These avalanches destroyed buildings and caused injuries and death, including 
that of two miners in 1934 and the tragedy on Mount Iuksporr in 1935.184 Part of the 
immediate response to the latter event was to create an avalanche prevention service 
headed by Pronchenko, an exploration geologist and secretary of a local Communist 
Party cell.185 In late December Pronchenko wrote about the work that the monitoring 
crew had done in his diary: “the gusty wind from the snow storm covers the eyes, hits the 
forehead and cheeks, and prevents [you] from moving forward. All around only a 
blizzard whizzes. … Climb up in the blizzard under overhanging rocks and cornices of 
snow! What do you do? – the people of the settlement live in constant fear.”186 The next 
day, according to Fersman’s stylized account, Pronchenko was back out monitoring the 
snow on Iuksporr and shouted out his last words to other members of the team: 
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“Avalanche, avalanche, watch out!”187 His death under tumbling snow secured him a 
place as a hero in local lore.  
The reaction to the considerable loss of life during the winter of 1935-1936 
entailed several strategies in the invigorated ‘struggle with avalanches.’ Local scientific 
organizations devoted more energy to the study of the phenomenon by establishing a 
permanent meteorological base on Iuksporr, holding conferences to discuss the issue, 
researching the morphological dynamics of snow cover, and attempting to determine 
zones most prone to avalanches.188 The city allocated more money to the construction of 
stone buildings that could better withstand the tumbling snow and rocks and to the 
erection of four-meter high walls protecting the settlements.189 The leaders at the Apatit 
trust were in a more ambiguous position since the explosions they were using in mining 
exacerbated the problem. The enterprise established a snow service, began to use 
controlled explosions to reduce the randomness of avalanches, and instituted new safety 
requirements for mining work.190 At a party meeting of miners in February 1938 after 
another avalanche, the depth of the tension over these phenomena was apparent. The 
bosses at the mine had refused to clear the work site as called for by protocol after wind 
speeds exceeded 10 meters per second (22.4 miles per hour). Still in the crux of the terror 
within the Communist Party, attendees denounced enemies of the people as responsible 
and reported the spread of rumors that the Bolsheviks had intentionally killed people.191 
That same year Apatit had to stop operating its lovchorrite mine on Mount Iuksporr 
because of frequent avalanches.192 In the long run the efforts to mitigate injuries and 
damage from avalanches in the Khibiny Mountains paid off.  By the 1950s and 1960s 
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people had learned to accommodate these natural occurrences and largely avoid the 
catastrophic consequences of the 1930s.193  
The Waste that Does Everything and Nothing 
Some of the planners of this project in the far north made strident efforts to 
manage industrial waste as resourcefully as possible. The dominant idea behind this 
approach was referred to as the complex utilization of natural resources, and the main 
materials subjected to such schemes were the nepheline by-products from apatite mining 
and enrichment. The story of nepheline in the Khibiny reveals some striking aspects of 
Stalinist economic transformation. First, the Soviet economy in this period had a 
conservationist strand in its approach to wastes from industry. The revolutionary hopes of 
building socialism helped inspire it and some of the particularities of the emerging 
centralized command economy allowed for it to be pursued initially. Additionally, the 
impulse maximally to reuse certain mining by-products and reduce pollution coexisted 
comfortably with the idea of harmoniously transforming nature. Finally, nepheline itself 
first inspired the elaboration of this grand design to utilize all elements of extracted 
mineral ore and then inhibited its realization.  
As geologists and local enthusiasts began to get excited about the possibilities of 
apatite development in the 1920s, they simultaneously turned to another nagging 
question: What should be done with the massive amounts of nepheline in the area?194  
The bulk of the Khibiny Mountains was a large igneous intrusion of this rock form, 
making the reserves of nepheline in the region seem “inexhaustible” to many 
commentators.195 Nepheline in the Khibiny occurs as nepheline seynite, an alkaline rock 
containing sodium, potassium, aluminum, and silicon. Unlike the deposits of apatite that 
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existed in isolated slivers along a narrow ring that could quickly and fairly cheaply be 
transformed into fertilizers, nepheline did not have an industrial significance that would 
have warranted building a settlement from scratch. However, its potential status as 
subsidiary material inspired scientists and industrial planners to outline its multifarious 
uses.196  
Four different forms of nepheline were of interest. The mass of urtite (nepheline 
seynite) outside the apatite deposits could in theory be used to make a whole array of 
nepheline products but would be economically inexpedient. The nepheline sands on the 
eastern shore of Lake Imandra could serve the glass, ceramic, and porcelain industries. 
However, the supply of these sands came to only 5 million tons, a relatively small total. 
The main forms of nepheline that attracted attention were the sections of mined apatite-
nepheline ore that were not suitable for processing as phosphates and the tailings from 
apatite enrichment that contained 70-75% nepheline and, barring reuse, would be dumped 
into the White River.197 Breaking down the chemical structure of Khibiny nepheline to 
21-22% alkaline, 34% alumina (aluminum oxide), and 44% silicon dioxide, Fersman 
elucidated twenty-three different uses for these molecular agents.198 The most important 
of these possibilities was the potential use of nepheline as an alumina source.199 
Throughout the 1930s the Apatit trust endeavored to transform the nepheline wastes it 
produced into a source material for the aluminum industry. 
The main framework of industrial waste management advocated by planners of 
the Khibiny project entailed what they called the “complex utilization” of natural 
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resources.  This model sought to use maximally all of the material removed from the 
earth and develop industry that would achieve regional self-sufficiency. The idea of 
complex utilization developed through the practical work of scientists like Ferman with 
Khibiny nepheline.200 At a Gosplan conference in April 1932, Fersman defined a 
combined economy as resting “not in the external combining or the summation of diverse 
manufacture, united only by a determined territory or in the best case by a general power 
and energy economy, but in the deep interweaving of production processes, depending on 
the complete use of all mining mass extracted from the earth during the maximum 
constriction of the radius of use of raw materials.”201 As his main example of this model, 
he cited the apatite industry he had helped create in the Khibiny Mountains.202 He further 
described how this complex utilization of mineral material would rely on technological 
innovations in heavy industry processing and the recycling of tailings from enrichment in 
order to manufacture other valuable products.  
Fersman’s optimism about the potential of this model in a planned socialist 
economy came through especially when he turned to its environmental implications. 
Complex utilization “is the idea of the protection of our natural resources from their 
predatory squandering, the idea of using raw material to the end, the idea of the possible 
preservation of our natural supplies for the future,” exclaimed Fersman, “where not one 
gram of extracted mining mass is lost, where there is not one gram of waste, where 
nothing is emitted into the air and washed away by water.”203 The goal of complex 
utilization in the Khibiny, therefore, was not only to use mined ore efficiently, but also to 
prevent nepheline waste from polluting the local environment. 
This idea of industrial production that was maximally efficient with the raw 
materials extracted from the earth and minimized nepheline waste and pollution inspired 
the initial planning and modes of expansion pursued by trust leaders. In December 1929, 
before the basic plans for the project had even been worked out, Kondrikov pressed the 
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issue of the potential applications of nepheline.204 The next year Vorontsov justified 
dumping nepheline tailings into the White River as a temporary measure until 
reprocessing began.205 From 1931 onward the Apatit trust became involved in a 
protracted campaign to turn nepheline wastes into a source material for aluminum 
production and to create a processing plant in nearby Kandalaksha. Near the end of the 
year trust leaders estimated that they could gradually increase their annual output of 
nepheline concentrate from tailings from 140,000 tons in 1933 to 750,000 in 1937, 
providing enough material for almost a half million tons of alumina over this period.206 In 
February 1932, various agencies involved in the project protested a decision to place the 
alumina plant under the Aluminum Union of the Main Administration of Non-Ferrous 
Metallurgy of the NKTP, taking it away from Apatit.207 In a complaint that would reach 
Stalin, one chemist objected to this move because it would separate aluminum production 
from the “complex utilization of the minerals of the Khibiny.”208 A few months later, in 
May 1932, the issue was solved for the time being when the state transferred Apatit to the 
NKTP and allocated it approximately 17 million rubles for the construction of the new 
combine.209 At the time dubbed the Northern Chemical Combine, the facility was planned 
to have three main sections—cement, thermophosphate, and alumina—that would 
process materials extracted from the Khibiny.210  
The processing of nepheline tailings into alumina was uncommon. Bauxite was 
and has remained the primary source material of the aluminum industry globally. Rich 
deposits of bauxite rock contain up to 40-60% of alumina and the main process for 
isolating this substance has been used since the late nineteenth century.211 The Soviet 
Union, however, had a comparative dearth of this raw material that was especially stark 
before low-grade deposits of it just south of Lake Ladoga in the Leningrad region began 
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to be exploited in 1931.212 Though alumina production required a significantly larger 
amount of nepheline than bauxite (four tons of nepheline concentrate per ton of alumina), 
the process created several useful by-products: cement, soda ash (sodium carbonate for 
glass manufacture), and potash (a form of potassium carbonate that can be applied as a 
fertilizer).213 The value of these substances figured into the calculations that advocates of 
re-processing nepheline tailings at Apatit made to demonstrate its economic viability. The 
main obstacle to using this method was the lack of limestone (needed as a reagent) in the 
region and the transportation and energy costs associated with the manufacturing 
scheme.214 These negative factors ultimately made alumina production from nepheline 
more expensive. Nevertheless, a combination of concern over a lack of bauxite sources 
and attraction to processing technology that minimized waste and maximized the output 
of an array of products inspired initial investment in the construction of a new 
combine.215 It is likely that an economy primarily concerned with profit instead of output 
would not have embraced this path of waste recycling for nepheline. 
 After the initial decision to build a chemical combine in Kandalaksha, the project 
faltered. State agencies refused further funding requests from the trust, allocating only 
one-fifth of the proposed amount for 1932-1935. During this period none of the main 
industrial objects was built and the surveying for local limestone sources had come to 
naught. 216 The discovery of new rich bauxite deposits in the Urals in the mid-1930s 
strengthened the position of the segments of the non-ferrous metallurgy industry that 
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opposed using nepheline.217 Nevertheless, engineers and consultants for the trust 
continued to promote research on nepheline and in 1935 succeeded in getting an alumina 
plant in Volkhov, outside of Leningrad and near a limestone quarry, to convert to using 
nepheline concentrate.218 G. F. Solov´ianov enthused about this time that “the only raw 
material source able to play a decisive role as a substitute of the world aluminum industry 
is Soviet /Kola/ nepheline.”219 At this point, as Apatit began to pay some attention to the 
effects of dumping in the White River, the enterprise commenced construction on a 
nepheline enrichment facility to produce nepheline concentrate out of tailings.220 A full-
capacity, combined apatite and nepheline enrichment factory, initially begun in 1933, 
went into operation in 1939 and that year construction began on a redesigned aluminum 
refinement plant (producing aluminum from alumina and not alumina from nepheline) in 
Kandalaksha.221 Limestone’s presence and absence partially determined this alteration. 
As the project began moving again in the mid-1930s and the development of the 
nearby nickel industry was underway, researchers and enterprise leaders searched for 
additional applications for nepheline waste. In 1935 a controversy arose as Apatit 
attempted to sell nepheline concentrate as a coagulant for water purification and the State 
Sanitation Inspectorate prohibited this use. The agency was concerned about the 
relationship between the purifying fluorine and the potentially poisonous phosphorous 
anhydride in Khibiny apatite and forced the enterprise to continue testing before giving 
its approval.222 At a meeting of a bureau of the scientific research sector of the NKTP in 
January 1936 devoted to “the questions of the complex utilization of Khibiny apatite-
nepheline ore” attendees passed several resolutions. One endorsed the construction of a 
new factory in Leningrad, “Red Chemist,” that would process alumina from nepheline 
with sulfuric acid. Others called for the State Institute of Applied Chemistry (GIPKh) to 
devise a chlorination method for processing nickel and copper ore, to examine the 
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potential use of chlorine as a gas, to research applications of tailings from nickel and 
copper processing, and to study the enrichment of rare minerals in the region.223  
During this meeting, the participants joked playfully about the entire issue of 
reusing industrial wastes and revealed some of their thinking about the problem. For 
instance, Kondrikov quipped, mocking opponents of complex utilization, “it is the same 
in heavy industry. ‘Yes ‘the tails of bulls’ interest me’ /laughter/. ‘And only them. But I 
do not need the ‘bull.’’ And let’s end this business. Here and now. They want to receive 
refined alumina and to the 'holy mother' with everything else.”224 After explaining the 
need for more research on a chlorination method of nickel processing that would utilize 
nepheline tailings, A. N. Kuznetsov of the GIPKh told Kondrikov to build the factory 
with old methods if it was so pressing. To this comment Kondrikov replied, “We will 
leave all the dumping mounds and save them (otvaly) /laughter/” and Kuznetsov retorted, 
“Please. I collect all kinds of trash.”225 While continuing in a jovial vein, Kondrikov did 
blurt out the crux of the issue from the perspective of Apatit: the need for the 
“modernization of methods” as ore qualities fall and that the issue is “not how to throw it 
away, but how to use it.”226 The overall disposition that was displayed at this meeting of 
Soviet industry demonstrates the convictions both that minimizing industrial waste was 
inherently economical and that human manipulation would eventually be able to get 
nature to do what they wanted it to do. 
In the long run, we can judge Fersman’s environmentally hopeful vision of the 
complex utilization of nepheline as a failure. The nepheline tailings produced by apatite 
production never came close to being completely reused and the dumping of them in the 
White River continued for many years, supposedly turning the water literally white by the 
late 1930s.227 Apatit produced very little nepheline concentrate before the Second World 
War devastated Kola industry. Two alumina plants south of Lake Ladoga, Volkhov and 
Pikalevo, began using Khibiny nepheline in 1949 and 1959, respectively, and the 
Kandalaksha Aluminum Factory finally opened in 1951.228 As production figures for 
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apatite concentrate grew astronomically, thereby creating an equivalently large amount of 
nepheline tailings, the amount of nepheline concentrate manufactured by the trust 
staggered, only reaching the level of 750,000 tons a year that had been estimated for 1937 
in the 1960s.229 To the chagrin of Apatit the country’s aluminum industry remained more 
attracted to the idea of importing foreign bauxite than increasing processing with 
nepheline after Soviet bauxite sources began to dwindle in the 1970s and 1980s.230 
Through that time only around 15% of the nepheline wastes created by the mining and 
processing of Kola apatite were used to make nepheline concentrate; the rest of it was 
either discharged into local waterways or placed in one of several tailing dumps 
(khvostokhranilishcha).231 Until 1957 the company poured unfiltered wet tailings into the 
White River and continued to pollute this waterway on a large scale after this point. The 
three dry tailing dumps eventually filled and became point sources for hazardous dust.232  
By 2002, one scientist estimated that half a billion tons of nepheline sat in these tailing 
dumps and still spoke of the possibility of someday processing aluminum from these 
wastes.233 Another scholar made a more critical estimate in 2004, putting this figure at 
close to 900 million tons and additionally noting that over half of the 3 billion tons of ore 
(over a cubic kilometer in area) extracted from the Khibiny Mountains remained in rock 
heaps near the mines.234 This estimation would mean that at most 20% of the material 
taken from the mountains had been transformed into an industrial product. 
But why were so many grams of extracted mining mass lost, so many grams of 
waste produced, and so much emitted into the air and washed away by water? An 
explanation focusing solely on human intentions and economic logics misses the fact that 
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nepheline rock was not passive in this process. Nepheline’s potential as both a pollutant 
and aluminum source inspired the schemes of complex utilization to turn it into the latter, 
but its intractability hindered these plans and resulted in it primarily functioning as an 
agent of environmental destruction. The point here is not that political and economic will 
could not have overcome nepheline’s recalcitrance, but that in this case they did not. 
Though the behavior of mineral ore does not explain the human craving for industrial 
production in the Khibiny, it does reveal both part of the origin of these environmental 
hopes during Stalinist industrialization and an important reason why they did not come to 
fruition. 
Confronting Pollution 
To a surprising extent, the leaders of Apatit in the 1930s knew about the problems 
being caused by air and water pollution and made some attempts, albeit often impotent 
and half-hearted, to address these issues. Different groups within the state apparatus 
carved out divergent positions: sanitation inspectors were the most concerned; local 
government leaders worried about the impact on human health; scientists seemed eager to 
extend their expertise into further realms; and enterprise leaders defended the measures 
they had taken and resisted new ones. If the promotion of complex utilization reflected 
the environmental optimism of Stalinist modernization, debates about pollution in the 
1930s pointed more to the contradictions that abided in Soviet socialism between efforts 
to render nature economically useful and attempts to harmonize humans’ relationships 
with the environment. 
The issue of pollution came to the forefront as state planners began devising a 
scheme to expand the city of Khibinogorsk in the fall of 1934, raising the population of 
the town and the mining settlements at Kikusvumchorr and Iuksporiok to 68,000.235 
Concerns about this proposal spread through planning bureaucracies at the city, regional, 
republic, and state levels. A number of agencies expressed concern about remedying the 
poor organization of the water system, preserving the remaining green areas in the city, 
reducing dust in town created by the enrichment factory, and closing or moving an 
experimental phosphorous factory that had been in operation since 1933.236 A report of 
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V. E. Lebedeva of the Main State Sanitation Inspection of the RSFSR from January 25, 
1935 sent to Apatit and other organizations was particularly explicit.237 The report 
claimed that overall, Kirovsk was a difficult place in which to arrange good sanitary 
conditions. She noted that currently a layer of dust sat on top of the roofs and steps of 
buildings and had begun to kill coniferous trees. She suggested installing new electric 
filters at the enrichment factory and greening the area to bulwark air quality, but 
acknowledged that the location of the enrichment facility meant that it would continue to 
represent “definite insalubrities for the city.”238 Lebedeva also called on Apatit to filter 
out “resinous substances and kerosene” from the water it dumped. These materials “can 
spoil the water of the lake and kill the fish it has there. The White River itself might turn 
into a canal of liquid sewage.”239 The report advocated that the location of the town’s 
food combine, currently in close proximity to sources of water and air pollution, should 
be changed. It also predicted that the conversion of the mines at Kukisvumchorr and 
Iuksporiok to underground work would raise new possibilities for polluting the water 
supply.240 
A major topic discussed in this report and by others in this period was the 
experimental phosphorous factory a half kilometer from the mining settlement of 
Iuksporiok. Lebedeva claimed it was “a source of extraordinarily dangerous water and 
air” because of its phosphorous discharges.241 The trust decided to build this installation 
quite close to a site that had been rejected for the apatite enrichment factory because of 
the stated need to maintain Great Vud˝iavr as a safe source for drinking and industrial 
water.242 After only a few years of operation the phosphorous factory had already begun 
to deplete the fish population in the ostensibly protected Great Vud˝iavr Lake and gases 
such as carbon monoxide threatened human health.243 In March 1935 an engineer for 
Apatit, upon noticing a stench from the water in the Iuksporr valley, tested samples and 
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established the presence of the poisonous phosphine (PH3).244 He insisted that immediate 
action should be taken to reduce this hazard. 
Despite the litany of environmental problems with the proposed expansion of 
Apatit, the State Sanitation Inspection of the RSFSR concluded that it did not need to 
oppose it if certain issues were addressed.245 Shortly thereafter Gosplan of the RSFSR 
approved the expansion. The resolution highlighted the priority of increasing production 
at the Kikusvumchorr mine to 4 million tons and at the Iuksporr mine to 2 million tons.246 
The Council of People’s Commissars of the RSFSR also approved the project and 
supported the request of the recently renamed Kirovsk City Council for comprehensive 
research into potential sources for the water supply, the purification of industrial and 
fecal wastewaters, sewer construction, and the preservation of the existing green areas in 
the city.247 
Controversy over pollution soon appeared again. At a meeting of local party and 
enterprise leaders on April 8, 1935, it was clear that concern about dust and poisonous 
drinking water circulated throughout the city. At a gathering of the Society of Regional 
Studies the previous evening there was what one critical attendee called “unwarranted 
racket” about the water quality of Great Vud˝iavr.248 S. I. Vol´fkovich presented some of 
the preliminary results of an ongoing government study that indicated that sewage water 
from the phosphorous factory was reaching Great Vud˝iavr. Though the present levels 
seemed safe, the enterprise urgently needed to purify the industrial sewage from the 
phosphorous factory and add fluorine to the water, which could oxidize and stabilize 
phosphorous substances.249 Fridliand focused his comments on dust from the enrichment 
and phosphorous factories. He claimed that these particles could cause tuberculosis. 
Encouraging ventilation measures on the work sites, Fridliand concluded: “if we do not 
take sanitary (ozdorovitel´nykh) measures, there will be poisoning.”250 Other speakers 
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brought up the failure of the enterprise to build the planned sewage system and the 
general location of the city as factors exacerbating the effects of pollution.251 
The dominant voices at this meeting, especially those from Apatit, ignored the 
reports of Vol´fkovich and Fridliand and the recent discovery of toxic phosphine in the 
water. They emphasized the uncertainty about the issue as a means of dismissing its 
seriousness. One obstreperous speaker, Isakov, retorted that raising concern over the 
issue before the completion of testing in August was “indecent” if not “politically 
disloyal.” He reported that he was receiving calls day and night about phosphorous in the 
water and that “panic is already beginning to be felt” in the city. Though he used the lack 
of thorough knowledge about pollution to depict discussion of this environmental issue as 
dangerous in a borderland region, Isakov also was quick to evoke his own subjective 
impression to dismiss the issue. “But in the meantime the drinking water from Vud˝iavr 
in my opinion does not represent a danger in relation to poisoning. People not only 
haven’t been poisoned, but over the last two years our mortality rate has not 
increased.”252 The technical director of Apatit’s enrichment factory, A. L. Kasparov, 
employed a similar tactic in dismissing the consequences of air pollution. He noted that 
he felt fine after four years there, including two years when filters were not being used at 
all.253 
Kondrikov had the last word at this meeting and displayed impatience with all of 
the criticism being leveled. Responding to the notion that the location of the city was less 
than ideal, Kondrikov defended the choice as preferable given other issues such as 
transportation and the availability of a water source. For him air and water quality were 
subsidiary issues in a totalistic vision of industrial planning; improving housing and 
establishing conditions to make the city attractive to potential workers were more 
important.254 The manager also defended the dust-collecting filters they were currently 
using as more effective than anticipated and argued that the long winter and icy 
conditions there helped prevent the dispersal of the dust already emitted.255 On the issue 
of the potential contamination of water with an active form of phosphorous, he was 
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bombastic in his refutations. He expressed skepticism that the concerns about the health 
effects of this pollution were legitimate.256 He forcefully stated the position of Apatit:  
In regard to the question of the water supply. Above all the issue being pushed by 
the Health Protection and Sanitation Inspections is that perhaps something will 
happen. … Well, you know, perhaps the Kola Peninsula will collapse and we will 
not extract apatite then. Give figures. If we ourselves do not understand, then the 
issue needs to be put before an authoritative commission and not confessed to all 
gods, not confessed at all intersections. All analyses need to be checked 
thoroughly. Do not speak of an off-chance because for an off-chance we will not 
give one kopeck.257 
There is something interesting going on here. Kondrikov’s response displayed a typical 
opportunistic employment of uncertainty in the face of environmental problems that one 
might expect from captains of industry in many political-economic systems. Uncertainty 
about problems more closely tied to production in the short-term would not have justified 
such inertness.  
Though the response of Apatit to concerns being raised about pollution 
demonstrated that it was indeed a low priority and that its leaders attempted to avoid 
some of these new tasks, the enterprise did take some actions. Over the next few years it 
funded more organized greening campaigns, a ventilation system in the underground 
mines, and new construction at the enrichment facilities partially as means of reducing 
the effects of industrial dust.258 Management and consulting agencies discussed the idea 
of reusing water during the enrichment process.259 Apatit also looked into using Little 
Vud˝iavr Lake as a new drinking water source and sought more investment in the sewer 
system.260 These measures reveal that the idea of building a new socialist city where 
humans would be in harmony with the environment maintained some salience in these 
echelons. However, the fact that Apatit continued to fund the experimental phosphorous 
factory, thereby potentially poisoning the water originally intended for drinking, speaks 
of an inability of this form of industrial modernization to do what advocates claimed it 
would.261  
                                                
256 GAMO, f. 773, op. 1, d. 51, ll. 305-306. 
257 GAMO, f. 773, op. 1, d. 51, l. 305. 
258 GAMO, f. 773, op. 1, d. 52, l. 506; GAMO, f. 773, op. 1, d. 55, l. 241; and GAMO, f. 773, op. 
1, d. 63, ll. 162-169. 
259 GAMO, f. 773, op. 1, d. 55, ll. 388ob, 442-443. 
260 GAMO, f. 773, op. 1, d. 55, l. 256. 
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Several scientists involved in the economic development of the Khibiny region 
continued to think creatively about environmental protection in the late 1930s. 
Geographer Gavriil Rikhter studied the internal water system of the Kola Peninsula in 
these years and urged further research on the relationship between aquatic organisms and 
pollution. He proposed that a general plan for the “complex utilization” of water 
resources needed to be devised to balance industrial, municipal, and ecosystem needs.262 
Fersman, typically, was quite ambitious when he turned to the issue. In an unpublished 
essay on nature protection on the Kola Peninsula from 1940, he advocated the 
preservation of water bodies near industry, the reduction of dust from processing, the 
complete use of mined apatite-nepheline ore, and the establishment of new nature 
reserves in the area. He sought to explain how putative impediments of the local climate 
such as wind, high tides, snow cover, the polar sun, and low temperatures could serve the 
region’s energy economy, allow for certain technological innovations, and provide 
unique transportation opportunities.263 
In contrast to this continued environmental optimism, Fridolin offered a bleak 
assessment of the anthropogenic loads that apatite production was having on the Khibiny 
ecosystem in December 1938. Every year, Fridolin reported, sections of forested land 
near Little Vud˝iavr were being cut or burned.264 Economically valuable fish such as 
salmon (losos´) that require fresh water rich in oxygen became threatened by industrial 
activity after 1932. “But since this time factory sewage waters in particular and the 
abundant concentration of thin dust of crushed apatite has so changed the character of the 
previously absolutely pure and typical mountain lake Great Vud˝iavr, on the shore of 
which the city Kirovsk is located, that the large fish that were found there earlier already 
do not live there.”265 The dust from apatite production, which despite the efforts of the 
enterprise’s engineers already had become concentrated so thickly that it blocked sunlight 
“like during a forest fire,” accumulated on leaves of nearby flora and disturbed their 
normal functions.266 In the longer term the cramped landscape of Kirovsk prevented the 
expansion of the city from ever reaching the 68,000 inhabitants discussed in 1934-1935. 
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The significant increase in the population of the socialist settlement and the production 
capacity of the company in the 1950s and 1960s required building the new town of 
Apatity twenty kilometers away on a main railroad line and placing a new enrichment 
facility between the two cities.267 
Conclusion 
The rapid creation of a new industrial civilization north of the polar circle in the 
Khibiny Mountains was part of a deliberate effort of the Stalinist political system to 
transform a periphery into a center of socialist modernity. The story of socialist 
construction during the first five-year plan is a familiar one for students of Soviet history. 
In this chapter I have argued that an under-recognized omnipresence of environmental 
factors influenced the essential character of Stalinist modernization.  
I began this chapter by noting that within a cauldron of revolutionary optimism, 
forced labor, and disorganized central planning a seemingly contradictory approach 
toward the environment emerged: one that both embraced the metaphor of nature as an 
object of conquest and also sought to establish a non-destructive harmony between 
humans and the rest of the natural world. I then endeavored to show how this tension 
played out in everything from the visions of the project and its initial organization to the 
dastardly hardships faced by the migrants to the new town and the diverse methods 
employed to cope with environmental problems. Throughout the analysis I strove to 
demonstrate how nature functioned as an actor capable of foiling human designs for it but 
also of acquiescing in the short run to forms of manipulation and exertions of power. The 
specific role of the environment in Stalinist modernization can ultimately be seen in 
several spheres: the attempt to transform territories with the potential for detached 
resource extraction into self-sustained industrial centers; the gap between the assertive 
ideas of mollifying the natural world for human use and the brutal social conditions 
nature helped create; and the way that a combination of a totalistic vision during rapid 
and chaotic industrialization and the unanticipated behavior of nature gave rise to an 
irreconcilable tension between the dictates of maximizing production and those of 
building socialism. 
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Chapter 3. Knowledge Ecologies and Reindeer 
 
The Kola Peninsula, like most Arctic environments, had never been teeming with 
life. Climate and other natural phenomena significantly curtailed the ability for flora to 
grow there and for herbivores to thrive. A large portion of the small number of people 
who lived in the region before the twentieth century relied critically on hunting reindeer 
to maintain their livelihoods. When advocates of modernization turned their attention to 
this territory, this dearth of biomass and the difficulties of cultivating crops led them to 
consider special strategies for making organic nature economically beneficial. Diverse 
forms of ecological knowledge crucially shaped a process of radical transformation of 
human interactions with reindeer during the twentieth century. Attempts to create a 
productive reindeer economy on the Kola Peninsula required more explicit dependence 
on living nature and the participation of non-human animal agents than railroad 
construction and phosphate mining. 
This chapter posits that knowledge about animals, landscapes, and sustenance 
decisively shaped the transformation of Kola reindeer economies through both the 
imposition of abstract frameworks aimed at establishing legibility and the adoption of 
environmental understandings based on experiential interaction with the natural world. 
The elaboration and employment of these forms of knowledge served diverse and 
contradictory political purposes, but on the whole contributed to the emergence of an 
extensively modernized reindeer economy that is also now a site for emphasizing the 
preservation of an alleged tradition. I propose classifying the two powerful modes of 
knowledge production about reindeer as legible and sentient ecologies. They each 
appeared in various manifestations in the ethnic politics of reindeer herders, the economic 
project of making reindeer husbandry productive, and the endeavor of conservation 
scientists to protect wild reindeer.  
Legible ecologies most clearly contributed to the process of modernization. I use 
this term to capture the environmental dimensions of the creation of “legibility” in the 
modern world. Legibility, in James Scott’s rendering, is ultimately a tool for the 
manipulation of societies and nature by states that functions through standardizing, 
simplifying, classifying, abstracting, and making “rational” complex and not entirely 
reducible phenomena. The production of legible knowledge serves state power by 
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enabling it to manage, control, and change society at heightened levels, though these 
efforts at modern transformation have often, Scott insists, failed.1 Environmental 
legibility can occur through the cultivation of carefully maintained timber forests, the 
creation of large reservoirs for dams, or the selective breeding of particular species to 
promote traits that benefit human societies. Departing somewhat from Scott, I venture 
that this form of ecological knowledge was propagated not only by sovereign entities like 
the state but also by a diverse array of actors, including sometimes reindeer herders 
themselves, in promoting the modernist project. On the Kola Peninsula campaigns to 
organize and consolidate herding communities along ethnic lines involved embracing 
rigid categories of national difference and simplistic understandings of herding 
techniques. The efforts to industrialize reindeer herding entailed a bias toward 
monocultural megafauna, which could be predictably monitored. Lastly, scientists sought 
to conserve the local population of wild reindeer by attempting to maintain a pristine 
ecosystem that was minimally modified by people.  
Sentient ecologies yield understandings of specific animals and environments 
through practical, communicative, and tactical involvement with the natural world. David 
Anderson develops this concept in his ethnography of Evenki reindeer herders who “act 
and move on the tundra in such a way that they are conscious that animals and the tundra 
itself are reacting to them.”2 Expanding on Anderson’s theory, Tim Ingold discusses 
sentient ecology as “knowledge not of a formal, authorized kind, transmissible in 
contexts outside those of its practical application. On the contrary, it is based in feeling, 
consisting in the skills, sensitivities and orientations that have developed through long 
experience of conducting one’s life in a particular environment.” This sensitivity and 
responsiveness roughly corresponds to what has been called intuition.3 This ecological 
knowledge is not limited to pastoral communities living in close proximity to animals and 
tundra landscapes. State reformers and scientists also relied on practical experiences, 
interactions, and understandings that are difficult to reduce to abstract reason. As such, 
                                                
1 James Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have 
Failed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998). 
2 David G. Anderson, Identity and Ecology in Arctic Siberia: The Number One Reindeer Brigade 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 116. 
3 Tim Ingold, The Perception of the Environment: Essays in Livelihood, Dwelling, and Skill 
(London: Routledge, 2000), 25. 
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sentient ecological knowledge also constitutes a vital element of modernist 
environmentality. This chapter demonstrates how sentient ecologies informed the process 
of transforming the Kola reindeer economy on multiple scales. Diverse types of 
interaction with reindeer among the Sami, Komi, Nenets, and Russians contributed to the 
nationalization of reindeer herding. The on-the-ground efforts of state agents to reform 
the reindeer economy frequently depended on action that adapted to local social and 
environmental conditions, albeit often in crude and forceful ways. Conservation scientists 
incorporated indigenous insights into their knowledge about wild reindeer populations 
and developed passionate commitments to this particular species. 
The efforts to transform human/reindeer interactions additionally gave rise to the 
imagined traditionalism of pastoralism on the Kola Peninsula. Such traditionalism has 
become a major form of symbolic identity and political capital for the Kola Sami in the 
contemporary world. However, reindeer herding, which is often taken as a traditional 
rural activity today, only became dominant in the region during the twentieth century. 
Historicizing the invention of this tradition demonstrates continuities that connect late 
imperial Russia and most of Soviet history, during which policy makers focused on the 
modernization of the reindeer economy, and tie together the later Soviet era and the post-
communist one, during which reindeer traditionalism received significant emphasis.4 I 
wish to highlight the overall Soviet contribution to the image of reindeer herding as 
traditional, as well as the way that traditionalist symbolism emerged as a manifestation of 
legibility during modernization campaigns. This point agrees with much of the 
anthropological literature about indigenous peoples, and especially reindeer herders, 
living in northern Eurasia.5  
                                                
4 For a classic statement on the invention of tradition, see Eric Hobsbawm and Terrence Ranger, 
eds., The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). 
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Murmansk region, are Anderson, Identity and Ecology in Arctic Siberia; Bruce Grant, In the Soviet House 
of Culture: A Century of Perestroikas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); Caroline Humphrey, 
Marx Went Away but Karl Stayed Behind (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998); Patty A. Gray, 
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The Ethnic Organization of Reindeer Herding 
 The transformation of reindeer/human relations on the Kola Peninsula during the 
twentieth century largely developed through the interaction of different ethnic groups and 
attempts by state reformers to order rural economies in the far north along these lines. 
The politics of ethnic relations on the Kola Peninsula shaped the introduction of reindeer 
pastoralism in the region, proposals for reform, economic restructuring, and the cultural 
promotion of reindeer traditionalism. On the one hand, the move to classify Kola reindeer 
herding as appropriately Sami despite its multiethnic origins fed into abstract and 
preconceived state logics that marked this territory and modes of livelihood in ethnic 
terms. On the other hand, differences in the ways that Sami, Komi, Nenets, and Pomors 
understood and experienced their interactions with animals and landscapes contributed to 
changes on the ground in important ways. The combination of types of knowledge 
ultimately led to the emergence of a reindeer economy based on hybrid forms of herding 
techniques that included participants of multiple ethnic groups, but that was defined as 
Sami. 
The Development of Pastoralism on the Kola Peninsula 
The rise of large-scale reindeer herding on the Kola Peninsula did not occur until 
the end of the nineteenth century, though people living there had hunted the animals for a 
long time. This development transpired to a considerable degree because of changing 
ecological relations that affected inhabitants of different places of the Russian north. It 
resulted primarily from Komi (or Izhemtsy) and Nentsy (or Samoedy) herders in the 
Pechora-Izhma River basin attempting to escape increased environmental pressures by 
migrating to the Kola Peninsula with large herds of reindeer.6 The Sami, who already 
                                                                                                                                            
Means to Be a Herdsman: The Practice and Image of Reindeer Husbandry among the Komi of Northern 
Russia (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2005); Florian Stammler, Reindeer Nomads Meet the Market: Culture, 
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6 In this discussion I am translating references to the Izhemtsy in primary sources as Komi. The 
Izhemtsy were a specific group of Komi, which included those who migrated to the Kola Peninsula. I am 
doing so for the sake of readability. This practice differs from how I refer to the Sami and Nenets. For them 
I keep the words Lapp and Samoed when they appeared in a primary source.   
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faced a dwindling stock of wild reindeer available for hunting, now encountered greater 
competition for lichen pastures. They responded by orienting their livelihoods more 
towards reindeer pastoralism and modifying some of their own strategies for keeping the 
animals. Thus, unlike most of the economic activities analyzed in this dissertation, the 
key first step in the growth of “modern” reindeer herding did not come from state reform 
efforts. Instead, it emerged from northern communities using their ecological knowledge 
to adapt to changing circumstances. 
Reindeer and people have been some of the most prominent mammalian 
megafauna on the Kola Peninsula for millennia. With dense furs, seasonal antlers, and an 
instinct to form herds, reindeer (Rangifer taranda), or caribou as they are known in North 
America, seek cold environments and often migrate long distances to forage on seasonal 
pastures. Current archaeological evidence dates the earliest human inhabitants on the 
Kola Peninsula to between 7,000 and 8,000 years ago.7 The ancestors of a group that 
came to be called the Sami (Laplanders and Lapps in earlier terminology) first arrived in 
the region sometime after 2,000 B.C.E. They spoke dialects of a Finno-Ugric language 
common to a number of other, more populous, groups of Sami in northern Scandinavia. 
Slavic-speaking residents known as the Pomors began inhabiting the Tersk coast as far 
back as the thirteenth century. Both the Sami and the Pomors relied predominantly on 
fishing for sustenance for much of their history, but also hunted wild reindeer and kept 
limited numbers of domesticated draft animals. Due partially to their inland orientation, 
the Sami allocated reindeer a more significant place in their culture and spiritual beliefs 
than the Pomors. The prerogatives of reindeer hunting were also inscribed in their loose 
system of territorial organization deemed pogosty (parishes), which often involved 
different seasonal settlements for given kin groups and included areas officially 
belonging to the Orthodox Church or the imperial government.8 
The domestication of reindeer depended on intimate understandings of the animal 
and responsiveness to the variable behavior of individual creatures. Communities 
                                                
7 Vitebsky, Reindeer People, 17-39; Igor Krupnik, Arctic Adaptations: Native Whalers and 
Reindeer Herders of Northern Eurasia, trans. and ed. Marcia Levenson (Hanover: University Press of New 
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1 (Saint Petersburg/Apatity: IS/ KNTs RAN, 2008), 70. 
8 I. F. Ushakov, Izbrannye proizvedeniia. Tom 1: Kol´skaia zemlia (Murmansk: Murmanskoe 
knizhnoe izdatel´stvo, 1997), 29-165 and I. F. Ushakov and S. N. Dashchinskii, Lovozero (Murmansk: 
Murmanskoe knizhnoe izdatel´stvo, 1988), 40. 
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throughout Eurasia first innovated methods for training individual wild reindeer for 
transportation, milk, and as hunting decoys. This process occurred without much of the 
selective breeding that characterized the domestication of other animals, but gradually led 
to the presence of certain traits in domestic reindeer that make the animals more prone to 
interact with humans in a variety of ways. Beginning in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries domestication extended to allow for the manipulation of grazing, migration, and 
reproduction of entire herds and accordingly to provide the basis for pastoralism (reindeer 
herding).9 Ingold describes this development as “a change in the terms of engagement” 
between humans and animals from a predatory relationship based on trust to a protective 
one of domination. Pastoralists honed different skills and knowledge as they began to 
interact primarily with domestic reindeer.10  
In the late nineteenth century the Kola Sami still relied more on fishing and 
hunting wild reindeer than on harvesting the products of domesticated animals. However, 
according to an ethnography from the time by Nikolai Kharuzin, the hunting economy 
had begun to decline because of a dwindling stock of wild reindeer.11 Kharuzin stressed, 
“not only Lapps but also Russian residents unanimously say that Lapps are becoming 
poor in reindeer.”12 In response to these resource limitations the Kola Sami became more 
orientated toward pastoralism as the population of domestic reindeer increased noticeably 
between the 1860s and 1880s.13 Herding practices remained organized in a way that 
allowed opportunities for engagement in other occupations. Most families kept only 
about 15-19 reindeer and would release them for grazing in the summer and collect them 
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again in the fall. Migration patterns varied noticeably between the western and eastern 
sides of the peninsula in part because of topographic differences.14 
Wild reindeer possessed deep spiritual significance for the Kola Sami in this era, 
which reflected cognition of the creatures’ active role in their hunting economy. While 
Sami communities nominally had converted to Orthodox Christianity centuries earlier 
and regularly attended church services in the late nineteenth century, they still held 
religious beliefs in shamans (noidy), sorcerers (kolduny), rock formations (seidy) and 
animal spirits.15 One of their rituals involved sacrificing wild reindeer under the direction 
of village sorcerers and displaying the animal’s horns on the roof of their dwelling.16 
Additionally, legends of a man-reindeer called Miandash who traversed between human 
and non-human worlds circulated among the Kola Sami. These stories drew on 
Miandash’s ability to transform from a wild reindeer into a human in certain locations 
such as a tent and associated separate lands of the Sami and reindeer with the realms of 
the living and the dead. 17 
Across the Arkhangel´sk province in the Pechora River basin, a quite different 
reindeer economy and ecology existed. The Nenets pastoralists in the region began to 
keep large reindeer herds comparatively early and taught herding to the Komi migrants of 
the sixteenth century. Having actively collected and traded furs with Russian merchants, 
the Komi in the Izhma region embraced market-oriented economic practices in their 
reindeer herding. Well-off Komi kept massive herds, hired other herders, profited from 
selling reindeer products to traders, and managed a total of close to twenty times the 
number of domestic reindeer as the Sami. The migration patterns of these pastoralists 
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were also distinct. Unlike the Kola Sami, who were confined to a peninsular 
environment, Komi herders continually guided the animals over hundreds of kilometers 
of territory every year and guarded them during every season, including summer grazing. 
This more intensive protective role of their domestic herders resulted in greater intimacy 
with how the animals behaved in expansive tundra lands. As lichen pastures became 
crowded and outbreaks of epidemics became increasingly common among the reindeer, 
the Komi searched for new lands and expanded the territorial presence of their herding 
activities.18 This expansion included a move to the Kola Peninsula in the 1880s by a 
group of herders from Izhma. 
Suffering from a decline in their herds at the time, several Komi in the Izhma 
region learned of abundant lichen pastures and a lack of reindeer epizootics on the Kola 
Peninsula. According to anthropologist Nikolai Konakov, Komi migrants tended to seek 
similar environments that could support the basis of their current economic complex. The 
Kola Peninsula only partially fit this model because of its distance and detachment from 
other Komi lands and its different climate. These features dissuaded most pastoralists 
with smaller herds from making the trek.19 Nevertheless, two wealthier herders provided 
several thousand domestic reindeer to allow for a group of sixty-five individuals, 
including several Nenets herders, to make the journey. They set out from the Pechora-
Izhma River basin in the autumn of 1883 and arrived the following spring. After a few 
years of migration around different parts of the Kola Peninsula, the Komi and Nenets 
families settled in the small Sami settlement of Lovozero. A large anthrax outbreak in 
1896 among reindeer on the Komi homelands inspired a number of additional families to 
join the herders on the Kola Peninsula.20 
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The introduction of the Komi reindeer economy to this new environment 
established large-scale reindeer herding on the Kola Peninsula. The arrival of the Komi 
and Nenets alone dramatically increased the domestic reindeer population of the Kola 
Peninsula. Furthermore, the influence of their pastoralism starkly raised the productivity 
of the reindeer economy, resulting in an over sevenfold growth in the domestic reindeer 
population in the region by World War I.21 The Komi continued many of their 
conventional herding methods here that conflicted with Sami practice, especially with the 
summer release of reindeer for the sake of concentrating on fishing.22 Antagonism 
between the groups grew especially tense as some Sami made accusations that the Komi 
stole free-grazing Sami reindeer during the summer—branding them with their own 
earmarks—and used lichen pastures intentionally reserved by the Sami.23 Confronted 
with a disappearing population of wild reindeer available for hunting, some groups of 
Sami also responded by altering their herding practice: beginning to keep much larger 
numbers of animals, constructing fences during summer grazing, and more vigilantly 
attempting to round up all their animals before the autumn rut.24 These changes in Sami 
practice marked their shift to a pastoralist reindeer economy.  
Debating Nationality and Modernity through Reindeer 
Discussions about the fate of Kola reindeer during the final decades of the 
Russian empire reflected anxieties about nationality in a multiethnic polity and about the 
type of modern economy best suited for the country. The commentators involved—
primarily state officials, scientists, journalists and regional enthusiasts centered in other 
parts of the Arkhangel´sk province—tended to agree on the need for some type of reform 
of indigenous societies and their economic practices. They frequently evoked the images, 
which extended back to at least the eighteenth century, of northern indigenous peoples 
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and their economic practices as backward and lacking civilization.25 By doing so, they 
engaged in the cultural construction of Sami and other groups’ ethnic identities, while 
discursively inscribing the “wildness” of their environments and societies. Thus, state 
categorization for the sake of control was a dominant part of this story. Yet, the 
sometimes acerbic debates among late imperial reformers reflected not just political or 
scientific differences about the desired national ordering of the empire, but also their 
distinct environmental experiences and knowledge.  
In an assessment of the potential economic benefit of the Russian north to the 
central state from 1897, the governor of the Arkhangel´sk province, Aleksandr 
Engel´gardt, relied on a brief travel experience to advance a general evaluation of the 
ethnic organization of the Kola reindeer economy. An ephemeral summer encounter with 
the Kola environment supplemented preconceived stereotypes about the Sami as 
appearing “gnome-like” and being on the path to extinction as he insisted that there were 
plentiful natural resources available to them on state lands.26 According to Engel´gardt, 
the Sami were bad pastoralists who did not care about increasing their herds and let their 
reindeer roam freely in the summer. He contrasted them to the recent Komi migrants, 
who “conduct the reindeer trade correctly and sensibly guard reindeer against attack from 
predatory beasts.”27 This comparison of ethnic herding practices would become a major 
element in discussions about the Kola reindeer economy until after collectivization. 
Engel´gardt here implicitly imposed an ethnic hierarchy that placed the Komi somewhere 
between Russians and the Sami on a scale of modernity. 
A little over a decade later another commentator, writing under the pseudonym 
V—r, evoked a similar hierarchical arrangement of groups involved in the reindeer 
economy on the Kola Peninsula. This time, however, the author’s observations of the 
practices of tending transportation reindeer led him to invert the established order by 
placing the Russians below the other ethnicities. At the time the fledging assistance 
efforts of outside scientists to improve Pomor fishing techniques and competition from 
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foreign trawling ships was a matter of great controversy among educated society in 
Arkhangel´sk.28 V—r criticized the “excessive exploitation of the strength of the 
reindeer” by some Kola herders. The author continued, “this carelessness is very harmful 
and unprofitable, but worst of all it has penetrated not only the life of savages or semi-
savages, but also of the Russian peasant who is almost fully deprived of cultural 
influence on the Kola Peninsula.”29 In this rendering, the environmental and social 
context of the region undermined the Pomors’ status as the supposedly superior group 
and spoke to the direness of the need for reform. V—r believed that “more rational use of 
resources from the natural environment” could allow Kola reindeer herding to become 
profitable.30 By “more rational” he meant, like Engel´gardt, adopting Komi methods of 
husbandry and land use. 
In the years immediately preceding the outbreak of the First World War, 
divergent ecological visions of the economic role of the North informed debates about the 
nationality among reformers in the Arkhangel’sk province. The proprietor of the Pechora 
Experimental Agricultural Station, Andrei Zhuravskii, espoused a romantic view of 
reindeer herding as an inherently productive activity that required minimal labor. 
Estimating that reindeer could give pastoralists an 800% return on invested capital after 
five years, he stressed that indigenous practitioners were on the whole well-off 
economically. Other commentators on the reindeer economy in the Arkhangel´sk 
province, including the Kola Peninsula, shared this optimistic assessment of tundra nature 
use. One wrote, “receiving everything from the tundra and nothing from humans, 
reindeer give them everything.”31 The ease of the herding economy, rather than a lack of 
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culture, served to prevent northern realms from being worked for crops. Indeed, 
Zhuravskii elaborated this assessment of reindeer herding for the sake of launching into 
the promotion of agricultural colonization of herders’ tundra lands by Russians.32 His 
general approach for understanding and transforming the “primitive landscape” of the 
north involved relying on Russian “self-knowledge” instead of “Western European 
science” and the introduction of traditional agricultural activities of rural Russians to the 
tundra.33  
Promoters of Komi herding V—r and Sergei Kertselli, who were likely the same 
person, attacked Zhuravskii’s position. They accused him of exaggerating the viability of 
reindeer pastoralism and using pseudoscience in his study of tundra landscapes. V—r, for 
instance, remarked on Zhuravskii’s ignorance of veterinary medicine and held him 
culpable for spreading the inaccurate idea that reindeer herding was especially 
profitable.34 Kertselli engaged in an even more polemical critique. Besides questioning 
Zhuravskii’s credentials as a scholar, Kertselli disputed his ideas about tundra landscapes 
and their mutability.35  Kertselli described his opponent’s position thusly: “the polar 
tundra—this is an ordinary uncultivated plot of land that is superficially marshy and thus 
easily transformed into a meadow.” He quoted Zhuravskii, who wrote, “wherever there is 
the donkey of a settler in 2, 3, or 4 years magnificent meadows appear in the places of 
former “marshes” (tundra).”36 According to Kertselli, Zhuravskii also claimed that 
migrating herds of domestic reindeer had been trampling the tundra mosses and thus 
preventing the regeneration of grasslands, which could support less mobile livestock and 
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fertile soils, capable of cultivating crops.37 Kertselli attempted to refute Zhuravskii’s 
vision of the tundra point by point. He challenged the accuracy of the historical and 
contemporary examples of meadows existing in the region and claimed that Zhuravskii 
exaggerated the profitability of pastoralism. Kertselli also showed that the tundra was less 
marshy than Zhuravskii thought, denied that reindeer trample moss, and demonstrated the 
heavy manure requirements to make these lands agriculturally fertile.38 For his part, 
Kertselli generally emphasized the comparative immutability of the tundra and the 
suitability of it for Komi activities such as reindeer herding.  
Despite the distinctions in nationality politics and the models of economic 
development present in these two positions, they coalesced around the stance that the 
current reindeer economy required transformation: either conversion to agricultural 
practices more common in other regions of the country or further expansion of the 
commercial approach of some Komi groups. Both sides left little room for Sami 
economic practice to evade reform. Writers discussing the Kola Sami during the last 
years of the Russian Empire reflected agreement with this sentiment. For instance, 
Vladimir Vize prefaced an article from January 1917 on Sami legends with the words: 
“the process of the “Russification” and the infection of Russian Lapps with new ideas is 
going very quickly and will hasten even further with the installation of the Murmansk 
railroad. That is why we should realize that it is not far from the time when the legends of 
olden times will completely fade from the memory of the Russian Lapps.”39 A sense that 
the indigenous knowledge of this historically defined “other” was irretrievably slipping 
away inspired a number of other journalists and researchers to collect Kola Sami folklore 
and write ethnographic accounts of this group and its lifestyle.40 This desire to capture the 
past while embracing the future would become more assertive in the 1920s. 
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The Promotion of “Sami” Reindeer Herding 
Plans for reforming the Kola reindeer economy in the early years of the Soviet 
Union turned to a more consistent focus on raising the status of specific national 
minorities. Within the context of the Kola Peninsula this strategy evolved so that the 
reindeer economy became legible as a Sami terrain, despite the actual incorporation of 
Komi and Nenets herding techniques into the collective farms. Through the 1920s, 
assessments of the Kola reindeer economy shifted from emphasizing “poor Lapp 
practice” to positing the potential suitability of Sami land use patterns. The process of 
restructuring the reindeer economy in ethnic terms involved top-down applications of 
nationalities policy, in particular standardized institutional forms and abstract 
assessments of variations in herding among different groups. It also included the 
articulation of experiential forms of land use, mediated through local bureaucrats and 
scientists, as being somehow appropriate for the region. 
The lives of reindeer and the ecosystem of the Kola Peninsula were modified to fit 
the nationality politics of the Soviet Union: a post-colonial and avowedly non-imperial 
empire bent on nation-building as a form of operationalizing socialism. Recent 
scholarship on nationality in the Soviet Union has interrogated the treatment of non-
Russian groups to develop deeper understandings of modern nationhood and elucidate the 
resemblances of the country to an empire. This research has revealed much about the 
nature of nationality politics during the formation of the Soviet Union: the significance of 
the Leninist commitment to self-determination and the reliance on territorial units aimed 
at making populations national in form but socialist in content; the belief that 
encouraging ethnic identities was a temporary part of a historically necessary process to 
advance the country culturally and economically; and the tense overlap of policies that 
offered special opportunities to members of minority groups and ones that repressed 
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overly assertive articulations of nationality.41 There is a division in this historiography 
between scholars who highlight the significance of a coherent policy and the institutions 
of implementation, most notably Terry Martin, and those who point to the critical role of 
knowledge production, in particular Francine Hirsch.42 The attempts to deal with Kola 
reindeer herders offer a good site to examine the interaction between state institutions and 
ethnographic knowledge, since not only were both present and instrumental here, but they 
also involved many of the same people. The influential ecological knowledge produced 
by these early Soviet organizations emerged not only through the elaboration of 
classificatory schemes, but also from researchers’ practical experiences in the tundra. 
The Soviet promotion of the Kola reindeer economy as Sami began with public 
commentary that stressed its perils and potentials. The turbulence of the wars and 
revolutions of 1914 to 1921 caused the domestic reindeer population to shrink sharply: 
the Sami in particular lost 70-75% of their herds.43 Reflecting on this situation, Kertselli 
claimed that the wars only exacerbated the extant problems rooted in the irrational system 
of keeping reindeer used by the Sami. He continued to employ an ethnic hierarchy that 
placed the Sami below the Komi: “Lapp reindeer herding can be regarded as the 
subsidiary reindeer herding of a hunting and fishing tribe, while Komi (zyrianskoe) 
reindeer herding should be regarded as a type of industrial reindeer herding.”44 Journalist 
Zinaida Rikhter more sensationally evoked the place of reindeer in Sami culture, 
including stories of an annual reindeer holiday and the appearance of reindeer on old 
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Orthodox icons, as evidence of backwardness. 45 Popular portrayals like Rikhter’s also 
employed reindeer as a metonym for the natural wildness and lack of civilization of the 
region. Writers also publicized the potential value of reindeer, dubbing the animal the 
“gold of the tundra” and proclaiming, “no animal in nature is more industrially 
productive than reindeer.”46 
The institutional mechanisms for targeting the Sami for ethnic promotion emerged 
from a state framework that placed them at the bottom on a scale of national minorities. 
The Sami and the Nenets fell into the category of the “small peoples of the north,” which 
was devised in the first decade of Soviet rule. This grouping associated them more 
closely with hunter-gathering societies than pastoralists tending animals besides reindeer. 
The classification included twenty-six indigenous groups seen as occupying the most 
traditional level on a historicist hierarchy that was ideologically dominant in modernizing 
and colonizing regimes. This conviction in their extreme backwardness inspired aid 
programs designed to lift their cultural status quickly so that they could be incorporated 
fully into a modern socialist state.47 Neither the Russian Pomors nor the Komi belonged 
to this category of ethnicities and they were not seen as geographically indigenous to the 
Kola Peninsula. In contrast to the special attention they received in the imperial era, the 
Pomors received no ethnically based aid and witnessed a total government embrace of the 
industrial fishing practices that had earlier threatened their livelihood.48 The Komi, 
despite being an indigenous group living in the north and engaging in reindeer 
pastoralism, had a status closer to other large nationalities. In the regional realignment of 
the 1920s and 1930s the mainland territory of the Komi first became an autonomous 
region and then an autonomous republic. This separate territory and their higher status on 
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the imagined temporal scale underlying nationalities policy meant that the Kola Komi 
received little institutional support and evoked less ethnographic interest.49 
Institutional and ethnographic support for Sami reindeer herders arose 
simultaneously. The Committee of the North (officially, the Committee for Assistance to 
the Peoples of the Northern Borderlands) was created in June 1924 to boost the status of 
the small peoples of the north. The functional head of the organization, Anatolii Skachko, 
warned that if native northerners went extinct, the tundra lands on which they lived 
would become uninhabited deserts that lacked the beneficial influence of their economic 
activities.50 Under the leadership of Vasilii Alymov, the Murmansk Branch of the 
Committee of the North worked specifically on raising the economic and cultural level of 
the Sami and Nenets of the region but not the Komi.51 In 1927 the Russian State 
Geographic Society sponsored the Lapp Expedition to the region, which used on-site 
fieldwork to evaluate the physical anthropology, health, and cultural and economic 
conditions of the Kola Sami.52 The primary ethnographer of the expedition, Vladimir 
Charnoluskii, intensively studied the reindeer economy and Sami folklore. His 
evolutionist ethnographic work embraced a special sympathy for the plight of the Sami, a 
conviction in the value of deep and detailed research that included practical experiences 
in the tundra, and an eagerness to find applications to help make his research assist the 
subjects being studied.53 Based on this ethnographic work and discussions with local 
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populations, the Murmansk Committee of the North drew up plans for two Lapp native 
districts in the east and the west of the Kola Peninsula.54 
A main means through which the Murmansk Committee of the North and 
ethnographers studying the Kola Sami sought to promote that group’s national 
distinctiveness were their plans for reforming the reindeer economy. Both Alymov and 
Charnoluskii believed that proper regulation of lichen pastures was a key element in 
serving Sami interests and increasing the profitability of herding. In 1929 Alymov 
lamented a lower than desired growth rate of the domestic reindeer population and 
blamed the “multiplicity of farms with few reindeer”—80% of Sami herders had fewer 
than 50 animals at this point—and the “irrational, primitive running of the economy,” 
which allowed many reindeer to be lost to wolves.55 A primary strategy of the Murmansk 
Committee of the North for reforming the reindeer economy was the process of territorial 
formation (zemleustroistvo).56 Territorial formation involved surveying landscapes to 
assess the presence and varieties of lichen, figuring out the optimal arrangement for 
seasonal grazing and migration paths, establishing the capacity of reindeer on certain 
territories, and performing a number of other tasks to develop a basis for economic and 
administrative reform.57 The preference for this method of reform clearly reflected the 
sympathies of the Murmansk Committee of the North for the Sami since a major concern 
justifying territorial formation was preventing Komi from using Sami pastures.58  
For his part, Charnoluskii produced works of ethnography that explicitly 
valorized the Sami methods of land use. He chose to study a research site on the eastern 
part of the Kola Peninsula because it had been the least influenced by Komi and Nenets 
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58 GAMO, f. R-169, op 1, d. 6, ll. 6-10, 21. 
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reindeer herding.59 While attentive to the significance of fishing and hunting in the Sami 
economy, Charnoluskii also stressed the primacy of reindeer: “Reindeer in the everyday 
life of a Lapp is everything: food, a means of transportation and a source of secondary 
earnings. Consequently, one can say without exaggeration that the entire budget of a 
Lapp of moderate means is provided by reindeer.”60 He further posited that aspects of the 
Sami grazing methods, in contrast to Komi practice, were appropriate for the Kola 
Peninsula. The Kola Sami felt “deep indignation” at the “the Komi methods of using 
lichen” because it unnecessarily trampled and destroyed pasturelands through 
overgrazing. According to Charnoluskii, the Sami desired a “totally conditional 
designation of the boundaries of several sections of land (in general land that no one 
owns) with natural markers, which are necessary for avoiding the mixing of herds.”61 
When outlining his vision of how the Kola reindeer economy should be reformed, 
Charnoluskii insisted that the “prudent herd management” of the Komi and Nenets be 
combined with Sami means of “carefully treating the pastures of their region, which are 
disappearing before our eyes.”62 Here the environmental and ethnic concerns coalesced as 
Charnoluskii offered a more sustainable vision of development that made use of 
indigenous knowledge. 
This rejection of a system of pasture usage based on Komi methods extended to 
natural scientists working for the Murmansk Committee of the North. Geobotanist 
Aleksandr Salazkin conducted detailed surveys of flora on Kola lands, which pointed out 
that only a quarter of the abundant foraging resources for reindeer herding were being 
used. The Kola Peninsula was unique, he asserted, in the richness of its summer lichen 
pastures and in the comparative surplus of pasturelands in the forest zone, usually 
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occupied in the winter, over those in the tundra, typically used for summer grazing. 
Salazkin argued that these traits made the Kola environment better suited for Sami 
pasture usage, including the summer release of reindeer, which had been criticized as a 
sign of their backwardness. “The Komi-Nenets system of grazing herds for the whole 
year certainly does not respond to the particularities of the local lichen pastures and quite 
harmfully affects their condition during summer pasturage,” he wrote. Instead, he blamed 
this practice for the problems of the reindeer economy: “despite the far from full use of 
the foraging resources, one observes places with crowded pastures in the tundra.” Like 
Charnoluskii, this emphasis on the proper foraging techniques placed the historic Sami 
practice as an appropriate foundation for the development of “socialist reindeer 
herding.”63 
Ethnicity and Repression 
During the 1930s the debate about Sami and Komi herding methods took a violent 
turn. The ethnographers and members of the Murmansk Committee of the North ceded to 
larger state policy on the basic terms for forming collective farms. However, the markers 
of class distinction based on ethnicity among reindeer herders came to be used in 
decisions to subject the Kola Komi to disproportional de-kulakization. In the middle of 
the 1930s the target of state oppression shifted to the Sami, who were accused of 
organizing a nationalist plot with the support of Finland. Throughout these bloody 
episodes, the complexities of the ethnic composition of the indigenous communities and 
herding techniques challenged the stability of the classificatory frameworks used by 
collectivization activists and the secret police. Ethnic identity first became a distorting 
lens for what were intended to be class-based policies. Later accusations of Sami 
“nationalism” were waged against a diverse group that included many non-Sami 
individuals.  
The conviction that indigenous peoples had been somehow frozen in time affected 
interpretations of the class composition of native northerners. Advocates at the 
Committee of the North initially sought to sidestep class distinctions within indigenous 
communities by associating them with the primitive communist stage of development. 
                                                
63 A. S. Salazkin, “Estestvennye kormovye ugodiia Murmanskogo okruga,” in Sovetskoe 
olenevodstvo (Leningrad: Institut izdatel´stva olenevodstva, 1934), 55. 
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However, this notion came under attack by the middle of the 1920s, causing the 
Committee of the North to cede ground. Part of its strategy in the Murmansk region was 
to help organize separate Sami, Nenets, and Komi collective farms.64 Beginning in 1928 
several small collective farms based on a few Sami families were created, including the 
work association Saam in the Voron´e pogost and one called Olenevod (later Krasnaia 
Tundra) in the Semiostrov pogost.65 These on-paper collective farms essentially broke up 
when herders left their winter pastures in the spring and the intentional maintenance of 
ethnic composition in collective farms ceased by the end of 1929.66 In an attempt to 
defend their gradualist approach to reform, Skachko also proposed a scheme that denied 
the measurable class stratification among hunters and fishers but admitted to the 
existence of kulaks among reindeer herders.67 Individuals who owned more reindeer 
could be ascribed the class status of kulak.68 As those assisting the Kola Sami made 
abundantly clear, these kulak herders were disproportionally Komi. 
The focus on comparatively wealthy Komi herders as class enemies emerged 
primarily from the generalities of state policy and the information about the class 
composition of indigenous groups supplied by the Murmansk Committee of the North. 
Alymov clearly bemoaned the efforts to apply class categories to indigenous society, 
complaining that the middling group (sredniaki) was so porous that it rendered simple 
indices of economic stratification inaccurate.69 But he also contributed crucially to the 
outcome of these efforts by compiling data that demonstrated a disproportional number of 
Komi households owned larger reindeer herds and hired laborers.70  In his continual 
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promotion of Sami herding methods, he relayed “the unanimous opinion” of “Lapps and 
their Russian neighbors” that the presence of “rich Komi” with 600-700 reindeer 
“systematically harms their reindeer herding.”71 These critiques of Komi herders became 
more vocal as the forced collectivization campaign neared. Alymov reported that he 
“more and more frequently” received grievances from Sami about “unauthorized 
occupation of Lapp pastures by large and predominantly Komi reindeer herders,” and 
urged the Murmansk Executive Committee “to raise the issue of prohibiting the 
unauthorized occupation of reindeer pastures by large herds and the unauthorized 
migration of reindeer herders to already settled places.”72 The optimal reindeer ecology 
remained central to the new class-based ethnic politics on the Kola Peninsula.  
As collectivization unfolded in the 1930s, the majority of herders oppressed as 
kulaks were Komi.73 In one instance at the Krasnaia Tundra collective farm in Ivanovka 
the conflict between Komi and Sami fell on the ancestors of the village’s founder Ivan 
Artiev—a Komi herder who had migrated there in the nineteenth century.74 Targeted as 
kulaks, several of the Artievs faced arrest, expropriation of their animals, and exclusion 
from the collective farm.75 Around this time, Charnoluskii complained of continued 
Komi dominance to the Committee of the North, stating that, “labor was assigned 
improperly. The Lapp group carried a large load and completed more difficult work than 
                                                                                                                                            
reindeer owned. The second table revealed that over half of Kola Sami owned fewer than 50 reindeer and 
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others.”76 Meanwhile, Communist Party activists attributed difficulties in collectivization 
to ethnic tensions. Trying to explain the minimal Sami presence in the Tundra collective 
farm in Lovozero, party reporter I. Budovits vividly evoked the existence of atavistic 
national antipathies: “Lapps, who sucked in hatred for the Komi nationality (the great 
power in the conditions of the Kola Peninsula) from their mother’s milk, do not 
understand that among the Komi there are farm hands, bedniaki, sredniaki, as well as 
predatory money-lenders, thieves, and exploiter-kulaks.”77 
As the Komi became disproportionally demonized as kulaks, the vocal promotion 
of Komi herding methods as “Komi” instead of “Soviet” ceased. The Komi continued to 
dominate Kola reindeer husbandry, keeping significantly larger herds than the Sami and 
earning more. Additionally, the economic success of certain Komi allowed for some 
features of their herding to be embraced (large herds, year-round surveillance, etc.) as 
elements of modern reindeer husbandry. However, the rejection of the specific “Komi” 
character of this model combined with the simultaneous abandonment of the effort to 
delineate and preserve “Sami” herding led the multiethnic Kola reindeer economy to 
become more discursively generalized as “Sami.” This development, above all, reflected 
historical precedent and longstanding generalizations of the area as Sami lands. 
Accordingly, less overt attention to the ethnic composition of the reindeer economy after 
the early 1930s made it appear more Sami.  
Like much of the rest of the country, the 1937-1938 terror targeted segments of 
the Kola reindeer economy, uprooting and undermining previous class and ethnic 
distinctions promoted by the state. During the mid-1930s the ethnographers and 
reformers of the Kola Sami continued to try to develop a Sami literary culture and later 
renewed their campaigns to create an autonomous Sami region in the western part of the 
Kola Peninsula.78 Then a series of arrests connected to the mass operations against Finns 
in Karelia halted these efforts.79 These mass operations scheduled specific populations—
former kulaks, criminals, anti-Soviet elements, and specific nationalities believed to pose 
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a potential military threat to the country—for arrests and exterminations by quota. In 
1938 state security agents accused Kola reindeer herders and Sami advocates of 
participating in a conspiracy involving fascists in Finland and nationalists in Karelia to 
unite the Kola Peninsula with Finland. Part of this plot included the establishment of an 
independent Sami state, which would aid in the creation of a Great Finland extending to 
the Urals.80 The efforts to promote Sami ethnicity served as the main link in the case that 
allegedly connected this group to anti-Soviet plots. 
Though this bout of repression suppressed linguistic and cultural expression of the 
Sami, it conversely and unintentionally highlighted the Sami identity of the region. This 
development occurred primarily through the multiethnic targeting of individuals involved 
in plans for creating an independent Sami government that lumped together Komi, 
Russians, and Nentsy with Sami. During the terror, state police agents elided the ethnic 
distinctions in Kola herding communities and implicated Komi in promoting “Sami 
nationalism.” Several Komi herders who had faced earlier repression as kulaks lost their 
lives in this case, including several of the Atrievs. On the whole fewer than half of the 
approximately thirty individuals repressed for alleged involvement in a counter-
revolutionary Sami nationalist plot were actually Sami. Just as many were Komi or 
Nenets, and at least 18 were reindeer herders.81 Under the duress of interrogation, 
Alymov confessed that he planned on becoming president of a new Sami state and that 
Salazkin would be the War Minister.82 On October 22, 1938 state agents executed fifteen 
of the individuals involved in this case, including Alymov, Salazkin, the Atrievs, and 
other Sami, Komi, and Russian individuals.83  
The Rise of Sami Traditionalism 
In the late Soviet era Kola reindeer began to be increasingly celebrated as a 
traditional Sami animal. The rise of traditionalism resulted in part from the previous half-
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century of the modernization campaigns that had reshaped the reindeer economy through 
collectivization, amalgamation, and resettlement. This shift from a focus on reform to 
preserving tradition at first occurred as a cultural practice surrounding indigenous groups 
and the reindeer economy in an era of the fully developed state farm system of late 
socialism. The official celebration of folkways after the Second World War intermixed a 
romantic Soviet traditionalism with an enervated form of ethnic particularism and 
culturally elevated reindeer as quintessential tundra animals. This Soviet origin reflects a 
connection between the communist and post-communist eras that has often been 
obscured by narratives that stress ethnic repression in late socialism. Nevertheless, the 
promotion of tradition grew into a new development strategy only in the post-socialist 
era. At this point local ecological knowledge, which had also contributed to 
understandings of what was traditional, became itself an institutionalized and imposed 
form of legibility. 
The performance of Sami reindeer traditionalism already existed in the 1930s, but 
became a prominent element of Kola regional culture in the post-Stalin era. The Holiday 
of the North, an annual sports festival that would come to be known locally as the “Polar 
Olympics,” began in 1934 and included reindeer races as one of its most popular events. 
For many urban Kola residents, this was the only time they would see reindeer and 
herders. The athletes and animals would wear the historic attire of native groups and 
several of the competitions would specifically require the use of old technologies like 
Sami sleighs.84 In the 1960s, Charnoluskii, who survived the terror but served a lengthy 
stint in Gulag camps, began publishing some of the Sami folklore he had collected earlier 
in popular science books.85 One of them included numerous fragments of Charnoluskii’s 
earlier conversations with Sami who stressed reindeer herding as a traditional activity. He 
quoted one old Sami man saying “And how are we not reindeer? We are reindeer and 
reindeer are us” and “We are not plowmen, we are not mowers. … We are a reindeer 
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people. Our bread is father-reindeer.”86 A film on the Kola Sami from 1983, We are 
Reindeer People, repeated this association.87  
Soviet policies aimed at productivism and rural consolidation also contributed to 
the rise of traditionalism. The case of the village of Lovozero can illustrate this point. As 
Natalia Gutsol, S. N. Vinogradova, and A. G. Samorukova argue, “the contemporary role 
of Lovozero as an ethnic and reindeer-herding center on the Kola Peninsula came about 
as the result of historical, political, and socio-economic processes and events that 
occurred in the Murmansk region during the twentieth century.”88 An old yet average-
sized settlement of the Sami dating back to the sixteenth century, Lovozero had only 
become a center of reindeer herding with the Komi migration of the nineteenth century. 
At the time of collectivization, Komi households dominated the Tundra collective farm.89 
Yet, the influx of 435 Sami from resettled villages to Lovozero in the 1960s more than 
doubled the Sami population of the village and played into a new romantic framing of 
indigenous ethnicity.90 The construction of the Museum of the History of Kola Sami in 
Lovozero in 1962, for instance, positioned the village as a traditional center of Sami 
culture and reindeer herding.91 Finally, as the productivist transformation of the reindeer 
economy stabilized in the 1970s, older Sami herding methods such as the use of fences 
and the free release of animals in the summer again became standard practice on the Kola 
Peninsula.92  
Beginning in the perestroika era, Sami activists started using notions of tradition 
to pursue political ends and international agencies sought to reform the reindeer economy 
in ways that would more closely resemble pre-Soviet forms. Increased contacts with the 
Sami in Scandinavia and the newfound acceptance of oppositional national and ethnic 
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politics in the late 1980s influenced the expansion of a social movement focused on 
preserving, protecting, and promoting Sami culture. Ethnic activists of the Kola Sami at 
the Social Organization of the Sami of the Murmansk Region in Lovozero and the 
Association of Kola Sami in Murmansk promoted a development model that has been 
characterized as neo-traditionalism.93 Ethnographer Alexander Pika described it as: “a 
rejection of the state ‘modernizing drive (modernizatorstvo)’ in favor of demands for 
legal protection for northern peoples, freedom for independent economic and cultural 
development, and self-government.” He continued that “a ‘neo-traditionalist’ economy 
for northern native communities presents the possibility for combining traditional native 
land use, natural economy (khoziaistvo) and market relations, on the one hand, with 
reliance on state help, and compensation from the processing of oil, mineral, sea, forest 
and other natural resources in the north, on the other.”94 
The attempts to enact neo-traditional reforms in the Kola reindeer economy have 
led to tensions between the ethnic Sami activists and the multiethnic reindeer herders in 
the post-Soviet period. The divergent social statuses and rhetoric embraced by 
participants in this conflict reveal the confused political purposes of the notions of 
modernity and tradition. Sami activists have often been best able to take advantage of the 
opportunities of post-Soviet modernity and, while they advocate traditionalist politics, 
have employed similar assumptions about herders as currently behind the times. The 
herders, for their part, often maintain allegiance to Soviet modernity, criticizing ethnic 
activism as promoting a move back to primitivism while also seeing it as corrupt in part 
because of its newness and foreignness.95 As one reindeer herder expressed his resistance 
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to neo-traditionalism, “They (i.e. foreign activists) shall not drive us back to the Stone 
Age!”96 Lastly, the multiethnic composition of the actual herding brigades has given the 
avowedly Sami political promotion less legitimacy among some of the herders.97 
The incorporation of a putative focus on local knowledge and historic land use 
into reform programs supported by outside organizations has effectively created a 
traditionalizing form of modernization that has exhibited a similar propensity for 
institutionalized abstraction. The most blatant examples of employing a legible tradition 
have been the calls to develop a system of reindeer husbandry akin to the ranching 
practices of the Scandinavian Sami, but that have no precedent on the Kola Peninsula.98  
An internationally funded project in the 1990s sought to employ Canadian-style co-
management as a reform model for the Sami economy. Co-management intended to 
democratize nature use by “combining indigenous and cultural environmental wisdom 
about wildlife…with scientific knowledge.”99 The results of the project never extended 
beyond the initial work with a few Sami communities. A somewhat more successful 
effort began in 2003 with attempts by Aleksei Lapin, a Sami man from Lovozero, to 
create a private reindeer-herding commune (obshchina) called Kedd´k with the financial 
and organizational backing of the Danish non-governmental organization Infonor. 
Ideologically justified as promoting traditional, ethnic, and privatized reindeer herding, 
Kedd´k initially strove, however, to embrace economic modernity and social and 
institutional forms that resembled the state farm model of organization, as Vladislava 
Vladimirova has shown.100 Together these projects of bringing ethnic traditionalism to 
the Kola reindeer economy demonstrate the intimate connections between modernist and 
avowedly non-modernist forms of knowledge. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Region, Northwest Russia),” in B. C. Forbes, et al., eds., Reindeer Management in Northernmost Europe 
(Berlin Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, 2006), 117-133. 
96 Quoted in Vladimirova, Just Labor, 405. 
97 Vladimirova, Just Labor, 59-102. 
98 Overland, “Politics and Culture among the Russian Sami,” 157-259 and Vladimirova, Just 
Labor, 317-407. 
99 Michael P. Robinson and Karim-Aly S. Kassam, Sami Potatoes: Living with Reindeer and 
Perestroika (Calgary: Bayeux Arts, 1998), 25. 
100 Vladimirova, Just Labor, 317-390. 
 151 
Reindeer Productivity in a Communist State 
 The Soviet project of bringing socialism to Russia entailed the complete 
economic transformation of the country, including of activities that seemed as outside of 
industrial modernity as reindeer herding. The campaigns to turn the complex and 
somewhat incomprehensible occupational activities of Kola tundra dwellers into a 
systematic branch of animal husbandry that could be monitored and controlled involved 
many classic techniques of modern statecraft. Representatives of the Soviet state applied 
abstract frameworks designed to reform agriculture to the reindeer economy, insisted on 
surveillance over the animals, sought to maximize the productivity of the industry by 
increasing herd sizes, and constricted the space available for reindeer and herders. At the 
same time the modernization of the reindeer economy also relied on ecological 
knowledge that could not be subsumed into this systematizing and simplifying logic. 
Despite policy that was cavalier toward local nuance, its implementation was forced to 
grapple with environmental conditions beyond state control or, indeed, understanding. 
The process of attempting to make reindeer herding a productive industry, therefore, 
incorporated practical ways of knowing the land and animals that remained below the 
surface of regulations from the center. This knowledge was reflected in experiential 
interactions with reindeer and practical understandings of the capacities of grazing lands, 
the haphazard solutions applied by state agents to natural obstacles, and the attitudes of 
herders toward different episodes of reform. 
Collectivization of Kola Reindeer Herding 
The formation of new agricultural institutions known as collective farms 
(kolkhozy) in the late 1920s and 1930s permanently transformed the Kola reindeer 
economy. The collectivization of Kola reindeer gradually allowed indigenous 
communities in the region to become more legible for socialist modernity. The 
application of certain techniques of acquiring knowledge about and control over the 
reindeer economy crucially served these reforms. Most fundamentally, reindeer 
pastoralism only became comprehensible and manageable to Soviet authorities as an 
agricultural activity. The state utilized scientific research and institutions and established 
new forms of monitoring the mobility and the size of herds. It focused on expanding the 
productivity of the newly industrialized reindeer economy, which largely meant 
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increasing the number of domestic animals kept by herders and de-emphasizing the 
importance of fishing and hunting. Yet, even during the violent episodes of 
collectivization, the interactive relations between people and reindeer influenced the local 
social and environmental outcomes of the policy. 
Soviet reformers of the 1920s acclaimed not only the usefulness of reindeer for 
the Sami and other groups, but also the potential for them to serve regional 
industrialization as a whole. In order to promote a recovery of the herding economy from 
the devastation of World War I and the Russian Civil War, Kertselli offered a vision for 
industrializing reindeer herding that sought to build on extant practices instead of 
radically reorganizing them.  His model relied on individual initiative and state assistance 
in the form of establishing a reindeer herding station on the Kola Peninsula to study 
animal diseases, feeding techniques, and methods of processing reindeer products. He 
also encouraged the government to arrange wolf hunts by supplying participants with 
guns and offering prizes to assist in predator eradication.101 During this decade, reform 
primarily occurred through the aid of credit cooperatives that provided subsidized loans 
to individual herders. Their operation accompanied a marked growth in the Kola reindeer 
economy, which included the commencement of exporting venison from the Kola 
Peninsula in 1927 and a more than doubling of the domestic reindeer population between 
1923 and 1929.102 Efforts were also made to use the transportation services of reindeer to 
help develop the north. Since draft reindeer could reach otherwise inaccessible places, 
geological surveyors, construction workers, and miners employed the animals in the 
Khibiny Mountains to haul loads of ore and other materials.103 
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The collectivization of agriculture in the Soviet Union was above all a 
modernization program designed to establish central state control over output and force 
increased production of food. In most instances collectivization concerned restructuring 
farms involved in crop cultivation or livestock breeding, improving state capacity to 
acquire grain to feed urban areas, and putting a socialist veneer over the peasantry. As we 
have seen in the case of the special settlers in the Khibiny Mountains, a war against 
wealthier rural inhabitants laid a foundation for collectivization by providing 
expropriated land, property, and animals that would be redistributed among members of 
the new collective farms and state farms. While in theory poor and middle class peasants 
would volunteer to create or join collective farms, in practice many entered them through 
coercion employed by party activists.104 Reindeer collectivization posed special problems 
because of the migratory character of the animal and the long regeneration period of the 
lichen pastures. These features meant that reindeer could not be kept like cattle or other 
farm animals but instead required considerable mobility for foraging. Collectivization 
also carried with it a conviction about the need to surmount the country’s backwardness 
once and for all. This ideological imperative doubly affected the indigenous groups 
involved in the Kola reindeer economy because, as Skachko put it, “the small peoples of 
the north, in order to catch up with the advanced nations of the USSR, must, during the 
same ten years, cover the road of development that took the Russian people one thousand 
years to cover, for even one thousand years ago the cultural level of Kievan Rus´ was 
higher than that of the present-day small peoples of the north.”105  
Scholars often relate Soviet gigantism to large industry, but this impulse also 
became influential in the Stalinist transformation of the reindeer economy. This overall 
mentality directed Soviet reindeer herding toward using meat, milk, and fur production to 
accumulate capital instead of simply providing food and clothing for indigenous 
communities. In 1929 Kertselli predicted that the country could eventually support 15-20 
million domestic reindeer and other reformers boasted that the lichen supplies in the 
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Murmansk region could supply food for up to 300,000 animals. 106 Neither figure ever 
came close to materializing. To achieve an intended tenfold improvement in the 
productivity of Kola reindeer herding, the initial collectivization plans anticipated getting 
91% of households to join the fourteen new collective farms and a state farm by 1933.107 
The earliest proposals mentioned that this state farm (sovkhoz) would include 50,000 
reindeer, which was close to the entire population of this species on the peninsula at the 
time.108  
Local ecological knowledge, nevertheless, mollified this productionist focus. 
Insisting that “the observations of the Lapps about weather and other geographical 
phenomena in the tundra” and “about the life and habits of wild and domestic reindeer” 
could aid Soviet science, Charnoluskii sought to detail this “indigenous knowledge” 
(znatkikh) in a published overview of the complex and diverse herding methods 
employed in the eastern half of the Kola Peninsula.109 Alymov attempted to utilize these 
insights and argued that “Every reindeer-herding settlement, every pogost requires its 
own particular approach when organizing collective farms.”110 He also suggested that in 
order to build up the domestic reindeer population, herding communities should reduce 
slaughter numbers, cease venison exports, and rely more on subsidiary activities like 
fishing and hunting during the first years of collectivization.111 The Murmansk 
Committee of the North further drafted a scaled back plan for the state farm that would 
require importing fewer reindeer from other parts of the country and thus reduce the 
likelihood of disease among the animals.112 
Beyond helping establish the class composition of native northerners, scientists 
contributed to collectivization through the application of information about the natural 
environment. The government created the Murmansk Experimental Reindeer-Herding 
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Point near Krasnoshchel´e in the mid-1920s to research pasture use, feeding techniques, 
breed difference among animals, predator protection, and herding methods. Less 
successful efforts were also made to provide veterinary services to herding regions and 
develop a means of restricting the spread of reindeer diseases.113 In 1934 Salazkin 
conducted a botanical assessment of the territory used by the Sami. He proposed that the 
utilization of forested territories for summer pastures instead of the exclusive dependence 
on mountain tundra areas would raise herd capacity.114 Collectivization activist Budovits 
adopted some of the biological aspects of Charnoluskii’s research, including a 
classification system of the different types of reindeer, to suggest a model of diversified 
herding.115 He claimed, “the exploitation of a herd would produce much better results if 
part of it was specially suited for the goal of cultivating venison, another part of it for 
hides, a third would be selected to produce milk, a fourth would be used for transit, 
etc.”116  
Another major tactic for exerting more control over the reindeer economy during 
collectivization was the innovation of new forms of surveillance. Authorities instituted a 
notoriously inaccurate system of counting reindeer bi-annually to estimate the number of 
animals after the birthing period in the spring and after the annual slaughter of reindeer in 
the winter.117 This pretense of knowing reindeer numbers enabled the promulgation of 
economic plans and the development of scientific methods for increasing productivity. 
The entire program of industrializing reindeer herding also involved heightened 
regulation over space and mobility in the tundra. Accepting the necessity of migration as 
a requirement of the animals and the natural conditions of the north, reformers during the 
collectivization campaign emphasized clearly delineated pasturelands, techniques like 
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territorial formation to maximize effective use, the constriction of migration routes, and a 
replacement of the previous pogost system of spatial organization.118  
During collectivization, the government sought to restrict reindeer herders’ 
mobility. Though the pogosty often became the territorial basis for the new collective 
farms, collectivized communities became confined to one primary settlement with 
temporary tundra bases serving herding activities. Only the herders, who were men, and a 
few camp workers, often the wives of senior herders, traveled with the animals to the 
tundra; many residents, including the families of herders, stayed in the village year-
round.119 These spatial politics began a gradual process of the resettlement and 
concentration of herding communities that would accelerate in the 1950s and 1960s.120 
One specialist on Kola reindeer economy, E. V. Bunakov, expressed the common desire 
to transform nomadic peoples into sedentary animal breeders whose occupation, as 
opposed to way of life, required some seasonal movement. In 1934 he wrote, “we believe 
that a more progressive reindeer economy that is suitable for the interests of socialist 
reconstruction is a system of year-round stationary pasturage, given an increased herd 
size and the organization of steady corralling.”121  
The evasiveness of the social and natural environment to legible categories 
shaped the chaotic implementation of the state’s collectivization policies. Roughly 
following national trends, up to 62.5% of the Kola reindeer economy was temporarily 
collectivized during the winter of 1930 before many of the new farms broke apart in the 
spring.122 The activities of Ivan Pen´kov, a government operative in some of the most 
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remote areas of the Kola Peninsula, help reveal in part why this occurred. 123 As the head 
of the Krasnaia Tundra collective farm in Ivanovka, Pen´kov sought to apply a wage and 
investment system used at agricultural communes elsewhere in the country to the 
occupationally distinct conditions of an Arctic reindeer economy. Pen´kov found few 
obliging organizations in the regional center of Murmansk when he tried to procure 
supplies for herders’ tents and faced an almost farcical series of pleas, negotiations, and 
bargains with provisioning agencies.124 Furthermore, the warnings of the Committee of 
the North members about the risks of importing reindeer from other parts of the country 
proved prescient. After purchasing a large number of animals, the new state farm suffered 
an outbreak of hoof disease (kopytka) and many reindeer perished.125 Indeed, the 
difficulties that reindeer had in surviving collectivization undermined the productivist 
rationale of the policy. Thus, while approximately 40% of households and 75% of 
reindeer on the Kola Peninsula belonged to collectivized or state institutions in 1932, the 
domestic reindeer population after this point declined to below its pre-collectivization 
level.126 
The resistance of herding communities to collectivization contributed to its lack 
of economic success. Throughout the country, rural residents slaughtered and feasted on 
animals slated for state expropriation and sometimes let carcasses rot to prevent 
authorities from profiting from a policy they denounced as a second serfdom.127 While 
the 1932-1933 famine also caused people to turn to this tactic out of desperation, Lynne 
Viola and Sheila Fitzpatrick have appropriately seen such episodes of killing animals as 
forms of resistance. 128 Bunakov estimated that the “frantic resistance” of kulak herders 
on the Kola Peninsula helped lead to the loss of approximately 7500 reindeer during 
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1932.129 Specific cases of reindeer slaughter on the Kola Peninsula expose how the 
classificatory frameworks of state policy elided much more nuanced social relations. For 
instance, a Sami man in the Pulozero region, Kondrat Arkhipov, faced accusations of 
being a kulak and a sorcerer who stole and burned other herders’ reindeer. The details of 
his apprehension and trial point instead to community cohesion and his paternal authority 
in Sami society. Arkhipov evaded the state for months and villagers, who likely knew his 
approximate location the whole time, only helped find him when pressured by the 
state.130 In another case, six individuals from Tundra were convicted of killing at least 
144 reindeer from other herders. Though authorities wanted to frame such actions as 
kulak exploitation, all of the herders had been deemed lower class and, indeed, two of 
them had begun to forge Communist Party affiliations.131 
The treatment of nature by herders also affected the outcomes of the efforts to 
reform the reindeer economy in the 1930s. The Sami had developed a system of carving 
personalized earmarks to distinguish their reindeer, which would frequently herd with 
other pastoralists’ animals.  Part of the initial complaint against Arkhipov had been that 
he refused to let others search the herd for reindeer with their earmarks.132  During the 
case of the six Tundra herders, the defendants had supposedly attempted to cut new 
earmarks into stolen reindeer to make them resemble those of their own animals.133 The 
herders’ understanding of how to interact with these animals facilitated this act of 
resistance to collectivization. The relationship of herders and some of the sympathetic 
reformers to reindeer and the land also became a source of criminal allegations during the 
terror. The police accused individuals of committing arson on lichen pastures, 
deliberately disseminating hoof disease among the animals, leaving the reindeer without 
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supervision, and slaughtering calves.134 This line of inquiry by the People’s Commissariat 
of Internal Affairs (NKVD) reveals the state's unease with its inability to manage the 
Kola reindeer economy. Fires were a natural occurrence in such regions and the efforts to 
systematize and regulate the pastures of the collective farms before adequate fire 
prevention services existed likely impeded the ability of herders to adapt. The spread of 
hoof disease was a predictable outcome of pursuing the relentless increase in herd 
numbers without adequate veterinary facilities. Conceding that natural conditions outdid 
the Soviet attempt to control the tundra was less acceptable than placing the lack of 
human omnipotence in a framework of intentional counter-revolutionary wreckage. 
Collectivization resulted in a reindeer economy that both conformed to state 
power and embraced modified customary practices. It proceeded gradually after the 
initial drives; according to Soviet-era sources, the herders were almost entirely 
collectivized only by the end of the decade.135 A safer estimate of full collectivization 
would be after the post-World War II reconstruction.136 By shifting away from fishing 
and hunting, collectivization created an industrialized reindeer economy in which the 
number of animals and amount of venison were the ultimate criteria of success. By 1937 
the domestic reindeer population in the Murmansk region had more than recovered from 
the disruptions of collectivization, reportedly reaching 76,918 animals.137 In the 
collective farms, herders split into several brigades that tended large herds composed of 
collective and private reindeer, which were roughly equivalent to the private plots that 
peasants were allowed to use for personal gardens. In the second half of the 1930s a new 
land use system that designated specific seasonal pastures for each collective farm 
brigade was instituted.138 This arrangement of pastures entailed year-round surveillance 
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over the animals and abandoned the Sami technique of free summer grazing.139 Based on 
extensive research on Kola reindeer herding, anthropologist Yulian Konstantinov argues 
that the keeping of private reindeer was not a simple vestige of the pre-collectivized 
economy. Instead, collectivization paradoxically functioned as a form of privatization of 
reindeer by establishing more formal relations of ownership. He further notes how 
herders, who were well aware of divergences between official statistics and reality, chose 
to play along with the rationalizing state practices when social circumstances required 
it.140 
Postwar Amalgamation 
From the Second World War to the heart of the Brezhnev-era in the 1970s, the 
efforts to bring Soviet modernity to the Kola herding economy continued through 
processes of increased concentration of people and animals and the simplification of 
indigenous livelihoods. While lacking the violence that accompanied collectivization, the 
amalgamation of numerous reindeer-herding collective farms into a few large state farms 
from the late 1950s to the early 1970s isolated herding communities from historically 
important forms of nature. The logic of the program involved a spatial re-organization of 
the rural taiga and tundra that prioritized energy, industrial, and military installations over 
continued land use patterns of herding communities and that embraced a quasi-urban 
confinement of pastoralism as a strategy for increased production. As with 
collectivization, the local sites in which the state’s amalgamation policy was 
implemented also reveal the influence of sentient ecological knowledge. 
The conditions in the region during the Second World War led to a notable 
decline in the Kola reindeer economy. Many herders served in the Red Army during the 
war and left their animals unattended. Reindeer also assisted the army on the Finnish 
front as an unsustainable means of transport, sustenance, and other supplies.141 The 
reindeer population almost completely disappeared from Karelia and fell from 70,300 
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animals in 1940 to 42,900 in 1945 on the Kola Peninsula.142 As the war wound down, 
central party and economic organizations sought to remedy the exhaustion of the local 
food supply in the north by again increasing the development of the Kola reindeer 
economy and attempting to expand polar agriculture.143 The gradual recovery of the 
reindeer industry during the postwar reconstruction occurred, however, more because of 
the activities of pastoralists and ecological factors related to reindeer population 
dynamics than as a result of new policy interventions. 
In the late 1940s and 1950s the government gradually began to pay more attention 
to agriculture. After another drought and famine took over one million lives in 1947, the 
policy makers turned to a re-invigorated trust in Trofim Lysenko’s vernalization 
techniques to establish more stable agricultural surpluses.144 In the 1950s Nikita 
Khrushchev eagerly sought to revive Soviet agriculture by devising a series of policies 
such as the Virgin Lands program.145 A key element of Khrushchev’s agricultural policy 
was the consolidation of collective farms into larger state farms: between 1953 and 1958 
the total number of collective farms in the USSR fell by over a quarter.146 As these 
agglomeration policies continued into the 1960s, central agencies used 1959 census data 
to draw up a list of 580,000 “non-viable” villages slated for liquidation. The idea was to 
leave only two concentrated agrocities in each region.147 On the Kola Peninsula this 
policy of amalgamation led to a remarkable reduction in reindeer herding enterprises 
from over a dozen before World War II to two state farms by the end of the Soviet era.148  
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Amalgamation aimed at increasing the productivity and profitability of the 
herding economy by enlarging the scale of operations in concentrated locations. In terms 
of this goal, the policy brought about mixed results. The first reindeer-herding collective 
farm to be liquidated was the mostly Sami Vpered in Chudz´iavr, which was forced to 
move to Lovozero in 1959 after many years in the red. Its herders and reindeer joined 
Tundra.149 By the end of amalgamation a decade later the performance of collective 
farms mattered less in determining their fate. Thus, the collective farm Bol´shevik in 
Varzino, which had been fulfilling its production plans consistently in the 1950s and 
1960s, also joined Tundra in 1969.150 The productivist economic logic of creating larger 
and larger herding organizations to grow the reindeer economy led to the domestic 
population on the Kola Peninsula reaching its twentieth-century peak in 1971 as the 
resettlement process was completed. However, it began a period of decline after this 
point, mirroring the general economic difficulties of the Soviet Union in the 1970s.151  
Economic motivations related to desired models of land use besides reindeer 
herding also played an important role in determining the geography of resettlement. 
Several small reindeer-herding villages were forced to move because of new 
hydroelectric power stations. The economically successful Dobrovolets collective farm 
moved from Voron´e to Lovozero and its members joined Tundra in the early 1960s so 
that their village, including an old Sami cemetery, could be transformed into a reservoir 
for the Serebriansk Hydroelectric Station.152 A similar development occurred at the 
Krasnaia Tundra collective farm in Chal´mny-Varre (Ivanovka). Residents moved to 
nearby Krasnoshchel´e in the 1960s when the village became slated for flooding to serve 
a planned electric station on the Ponoi River. The collective farm combined with one in 
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the new location and eventually became the state farm Imeni V. I. Lenina (In the Name of 
Lenin).153 
The formalized process of local decision-making during amalgamation suggests 
that Kola reindeer herders managed to impart their insights about tundra ecology and 
express their interests to at least a limited extent. Members of the collective farm 
Bol´shevik voted convincingly, but not unanimously, for resettlement. Collective farm 
members in favor cited the lack of supplies and electricity in the village, the distance 
from amenities, and the fact that young people were already abandoning Varzino. When 
the members of Tundra took up the issue, they expressed concern about limited 
pastureland for reindeer herds. Tundra member V. A. Podoliak declared, “the most 
complicated question concerns pastures for reindeer. We have so few winter pastures and 
will need to accommodate another three-thousand animal herd.”154 Tundra ultimately 
agreed to accept Bol´shevik on the condition that they receive pastureland back from the 
Imeni V. I. Lenina collective farm and that current members of Tundra get to move into 
any new building first instead of the migrants. During the earlier resettlement of 
Dobrovolets, collective farm members secured moving expenses and two new apartment 
buildings in Lovozero from the new hydroelectric plant. However, this time housing 
planners botched this construction project and many former members of Bol´shevik 
remained without the promised accommodations for years.155 
Amalgamation remade the tundra. As an apogee of the Soviet modernization of 
reindeer herding, the consolidation of collective farms and the resettlement of villages 
left the Kola Peninsula with only two reindeer-herding state farms, Tundra and Imeni V. 
I. Lenina, in the agrocities of Lovozero and Krasnoshchel´e. Like many places that dotted 
state-socialist landscapes, Lovozero became a community of a few thousand living in 
large concrete apartment blocks. Amalgamation continued decades of confining reindeer 
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and herders into reduced territories; Dobrovolets, Vpered, and Bol´shevik lost 120,000 
hectares as they were combined with Tundra.156 More than the total reduction of territory, 
the concentration of people and reindeer modified tundra livelihoods. Throughout the 
1930s to the 1950s, fishing and hunting remained key to, if not the dominant components 
of, herding communities’ economies. For the inhabitants of Varzino in particular, salmon 
(semga) fishing at numerous points on the rivers of the Semiostrov region was more 
significant than reindeer herding.157 Combined with isolation from fishing grounds and 
hunting territories, a singular focus on reindeer herding helped further make this 
economic activity be seen as the main traditional indigenous occupation on the Kola 
Peninsula.  
The Sovkhoz Tradition and Post-Soviet Reforms 
The attempts to modernize indigenous communities on the Kola Peninsula had so 
modified the patterns and practices of the reindeer industry by the Soviet collapse in 1991 
that new forms of the state-socialist economy became valorized as traditions by herders 
in the post-Soviet era. The state farm system brought a modicum of stability to the people 
and animals involved in the Kola reindeer economy, which became a source of 
retrospective legitimacy when renewed reforms based on attempts to implement market 
mechanisms again brought disruptions to the tundra. The politics of ecological 
knowledge played a partially familiar and partially distinct role in the local manifestation 
of capitalist reforms. The legibility of the market depended on the explicit incorporation 
of international actors and changing land-use according to the whims of abstract buyers 
instead of an abstract state. However, the environmental and social relations of the 
reindeer economy never fit within the formal structures of the communist system and did 
not quickly integrate into markets. 
During the late Soviet era, the state farm system of reindeer herding that emerged 
from amalgamation and its corresponding environmental relationships became deeply 
entrenched on the Kola Peninsula. In contrast to collective farms, the government took 
more responsibility for keeping state farms financially afloat by providing investments 
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and loans and detaching salaries from direct dependence on economic productivity. With 
the use of new technologies such as snowmobiles, helicopters, and all-terrain vehicles, 
the Kola state farms focused on producing and delivering venison to a steady purchaser, 
the Murmansk Meat Combine.158 Konstantinov, Vladimirova, and Hugh Beach describe 
how the ecological associations that herders had with reindeer changed after 
amalgamation. Operating out of concentrated agrocities, several brigades of each state 
farm were responsible for tending huge herds of reindeer. In a return to earlier practices 
on the Kola Peninsula, the brigades left their herds for free grazing in the summer. In the 
context of state ownership of the previously collective reindeer, personal animals became 
an even greater priority for many pastoralists. At the same time the increased sizes of the 
herding enterprises, the general behavior of these nomadic herbivores, and the mixing of 
personal and state farm animals further impeded any direct contact with one’s own 
reindeer. Only during the winter corral would personal reindeer, which were 
distinguished by earmarks and slated for slaughter, come to the attention of their 
owner.159 
For all of the energy devoted to making reindeer herding a productive industry, 
Soviet policy interventions seem to have had less of an impact on the population of 
domestic reindeer than the ecological relationship of this herding species to its 
environment. Reindeer populations have a tendency to grow until an exhaustion of 
foraging resources and then decline rapidly.160 Excepting the obvious episodic social 
influences such as the arrival of the Komi, the devastation of World War I and the 
Russian Civil War, the reverberations of the 1932-1933 famine, the impact of World War 
II, and perhaps the disorder of the late 1990s, the population dynamics of domestic 
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reindeer in the twentieth century appear fairly unresponsive to collectivization, 
agglomeration, and attempted marketization (see Table 5). For instance, the massive 
expansion of the reindeer population in the earlier twentieth century, when no official 
policy of industrializing reindeer herding existed, was far greater than the results of any 
deliberate efforts to increase herd sizes in the Soviet era. While these population 
estimates have obviously limited accuracy and reflect a prominent practice of 
establishing legibility, the contours of the fluctuations seem large enough to trust in 
assessing general changes.    
Table 5. Reported Population of Domestic Reindeer in the Murmansk Region161 
 
Year Domestic 
reindeer 
population 
Year Domestic 
reindeer 
population 
Year Domestic 
reindeer 
population 
1886 13,000 1929 56,500 1963 78,152 
1887 18,000 1932 63,100 1968 79,117 
1896 45,000 1934 54,000 1971 82,832 
1905 59,000 1937 76,918 1981 63,000 
1910 67,200 1940 70,300 1985 71,449 
1914 81,000 / 74,000 1947 42,045 1991 73,356 
1923 23,000 1950 53,883 1998 72,438 
1927 48,300 1959 74,800 2002 57,000 
 
The post-Soviet reforms of Kola reindeer herding aimed at making it part of a 
capitalist market economy, but ended up allowing important elements of the Soviet state 
farm system to abide. An episode of impoverishment and disempowerment, which have 
often accompanied top-down modernization campaigns, preceded efforts to implement a 
vision of neo-traditionalism in indigenous communities. Russian neoliberalism was 
ushered in by shock-therapy policies—hasty privatization, the de-regulation of price 
controls, withdrawal of state subsidies, and increased openness to foreign trade—and a 
political overhaul that gave the country institutions of representative democracy. The fate 
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of agricultural property in these reforms involved legal and practical complexities in the 
distribution of rights and the moral anxieties in society over the reorganization of 
ownership. Ethnographic research has probed effectively the on-the-ground 
contradictions in many realms of the post-socialist world that complicate understandings 
about how capitalist property regimes function.162 Initially privatized as Limited Liability 
Partnerships, meaning that managers and employees received the majority of the shares 
of the firm, the Kola state farms Tundra and Olenevod later became Agricultural 
Production Cooperatives (SKhPK). In part because the basic structures of mixed 
collective/private ownership of reindeer has remained in place through these 
cooperatives, the post-Soviet administration and management of Tundra and Olenevod 
resemble the state farm system more than overt entrepreneurship.163 Konstantinov and 
Vladimirova call the continuation of many of the everyday economic practices and 
structures associated with the state farm “sovkhoism” and argue that it has been “a much 
more stable tradition, than anything that dates before.”164  
The new market orientation of herding institutions has also transformed 
environmental relations in similar directions as Soviet-era reforms. Unlike reindeer 
husbandry in much of Siberia, the Kola herding cooperatives benefited from their close 
proximity to the venison market in Scandinavia and were able to secure a monopolistic 
buyer, the Swedish firm Norfrys-Polarica. Combined with herders’ ability to access 
natural resources from the tundra during crisis moments, this relationship allowed the 
reindeer cooperatives to play a sustaining role in Lovozero and Krasnoshchel´e.165 The 
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actions of international companies also contributed to the further isolation of indigenous 
communities from fishing areas in the region. While amalgamation had separated 
communities from fishing grounds, many continued to catch salmon in rivers and streams 
when the opportunity arose. In the 1990s foreign tourism companies attained the 
exclusive right to use certain rivers in the eastern part of the Kola Peninsula. These 
companies advertised their salmon fishing expeditions by overtly referring to the fact that 
locals are not allowed to fish in the rivers.166 Such developments have continued the 
elevation of reindeer as a means of material well being for indigenous communities. 
Efforts to Protect Wild Reindeer 
Institutionalized conservation on the Kola Peninsula was a modern innovation. It 
began in the 1930s during the first fit of Stalinist industrialization with the creation of the 
Lapland nature reserve, which aimed at preserving aspects of the ecosystems seen as 
traditional. To a large extent this protected area concentrated on restoring the wild 
reindeer population in the western part of the peninsula. The scientists working there 
combined a desire to use their expertise to rationalize an ecosystem with a romantic 
attachment to supposedly pristine environments. Especially in the 1950s and 1960s, this 
commitment to controlling a landscape led to conflicts between conservationists and 
reindeer herders. Many scholars have criticized scientific conservation as disconnected 
from local communities.167 Tim Ingold contends that the doctrines of scientific 
conservation hold that “the world of nature is separate from, and subordinate to, the 
world of humanity” and asserts that, on the contrary, for hunter/gatherer societies 
“conservation and participation” are compatible. For them, “caring for the environment is 
like caring for people: it requires a deep, personal and affectionate involvement, an 
involvement not just of mind or body but of one’s entire, undivided being.”168 I intend to 
show here that while conservation scientists pursued the protection of wild reindeer on 
the Kola Peninsula with a strong conviction in the superiority of their rationalist 
knowledge, they were also influenced by personal, participatory, and affectionate 
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involvement with the environment. Not just reindeer communities, but conservation 
scientists as well, were informed by sentient ecological knowledge. 
The Rise of Reindeer Conservation on the Kola Peninsula 
In the 1920s and 1930s a small group of marginalized scientists initiated a 
campaign to protect the population of wild reindeer on the Kola Peninsula. Motivated in 
part by their own intimate connections to the natural world and desires to put their 
expertise into practice, they endorsed the establishment of a protected space for species 
study and restoration. Their conservation efforts involved making public arguments about 
the economic value of creating a nature reserve, while relying on indigenous insights and 
assistance to do the work of protecting wild reindeer. This strategy succeeded in 
convincing state authorities to allocate land for the creation of the Lapland nature reserve 
in 1930. 
Organized nature protection in Russia predated the revolutions of 1917, but the 
nationalization of land after the Bolshevik takeover presented a unique opportunity to 
expand the system of nature reserves in the country. In late imperial Russia 
representatives of educated society, who were concerned about the transformation of 
landscapes and the disappearance of species, formed conservation groups that convinced 
several large landowners to set aside significant tracts for nature reserves called 
zapovedniki. They planned to establish an entire system of protected areas that would 
represent diverse ecological models of untouched wilderness. During the Russian 
Revolution, the state acquired vast lands that had previously belonged to nobles or the 
Orthodox Church. With top-level government support, the zapovednik system underwent 
a remarkable expansion of the size and number of reserves throughout the 1920s.169  
As Douglas Weiner has emphasized, the initial conception of nature protection in 
the Soviet Union was quite radical, even by global standards at the time. Conservation 
scientists embraced a model of the reserves based on the principle of the inviolability of 
specific natural systems. All humans not involved in the scientific management or 
security functions, including tourists, would be completely excluded from the territories. 
The scientific justification for this approach came from the concept of biocenosis. Early 
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Soviet conservation biologists believed that all of living nature could be divided into 
subsystems called biocenoses that exhibited the properties of species interdependence and 
long-term equilibrium. In their view both of these ecological properties required strict 
and enduring protection of representative samples of these unaltered environments.170  
Serious scientific concern about preserving the population of wild reindeer on the 
Kola Peninsula, which had been in decline since even before the Komi migration of the 
1880s, emerged in the late 1920s.171 A single botanist named German Kreps led the 
campaign and elaborated a strong case for conservation.172 In the local Communist Party 
newspaper Polar Pravda in the spring of 1928, Kreps publicly announced the idea of 
setting aside a territory of approximately 200,000 hectares in which all forms of 
economic activity would be prohibited in order to save the region’s wild reindeer from 
extinction.173 He elsewhere noted the inadequacy of the current hunting prohibitions 
because of the impossibility of enforcement and insisted, “the only effective measure for 
the protection of wild reindeer is the organization of a nature reserve (zapovednik) on the 
Kola Peninsula.” This zapovednik would have the “goal not only of protecting a single 
animal, but also of preserving the entire geographical landscape in natural 
inviolability.”174 Kreps outlined justifications for this reserve that highlighted its value for 
science, the future hunting economy, and the domestic reindeer industry.175 He proposed 
using the lands surrounding the Chuna tundra to the west as the site for the future nature 
reserve, since this territory had sufficient forest and lichen cover, a mountain tundra area, 
an existing population of wild reindeer, a diverse range of other plant and animal species, 
and distance from centers of human activity.176  
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In addition to the formal rationalist elements of the plan, Kreps relied crucially on 
the ecological knowledge of the Sami living to the west of Lake Imandra. The proposed 
territory for the reserve was uninhabited except for two or three Sami families who fished 
there during the summer.177 These individuals participated in the work of the reserve by 
offering their recollections of previous environmental conditions, helping count the 
existing wild reindeer population, and later serving as security guards. Based on 
memories of older Sami hunters, Kreps ascertained that the population of Kola wild 
reindeer underwent periodic booms and busts as the animals over-consumed the available 
lichen pastures. During the previous three or four decades, however, the expansion of 
reindeer herding and the establishment of the Murmansk railroad had caused a 
precipitous drop in the wild reindeer population beyond these normal fluctuations. This 
change, according to Kreps, necessitated an intervention.178 Kreps also depended on the 
ability of Sami hunter Fedor Arkhipov to distinguish between wild and domestic reindeer 
from a distance during his first attempt to estimate the population in April 1929.179  
Government agencies officially established the Lapland nature reserve on January 
17, 1930 and soon after named Kreps as its director.180 In the fall he hired three security 
guards and a botanist named Oleg Semenov-Tian-Shanskii, who would come to play a 
decisive role in the history of the reserve.181 The desire to commune with nature enticed 
Semenov-Tian-Shanskii, who at the time worked at a meteorological base along the 
Murmansk railroad. After receiving the offer to join the Lapland nature reserve, he wrote 
in his diary, “work observing and studying nature is more to my liking and I would very 
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much like to take up his offer.”182 Just before the reserve staff moved out to the Chuna 
Tundra for their first winter on the reserve in 1930-1931, they learned of the discovery of 
valuable metal deposits by geologists in the nearby Monche region. Semenov-Tian-
Shanskii recorded Kreps’s despair at the prospect that industrial activities would 
commence on the territory of the zapovednik: “The whole nature reserve, the result of 
several years of his labor, will be ruined since the exploitation of one of these basic parts 
of the territory of the nature reserve will soon bring about the disappearance of the wild 
animal.”183 The scientists avoided this result by adjusting the reserve’s borders, but 
challenges to maintaining a lack of industrial influence on the territory would continue.184  
Difficulties and Successes of the 1930s 
Over the first decade of its existence the Lapland nature reserve made 
considerable gains in its mission to restore wild reindeer, but both state pressure and 
ecological factors forced an abandonment of the ideal of it as an inviolable model of a 
natural system. For one thing reindeer simply did not stay within the confines of the 
protected territory. Despite his public appeals to utilitarian rationales for conservation, 
Kreps seemed attracted to the idea of maintaining natural systems with minimal 
economic influence. His pursuit of these methods of nature protection ultimately placed 
him in a vulnerable position for denunciation during the 1937-1938 terror. Unlike many 
leaders of the regional economy, however, he escaped the ordeal with his life but not his 
job. The economy-centered logic of state policy at the time clashed with the multivalent 
motivations and practices of the employees of the Lapland reserve. The successful 
recovery of the wild reindeer population from near extinction and the ability to campaign 
for an expansion in the protected territory marked accomplishments for Soviet 
conservation.  
Though Kreps used the concept of inviolability in his initial plan for the reserve, it 
was already under attack by the time of its creation. Inviolability implied permanence in 
space and time. Parcels of untouched nature would be kept with minimal human 
interference. This notion not only contradicted the priorities of a rapidly industrializing 
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state, but it also seemed inadequate to some zapovednik scientists who pointed out that 
the territories they were protecting were not in fact “untouched” but had also suffered 
anthropogenic influences that could be remedied.185 The vexed issue of acclimatizating 
exotic species served as the practical embodiment of this debate at the Lapland nature 
reserve. Since the early 1920s biologists working in the People’s Commissariat of 
Agriculture had been advocating for the introduction of North American muskrats to the 
northern realms of the country as means of expanding the hunting economies there.186 
Though they almost certainly opposed such species introduction to non-native 
ecosystems, Kreps and Semenov-Tian-Shanskii cooperated and released imported 
muskrats onto the Lapland reserve in 1931.187 The acclimatization of beavers, which had 
lived in the region until some point in the nineteenth century, received considerably more 
enthusiasm from zapovednik workers.188 Both projects represented departures from the 
original concept of inviolable protection.   
Kreps’s understanding of reindeer ecology and proper restoration efforts became 
fodder for a campaign against him. In contrast to his initial claims about the benefit of 
preserving wild reindeer for the domestic reindeer economy, his scientific research on 
herd interaction led him in the opposite direction. Based on his own observations and 
information from local Sami, he moved toward seeing little economic benefit in keeping 
wild and domestic herds in proximity to each other. Though he maintained an emphasis 
on the potential to hunt wild reindeer in the future, Kreps’s supposed reluctance to 
promote the economy evoked criticism from the head of the Apatit trust, Vasilii 
Kondrikov, in September 1933. 189 Kondrikov commented, “wild reindeer are a good 
thing, but I should say that comrade Kreps with his wild reindeer should still be more 
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concerned with practical issues.”190 An exposé in the newspaper Kirovsk Worker about 
the Lapland nature reserve shortly after Kreps was fired in early 1937 emphasized the 
divergent understandings about the purpose of wild reindeer conservation.191 The author 
assailed the Lapland nature reserve’s research program for not prioritizing the study of 
lichen restoration in an area where there had been a forest fire in 1936 and accused Kreps 
of issuing “a call to exterminate wild reindeer.” He based this attack on Kreps’s 
observations that wild reindeer contribute “to domestic reindeer going wild,” “can disturb 
the work of rescuing domestic reindeer from gadflies and therefore are harmful in 
reindeer-herding regions,” and are not genetically unique from domestic reindeer.192 
These troubles did not prevent the staff of the Lapland nature reserve from 
pursuing their agenda effectively. The wild reindeer population on the western half of the 
Kola Peninsula quickly recovered; Kreps wrote to Charnoluskii in 1931 that it had 
already increased one and a half times.193 During the 1930s, conservation scientists 
employed a method to estimate populations that involved ascertaining the herds’ 
locations at different times of the year, finding the animals in tundra and forest zones, 
surveying track marks, and distinguishing domestic reindeer that had mixed with a wild 
herd.194 Their results pointed to a steady rise in the number of wild reindeer, reaching 
over 900 by the end of the decade.195 The Lapland nature reserve also became part of the 
state system of zapovedniki of the Russian Republic in February 1935 and had its budget 
considerably increased. This move allowed the reserve to hire more researchers, 
including three female scientists (M. I. Vladimirskaia, N. M. Pushkina, and T. P. 
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Nekrasova), and to expand its research and cultural enlightenment programs to better 
meet state demands.196 
Additionally, the behavior of wild reindeer themselves helped reserve scientists to 
expand the borders of the zapovednik in 1941. In 1939 the staff claimed to have 
discovered that the territory of the Lapland reserve was only 138,000 hectares instead of 
the officially sanctioned 200,000 hectares.197 On top of this miscalculation, the wild 
reindeer of the reserve began to roam in areas outside of the reserve’s borders.198 
Semenov-Tian-Shanskii and other reserve staff used this information to campaign for an 
enlargement away from the new industrial center of Monchegorsk throughout 1940.199 
The official decisions to expand the zapovednik mentioned these reasons, stating “in 
connection with the increased numbers of wild reindeer and elk in the Lapland nature 
reserve, the insufficiency of foraging resources led to the displacement of these animals 
beyond the border of the nature reserve into the regions of the Monche tundra, where they 
are deprived of effective protection from poaching” and that the new boundaries are 
necessary for “promoting the propagation and preservation of wild animals that are 
valuable in economic and scientific terms.”200  
Postwar Troubles for Soviet Nature Protection 
Located near the Soviet border and sites of military activity during World War II, 
the Lapland nature reserve lost a significant portion of its wildlife during the conflict. In 
1951 the reserve faced liquidation as part of a nation-wide attack on zapovednik 
conservation. The effect of closing the Lapland zapovednik for most of the 1950s on wild 
reindeer remained minimal, however, as the population of the species again recovered 
from wartime devastation. The operations of the reserve changed after it re-opened in 
1957 to rely less heavily on the first-hand observations of Sami hunters. Semenov-Tian-
Shanskii was the functional if not nominal leader of the reserve from Kreps’s departure in 
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1937 until his death in 1991. His thoughts and concerns during these tumultuous events 
of the postwar era reveal some of the moral motivations for this scientific conservation.  
During the Second World War, state-sanctioned hunting of reindeer occurred on 
the territory of the Lapland reserve.201 These attempts to supply venison to the front led to 
sharp declines in both domestic and wild reindeer in the western part of the Kola 
Peninsula.202 The shift from protection to aggressive hunting apparently also affected the 
psychology of the animals. A Sami security guard named Artamon Sergin, who had 
worked at the reserve since its formation, described “the extremely alarmed behavior of 
wild reindeer” in his diary during the war. In February 1942 he wrote, “Wild reindeer 
now began to move very quickly. If you frighten them away, they will go thirty 
kilometers and not eat but go straight. If one or two reindeer stay on the path, then they 
go in pursuit of them and scare away the herd.”203 Years later Semenov-Tian-Shanskii 
remained upset with how this wartime hunting was conducted: “In the first year of the 
war the shooting began under the flag of supplying the Soviet army. With time this initial 
goal was forgotten; only the urge ‘to warm one’s hands’ did not disappear, to plunder that 
which the nature reserve should have protected.”204 
In the final years before liquidation, several conflicts arose that pitted the reserve 
scientists against other staff members and local reindeer herders. Pastoralists at the 
nearby Krasnoe Pulozero collective farm seem to have resented their exclusion from the 
land and resources of the zapovednik, while scientists saw them as the main perpetrators 
against the area’s protected character. Returning to the Lapland reserve in 1949, 
Semenov-Tian-Shanskii accused the members of the Krasnoe Pulozero collective farm of 
poaching approximately 50 wild reindeer the previous year.205 Then in June 1951 one 
worker at the reserve wrote a denunciation about the scientific staff, including Semenov-
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Tian-Shanskii and Vladimirskaia (who were now married).206 The disgruntled employee 
complained that the scientists exploited the wildlife of the reserve to feed themselves and 
refused to share the fish they caught. Semenov-Tian-Shanskii accounted for all of the 
wildlife they consumed and justified the ecological sensibility of such predation. The 
official response sided with the scientists and pointed out that all reserve workers were 
entitled to fish for subsistence.207 
The closing of the Lapland nature reserve was part of a new law that reduced the 
amount of territory under zapovednik protection in the Soviet Union from 12,600,000 
hectares to 1,384,000 hectares and eliminated 88 of 128 reserves. This new policy 
broadly reflected a renewed ascendance of overtly instrumentalist methods of Soviet 
nature use that characterized the heightened influence of Lysenko. Weiner recounts how 
the leaders of the Lapland reserve heard rumors that their zapovednik was going to be 
liquidated while on a trip to Murmansk in August 1951. They sent a panicked telegram to 
the head of the system, Aleksandr Malinovskii, about the issue and received assurances 
that the Lapland reserve was not threatened. Only a few weeks later, the reserve was shut 
down.208 In part because of this seemingly deliberate deception, the Lapland reserve 
became one of the first former zapovedniki to benefit from a surge in scientific activism 
in the immediate post-Stalin years. In 1954 Malinovskii had joined a petition of reserve 
scientists to restore the Lapland zapovednik. A government decree from November 1957 
included the Lapland nature reserve the first round of zapovedniki to be re-established.209 
The revived Lapland nature reserve kept wild reindeer preservation as a key component 
of its mission.210 
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Liquidation had an ambiguous influence on the environment of the Lapland 
nature reserve. Timber collection began in the region and supposedly an additional third 
of the forests in the area burned down, which destroyed significant portions of lichen 
pastures. Despite these ecological degradations and the claims of conservation scientists 
that wild reindeer now faced new threats, the population of the animal actually doubled 
or quadrupled during the period of liquidation.211 The State Hunting Inspection also used 
a new method for counting reindeer that involved taking photographs of herds from 
helicopters.212 This technique replaced the earlier practice of relying on the practical 
skills and knowledge of reindeer herders to count the animals after the Lapland reserve 
re-opened. Without the help of herders and the ability to get close to the herds it was 
nearly impossible to distinguish between wild reindeer and the domestic ones that had 
joined the group.213 
Hunting, Herding, or Protecting 
In the 1960s the staff at the rehabilitated Lapland nature reserve more assertively 
advocated policies that matched their interests. Conservation scientists led a vocal 
campaign to reform hunting regulations on the Kola Peninsula and contributed to the 
closing down of the Krasnoe Pulozero collective farm during the agglomeration process. 
During this decade the wild reindeer population in the area boomed dramatically, 
reaching an unsustainable 12,640 in 1967.214 The ways that emotion entered Semenov-
Tian-Shanskii’s reactions to conflicts with herders and hunters suggest that his own 
sentient knowledge of wild reindeer was replacing a previous reliance on the insights of 
indigenous groups. Furthermore, in this analysis I emphasize that the dynamics of 
reindeer interaction belong in our explanation of the dispute between herders and 
conservation scientists. The conflict was not just an instance of elite abstraction and 
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debasement of an indigenous group’s methods of nature use, but had a basis in 
incompatible environmental prerogatives. 
The willingness of reserve scientists to engage in political and economic debates 
manifested itself in a critique of hunting regulations. At a conference in Moscow in 
November 1960, Semenov-Tian-Shanskii lambasted an array of practices he found 
antithetical to a “rational” hunting economy, such as propagandizing a campaign to 
“exterminate ravines” in regions where these birds posed no threat and using helicopters 
to pursue large animals that could not be transported back from where they were shot.215 
His approach to reindeer predators seemed intent on limiting human interference in fauna 
ecosystems. Wolves, “the most dreadful enemy of reindeer,” did not require eradication 
because they only occasionally preyed on the western population of wild reindeer and 
had mostly disappeared from the region in the postwar years.216 The wolverine, insisted 
Semenov-Tian-Shanskii, “is a useful predator up to a certain extent: exterminating sick 
animals and being an instrument of natural selection, it is conducive to the maintenance 
of a viable population.”217 Since overall “only man controls the number of wild reindeer” 
and their population had grown considerably, Semenov-Tian-Shanskii proposed a set of 
“rational” and “planned” hunting guidelines for them.218 He claimed that up to 1000 
animals of a population of 5400 could be killed a year. Many of his proposed regulations 
reflected a defensive disposition toward this species. He argued for the need to shoot 
from one hundred meters away in order to not disturb the herd, the inclusion of domestic 
reindeer that joined wild herds within hunting quotas, the use of air counts to adjust the 
amount of hunting permitted each year, and a prohibition on hunting during certain times 
of the year. As he passionately explained this final point, it would be “barbarism” to 
shoot calves during their third trimester of pregnancy.219  
The Lapland nature reserve also became embroiled in a quarrel with reindeer 
herders. Semenov-Tian-Shanskii reported an incident in 1960 during which a group of 
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reindeer herders from the Krasnoe Pulozero collective farm received permission to check 
the zapovednik for some of their animals from the reserve’s acting leadership while he 
and the director were away on a business trip.220 The collective farm claimed that 400 of 
their domestic reindeer had escaped to the reserve.221 A group of herders entered the 
zapovednik with a reserve security guard and shot fourteen reindeer, but instead of 
checking their earmarks to verify that they had belonged to Krasnoe Pulozero herders, 
the security guard covered up the matter.222 An outraged Semenov-Tian-Shanskii 
declared, “this entire incident must be regarded as poaching with the connivance of the 
very workers of the nature reserve.” At this point he already saw the Sami “reindeer 
herders of the Pulozero collective farm” as “the main poachers on the territory of the 
nature reserve in the postwar years.”223 The Krasnoe Pulozero collective farm had 
recently lost a large portion of its reindeer in the late 1950s and did not seem to take these 
accusations very seriously.224 On the contrary, its members continued to insist that their 
animals had escaped to the zapovednik.225 After losing more reindeer during 1961, the 
Pulozero village council sought “to take all measures to retrieve the reindeer that had 
broken away and to fire in the regions of the Lapland nature reserve.”226 These desperate 
measures of the herders came to naught. After several years of planning, the Krasnoe 
Pulozero was officially liquidated in 1964 and their reindeer were transferred to the 
Murmansk Experimental Reindeer-Herding Station.227  
Episodes like this one often get interpreted as conflicts between elitist 
conservationists who hold romantic views of untouched wilderness devoid of human 
influence and native communities who long had depended on that local ecosystem for 
their livelihoods. The frequent dislocation of native groups from protected territories 
reveals the hierarchical power relations embedded in certain strands of 
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environmentalism.228 This dynamic was certainly at play in the conflict between the Sami 
herders from Pulozero and the scientists of the Lapland nature reserve, who became 
complicit in supporting the Soviet state’s forced relocations. The placement of the 
domestic reindeer under the auspices of another scientific organization that was more 
inclined to keep these animals separate from the wild population of the zapovednik 
appeared to satisfy the conservationists at the Lapland reserve.  
But there was validity to the concerns of zapovednik scientists about the potential 
for separate herds of wild and domestic reindeer to thrive in close proximity to each 
other. Wild reindeer and domestic reindeer do indeed compete for foraging resources, 
limiting the possibility for a large-scale herding economy and a vibrant wild reindeer 
population to exist in the same area. Semenov-Tian-Shanskii attributed the ballooning of 
the wild reindeer population after World War II to the decline in reindeer herding in the 
western part of the Kola Peninsula. During this period, competition for lichen supplies 
became more intense and the animals grew dependent on pastures outside the Lapland 
nature reserve.229 In a large report on the interaction of wild and domestic reindeer from 
1963, Semenov-Tian-Shanskii expressed his views on the issue. He outlined four 
divergent hypotheses about wild reindeer: they were going extinct and required special 
preservation measures; they were a valuable resource that should be reasonably 
exploited; they threatened reindeer herding and should be exterminated along with 
wolves; and they did not exist but instead were domestic animals that went wild and have 
no particular value.230 By setting up a contradiction between the potential harm that wild 
reindeer could have on reindeer herding and positions valuing their preservation, he 
argued for favoring the needs of wild reindeer over the herding economy.  
Reindeer Conservation through the Soviet Collapse 
The efforts to protect wild reindeer on the Kola Peninsula in the final decades of 
the Soviet Union and the post-Soviet era overlapped with the rise of environmentalism as 
a global political movement. Scientists at the Lapland nature reserve first took advantage 
of newfound space in the Soviet public sphere to insist on the significance of 
                                                
228See, for example, Ramachandra Guha, Environmentalism: A Global History (New York: 
Longman, 2000) and Karl Jacoby, Crimes against Nature: Squatters, Poachers, Thieves, and the Hidden 
History of American Conservation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001). 
229 GARF, f. A-358, op. 4, d. 1521, ll. 75-80. 
230 GARF, f. A-358, op. 4, d. 1521, l. 4. 
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environmental issues in the late 1970s and 1980s. The increased involvement of 
international organizations and the turn toward a new form of political economy began in 
the mid-1980s and took over in the 1990s. In this new situation the Lapland nature 
reserve sought to reform its conservation strategies and ended up moving closer to 
industries it had opposed in the late Soviet era.  In pushing a conservationist agenda in 
opposition to the nearby Severonikel´ combine during the late Soviet era, Semenov-Tian-
Shanskii and his colleagues combined scientific and aesthetic appeals. Beginning in the 
1990s, cooperation with a multinational corporation enabled conservation scientists to 
more effectively protect and restore the ecosystem near the zapovednik, including the 
wild reindeer population. The price for this industry support was a diminished role in 
political activism.   
Table 6. Reported Population of Wild Reindeer in the Western Part of the 
Murmansk Region231 
 
Year Wild 
reindeer 
population 
Year Wild 
reindeer 
population 
Year Wild 
reindeer 
population 
1929 99 1968 2280 1983 180 
1931 150 1969 9692 1984 250 
1937 415 1970 5506 1985 270 
1940 935 1971 6447 1986 300 
1948 380 1972 9756 1987 320 
1957 1964 1973 7250 1988 520 
1959 563 1974 5400 1989 426 
1960 2168 1975 3420 1990 600 
1961 4397 1976 482 1995 824 
1962 3688 1977 1234 1996 1000 
1963 3974 1978 545 1997 1100-1150 
1964 5793 1979 101 1998 1270 
1965 5880 1980 288 1999 1370 
1966 6117 1981 100 2000 500 
1967 12640 1982 180 2001 200-300 
 
The boom in the wild reindeer population lasted until the middle of the 1970s and 
then the number of animals in the territory in and around the Lapland nature reserve fell 
                                                
231 Makarova, “Dikii severnyi olen´ Kol´skogo poluostrova v kontse XX—nachale XXI vekov,” 
Nauka i biznes na Murmane, no.  4 (August 2003): 43; Diuzhilov, “‘Arkhipelag Svobody’ na Murmane,” in 
Fedorov, et al., eds., Zhivushchie na Severe, 95; GARF, f. A-358, op. 2, d. 111, l. 25; and GARF, f. A-358, 
op. 2, d. 231, l. 32. 
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precipitously. The primary causes of this decline were that the quantity of lichen pastures 
degraded down to a quarter or a fifth of what they had been in the 1930s and 1940s and 
the increased hunting of wild reindeer. Though Semenov-Tian-Shanskii had hoped to turn 
human predation into a technique of reindeer conservation, the population bust required 
at least a decade of lichen restoration before a recovery of reindeer.232 The situation 
reached its nadir in 1981 when the wild reindeer count came up with a population 
estimate of 100 animals, almost exactly the same as it had been when Kreps first made 
his desperate pleas for creating the zapovednik.233 In response reserve staff helped re-ban 
wild reindeer hunting in the area.234 Much of the population fluctuations after the 1950s 
that appear in Table 6 can be attributed to non-human factors of Kola political ecology. 
However, without the protection efforts of the zapovednik it is quite possible that wild 
reindeer would have ceased to exist in this area. 
Reserve scientists used the decline in reindeer to launch a public attack on the 
Severonikel´ combine in Monchegorsk, a nickel smelter to the northwest of the Lapland 
zapovednik. Severonikel´ released massive amounts of sulfuric dioxide emissions and 
other pollutants that visibly destroyed sections of local flora. Reserve scientists had long 
monitored the influence of this atmospheric pollution on the forest cover in the 
zapovednik and in the 1970s demonstrated that emissions from Severonikel´ were 
destroying lichen and mosses. They feared that this environmental disturbance might 
threaten the recovery of wild reindeer, which depended on an eventual restoration of 
overgrazed lichen pastures. In addition, the sulfur dioxide released from Severonikel´ had 
challenged the territorial integrity of the nature reserve by damaging trees on a fourth of 
the territory of the Lapland nature reserve by 1980.235 Semenov-Tian-Shanskii and Vasilii 
                                                
232 Semenov-Tyan-Shanskii, “Wild Reindeer of Kola Peninsula” and Zakharov, “Wild Reindeer of 
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235 GARF, f. A-358, op. 4, d. 1640, ll. 1-86 and O. Semenov-Tian-Shanskii and V. Kriuchkov, 
“Visit dym nad zapovednikom,” Pravda (October 10, 1980). In reserve documentation from 1966 
Semenov-Tian-Shanskii gave a detailed description of the damage caused by sulfur dioxide emissions. See 
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Kriuchkov, the director of the laboratory of nature protection of the Kola section of the 
Academy of Science, outlined their concerns in an article in the nationwide newspaper 
Pravda on October 10, 1980. They wrote, “a sword of smoke from the Severonikel´ 
combine already hung over the coniferous forests of the eastern part of the nature reserve 
in the 1950s. Connected to the growth in production in the 1970s the forest withered at 
such a tempo that the nature reserve is just at the point that it might turn into the same 
sort of wasteland (pustynia) as the outskirts of Monchegorsk.” Given that the “natural 
complex of the nature reserve has been ruined,” “it is necessary to increase its territory so 
that its landscape will fully serve as a model (etalon) of the primitive nature of the 
region.”236 As another reserve scientist, A. Bragin, insisted in a follow-up article in Polar 
Pravda, “a healthy natural environment remains a necessary condition for the normal 
development of human society. In the harsh conditions of the Far North this truth (istina) 
is especially apparent.”237 
This conservationist advocacy achieved some notable success. In 1983 the 
government nearly doubled the total territory of the reserve by adding regions to the 
northwest, upwind from the Severonikel´ combine, while removing already degraded 
lands near Monchegorsk from protection.238 In February 1985, the United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) designated the Lapland 
zapovednik as a biosphere reserve. 239 Neither of these developments did much to shift the 
direction of increasing environmental destruction on the Kola Peninsula from industrial 
pollution during the 1980s. Indeed, transferring territory with destroyed vegetation out of 
protection speaks of an abiding desire to separate and isolate geographical spaces of 
conservation and economic activity. However, the wild reindeer population in the 
western part of the Lapland zapovednik gradually recovered and protests against the 
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increasing industrial pollution became a focus in the anti-government social action that 
appeared during the final years of communism.240  
Since the Soviet collapse, the tactics of conservation practiced by the Lapland 
nature reserve have changed dramatically. Beyond the multifarious factors that 
transformed Russia in this era, the passing of Semenov-Tian-Shanskii in 1990 affected 
local efforts as well.241 A vocal oppositional stance of environmentalists in the 
perestroika years dissipated in the 1990s.242 Yet, the maintenance of cultural and natural 
heritage through protected spaces became an officially sanctioned imperative with 
governmental and international support in many places throughout the former Soviet 
Union.243 Laura Henry’s recent examination of post-Soviet environmental activism 
distinguishes among three types of organizations: grassroots, professional, and 
government-affiliated.244 The Lapland nature reserve could probably be classified as a 
corporate-affiliated organization in which similar hierarchical structures and 
dependencies as government-affiliated organizations exist, but they have been directed 
toward a multinational corporation. It also has been able to embrace a more international 
disposition than some of the government affiliates Henry describes.  
As an environmental institution the Lapland nature reserve has used its 
relationship with the Kola Mining and Metallurgy Company (Kola GMK), a subsidiary of 
Noril´sk Nikel´ and operator of the Severonikel´ smelter, to address the effects of 
industrial pollution on the protected territory. However, this cooperation has led to it 
being less engaged in environmentalist politics than earlier periods. Following the Seville 
Strategy for Biosphere Reserves that UNESCO adopted in 1995, reserve leaders re-
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envisioned the purpose of conservation by largely abandoning the principles of territorial 
isolation and seeking instead to find areas of common interest with societal, 
governmental, and industrial actors.245 In practice this strategy has meant that the Lapland 
reserve has broadened in its focus on tourism and assisting regional development, while 
accepting funds from the companies responsible for continued pollution. Under this 
system industrial enterprises have considerably reduced pollution of sulfur dioxide from 
their late Soviet peak and have committed to supporting ecosystem restoration. This 
source of funding has been especially important for the zapovednik because government 
allocations largely evaporated during the 1990s.246 It has allowed the reserve to continue 
its annual monitoring of the wild reindeer population and adopt new scientific approaches 
to wildlife management.247  
In taking corporate money the Lapland nature reserve has also participated in a 
public relations effort of Noril´sk Nikel´ to depict itself as a green company. Noril´sk 
Nikel´ has transformed the reserve by supporting tourist attractions like Grandfather 
Frost’s workshop and other efforts at educational outreach. The reserve also cooperates 
with the company’s campaigns to present nature protection as aligned with the interests 
of industry. For example, a children’s book published in 2006 by Kola GMK depicts two 
children who search for Grandfather Frost’s missing reindeer on the Lapland reserve. At 
one point they encounter Salatovyi, an environmental monitor working for Severonikel´.  
During a conversation, the children apply the appellation “the main Guardian of Nature” 
to Kola GMK, winning Salatovyi’s approbation. The narrative moves to an explanation of 
the Severonikel´ combine’s production process and its history of pollution. In apologizing 
for this unfortunate side effect, Salatovyi affirms the historic and contemporary primacy 
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of industrial interests over environmental ones: “But what could have been done?  Did 
people need nickel? They needed it. And did they need copper? Very much so.”248 
Conclusion 
Over the past century modernization has deeply influenced Kola reindeer and the 
people who interacted with them. The advent of large-scale pastoralism, the 
establishment of an industrialized and collectivized reindeer economy, the conservation 
efforts of scientists, the resettlement of communities and animals to a few urbanized 
villages, and the market reforms that shifted production toward international buyers all 
significantly transformed the economic relations between Rangifer tarandas and Homo 
sapiens. During this “century of perestroikas,” as Bruce Grant has called it, policy makers 
and outside commentators shared an abiding conviction that the Kola reindeer economy 
needed to be brought into the present.249  Divergent desires and capacities for outside 
control and distinct political-economic ideologies led the organizational instruments of 
this modernization to vary. However, indigenous groups throughout the Arctic, in Mark 
Nuttall’s words, have faced “common experiences” with “how various capitalist and 
socialist states claimed control over their lands and animals,” especially reindeer.250 The 
emergence of a traditionalist discourse through these modern reforms was one significant 
similarity uniting the Soviet Union and other states.  
Variegated forms of knowledge affected power relations among people, reindeer, 
and environments during this transformative period. Both legible and sentient ecologies 
shaped the contours of the modernization of the reindeer economy. Thus, while ethnic 
ordering, expanded production, and conservation clearly operationalized high-modernist 
tactics of using abstractions, classifications, and simplifications to enable elite rule, the 
participation of marginal social actors and non-human natural elements in knowledge 
production also helped define modern environmental politics on the Kola Peninsula. 
Augmenting legibility with sentience points to the ways that modernization did not allow 
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people to ascend over nature but instead radically reconfigured their relationships with 
the environment.
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Chapter 4. Environmental Pollution and the Nickel Industry 
Monche is a Lapp word. In Russian translation it means beautiful. This truly is a beautiful 
region with rugged mountain ranges and an array of beautiful lakes, streams, shores, and 
valleys that are covered with splendid forestland of pines, spruces, and birches. Here 
there is a splendid mild climate, remarkable conditions for winter skiing and skating and 
for sailing and rowing in the summer. Our task is to preserve this exceptional nature of 
the region, to create good conditions of life and work, and to create the conditions for 
people to relax.1 
Nikolai Vorontsov, Polar Pravda, 1935 
“If you’ve ever had the notion to visit Hell, Monchegorsk is pretty close.”2 
Lonely Planet: Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, 2000 
How and why did this happen? Why did a town serving the nickel industry in the 
far north turn into an environmental tragedy despite the efforts of urban planners and city 
managers to maintain its beautiful nature? Setting aside the propagandistic intent of 
Vorontsov and the ironic exoticism of Lonely Planet, these sentiments reflect a genuine 
contrast between the hopes for the project and its long-term results. To an even greater 
extent than the apatite industry, the mining and smelting of non-ferrous metals on the 
Kola Peninsula in the twentieth century heavily polluted local water bodies and soil, 
decimated vegetation over large territories, and damaged human health. Scientists have 
observed that the high concentrations of nickel, copper, sulfur dioxide, and other 
chemicals from the Severonikel´ combine in Monchegorsk and the Pechenganikel´ 
combine in Nikel´ and Zapoliarnyi increased the acidity of nearby freshwater lakes and 
streams and altered the chemistry of proximate soils.3 These processes caused 39,000 km2 
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of visible forest damage and 600-1000 km2 of full forest death in the areas surrounding 
the enterprises by the end of the century.4 In the 1990s a large number of children in 
Monchegorsk and almost half of the population in Nikel´ suffered from respiratory 
problems.5  
But what then explains the trajectory to these inauspicious environmental and 
social results? Scholars have responded to this question in variety of ways. An influential 
group sees the decision to industrialize regions such as the Kola Peninsula and the high 
levels of environmental pollution as pathologies of communist central planning. The 
efficiencies of capitalist economic systems would have avoided or at least would have 
been more apt to correct the environmental problems that appeared in communist 
countries. In direct opposition to this interpretation stand thinkers on the left and 
environmental historians who instead attribute contemporary environmental problems to 
the capitalist mode of production. If people in putatively communist countries spoiled 
places like the Kola Peninsula, it was because their economic systems actually functioned 
under a similar logic as capitalist ones. Another explanation turns to politics instead of 
economics. In this analysis the predatory instincts of the authoritarian Russian state 
shaped a long legacy of reckless resource exploitation. 
While incorporating some insights from these three lines of thought, this 
examination of the Kola nickel industry advances a different argument. The 
environmental consequences of the development of heavy industry emerged primarily 
from the pursuit of a form of economic modernization that united various political and 
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economic systems.6  Modernization here refers both to an impulse to update 
contemporary conditions in order to overcome or avoid an imagined state of 
“backwardness” and a politically-chosen embrace of continual economic growth as the 
desired status quo. Within the context of twentieth-century modernization, autarkic 
development, militarization, fluctuations in the global economy, and the material 
influence of the natural world also affected the trajectory of the Kola nickel industry. In 
order to demonstrate my case, I will first survey the alternative explanations in greater 
depth and elaborate the conceptual apparatus of this modernization thesis in the next 
section. The remainder of the chapter will then investigate the development of nickel 
mining and processing from its beginnings in the 1930s to the end of the twentieth 
century. In these discussions I will argue for the significance of the continual effort to 
modernize as an overarching explanation for Soviet pollution, highlight how different 
facets of the alternative interpretations fail to account for the decisive developments in 
this industry, and demonstrate the specific conjuncture of global processes and contexts 
in heightening environmental destruction in the late Soviet era. 
Explaining the Soviet Environmental Legacy 
Research on environmental policy and performance in the Soviet Union has come 
to an overall consensus that results were bleak. Pollution became a particularly acute 
problem in the Soviet Union and human attempts to manage the natural world led to 
noteworthy disasters such as the Chernobyl catastrophe, the drainage of the Aral Sea, and 
the disruption of Lake Baikal. Even recent re-assessments of the environmental legacy of 
communism that seek to temper somewhat this broad assessment acknowledge that 
destructive environmental practices existed in places like the Soviet Union.7 In one of the 
best-known and most evocative renderings of the consensus, Murray Feshbach and 
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Alfred Friendly Jr. write, “When historians finally conduct an autopsy on the Soviet 
Union and Soviet Communism, they may reach the verdict of death by ecocide.”8 This 
historian disagrees with these scholars’ conclusion about the collapse, but not with the 
image of the Soviet Union as environmentally ruinous. Before outlining what I consider 
to be the most convincing explanation for this outcome, I will explore the persuasive and 
unpersuasive features of three alternative interpretations, which respectively stress the 
influence of communism, capitalism, and authoritarianism.  
One of the most influential interpretations of the Soviet environmental legacy 
points to inherent deficiencies of the communist system. These authors offer a powerful 
critique of the functioning of the economy under state-socialism. This assessment 
encompasses an array of considerably diverse interpretations, but on the whole highlights 
tendencies in communist economies to imperil environmental stewardship, such as a 
focus on production over profits, a lack of efficiency, and inattention to market signals.9 
Two more specific and synthetic schools of thought warrant further attention here.  
One line of analysis follows János Kornai’s theories of the shortage economy. 
Kornai argued that socialist central economic planning suffered from several endemic 
problems. It created an incentive for enterprise managers to engage in hording, 
substituting inputs, and hiding capacities from higher authorities in order to assure that 
production quotas were met. Because resources got tied up in enterprises hedging their 
production capacities, shortages of needed goods and services brought about long-term 
instability in communist economies.10 Applying Kornai’s theories to environmental 
management, Ann-Mari Sätre Åhlander offers an explanation for the ineffectiveness of 
Soviet environmental protection measures. Since they were a low priority in a context of 
hard budget constraints, environmental regulations pertaining to pollution or natural 
                                                
8 Murray Feshbach and Alfred Friendly, Ecocide in the USSR: Health and Nature Under Siege 
(New York: Basic Books, 1992), 1. 
9 See Charles E. Ziegler, Environmental Policy in the USSR (Amherst: University of 
Massachusetts Press, 1987); Feshbach and Friendly, Ecocide in the USSR; D. J. Peterson, Troubled Lands: 
The Legacy of Soviet Environmental Destruction (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993); and Joan 
DeBardeleben, The Environment and Marxism-Leninism: The Soviet and East German Experience 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1985). 
10 János Kornai, The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1992). My understanding of Kornai’s theories has been facilitated by Katherine 
Verdery’s essay, “What Was Socialism, and Why Did It Fall?,” in her book What Was Socialism, and What 
Comes Next (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 19-38. 
 193 
resource use affected smaller enterprises more than the larger ones that exerted a greater 
environmental impact. Additionally, many smaller enterprises did not have technology 
upgrades available to them and larger ones were likely to use them inefficiently.11 Such 
impediments to environmental protection by economic actors do seem to be part of the 
puzzle that helps account for why enterprises like Severonikel´ and Pechenganikel´ 
continued to increase their sulfur dioxide emissions through the 1970s and 1980s despite 
their professed campaigns at pollution abatement. 
Another perspective on this issue takes a more geographic and historical approach 
to pointing out problems of the communist economic system. In The Siberian Curse, 
Fiona Hill and Clifford Gaddy argue that the skewed economic geography that Russia 
inherited from communist mistakes presents severe and potentially intractable obstacles 
for the country’s future development. By ignoring the costs of operating large-scale 
industries in the cold north and being willing to employ unfree labor, Soviet leaders built 
huge cities in precisely the wrong places from an economic point of view. Part of the 
motivation for this type of development came from deep-seated desires to use Siberia as a 
treasure chest, to populate it as a means of exerting control over the territory, and to meet 
long-standing military prerogatives as a Great Power nation that went back to the tsarist 
era. However, the actual industrialization of the north occurred because communist 
planners ignored market signals that would have made its lack of economic viability 
apparent.12 Hill and Gaddy extend their analysis to the Soviet environmental legacy by 
noting the striking overlap between the improperly developed regions they highlight and 
the most polluted cities in the country.13 The proximity of the Murmansk region to 
European markets and the mollifying effects of the Gulf Stream current made it a more 
competitive location than other peripheries, but the dynamic discussed by Hill and Gaddy 
is still seen in this region’s status as the most urbanized and industrialized Arctic 
territory. Furthermore, in a work informed by The Siberian Curse, John Round and Vesa 
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Rautio note that the lack of concern about energy consumption and pollution levels from 
the Soviet era still influences Kola enterprises today.14 
These analyses about the workings of communist command economies uncover 
much about the instabilities of the systems and the mechanisms through which their 
efforts at pollution abatement failed to achieve their stated aims. However, they severely 
underestimate the effect that Cold War geopolitics had in straining communist economies 
and inhibiting their ability to adapt to environmental concerns. This interpretation of 
Soviet environmental degradation also rests on the untenable assumption that capitalist 
economies have somehow responded more effectively to environmental concerns. A 
bird’s eye view of twentieth-century atmospheric pollution by sulfur dioxide, for 
instance, reveals a general pattern of deterioration until approximately the mid-1980s and 
then a trend of gradual improvement, regardless of the economic system of the country in 
question.15 From this perspective, the apparently extreme levels of Soviet pollution were 
actually quite marginal in the longer term. Moreover, the specific condemnation of 
communist systems implies that contemporary capitalism has solved or is on the path to 
solving environmental problems. The ineffectiveness of efforts to mitigate climate 
change during the past two decades—not to mention the current bout of 
anthropogenically induced mass species extinctions, large-scale disasters like the 2010 
Deepwater Horizon oil spill, and other worsening environmental issues—contradicts that 
view. 
Other scholars take the opposite approach. Instead of highlighting communist 
ecocide, they point to the hegemony of the capitalist system in the modern world as the 
root cause of environmental calamities. Simplifying a nuanced field of interpretations, 
twentieth-century communist governments are usually taken to be too fundamentally 
similar to capitalism to constitute genuine socialism or are ignored in broad 
condemnations of contemporary political economy. Many Soviet commentators on the 
environment shared this conviction in capitalism’s culpability for environmental 
problems, but unsurprisingly were reluctant to equate their country’s economy with it. 
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According to these scholars, capitalism engenders environmental degradation because the 
logic of continual wealth accumulation by the elite classes requires that all limits on 
natural resource use must be overcome or circumvented through value producing inputs 
of labor and technology. Additionally, the assignment of property values to elements of 
nature and their subsequent privatization—that is, the transformation of nature into 
marketable commodities—create predictable paths for their exploitation. A wide 
spectrum of neo-Marxist thinkers and environmental historians has embraced a form of 
this view. 
World-systems theorists, a number of prominent political ecologists, and a group 
of green Marxist thinkers indict capitalism for environmental problems, including those 
that plagued communist countries. Drawing on the eclectic influences of the Annales 
school, dependency theory, and traditional Marxist political economy, scholars like 
Immanuel Wallerstein propose the existence of historically-situated and hegemonic 
world-systems that structure the political and economic order through class relations and 
geographic hierarchies. Following this logic, Wallerstein places the Soviet Union as part 
of an omnipresent, though temporally limited, capitalist world-system. In his later 
writings he specifically attributes global environmental deterioration to this system.16 
Neo-Marxist political ecology from the classic scholarship of Eric Wolf to the recently 
prolific works of David Harvey points to the variability of the capitalist mode of 
production and the contradictions that emerged as “nature” becomes a resource in the 
process of accumulation.17 These scholars tend to have little to say on the experience of 
twentieth-century state-socialism. Finally, a group of philosophers have struggled to gain 
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new insights from the critiques of environmentalists and to revise and adapt Marxism to 
respond to ecological crises. They share the conviction that capitalism has brought about 
recent environmental degradation, but more readily acknowledge the challenge that the 
Soviet experience poses for the viability of orthodox strands of Marxism in the 
contemporary world and urge new socialist movements to learn from the past.18 
A number of environmental historians without avowed ties to Marxism echo the 
conviction that capitalism led to ecosystem degradation. Foremost among them is Donald 
Worster, a pioneer of the field, who initially proposed that a culture of capitalism in the 
Great Plains of the United States during the 1930s caused the natural disaster known as 
the Dust Bowl.19 Elsewhere he speaks more broadly that since the mid-nineteenth century 
“the combined forces of human population increase and industrial capitalism have spread 
that vulnerability into the remotest corners, into thousands of ecosystems.”20  Claiming 
that capitalism was the “decisive factor” in the United States’ “use of nature,” he extends 
the impact of this factor on agricultural development further. The American “willingness 
to take risks for increased production has set a pace that other nations, such as the Soviet 
Union, feel constrained to follow––just as less aggressive plains farmers have been led to 
emulate their more affluent entrepreneurial neighbors.”21 Though Worster takes caution 
not to efface local nuance, he sees capitalism’s influence as worldwide. 
The explicit treatments of Soviet environmental history by scholars who attribute 
environmental degradation primarily to capitalism bring us to the unsatisfactory elements 
of this explanation. In an attempt to address the unimpressive environmental record of 
state-socialism, green Marxist philosopher James O’Conner insists, “really existing 
socialism and capitalism were formed in interaction—often violent interaction—within 
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and between each other during the 20th century.”22 Yet, his logic here applies equally to 
capitalism. For the sake of historical analysis we only have “really existing” capitalism 
and socialism and not their ideal types. Arran Gare more specifically contends that the 
Soviet “command economy continues the domineering orientation to people and to nature 
of capitalism in a more extreme form.”23 Though similarities between the central 
command economy and capitalist industry explain a good deal about the Soviet 
environmental record, state-socialist economies functioned in significantly different ways 
than market-based ones. Really existing communism cannot be reduced to an aberrant 
manifestation of global capitalism.   
Another series of explanations eschew a focus on economic systems and instead 
turn to politics. In this case the presence of authoritarian rule in Russian and Soviet 
history accounts for the lack of awareness of environmental issues in society and the 
ineffectiveness of constituencies concerned about environmental protection in exerting an 
influence on the central government. Two of the most prominent environmental 
historians of Russia, Douglas Weiner and Paul Josephson, embrace a form of this thesis, 
though they both also see Soviet environmental degradation as ultimately a multi-causal 
phenomenon. In his comparative work, Resources under Regimes, Josephson turns to the 
predilection of authoritarian regimes such as the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, 
communist China, and military-led Brazil for “large-scale geo-engineering projects to 
alter the face of the earth and its rivers” as means of explaining their “great impact on the 
environment.”24 Weiner, for his part, points to deep continuities in Russian history 
relating to a pattern of authoritarian rule to account for the “treacherous patchwork quilt 
of poisoned lands, poisoned air and poisoned water we encounter today.”25 He posits that 
the country’s relationship to its natural resources has long suffered from the predatory 
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practices of a militarized tribute-taking state that first appeared with the Muscovite tsar 
declaring all land his patrimony and continued into the Soviet and post-Soviet eras.26 
These political approaches only account for part of the problem. Josephson’s 
comparisons help draw out some of the distinct environmental practices of authoritarian 
regimes. However, large-scale projects only constitute one sphere, albeit a prominent 
one, of environmental disruption. States with ostensibly democratic political systems 
have had at best only marginally better success with addressing environmental problems. 
Indeed, the Nazis may have possessed a better environmental record than non-
authoritarian polities.27 Weiner appropriately highlights continuities that extend from 
tsarist Russia to the Soviet and post-Soviet periods. But seeking the answers in notions of 
patrimony and exploitative tribute-taking of natural resources diminishes the significance 
of the fact that the “poisoned” landscape was a product of twentieth-century economic 
transformation and not simply the result of a centuries-long process of environmental 
degradation. 
Instead of narrowing in on the putative uniqueness of Russia (like the communism 
and authoritarianism explanations do) or eliding the distinctions of the Soviet economy 
(like the capitalism one does), we should turn to another basic process—modernization—
to understand pollution in the Soviet Union. As I use it in this dissertation, modernization 
means both a process of economic, social, and technological changes that first emerged 
with nineteenth-century industrialization and a broad ideology of progress that motivated 
such transformations and appealed to actors of varying political stripes. James Scott sums 
up the high-modernist ideology as “a supreme self-confidence about continued linear 
progress, the development of scientific and technical knowledge, the expansion of 
production, the rational design of social order, the growing satisfaction of human needs, 
and, not least, an increasing control over nature (including human nature) commensurate 
with scientific understanding of natural laws.”28 Many powerful capitalists, communists, 
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authoritarians, and democrats shared this ideology and struggled to remake the world 
according to its precepts. This cultural element rests at the base of modernization and in 
an important way renders the entire process illusionary. But we also need to be attuned to 
the material changes brought about by the pursuit of it if we want to understand how it 
affected human-environment relationships. Timothy Mitchell touches on a tendency in 
scholarship that interrogates the relationship between knowledge and power to bracket 
off materially relevant subjects: “Demonstrating that everything social is cultural left 
aside the existence of other spheres, the remainder or excess that the work of social 
construction works upon—the real, the natural, the non-human.”29  
Sharing Mitchell’s concern but not accepting all of his solutions in this case, I 
argue that we need to begin our understanding of modernization in a quite traditional 
way. Modernization entailed industrialization and a transition from gradual and 
intermittent economic development to rapid and continual growth. This global process 
produced variegated results. It benefited many humans by raising levels of consumption 
and enabling previously unimaginable lifestyles, while creating the conditions for a 
greater number of people to live in abject poverty than at points in the past. It 
reassembled human relations with nature in ways that could be neutral or even positive 
for the environment, but very often had a destructive impact. A major lesson from 
environmental history scholarship is that humans have only imagined nature to be pristine 
and untouched, but in actuality we have modified the environment extensively throughout 
our existence as a species. It is also the case that on a geologic timescale of millions of 
years anthropogenic influence on the earth may seem less significant. However, none of 
these facts should obscure the unprecedented changes to the land brought about by 
twentieth-century industrialization, economic growth, urbanization, technological change, 
and the more than quadrupling of the human population since 1900. These developments 
occurred in various political and economic systems in many countries. The case of 
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environmental degradation on the Kola Peninsula, therefore, belongs to a much larger 
story of economic modernization. 
The word “modernization” also indicates the political side of the process better 
than other terms such as development, industrialization, and economic transformation.30 
The social, economic, and environmental changes that occurred under the rubric of 
modernization consciously aimed at creating an avowedly “modern” world that would 
escape the “backwardness” of the past. I put these terms in quotations here to underscore 
that they depended on cultural perceptions and historically produced forms of knowledge 
that were infused with power. Modernization was a political project that united 
technocrats in late tsarist Russia, communists in the Soviet Union, and reformers in the 
1990s who saw the contemporary conditions of the country as somehow behind the times. 
As Niobe Thompson put this aspect of the definition of “modernization” in his 
ethnography of post-Soviet reform efforts in Chukotka:  
Unexamined, the term “modernization” operates as lexical shorthand for the 
diverse and numerous projects outsiders have imported into northern Russia’s 
local contexts, whether in the Soviet era or more recently. Under scrutiny, 
however, “modernization” pulls us toward its origins in an evolutionary paradigm, 
one that attaches to the imported manager a modern status and situates the local 
way of life further down on a single continuum of progress.31  
The evolutionary thinking of groups promoting modernization marginalizes local human 
ways of life by positing progress as the transformation of these livelihoods; it doubly 
does so with the plants, animals, and landscapes that might occupy a territory. The need 
for updating repeats itself continually. So, for instance, even the industrialized landscapes 
of Monchegorsk and Nikel´, created as means of achieving Soviet modernity, also fall 
prey to the evolutionist logic and become part of a “backward” terrain requiring post-
socialist modernization. 
By turning to modernization to explain Soviet pollution, I therefore embrace quite 
conventional interpretations of environmental deterioration, but seek to bring together 
elements of these paradigms less typically interwoven. The classic declensionist narrative 
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of industrialization harming the environment still has analytic salience and the nuances of 
the process should not distract us from recognizing this trend. Nor should the promises of 
sustainable development mask the contradictions between economic growth and 
ecosystem health. Many scholars who follow the cultural critique of modernization as 
ideology resist accepting this appraisal of the material consequences for the natural 
world. In part they are reacting against the neo-Malthusianism of some of the original 
advocates of such a stance and the quasi-authoritarian political solutions sometimes 
proposed. Furthermore, since they tend to question the existence of universal knowledge 
and seek to dislodge the nature-society dualism, these thinkers occasionally distrust the 
scientific discourse behind claims that industrial economies cause environmental 
disturbance.32 I rely on science as the best means we have for comprehending the natural 
world, but am equally convinced that we must turn to critical theory about modernization 
and the environment to understand power dynamics and thus the causal forces behind 
anthropogenic change. This approach, finally, helps us appreciate the ways that the 
natural world itself can be involved in the generation of pollution. 
The remainder of this chapter examines the Soviet environmental record through 
a case study of the metal industry on the Kola Peninsula. I will frame the discussions of 
various developments around how they fit or do not fit into the different explanatory 
paradigms just reviewed. I will show that this modernization thesis best accounts for the 
environmental results of industrialization in the far north and leaves adequate room for 
both the uniqueness and commonalities of the Soviet developmental trajectory. In 
particular, the attempt to combine autarkic development and use of the region as an 
extraction periphery during the 1930s, the decisive role of military prerogatives in 
industrialization, the futile attempts to continue economic growth through expanded 
production in the 1970s and 1980s, and the variegated effectiveness of communist and 
capitalist pollution abatement strategies all speak to the centrality of modernization in the 
environmental consequences of the Kola nickel sector. 
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Soviet Autarky and Nickel in the 1930s 
Stalinist political economy, as I argued earlier in this dissertation, combined a 
hasty and militaristic approach to development with an unrealized desire to create 
harmonious natural habitats for humans. The mutual pursuit of these contradictory goals 
continued to shape the establishment of the nickel industry on the Kola Peninsula during 
the 1930s. Economic planners and enterprise leaders sought to subdue the natural world, 
put it under their control, and extract value from it, but they also viewed the entire project 
of large-scale regional development as part of a holistic venture that would produce 
environmental harmony. This discussion of the rise of non-ferrous metallurgy on the 
Kola Peninsula highlights the contours of this autarkic modernization from the discovery 
of nickel deposits in the Monche tundra in 1929 to the commencement of production in 
1939. I examine the particular manifestations of familiar elements of the industrial 
experience already elaborated in this dissertation: the environmental ideologies and 
motivations for development behind the project; the multifaceted ways that interactions 
with the real environment did not occur entirely on Soviet planners’ terms; and the 
exacerbation of human-produced vulnerability to natural calamities for the forced 
laborers sent to build the nickel works. I also demonstrate that the effects of pollution on 
the physical landscape remained moderate compared to what came later. Responsibility 
for post-Stalinist pollution cannot be exclusively attributed to regionally and nationally 
constituted modes of autarkic development. 
An impulse to combine regional modernization with the extraction of natural 
resources was at the heart of industrialization of the 1930s. The development model, 
while itself rooted in a deep history of technocratic statist thinking and planning in the 
pre-Soviet era, afforded the state political legitimacy as ostensibly distinct from the tsarist 
era. As one newspaper article in the midst of the construction of Monchegorsk and the 
Severonikel´ plant put it: “On par with other so-called backward regions of the eastern 
part of Russia, the Kola Peninsula existed for autocracy only as an object of predatory 
exploitation of natural resources—forests, furs, and fish—and not as a region for the 
development of productive forces.”33 This modernist imperative to overcome 
backwardness lies at the foundation of the introduction of non-ferrous metallurgy into 
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this region. The desire to convert nature not into exploited resources but transformative 
production indicates a significant feature of environmental thinking in the Stalinist era. 
 In a sense, this longing for the harvesting of local productive forces also reflected 
one of the major insights noted by Gaddy and Hill: Soviet economic development 
attempted to create the equal geographic distribution of industry irrespective of costs and 
markets.34 The motivation for Soviet autarky and a modicum of evenness in the 
geography of development explains a good deal about the scale of industrialization on the 
Kola Peninsula. The focus on productive forces instead of marketable commodities 
speaks to the limit of the capitalist process of the commodification of nature in explaining 
Soviet economic development. However, the urge to extract metals from the ground was 
common among countries with far northern regions. The expansion of Canadian mining 
activities in the Subarctic paralleled Soviet development and an international consortium 
of firms sought to begin working the nickel in the Pechenga region (Petsamo) while it 
was under Finnish control in the 1930s.35 Furthermore, Hill and Gaddy mistakenly 
attribute this strategy of attempting to develop industrial self-sufficiency to Marxist 
ideology and the government’s hostility to markets. But as Karl Polanyi noted in the 
1940s, the Soviet state was responding to an altered global economy: “Socialism in one 
country was brought about by the incapacity of market economy to provide a link 
between all countries; what appeared as Russian autarchy was merely the passing of 
capitalist internationalism.”36 
The Soviet Union did not acquire a nickel industry until the 1930s. As in all 
mining and processing activities, the first step in the creation of a national industry was 
the discovery of deposits. Nickel exists in comparative abundance among elements in the 
earth, however areas with high enough concentrations of the substance for efficient 
extraction are relatively rare. These deposits come in two types: silicates that appear at 
central latitudes near the surface and sulfides mixed with copper and cobalt that primarily 
occur deeper underground in northern regions. The tsarist government first established 
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nickel mining and processing in the 1870s at silicate deposits near Ufal in the Urals, but 
ceased this venture and relied exclusively on importation after French colonialists began 
marketing nickel from New Caledonia.37 With the industrialization push of the first five-
year plan, the Soviet Union returned to processing the nickel in Ufal, beginning 
production in the fall of 1934, and intensified the search for new deposits within the 
country.38 Nickel possessed a variety of economic uses predominately as a substance in 
the metallic alloys needed for heavy industry and defensive armor. The move to establish 
a nickel sector within the country fit with some of the main prerogatives of Stalinist 
industrialization: the reduction of imports and creation of economic self-sufficiency.  
These goals also promoted a favorable atmosphere for the exploration of new 
nickel sources within the country. Soviet geologists only discovered the sulfide nickel 
deposits on the Kola Peninsula as Stalinist industrialization of the region commenced. On 
a small expedition with German Kreps to the Monche tundra to the west of Lake Imandra 
in the summer of 1929, which was partially intended to establish the borders of the new 
Lapland nature reserve, geographer Gavriil Rikhter took a sample of rock that caught his 
attention by making the arrow on his compass move. Chemical analysis showed that this 
magnetic ore indicated the presence of nickel in the area and inspired further systematic 
study of the territory.39 By this point the enormity of the sulfide nickel deposits in the 
considerably more remote Noril´sk region became clear.40 The surveying of the Monche 
tundra over the next few years, in contrast, raised doubts about the levels of nickel and 
copper there and delayed any development project.41 The confident chief of the 
Leningrad Communist Party, Sergei Kirov, remained interested in the substantial iron 
deposits also being discovered in the Monche region and ordered additional research. He 
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reportedly attempted to encourage an uncertain Aleksandr Fersman, who supervised 
much of the geological exploration in the region, with the hubristic words, “there is no 
land under Soviet power that cannot be changed by skillful hands for the benefit of 
humankind.”42 This impulse to use all elements of the mineral ores influenced industrial 
projects in the 1930s quite considerably with contradictory environmental consequences. 
The move to build a nickel smelter and a new socialist city in the Monche tundra 
reflected the approach to autarkic development taken by the industrializing Stalininst 
state. Though regional representatives consistently requested greater allocations and 
attention to their territories, state economic planners sought to coordinate the extraction 
and processing of different regional resources to serve the centrally planned economy. An 
arena of compromise and conflict existed between central planners, who focused on 
shifting the trade balance to minimize imports and maximize exports and growing the 
economy aggregately, and regional leaders, who desired local development. These 
spheres of interest within the industrializing state shaped debates over natural resources 
and the geography of economic development.43  
Changes in the global economy and the expansion of confirmed nickel reserves in 
the Soviet Union affected the decision to invest in the industry. In the case of the Kola 
Peninsula, surveying work sponsored by the Apatit trust and central agencies helped lead 
to a drastic increase in confirmed quantities in three of the deposits (Niuduaivench, 
Sopchuaivench, and Kumuzh´ia) of the Monche region during 1934. The total amount of 
confirmed metallurgic nickel there rose from 10,000 tons to 50,000 tons during that 
year.44 Shortly after, technicians in Leningrad figured out a method for enriching the ore 
from Niuduaivench and Sopchuaivench, which had relatively low concentrations of 
nickel, into an intermediary matte that required additional processing.45 The simultaneous 
decision to manufacture nickel at three new plants in Orsk, Noril´sk, and Monche in the 
spring of 1935 indicated that central authorities came to view the industrial development 
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of this sector to be a national priority irrespective of regional lobbying. Soviet officials 
chose this time for development partially in response to an upsurge in the global nickel 
market, which was growing rapidly after a steep decline in the 1920s.46 They also 
responded to the move of the International Nickel Company (INCO) of Canada, which 
owned 90% of the known nickel reserves worldwide in the early 1930s and held 
monopoly power, to expand its international operations. This extension abroad by INCO 
included beginning to set up nickel mining and smelting operations on a comparable 
scale in the Petsamo region of northern Finland in 1934, a territory that became Soviet 
Pechenga after World War II.47 The creation of new Soviet nickel plants also connoted an 
intended, though poorly implemented, effort to coordinate the industry so that it could 
benefit from the cost advantages of economies of scale. For instance, the lower 
transportation costs of a smelter on the Kola Peninsula compared to Noril´sk influenced 
the decision to build a large one there despite less significant nickel deposits in the 
region.48 Far from being a manifestation of the obliviousness of communist economies to 
market forces, the enlargement of the Soviet nickel industry at this stage responded to 
developments in the capitalist world. 
Regional input still informed the process significantly, at least on the Kola 
Peninsula. Vasilii Kondrikov, the head of Apatit and Severonikel´ at the time, wrote a 
letter with V. A. Iazykov to the boss of the NKTP, Sergo Ordzhonikidze, on March 26, 
1935 that proposed the initial timetable and budget for the project.49 Ordzhonikidze’s 
order to commence the nickel works on April 29, 1935 closely resembled this proposal 
with only a slight budget cut and the appointment of another administrator from Apatit, 
Nikolai Vorontsov, to head the construction of the plant.50 This directive stipulated that 
the enterprise should produce 3000 tons of nickel and 3000 tons of copper by the end of 
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1937 and 10,000 tons of each by the end of 1938.51 In this instance the center listened to 
the regional representatives’ assessment of their capacities to modify nature into 
economic products. 
As the project proceeded, the individuals involved in planning once again 
espoused the idealistic visions of a new socialist city in which workers would live in 
harmony with their natural surroundings and attempted to implement this scheme. 
Though such thinking was routinely posited as having communist credentials, this 
technocratic holism also fit into a broader trend surrounding large-scale modernization 
projects. For instance, German author Emil Ludwig described the function of the Aswan 
Dam on the Nile River around this time: “A mighty element had been tamed by human 
ingenuity so that the desert should bring forth fruit, an achievement which the centenarian 
Faust had attempted as the highest attainable to man in the service of his fellow-men.”52 
These environmentally colonialist ways of thinking envisioned nature as serving humans 
peacefully and passively, but often eschewed outright antagonism. In the case of the Kola 
nickel industry, project leaders decided to call the new city Monchegorsk and frequently 
pointed out that “Monche” meant “beautiful” in the Sami language.53  One newspaper 
article in November 1936 evoked the notion of humans completing imperfect nature: 
It was wild uninhabited tundra. For centuries no one came here. High mountains 
surrounded the tundra and no one knew what resources they stored. But the 
Bolsheviks came and figured out the secrets of the mountains. And now the 
Monche tundra is unrecognizable. It became actually beautiful. So far this beauty 
consists not in constructed factory buildings and not even in avenues and squares. 
This beauty is in the great creative work that the Bolsheviks began and 
persistently undertake.54  
In this rendering, human activity, and not untouched nature, engendered a beautiful 
landscape. 
While there was less fanfare surrounding the construction of Monchegorsk as a 
socialist city than there had been for Khibinogorsk (a reflection of national trends and the 
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move away from the cultural revolution of 1928-1931), project leaders took more 
practical measures to implement this holistic vision of nature in an urban environment. 
Claiming to have learned a lesson from his experience in the Khibiny, Kondrikov ordered 
that the old growth forest within the city itself be preserved and turned into a park.55 The 
main architect of Monchegorsk, Sergei Brovtsev, sought to design the city in this 
direction by including green belts along the main boulevard and maximizing the views of 
the mountain relief.56 Applauding these efforts, the local Monchegorsk newspaper, In the 
Fight for Nickel, exclaimed, “In the summer the city will be engrossed in the greenery of 
forests. It will be a garden-city.”57  Urban planners also took into account an additional 
element when choosing the location for the city besides the typical considerations of the 
optimal arrangement for industrial and municipal structures, the means of supplying 
water and sewer service, and transportation issues.58 They decided to place the city 
upwind from the smelter facility so that the smoke, dust, and sulfur dioxide emissions 
would blow away from the residential areas.59 This move succeeded in helping preserve 
the green spaces within Monchegorsk in later years even as pollution decimated 
vegetation to the south of the factory. 
These relatively minor, though noteworthy, achievements in generating harmony 
with the local environment during industrialization contrast with the situation at the 
worksite. The massive reliance on forced labor, chaotic planning, and the intractability of 
nature once again produced abysmal conditions for those unfortunate enough to live near 
the site of the new socialist city. Even the freely recruited laborers first moved into 
crowded and unsanitary tent settlements. Local Murmansk historian Aleksei Kiselev 
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recalled how an epidemic struck his family upon their arrival in Monchegorsk in 1935.60 
In part due to the destructive influence of blizzards, snowdrifts, and flooding during 
spring thaws, housing construction for Monchegorsk and the mining settlements at 
Sopcha and Niud languished behind schedule.61 During the following summer a party 
inspector grimly detailed the situation: “It is clear from this that in the barracks and tents 
75% of all workers live cluttered in filth with children. The inflow of workers and their 
distribution increases on account of the consolidation of the barracks and tents. In rare 
cases workers sleep in the forest under trees because there is no place in the tents.”62 The 
failure of state and enterprise planners to create the harmonious habitat they envisioned 
led to a quick exodus of recruited workers and resulted in reports of widespread 
drunkenness, disorder, and impending epidemics at the new worksites.63 Memos cited 
illegal de-forestation and arson as a common offence. One also claimed that 
approximately 900 hectares of forest in the area had been burned during the previous 
month because of the lack of a fire-fighting service.64 The anthropogenic impact of such 
arson and felling in this moment, however, paled in comparison to nature’s influence on 
the humans living there.   
The recruited laborers and their families only made up a portion of the new 
inhabitants of the Monche tundra in the mid-1930s. Many more came there as prisoners 
through various branches of the Gulag system, including special settlers transferred from 
Kirovsk and other locations, the eighth department of the White-Sea Baltic Combine at 
Monchegorsk, and its fourteenth department, which built the railroad line connecting the 
new town to the Murmansk railroad.65 From the very beginning of the project, plans to 
use temporary prison colonies to build the settlement coincided with intentions for a 
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holistic socialist city.66 By the end of 1935, approximately 6,000 of 10,000 workers at 
Severonikel´ were in the Gulag system and the livelihoods of these prisoners in northern 
nature fared no better than those of the recruited laborers.67 The inadequate provisioning 
of basic services and the use of the Gulag in Monchegorsk followed a deeply entrenched 
pattern of hasty and coercive modernization, which extended back to the construction of 
the Murmansk railroad during World War I and became part of the modus operandi of the 
Stalinist system during the first five-year plan. Given the closer correspondence of these 
features with eras of industrialization than with the totality of communist rule, it makes 
more sense to understand them as by-products of a particularly brutal strategy of 
militaristic modernization than as the logical outcome of communist economic practice.  
Soviet efforts to create self-sufficiency in nickel production with rapid 
industrialization in the second half of the 1930s staggered because of infrastructural and 
environmental limitations. The dreadful political reverberations of these delays represent 
a unique feature of the Stalinist state, as failures in economic performance became a 
pretext for arresting and shooting enterprise leaders. The chaos that gripped the 
Severonikel´ project accelerated in the autumn of 1935 and culminated with the arrest of 
Kondrikov and other enterprise leaders in March 1937. The original head of Severonikel´, 
Vorontsov, suffered from a heart attack and was fortuitously transferred to Leningrad in 
November 1935.68 Afterward I. M. Epshtein became the nominal head of the enterprise, 
while Kondrikov maintained much of the authority over it and Apatit.69 Construction of 
the railroad line between Monchegorsk and Olen´ia, the building of industrial objects for 
the mines and smelter, research on the extraction process, and the surveying work to find 
new deposits all encountered significant setbacks throughout 1936.70 A major issue here 
was that the mountains of the Monche tundra did not contain as much nickel and copper 
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as geologists and economic planners had hoped.71 This fact posed considerable 
difficulties because the poorly impregnated ore required greater quantities of materials to 
be mined and expensive and energy intensive processing and smelting to produce the 
matte.72 This inability to manipulate nature under a dictated timeframe elicited a variety 
of responses, including accusations against economic managers by the local Communist 
Party and the further allocation of resources by the enterprise to research the problem 
instead of prioritizing the delivery of provisions and payment of wages.73 The discovery 
of new reserves of sulfide ore with over 5% nickel concentration on Nittis-Kumuzhia in 
1937 resulted in a hasty shift in the production plan toward extracting and processing 
material from this deposit.74 It also played into the dynamics of the Stalinist terror as the 
failure to foresee the existence of this geological formation offered further grounds for 
denunciations against Kondrikov and others.75  
As the secret police arrested, imprisoned, and killed a number of leaders of the 
Severonikel´ project in 1937, a tense atmosphere and increased militarization of the 
production process pervaded the Monche tundra.76 Fear of violent reprisal infiltrated the 
decision-making process and the Gulag administration sent more prisoners to aid 
construction.77 Within a maelstrom of terror and forced labor, Stalinist industrialization 
was transitioning from revolutionary projects to create socialist modernity to an outright 
war economy. The discovery of the rich ore in Nittis allowed the plant to mine sufficient 
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material throughout 1937 and 1938 and to devise a less complex smelting scheme to 
begin producing nickel-copper matte in February 1939.78 Though some of this material 
was used to manufacture statues of Lenin and Stalin and an engraved piece of it was 
displayed in a local museum, the press at the time celebrated this achievement with much 
less gusto than earlier Soviet propaganda.79 Decreased public visibility of strategic 
industries like nickel became standard during World War II and the rise of the Cold War. 
Taking stock of the influence of the development of the nickel industry on the 
Kola environment in the 1930s, the scale and pace of the transformation of the Monche 
tundra was unprecedented at the time, yet minor in comparison to what occurred in later 
decades. In its first year of production, 1939, Severonikel´ manufactured 1597 tons of 
nickel and 571 tons of copper and extracted 94,032 tons of ore. Not only did these 
amounts fail to meet the plan, they were marginal in terms of the production rates of the 
Kola nickel industry in the Brezhnev era.80 Even with inefficiencies in the smelting and 
mining operations and chaos in the construction of the new plant and city, industrial 
pollution remained low.81 This snapshot result does not speak of an environmentalist 
accomplishment of the Stalinist state, but rather points to the inability of planners to 
introduce industrial operations at the desired pace. Its significance for this analysis, 
nevertheless, lies in the fact that of all the ills that can rightly be pinned on the Stalinist 
strategy of autarkic modernization, disproportional environmental disturbance is not one 
of them. Instead, the anthropogenic impact on the Kola Peninsula in these years was 
typical of this level of industrialization.82 
Nickel as a Military Metal 
“Although interests identified with nickel production object to the classification of 
their industry as one of the munitions group,” prefaced The Wall Street Journal in 1935, 
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“there is little question that war would greatly increase the demand for the metal.”83 This 
prescient assessment, shared by some Soviet planners as well, explains much about the 
developments of the nickel industry in the years surrounding World War II.84 Beginning 
in 1939 the Soviet war economy on the Kola Peninsula grew even more forceful, but also 
somewhat more effective in producing materials. Threats of invasion at the start of the 
Second World War led to a halt in industrial activities in Monchegorsk. Throughout the 
war, each side of the polar front made steadfast attempts to maintain, renew, and gain 
control over nickel production on their territory. These disputes reflected some essential 
features of militaristic modernization during the construction of the Murmansk railroad 
during World War I, including even greater reliance on forced labor than during the 
1930s, increased surveillance, and the use of industrialization for primarily martial 
purposes. However, this development strategy for the Kola nickel industry during World 
War II also entailed a distinct approach to natural resource use. 
The environmental impact of war globally has vacillated between an extreme 
exacerbation of the devastating destruction of landscapes and much more rare reprieves 
for ecosystems from anthropogenic manipulation.85 Both forms of influence appeared on 
the Kola Peninsula during the Second World War—bombing and invasions wrecked the 
land but the aggregate interruption of industrial activities stalled the effects of 
atmospheric emissions on local flora. On the whole, the impact of pollution in the region 
during World War II remained minor, unlike the unprecedented changes to the Kola 
environment that occurred during the First World War. The geopolitical and military 
prerogatives that shaped the Kola nickel industry from 1939 and into the postwar world 
took non-ferrous metals as a material means of promoting state power. The objects of 
production in this model—nickel, copper, and cobalt—functioned neither as unleashed 
productive forces that could facilitate autarkic development, nor as wealth accruing 
commodities to be produced and sold. Instead, the utility of this transformed nature 
resided primarily in its defensive significance. During the war, Soviet leaders approached 
Kola resources in terms outside of communist or capitalist economic logics and instead 
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focused on building military strength. This wartime economic strategy relied, of course, 
on growth and mobilization whenever possible and thus represented a manifestation of 
not only power politics but modernization as well.  
The era of war began in 1939, the year Severonikel´ commenced production. The 
rise of the Nazi party to power in 1933 had kept tensions high between the Soviet Union 
and Germany in the intervening years. In 1938 the Soviet government started using the 
prospect of a war with Germany to attempt to coax the Finnish authorities into military 
agreements and warned about the possibility of a preemptive strike in the case of a 
conflict. The geopolitical calculus changed significantly after the signing of the Soviet-
German non-aggression pact in late August 1939 and the outbreak of the Second World 
War in Europe a few weeks later. Though the pact temporarily removed the pretext of a 
Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union, it also included secret provisions that placed Finland, 
along with the Baltics and parts of Poland and Romania, under Soviet spheres of 
influence. The Soviet government wasted little time in exerting its newly secured power, 
invading Poland with Germany in September 1939 and demanding considerable 
territorial concessions from Finland in October. After the refusal of the Finnish 
government to comply, the Soviet-Finnish Winter War broke out at the end of November 
1939 and lasted until mid-March 1940. The Soviet Union gained considerable territory 
near Lake Ladoga and the Salla region of Karelia from Finland, but failed to conquer the 
entire country during the conflict. It also received the remaining portion of the Rybachi 
Peninsula on the Kola Peninsula, but chose not to acquire the Petsamo region and its 
nickel deposits.86 
These military developments clearly affected heavy industry on the Kola 
Peninsula.  During the Winter War, Stalin and Molotov authorized the transfer of the 
Severonikel´ combine from the NKTP to the NKVD.87 With this switch the enterprise 
gained control over a greatly expanded Gulag camp, Monchelag, which grew from 3120 
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prisoners to 14,735 during 1940.88 The nickel works in Noril´sk had been under NKVD 
authority since their creation in 1935 and thus, in a sense, this move with Severonikel´ 
mirrored a Soviet strategy of placing industrial objects in difficult natural environments 
under secret police authority.89 However, security concerns on a borderland near a war 
zone and economic considerations stemming from a decision of British companies in 
South Africa to cease supplying the Soviet Union with cobalt after the Molotov-
Ribbentrop Pact played a role here.90  
The commensurate boost in available resources and implementation of an even 
more hierarchical administrative structure allowed the plant to raise production under 
Gulag purview, but chaos at the worksite remained. Upon acquiring Severonikel´, the 
NKVD increased its production quotas for nickel and copper and added electrolytic 
metals manufactured from expected supplies of nickel-copper mattes from Noril´sk to the 
plan for 1940.91 Then that autumn central authorities, including NKVD head Lavrentii 
Beriia, demanded another shift in operations to prioritize supplying the military with 
cobalt.92 Under the written warning of five to eight years in prison for not following new 
quality standards and the personal threat of execution from Beriia for delaying cobalt 
production, the heads of Severonikel´, Mikhail Tsarevskii and I. S. Beresnev, managed to 
satisfy their bosses sufficiently by the June 1941 evacuation of the worksite to escape 
these fates.93 In line with Tsarevskii's declaration that the industrial activities of the 
combine constituted part of “crucial state tasks for the defense of the country,” public 
information about production at Severonikel´ stopped appearing in this period, making it 
difficult to evaluate the extent of the increased output.94 Nevertheless, much of the 
situation on the ground in the Monche tundra remained disorganized under NKVD 
auspices. Severonikel´ continued to under-fulfill its plans and Gulag prisoners, 
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unsurprisingly, put in minimal effort—causing numerous work stoppages—and made 
escape attempts. The NKVD bureaucracy, furthermore, proved no more apt at controlling 
the environmental conditions that affected prisoner livelihoods. Large vacillations in the 
fulfillment of food and housing norms and the neglect of sanitary issues resulted in 
prisoners’ dwellings being filthy, cockroach-infested, and disease-producing.95 
In addition to martial tactics being introduced into the industrial regulation of the 
Monche tundra, militarization, in a more literal sense, also occurred over the nickel 
deposits in Pechenga (Petsamo in Finnish) in the era of the Winter War. The Russian 
empire had possessed this land before the revolution; the Bolshevik government agreed to 
grant it to the newly independent Finland in 1920 in return for land in Karelia. Pechenga 
comprised a strategic asset for Finland because it gave the state access to an ice-free port 
on the Arctic Ocean.96 The contract the Finnish government made with INCO required 
the company to work the deposits if they were deemed profitable and to return the mine 
and industrial objects to Finland in the event of a war in the region. The Red Army’s 
invasion of Pechenga during the Winter War opened the door for reconfiguring the 
ownership structure over the mines. Additionally, INCO’s subsidiary, the Mond Nickel 
Company, had not yet commenced mining the Pechenga deposits, despite geological 
discoveries, significant industrial construction, and demand from European countries.97 
Military strategy influenced the behavior of the various actors toward Pechenga. The 
Soviet Union returned most of Pechenga to Finland in March 1940 to avoid conflict with 
British and Canadian stakeholders. Germany, which desired more nickel for munitions, 
sat out the Winter War and then quietly arranged trade agreements with Finland to take 
control of the nickel deposits from the Allies. The Soviet government belatedly attempted 
to counter this move by demanding the nickel from the Pechenga deposits in late June 
1940, but failed to stop the German acquisition and the initial shipments of ore through 
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Kirkenes at the end of the year.98 These developments allowed nickel from Pechenga to 
serve the Nazi war economy for the next several years of fighting.   
German troops invaded the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941 and by late July much 
of the machinery and the vast majority of the population had been moved out of the 
Monche region and other parts of the Kola Peninsula. The government evacuated 
approximately 28,000 individuals of Monchegorsk’s prewar population of 33,000. Many 
men were enlisted into the Red Army, but a significant portion of workers and technical 
specialists and industrial equipment were transferred to other mining and metallurgical 
enterprises, including 13,438 Gulag prisoners who were sent to Noril´sk.99 During 
operation “Silver Fox” in the summer of 1941, German and Finnish troops attempted to 
take Murmansk and bombed several cities on the Kola Peninsula before being halted at 
the Zapadnaia Lista River in autumn.100 The stoppage in the mining and smelting of 
metals and the relatively quick stabilization of the front resulted in a decrease in 
industrial environmental transformation, which likely would have occurred without the 
attempted invasion, and minimal landscape destruction from war, which could have 
happened on a significantly greater scale had the conflict in the region been more 
protracted or intense. Despite these contingencies of the war on the Kola Peninsula that 
led to reduced environmental interference, individuals remaining in the region, mostly 
army troops, resorted to the desperate and rapacious hunting of wildlife for sustenance.101 
Furthermore, spillover effects certainly occurred as places like Orsk, Ufal, and Noril´sk 
increased their productive capacity to compensate for the loss of Severonikel´.102 
The desire for nickel for armor and other military uses shaped decisions on both 
sides of the polar front. The Soviet government ordered an early reconstruction of 
Severonikel´ in May 1942 and a Finno-German outfit accelerated nickel mining and 
smelting in the Pechenga region. With large numbers of women and children working the 
mines and factory under the threat of Nazi bombings, Severonikel´ managed to 
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manufacture moderate amounts of nickel for the Red Army during the remaining years of 
the war.103 With the outbreak of World War II the Finnish government officially broke its 
contract with the Mond Nickel Company and took over Petsamo Nickel, which 
cooperated with the German company I. G. Farbenindustrie to supply the Nazi Army 
with nickel until the Soviet invasion in autumn of 1944. During this period industrial 
operators removed 387,615 tons of nickel-copper ore, smelted 289,520 tons of ore at the 
settlement of Kolosioki in Pechenga, and shipped the vast majority, 15,661 tons, of the 
processed nickel-copper matte to Germany.104 There it served, above all, as a 
government-controlled material for manufacturing munitions instead of as a marketed 
commodity. 
The nickel works in Pechenga played a central role in the conclusion of World 
War II in the far north. As the tide of the conflict turned against Germany, Finnish 
authorities started longing for a separate peace agreement with the Soviet Union. The 
armistice they signed in September 1944 returned much of the territory that the Soviet 
Union had won during the Winter War, but also included the Pechenga region. With 
ample warning of an impending agreement, the German army evacuated the territory, 
hauled off some of the equipment from the mines and factories, and destroyed whatever 
remained. Specialists abroad believed that these actions would cost the Soviet Union at 
least ten years of reconstruction work.105 The Soviet press unsurprisingly narrated these 
events in a different fashion. Newspapers celebrated the occupation of Pechenga by Red 
Army troops in October as the “liberation” of an ancient Russian territory. They also 
highlighted its strategic significance, noting “the Germans also needed Petsamo nickel” 
and “polar nickel is also fighting the war by being transformed into powerful weapons for 
the Red Army.”106 The heroic significance of this metal in the wartime context 
                                                
103 Pozniakov, Severonikel´, 86-94; Kiselev, Monchegorsk, 62-69; and RGAE, f. 9037, op. 1, d. 
149, ll. 142-148, 204-210.  
104 Krosby, Finland, Germany, and the Soviet Union, 1940-1941, 186-202. 
105 V. A. Matsak, ed., Pechenga: Opyt kraevedcheskoi entsiklopedii (Murmansk: Prosvetitel´skii 
tsentr “Dobrokhot,” 2005), 397-409; “V osvobozhdennoi Pechenge,” Poliarnaia pravda (October 18, 
1944), 1; and Rautio and Andreev, Sotsial´naia restrukturizatsiia gornodobyvaiushchei promyshlennosti 
Pechengskogo raiona Murmanskoi oblasti, 13-14. 
106 “Pechengskim diviziiam—slava,” Poliarnaia pravda (October 17, 1944), 1; “V 
osvobozhdennoi Pechenge,” Poliarnaia pravda (October 18, 1944), 1; “Razgrom nemtsev na Krainem 
Severe,” Poliarnaia pravda (November 3, 1944), 1; “Bol´she metalla Rodine!” Poliarnaia pravda 
(November 5, 1944), 2; “Nikel´ voiuet,” Poliarnaia pravda (November 7, 1944), 3; F. M. Ternovskii, 
 219 
manifested itself in the renaming of the town of Kolosioki as Nikel´.107 The State 
Committee for the Defense of the USSR also ordered the nickel works rebuilt in 
December and workers at one of the mines managed to extract enough ore to produce 
nickel before the end of the war in May 1945.108 
The view of nickel as a vital military material continued into peacetime and 
informed the decisions to reconstruct and further develop the operations in Monchegorsk 
and Pechenga. The war experience fortified strategic thinking about natural resources as 
potential sources of state power. This legacy and the subsequent postwar prioritization of 
the nickel sector caused significantly more impact on the Kola environment than the 
activities of the non-ferrous metal industry in the 1930s and early 1940s. Though fewer 
data on pollution and environmental change existed during these years than later eras, one 
analysis cites that vegetation within a six-kilometer radius of Severonikel´ had been 
damaged by 1946.109 This estimate indicates substantial changes to the industrialized 
local environment, but nothing on the scale of the 1970s and 1980s. The rebuilding of the 
nickel plants quickly took on different military significance with the emergence of the 
Cold War. The resultant transformation of the Soviet economy—increased isolation from 
capitalist countries but new trade opportunities in Eastern Europe—shaped the postwar 
geography of industrialization and contributed to the perceived value of the nickel 
deposits in the north. Additionally, mining activities overall fell into the realm of military 
significance as the government ordered the comprehensive evaluation of radioactivity in 
the ore at places like Pechenga with the goal of finding nuclear fuel.110 The militarization 
and modernization of the Kola Peninsula mutually reinforced each other.  
The Postwar Growth Economy and Environmental Pollution 
Over the half century between the conclusion of the Second World War and the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, industrial activity and urbanized settlement on the Kola 
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Peninsula grew consistently and, compared with the preceding decades, stably. The 
region simultaneously became the most industrialized and populated Arctic region in the 
world and one of the most militarized places on the globe as well. This industrial 
transformation rested on a method of economic expansion that had been commonplace 
since the early nineteenth century: increasing production outputs to stimulate economic 
growth. As Kornai insisted, state-socialist centralized planning ultimately proved 
effective in directing economies toward this end.111 The broad trajectory of communist 
economies from World War II to the 1970s roughly mirrored industrial capitalist ones 
with increasing production and social welfare benefits bolstering continued growth. First 
World economies adapted to reduced growth rates through an embrace of different means 
of economic modernization. The turn to new technologies, an orientation toward the 
service industry, and neoliberal policies starkly changed the global political economy and 
ecology.112  
The effect of this reorientation on the Soviet Union was the phenomenon known 
as stagnation. The country responded to a staggering economy by attempting to 
accelerate a previously successful means of spawning growth: the expansion of 
production. It was precisely the continuation of this strategy of economic modernization 
in circumstances that rendered it less effective that led to levels of pollution by the Kola 
nickel industry in the 1970s and 1980s considered excessive. Neither Stalinism, nor 
inherent problems in the specifically communist approach to nature, can be blamed for 
the rapid environmental deterioration in these years.  The poor environmental record of 
the plants reveals that processes beyond the commodification of natural resources and 
profit motive—staples of industrial capitalism—contributed decisively to economically 
generated pollution. The logic of continual industrial development inspired policies that 
kept increased production as a top priority, despite growing environmental awareness and 
the exhaustion of much of the local nickel reserves. Accordingly, the broad impulse to 
modernize belongs at the center of our explanation. 
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World War II devastated the Soviet Union, its people, and economy. While the 
Kola Peninsula compared favorably to the areas most ravaged by wartime destruction, the 
regional nickel industry had to repeat much of the construction of the 1930s. Recently 
historians have argued that we should treat 1943 as the beginning of the reconstruction 
period, and this certainly makes sense in the case of Monchegorsk.113 Repair work on 
Severonikel´ benefited from wartime alliances with the United States and Britain and the 
supporting technology transfers. By 1946 the combine mined and smelted metals at levels 
comparable to before the war.114 Soviet work in Pechenga did not begin until late 1944, 
but the initial reconstruction of the plant and mines there likewise incorporated foreign 
assistance in the immediate aftermath of the war.115 It also proceeded much more quickly 
than initial construction: Pechenganikel´ began mining the Kaula deposit in March 1945 
and smelting some of its own ore in November 1946.116 
The grandiose designs for the Pechenganikel´ combine included a number of 
familiar features of previous socialist industrialization, but they emerged much more 
gradually without the revolutionary haste of many of the projects of the 1930s. Enterprise 
leaders paid considerable attention to geological surveying in the first few years. They 
already knew that the Kaula deposit contained drastically more metals than the ones in 
the Monche tundra and estimated in 1946 that, combined with the less significant 
Kammikivi deposit, the factory could produce 11,650 tons of nickel a year for the next 
200-255 years.117 Nevertheless, successful exploration in the nearby Pil´guiavr valley the 
following year revealed that the capacity of the deposit was 100 times greater than 
previous research had indicated.118 The steady moves to mine this deposit in the 1950s 
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and 1960s played an essential role in decisions to expand and maintain the Kola nickel 
industry. Regional party leaders during reconstruction also invested substantial energy 
into propaganda work in part designed to promote a holistic vision of industrial 
assimilation as improving nature.119 Newspaper articles spoke of “the treasure chest of 
the beautiful tundra” and lauded how “the natural resources of Pechenga and the 
enormous scale of the planned socialist economy will provide for the quick economic 
development of the region. On the basis of the natural resources the full-blooded life of 
the Soviet population will flourish all around.”120 Unsurprisingly, conditions on the 
ground were often much more difficult than these portrayals suggested.121 
As Pechenganikel´ drastically increased its confirmed reserves in the late 1940s 
and early 1950s, Severonikel´ encountered natural limitations on the growth of its mining 
sections. By 1950 geologists had failed to find new sources of nickel and copper in the 
surrounding mountains and the concentration of metals in the ore being processed was 
dropping precipitously.122 At this time the country was undergoing what historian Ethan 
Pollock has deemed the “Soviet Science Wars.”123 During this period ideological fervor 
affected professional knowledge production and government policy at heightened levels. 
Agronomist Trofim Lysenko came to the apex of his influence in 1948, for instance, and 
not only succeeded in suppressing genetics further, but radicalized an afforestation 
program into the Promethean Stalin Plan for the Transformation of Nature.124 The field of 
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geology also experienced a comparable period of internal ideological radicalism. At a 
meeting of the Kola section of the Academy of Sciences in July 1950, Mikhail 
Tsibul´chik presented an iconoclastic report replete with quotations from Stalin and 
references to dialectical science. He suggested that the stagnation in discovering new 
nickel reserves in the Monche tundra resulted from an incorrect theoretical approach to 
geological formation and proposed a new model.125 He specifically criticized “views 
about the geological structure and genesis of ores (genezis orudeneniia) rooted in existing 
interpretations that conclude that the Monche tundra lacks any prospects.”126 The other 
scientists at the meeting dismissed the ideas of this brazen newcomer to the region—with 
one attendee angrily exclaiming “This is a hooliganistic report!”—and highlighted the 
importance of empirical results above any theoretical approach in finding new 
economical deposits.127  
Though the rise of plate tectonics would soon transform the theoretical foundation 
of the geological sciences, Tsibul´chik’s opponents were correct on the matter of the 
Monche tundra: no new major discoveries occurred after this point. This natural 
limitation shaped subsequent industrial development on the Kola Peninsula. Severonikel´ 
transitioned to concentrating on smelting and began processing more and more ore from 
the Pechenga deposits.128 Furthermore, much of the regional mining economy diversified 
to other materials besides nickel and copper sulfides. Between the nominal end of 
reconstruction in 1948 and the early 1960s, two iron mining and processing plants went 
into operation in Olenegorsk and Kovdor, a rare metals facility opened in Revda near 
Lovozero, and, after much discussion and planning in the 1930s, an aluminum factory 
was built in Kandalaksha.129 The Apatit combine in the Khibiny began a period of 
sustained enlargement in these years as well.130 For their part, the deposits of the 
                                                
125 RGAE, f. 9037, op. 1, d. 404, ll. 2-130 
126 RGAE, f. 9037, op. 1, d. 404, l. 6. 
127 RGAE, f. 9037, op. 1, d. 406, ll. 1-29 [13]. 
128 Adams, “Nickel and Platinum in the Soviet Union,” in Jensen, Shabad, and Wright, eds., Soviet 
Natural Resources in the World Economy, 538-543. 
129 Broad overviews of these developments appear in “Vvodnyi ocherk,” in A. A. Kiselev, ed., 
Kol´skii entsiklopediia, vol. 1 (Saint Petersburg/Apatity: IS/ KNTs RAN, 2008), 118 and Gennady P. 
Luzin, Michael Pretes, and Vladimir V. Vasiliev, “The Kola Peninsula: Geography, History and 
Resources,” Arctic 47, no. 1 (March 1994): 1-15. 
130 A. V. Barabanov and T. A. Kalinina, “Apatit”: vek iz veka (Apatity: Laplandia Minerals, 
2004), 95-128. 
 224 
Pechenga region ensured supplies of raw material that would enable the Kola nickel 
industry to be included in the postwar boom of extensive economic growth. 
The reinforcing processes of modernization, militarization, and urbanization on 
the Kola Peninsula reached their peak between 1950 and 1970. The Cold War and the 
rising prominence of submarines in national security strategy provided impetuses for the 
marked growth of the Northern Fleet of the Soviet Navy on the Murman coast and the 
accompanying infrastructure to support this military unit.131 Having finally abandoned 
the use of Gulag labor in the middle of the 1950s, northern regions increasingly relied on 
appealing incentive packages—including higher wages, longer holidays, early retirement, 
and, notably, access to scarce goods—to attract settlers to proliferating polar cities.132 
This influx of military and voluntary residents resulted in dramatic population growth as 
the Kola Peninsula increased from 314,700 inhabitants in 1950 to 799,500 in 1970, 
averaging an enlargement of over 24,000 people a year.133 Economic modernization 
served as the other main attraction of people to the region and created a fully 
industrialized landscape along many sections of the Lake Imandra corridor. 
 This era of modernization also resembled general trends throughout the global 
north most closely, as countries across the Iron Curtain used unprecedented increases in 
industrial production to foster record levels of economic growth. From the early 1950s to 
1965 the annual production of nickel worldwide was nearly doubling every seven years, 
inspiring the Soviet Union to invest more in this industry and to begin marketing its 
nickel to foreign customers.134 The Soviet government achieved parity in growth rates by 
shifting away from the breakneck tactics of the Stalinist 1930s and toward more cautious 
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and effective methods of steady industrial expansion.135 Thus, enterprise leaders waited 
until 1956 to start setting up a mine at the deposit at Pil´guiavr (now called Zhdanovsk), 
despite believing by 1952 that it “is by size and prospects the largest of the copper-nickel 
deposits of the Pechenga region.”136 Concern about the dwindling reserves in the Monche 
region ultimately contributed to the decision to build the new mine and accompanying 
city of Zapoliarnyi. In the early 1950s Pechenganikel´ was sending about 20% of its 
mined ore and all of its smelted matte to Severonikel´.137 By 1965 the amount of shipped 
material going to Severonikel´ had increased to 80% of Pechenganikel´’s output.138 
Anticipating this trajectory in the mid-1950s, the government concluded that “the supply 
of raw materials for the Severonikel´ combine and the sharp increase in nickel production 
in the next several years from Kola raw materials should be resolved by forcing the 
construction and beginning the exploitation of the largest deposit in the USSR, the 
Zhdanovsk deposit, by a mining and enrichment enterprise.”139 At the end of the 1960s 
the desire to centrally coordinate regional nickel production led to an episode of 
agglomeration: the Zhdanovsk mining and enrichment combine returned to 
Pechenganikel´ and the Kola enterprises were grouped into the Nikel´ Association.140  
The massive enlargement of the nickel industry in the 1950s and 1960s produced 
mixed environmental results. Urban planners maintained a putative emphasis on creating 
natural harmony in industrial cities, which resulted in an unrealized proposal to locate 
Zapoliarnyi in an attractive valley ten kilometers from the mines and in the actual 
erection of a statue of a moose in the center of Monchegorsk.141 A more genuine 
achievement of the more gradual approach to industrial development was the reduction of 
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the vulnerability of the migrants to these worksites to the natural hazards of the region.142 
Nevertheless, pollution directly correlated with production levels and, accordingly, this 
industrial development led to more ecosystem disruption from sulfur emissions and toxic 
substances containing metals. As environmental issues became a greater concern in the 
Soviet Union in the 1960s, evidence emerged that mining and processing operations had 
unleashed dust that increased concentrations of heavy metals in surface waters, soils, and 
plants.143 Furthermore, forest damage from sulfur emissions extended 17 to 20 kilometers 
from the Severonikel´ plant by 1969.144 While their pollution levels continued to increase 
in the early parts of the decade, Severonikel´ embraced some nature protection measures 
in the mid-1960s.145 These efforts managed to stabilize and even reduce sulfur dioxide 
emissions from Severonikel´ and Pechenganikel´ for a brief period in the late 1960s as 
production continued to rise.146 On the whole, up until 1970 pollution from the Kola 
nickel industry occurred on a comparable scale to metal firms worldwide that operated at 
similar levels of production.147  
This situation changed in the 1970s when pollution in industrialized sections of 
the Soviet Union rose at a greater rate than many capitalist countries, despite a good deal 
of official public concern about nature protection.148 Two main catalysts for rapid 
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environmental deterioration by the Kola nickel industry existed at this time: the 
exhaustion of local ore with significant nickel concentrations and continual yet failed 
attempts to use further increases in production to create economic growth. In the 
Monchegorsk region, Severonikel´ closed the Nittis-Kuzhumia mine in 1969 and finished 
working a small deposit at Niuduaivench in 1974. The Severonikel´ smelters, which were  
Table 7. Reported Sulfur Dioxide (SO2) Emissions from the Severonikel´ Combine149 
 
Year SO2 
Emissions 
(1000 tons) 
Year SO2 
Emissions 
(1000 tons) 
Year SO2 
Emissions 
(1000 tons) 
1966 99 1979 189 1991 196 
1968 86 1980 206 1992 182 
1969 94 1981 187 1993 137 
1970 101 1982 239 1994 98 
1971 111 1983 278 1995 129 
1972 118 1984 257 1996 110 
1973 215 1985 236 1997 140 
1974 259 1986 251 1998 88 
1975 274 1987 224 1999 45 
1976 268 1988 212 2000 45 
1977 246 1989 212 2001 44 
1978 244 1990 233   
 
already receiving large quantities of material from Pechenga, began to import and process 
ore from Noril´sk, which was in the midst of a massive expansion of its mining 
operations that outpaced the capacity of its smelters. 150 The Noril´sk ore contained three 
times the sulfur concentration and resulted in dramatic increases in sulfur dioxide 
emissions at Severonikel´. Between 1972 and 1973 alone the amount of ore from Noril´sk 
processed at Severonikel´ and the sulfur dioxide emissions of the plant both nearly 
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doubled without comparable growth in sulfuric acid production (Table 7). Though sulfur 
dioxide emissions had been below 100,000 tons a year through the 1960s, they rose to 
averaging over 200,000 tons a year for most of the 1970s and 1980s (Table 7).151 A 
similar phenomenon occurred in the Pechenga region as the processing units in Nikel´ 
and Zapoliarnyi increasingly worked ore from the Zhdanovsk deposit with low nickel 
concentrations and correspondingly higher levels of pollution per unit of nickel 
manufactured.152  
In addition to the important role of the ore content, the decisions to continue 
industrial development also bear responsibility for heightened levels of pollution. In 
contrast to arguments that communist economies performed without regard for market 
fluctuations, the production boom of the Soviet nickel industry in the 1970s overlapped 
with a period of significantly rising prices and increased attention to minimizing 
operating costs.153 This upswing occurred as part of a sustained strategy to use the 
expansion of heavy industry to continue a process of economic modernization. These 
increases in output contributed to the Soviet Union acquiring the title of the world’s 
largest nickel manufacturer, but did not lead to economic growth rates at the same levels 
as earlier decades.154 One of the most obvious local manifestations of stagnation was the 
failure of the nickel enterprises to fulfill their annual production plans in the late 
1970s.155 Under these conditions, tasks such as environmental protection measures and 
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technological upgrades fell even further down on the list of priorities.156 Thus, despite 
public pressure on the combines and their nominal efforts to curb pollution in the 1970s 
and 1980s, the privileging of production as the main ingredient in modernization caused 
the most environmental destruction in the industry’s history thus far. 
The global economy struggled in the 1970s, but countries that responded to the 
slump by shifting from extensive to intensive growth strategies tended to fare better. The 
Soviet Union, like many but not all state-socialist countries, continued to use the 
capitalization of industrial development as its primary means of attempting to spawn 
economic growth. Many first-world capitalist countries instead now generated wealth 
through new innovations, a shift to the service and financial sectors, and increased 
trade.157 In the middle term the comparative success of these countries helped fund 
certain forms of pollution abatement, though the environmental impact of a similar 
reliance on continual modernization seems very likely to be less fortuitous in the long 
run. The decision of the Soviet Union to remain focused on increasing industrial 
production, on the one hand, demonstrates a comparative weakness of communist 
systems in addressing environmental issues. Evoking Cold War economic competition, 
and thus the specter of the capitalist world-system, does not explain why the Soviet 
Union and other state-socialist countries chose environmentally destructive economic 
policies. It would also be disingenuous, on the other hand, to take the results of intensive 
growth policies as evidence of an inherent advantage of capitalism over communism in 
environmental stewardship. The Soviet Union pursued strategies of modernization akin to 
the Keynesian models of the capitalist welfare state. Only in this period, they ceased to 
work and an episode of economic and environmental crisis resulted. As elsewhere in the 
world, such as post-colonial Zambia, which enacted policies of extensive industrial 
development of the copper sector in these years that failed to remedy the country’s 
poverty, the Soviet “expectations of modernity” ceased to come to fruition.158 
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Industrial pollution on the Kola Peninsula during the culmination of the Soviet 
experiment and into the 1990s vastly transformed the local ecosystem and brought about 
significant social ramifications. Sulfur emissions, metallic dust from mining, and 
industrial wastewater containing an assortment of toxic substances from metallurgical 
processing harmed or destroyed large areas of vegetation, altered the chemistry of soil 
and waterways, and killed aquatic fauna. Nickel and copper entered human food 
pathways through accumulating in high concentrations in locally grown vegetables.159 
Taken together, this air and water pollution also caused negative health effects among the 
populations of Monchegorsk, Nikel´, and Zapoliarnyi.160 In these decades the levels of 
environmental damage on the Kola Peninsula accelerated to such extremes that the region 
became considered one of the most polluted places in the Soviet Union. The large zones 
of decimated vegetation in the vicinity of Severonikel´ and Pechenganikel´ elicited 
protests from Soviet conservationists and, especially in the aftermath of Chernobyl, the 
public in Nordic countries.161 
During this moment of heightened international attention to environmental issues 
in the Soviet Union, the state’s attempt to shift the country’s economy gradually toward a 
greater market orientation with perestroika reforms failed to save the ruling elite or the 
state-socialist system. One measure in these reforms was the Soviet state’s decision to 
unite officially the Kola enterprises—Pechenganikel´, Severonikel´, and the Olenegorsk 
Mechanical Factory –with the larger Noril´sk combine into a new entity, Noril´sk Nikel´, 
in 1989. The political collapse of the Soviet Union opened the floodgates for the 
implementation of neoliberal economic reform in the guise of shock-therapy privatization 
policies. In the early 1990s the economic decline in Russia, rapid inflation, and 
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plummeting global nickel prices created much more significant social hardships on the 
Kola Peninsula than Soviet-era pollution had.162 In 1995 wealthy banker Vladimir 
Potanin convinced the Russian government to implement the infamous “Loans for 
Shares” program of privatization as an emergency measure to generate needed state 
revenue. The subsequent auction organized by Potanin’s bank allowed that very bank, 
Interros, to gain a controlling stake of Noril´sk Nikel´ with a bid representing a fraction of 
the actual value of the company.163 Noril´sk Nikel´ established the subsidiary Kola GMK 
to control Severonikel´ and Pechenganikel´ in 1998 and became extremely profitable in 
the 2000s. Severonikel´ maintained the largest nickel refinery in Russia and 
Pechenganikel´ continued to work its mines in the 2000s. The Kola nickel industry has 
benefited from decisions of Noril´sk Nikel´ to globalize its assets and become a 
multinational corporation, though the impending exhaustion of deposits in Pechenga 
leaves its future up in the air.164 
As the world’s largest nickel producer, Noril´sk Nikel´ managed to reduce its 
anthropogenic loads on the environment in the post-Soviet period, first through steep 
declines in its industrial output in the early 1990s and then with technological upgrades to 
better control pollution levels. Though these reductions in pollution are often taken as 
evidence of the superiority of capitalism in environmental stewardship, a longer-term 
chronological perspective brings us to a different conclusion. Sulfur dioxide emissions 
from the Severonikel´ plant, for instance, remained above the levels of the 1960s until 
1998, which reflects the comparative uniqueness of the late Soviet era (Table 7).165 
Furthermore, the two decades of post-Soviet operation of the Kola plants has most 
certainly generated more pollution than the Stalinist era did, which highlights the obvious 
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but frequently downplayed point that the scale of industrial activities most closely 
correlates with environmental disturbance.  
Communist and Capitalist Environmental Solutions 
An assessment of the nature protection measures pursued by the Kola nickel 
industry in communist and capitalist systems reveals common and contrasting features of 
conservation policies during an overarching process of modernization. These longitudinal 
comparisons of a single industry and region cannot control for considerable chronological 
variation—the fact that, for instance, global concern about sulfur dioxide emissions was 
minimal in the 1930s and perhaps at its peak in the 1980s—or account for major 
differences related to economic sectors and natural surroundings—the distinct issues 
faced by agriculturalists in temperate climates and nickel smelters in the Arctic. 
However, they can illustrate some of the basic contours of the efforts to solve 
environmental problems in different political-economic systems. 
Scholarship on waste in state-socialism addresses the different means of 
attempting to manage industrial pollution. In a work that elaborates a sociological theory 
of waste as a hybrid entity, Zsuzsa Gille proposes three waste regimes for socialist and 
post-socialist Hungary. In the “metallic regime” from 1948 to 1974, state and society 
emphasized the need to maximally reuse and recycle produced wastes in order to obtain 
value from them. The imperative of extracting all possible economic value out of 
industrial materials influenced public discourse and planning, while the issue of waste 
generation and distribution remained taboo. The “efficiency regime” focused, instead, on 
minimizing the levels of waste per unit of production through technological upgrades and 
reducing aggregate costs through the introduction of new economic models from 1975 to 
1984. And, finally, policy during the “chemical regime” from 1985 to 2004 began to treat 
wastes as useless and toxic by-products, which needed to be disposed of and contained. 
The state allocated authority to private enterprises for managing their wastes and 
relinquished much of its role in regulating their production.166  
A modified version of this periodization schema can be adapted to this evaluation 
of the politics of pollution abatement in the Kola nickel industry. I would add a “deferral 
regime” to describe Stalinist waste politics until the postwar era. In it the combination of 
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holistic thinking and extreme urgency led to a disposition that putatively favored the 
ultimate elimination of all waste, but accepted a low prioritization of this task because of 
a conviction that it could be solved in the future. World War II served as a bridge from 
hastiness to a period of stressing the more gradual reuse of industrial by-products, while 
waste distribution remained de-politicized. The incorporation of overt conservation 
measures into enterprise plans and an increased focus on cost reduction beginning in the 
1970s failed in the stated goals of reducing pollution because it contradicted the greater 
imperative of increasing production. Perestroika saw a major change in views about 
industrial wastes toward them being seen as harmful substances to be controlled instead 
of reused and the ascent of international involvement in environmental politics on the 
Kola Peninsula. However, we should separate the protracted and minimally effective 
period of market reforms lasting until the late 1990s from the more successful era of the 
recent past during which Noril´sk Nikel´ has been able to reduce certain forms of 
pollution. During this “multinational corporate waste regime,” environmental decision-
making has been largely allocated to a powerful private enterprise, which has the avowed 
agenda of acting only in its economic and political interest. 
Initially inspiring the project leaders of the apatite works in the Khibiny 
Mountains, a waste management scheme known as the complex utilization of natural 
resources continued to shape pollution control by the nickel industry in the 1930s. As 
Fersman elaborated this idea, it would have entailed the reuse of industrial by-products to 
the extent that the enterprises would eliminate all emissions.167 As one manifestation of 
this thinking, newspapers and journals in the early 1930s expressed excitement about the 
idea of using sulfur from the nickel ore in the Monche tundra to produce sulfuric acid for 
the apatite industry.168 During the period of NKVD management of Severonikel´ just 
before the Soviet Union’s entrance into World War II, the combine initiated efforts to 
convert sulfur dioxide emissions from the smelter into sulfuric acid and considered the 
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issue of increasing the amount of metals recovered from ore during processing.169 After a 
chaotic and bloody decade of rapid Stalinist industrialization, Fersman repeated his 
insistence about the need to recycle industrial wastes. In a discussion of “wastes and 
refuse of Monche,” he acknowledged, “the problem of protecting the mineral substances 
and nature of the surrounding area of the Monche region is especially acute.” He defined 
the issue as above all “a struggle with the loss of useful materials—nickel in lateral rock, 
cobalt in slag, selenium in silt and slag—but the utmost attention should be paid to the 
neutralization and utilization of emitted sulfur gases and the conversion of them into 
sulfuric acid.”170 In addition to touching on the abiding optimism of Stalinist pollution 
controls, Fersman’s report also exposed a more pervasive truth: the low prioritization of 
such issues during this conflict-ridden episode of industrial development meant that little 
action was taken to implement such ambitious ideas. 
The enterprises of the postwar Kola nickel industry made consistent and gradual 
efforts to transform all metals and sulfur removed from the earth into economic products. 
This Soviet manifestation of the “metallic waste regime” entailed a similar relation to the 
recycling of industrial by-products and the generation of pollution. On the one hand, 
repeated exhortations that all available natural resources should be made to serve the 
socialist state infused party and enterprise discourse from the end of World War II into 
the 1970s.171 Numerous specific campaigns emerged in response to this desire for the 
maximal extraction of value from natural materials. The Kola smelters improved their 
processing technologies and the reprocessing of slag to the point where they reduced the 
concentrations of nickel, copper, and cobalt in the solid wastes they produced by half.172 
Throughout these decades specialists additionally developed systems for collecting and 
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extracting metals from mining dust, which was a task explicitly connected to the 
installation of better ventilation systems in the mines.173 Repeated crusades to collect 
scrap metal also occurred during these decades along with portrayals of this type of 
recycling as a moral and patriotic duty.174 Finally, discussion about the conversion of 
sulfur dioxide into sulfuric acid consistently appeared until the actual opening of a unit 
for it at Severonikel´ in 1967.175 At the end of the 1950s the main engineer of 
Severonikel´ wrote that “the reduction of wastes to their minimum allows for an increased 
output of metals, a substantial lowering of costs of production, and simultaneously the 
elimination of dustiness from the sections,” revealing that enterprise leaders were not 
entirely oblivious to the connections among the economic, social, and environmental 
dimensions of these efforts.176 The author of a popular book about Monchegorsk 
predicted in 1961 that in a matter of years technologies of industrial reuse would manage 
to eradicate air pollution and improve air quality, all while the Severonikel´ combine 
increased its output of metals.177 
On the other hand, as the proceeding example demonstrates, the production 
processes that generated these agents of pollution were not subject to official scrutiny in 
these years. Also inherent in the idea of extracting all possible value from natural 
resources, which inspired certain forms of conservation, was the inclination toward the 
rapacious transformation of the entire material world into a means of serving human 
interests. This impulse represented a clear continuation of the “colonization of nature” 
described in the first chapter of this dissertation and as such characterized an impetus of 
economic modernization that has been common to communism and capitalism. 
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Reflecting the attachment to ever-increasing nature use, state enterprises on the Kola 
Peninsula ultimately maintained the prerogative of disposing industrial wastes as they 
saw fit. They could come under public criticism and face sanctions for violating sanitary 
and environmental laws, but authorities would not force these disposals to stop. For 
instance, Severonikel´ continued to dump large quantities of untreated waste into local 
waterways in the early 1960s, despite major fines and public censure.178 
Though the 1970s inaugurated a period of extreme pollution by the Kola smelters, 
it also witnessed considerable concern about environmental protection in the Soviet 
Union. In an article in Polar Pravda in 1973 that held specific industrial enterprises 
responsible for improving the air quality of the Murmansk region, the head of the 
Murmansk Hydrometric Service, Fedor Terziev, warned, “environmental pollution has 
become one of the most complicated and urgent problems of our time—the problem of 
the century.”179 The Soviet equivalent to the Hungarian “efficiency regime” did not 
embrace the same limited use of market mechanisms as environmental solutions, but 
entailed a comparable—though often unimplemented—focus on technological 
modernization and increased cost reduction. More importantly, perhaps, the reduction of 
waste and pollution became fully integrated into the repertoire of tasks that society and 
the Soviet state were to accomplish together. The goal of environmental protection 
measures expanded to explicitly include the creation of superior air and water quality 
under state-socialism.  
While the primary materialization of this new approach to pollution was increased 
public attention and press coverage, the nickel smelters also invested more resources in 
these tasks.180 Pechenganikel´ opened its own sulfuric acid section in 1979 and almost all 
Kola enterprises involved in mining attempted to improve their processing and reuse of 
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wastewater in the 1970s and 1980s.181 The enterprises defined these upgrades as part of a 
process of modernization and rationalization and returned to highlighting the “complex 
utilization of nature” as an overtly environmental solution.182 Despite the overall 
ineffectiveness of this approach in curbing pollution, environmental measures taken by 
the nickel enterprises often received praise for demonstrating the superiority of 
communist political economy over capitalism. Leonid Potemkin, a geologist who had 
helped open the Zhdanovsk deposit in the aftermath of World War II and went on to have 
a successful career as an official in the Ministry of Geology, put it with particular 
conviction. In a 1977 book on environmental protection and mining in the Soviet Union, 
he repeatedly contrasted the exploitative and destructive treatment of nature in capitalism 
with “communist society,” which “will be able to ensure the genuine harmony of 
technical progress and nature and the optimal combination of the development of the 
mining industry with the tasks of improving the environment.”183 
Perestroika marked a transition to a different period of pollution politics in which 
the state gradually retreated from claiming responsibility and international actors came to 
play a defining role. An increasing orientation toward global markets, which began 
during Gorbachev’s rule but became dominant with privatization of the 1990s, overlaid 
and, in many ways, drove this process. In the aftermath of the Chernobyl accident in 1986 
and the growth in knowledge about the extent of Soviet environmental pollution, two 
major changes occurred beyond the introduction of a new round of environmental 
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technologies.184 Members of Soviet society began to join with professional conservation 
scientists and official environmental groups to lodge active protests against industrial 
enterprises, including those on the Kola Peninsula, for harming the ecosystem.185 
Additionally, foreign countries turned pollution from the Soviet Union into a major 
diplomatic issue. This latter development was especially important in the case of the Kola 
Peninsula because of its large environmental loads, proximity to Finland and Norway, 
and the particular strength of environmentalism in the Nordic countries. As political 
scientist Robert Darst describes, Finland first offered to help fund and manage a drastic 
technological upgrade, commonly referred to as “modernization,” of the Pechenganikel´ 
plant in the late 1980s that would improve the smelter’s performance and reduce its 
emissions. In the 1990s Norway made a similar proposal to invest in this environmental 
solution, but just as with the Finnish offer, the plan languished. The Russian government 
possessed limited resources to contribute its portion of the funds in the early 1990s and 
environmental policy makers in Moscow increasingly saw the eventual closing of the 
plants as a more viable option.186 
Since the late 1990s the management of pollution by the Kola nickel industry has 
primarily been the prerogative of a successful multinational corporation, Noril´sk Nikel´. 
The tough new environmental protection laws initially enacted by the Russian Federation 
have subsequently been weakened and lax enforcement of them has remained.187 In the 
early 1990s the de-population and de-industrialization of the region, neither of which 
were conscious policies, contributed most notably to pollution reductions.188 Under 
Noril´sk Nikel´’s auspices, on the other hand, the profitability of certain measures to the 
company, instead of the growth in production, has become the ultimate arbiter of whether 
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or not an environmental measure is implemented. Global capitalism in autocratic Russia 
has still required the company to be attentive to state desires and consider international 
politics as well, but Noril´sk Nikel´’s corporate self-interest overwhelmingly determines 
decisions about industrial pollution. For instance, the privatized company initially 
rejected the Norwegian offer to upgrade Pechenganikel´ and instead diverted some of its 
smelting operations to regions farther from an international border. After opting for an 
expansion of mining operations in Pechenga in the early 2000s, it went ahead with 
investments in environmental technologies that had economic rationales and accepted 
Norwegian contributions to the project.189 Noril´sk Nikel´ has also sought to garner the 
favor of local environmentalists by providing finances to nature reserves near the 
smelters.190 In 2005 the company summarized its goals, “The adoption of nature 
conservation technologies is one of the most important directions of the ecological 
strategy of Kola GMK on the path toward the creation of clean production that exists in 
harmony with the natural environment.”191 Such a notion of forging harmony with nature 
in the midst of industrial development could have been written by Leonid Potemkin 
several decades earlier. While the transition to capitalism has shifted authority from state 
enterprises to private corporations, the power to pollute remains in the hands of sovereign 
actors dedicated to continuing economic modernization. 
Conclusion 
The Soviet system has often been targeted as being particularly harmful to the 
natural environment. In a way this criticism was fair when it first emerged in the 1980s 
during a moment when strains on the command economy did lead to especially poor 
environmental performance. But it makes little sense to generalize from this particular 
historical context to overarching claims about the superiority of market economies in 
dealing with environmental issues. For most of its existence in the Soviet-era the Kola 
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nickel industry generated comparable levels of pollution to enterprises under capitalist 
management. Focus on the uniqueness of Soviet ecocide furthermore obscures the 
influence of a broader undertaking in leading to much of the environmental destruction. 
In the twentieth century states and corporations throughout the world and 
operating under different political and economic systems chose to pursue processes of 
industrial and post-industrial development. Despite considerable degrees of popular 
support for these policies in various places and times, rarely were the basic decisions 
behind such projects of economic modernization arrived at through democratic processes 
outside the internal structures of states and corporation. Pollution, on the contrary, 
exerted indiscriminate effects on ecosystems and societies, which have burdened 
populations alienated from the choices to modernize. The level and form of input from 
society did vary widely in different places and times and the Soviet Union clearly stood 
on the less democratic and inclusive side of the scale. Yet, in both capitalist and 
communist systems a group of elite actors possessed the power to transform human-
nature relations radically for the remainder of society and the environment. Predictable 
environmental outcomes from this political project of modernization, therefore, rest at the 
foundation of the explanation of how Monchegorsk went from “exceptional” and 
“beautiful” to “hell.”  
 Certain contingencies of the Soviet experience, nevertheless, also help account 
for this transformation. This chapter has offered the suggestive case of the Kola nickel 
industry to illuminate these other processes. The isolation faced by the country during its 
first major industrialization push and the desire to attain maximal economic self-
sufficiency undermined the utopian holism espoused by planners. The strategic 
significance of the metal helped ensure that the military would attempt to secure the 
deposits during World War II and that the state would prioritize investing in the industry 
during the Cold War. The continued pursuit of expansions in production during a global 
economic shift produced especially poor environmental results for the country in the 
1970s and 1980s. And, finally, the combination of the economic collapse during the 
1990s, which cut production and thus pollution considerably, and the flexibility of a 
powerful multinational corporation, which can more easily transfer pollution generation 
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to different locations and use technology to reduce emissions per unit of production, have 
made the post-Soviet era seem better for the environment. 
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Chapter 5. Energizing the Landscape 
 
Introducing the plans for the Kola Nuclear Power Plant (Kola AES) to the public 
on November 12, 1967, Polar Pravda wrote, “Just fifty years ago the entire energy 
supply consisted of several low capacity generators. And now twelve hydroelectric power 
stations and the Kirovsk thermal-electric power station operate here, not counting local 
thermal power plants. But the rapidly growing industry of the Murmansk region requires 
further development of energy capacity.”1 The entire project of economic transformation 
of the Kola Peninsula depended on finding sources of heat, fuel, and electricity to provide 
enterprises, municipalities, and military installations with increasing amounts of energy. 
While today the Arctic seems poised to become a new center of oceanic oil exploration, 
the need to devise ways to maximally utilize Murmansk’s limited energy sources was a 
pressing concern for industrialists of the twentieth century. The regional history of energy 
reveals a recurring process in which increased use and newly harvested sources altered 
human/nature relations in ways seen and unseen. 
This chapter turns to a key facilitator of economic transformation to explore the 
environmental changes caused by modernization and the abiding interconnectedness 
between humans and the rest of nature in modern conditions. This dissertation began with 
another such facilitator—railroads, a means of transportation—to establish some of the 
persistent strategies and ideologies informing the modernization of the Kola Peninsula. 
Here I take stock of the influences and illusions of modern development by examining 
the Kola energy sector. As a necessary component in all forms of industrial activity, the 
energy sector allows us to see connections to the other economic branches evaluated in 
earlier chapters. I argue that despite the occurrence of radical environmental 
transformations that seemingly disconnected people from the natural world, processes of 
continual re-entanglement prevented the transcendence of society over nature.  
This discussion begins with a theoretical consideration of the relationship between 
changes to the physical world and connections of nature to society. It then proceeds to 
assess the history of different energy sources on the Kola Peninsula in rough 
chronological order of when they came to prominence. The discussion of organic 
materials focuses on the shifting canopy of vegetation in the region and the connections 
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between local and distant landscapes. The consideration of hydraulic energy from an 
elaborate network of hydroelectric plants concentrates on surface alterations to the Kola 
Peninsula, modifications in aquatic ecosystems, and the integration of natural processes 
in human bodies into energy production. The evaluation of nuclear power stresses its 
relationship with the militarization of the region and the rise of new forms of modern 
secrecy and risk. 
Dissociation and Entanglement in Russian and Soviet Modernity 
To assess the scale and character of the changes accompanying the harvesting of 
energy from the natural world, it is helpful to incorporate some theoretical considerations 
about the character of modernity. Modernization has led to the dissociation of certain 
connections between nature and society, while simultaneously reconfiguring an 
entanglement of them. Dissociation has involved an apparent separation from the natural 
environment. People have depended on less direct interaction with other species and 
water for sustenance and have been able to more readily cope with intemperate climatic 
phenomena. Their livelihoods have relied increasingly on manipulated natural systems 
and the reproduction of elaborate social-natural networks. They have altered physical 
landscapes in sweeping and permanent ways. On the other hand, entanglement has 
entailed the maintenance of the same fundamental interconnections between humans and 
the environment, albeit in modified and often masked arrangements. Modernization has 
created new human dependencies on industrially used nature and has embedded human 
experience in unacknowledged natural processes. Municipal heat, water, and electrical 
service, for instance, all rely on the integration of unseen natural elements into human 
lives.2  
Political power has appeared in both dissociation and entanglement through the 
production of knowledge and impacts on the material world. Anthropologist Gíslí Pálsson 
summarizes the relationship between nature and society in modernist thinking as 
centering on “disembeddedness, dualism, certainty and human mastery” as opposed to 
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the postmodern emphasis on “embeddedness, monism, and the absence of certainty and 
human mastery.”3 For historical actors and later analysts, the nature/society relationship 
occurred to a significant degree on the level of perception. People have aspired to 
overcome nature’s limits and felt enmeshed in their environments and seemingly inherent 
natural proclivities. A good deal of economic and environmental politics has happened on 
this plane from the Promethean longings of the industrialists to the romantic desires of 
conservationists for untouched wilderness. The materiality of the phenomena more 
readily reveals the transformative scope of modernization on the natural world and 
human society. Environmental change and human displacements contributed to 
detachment, while the creation of intricate networks and new pervasive risks foster 
enmeshment.   
In his philosophical meditations on modernism and modernization, Marshall 
Berman explores an evocative phrase from the Communist Manifesto, “all that is solid 
melts into air.” In Berman’s reading this phrase points to the paradoxical creative 
destruction and dialectical ambiguity of modernity.4 In Marx and Engels’ original use, the 
phrase also conjures up a potential break of humankind from previous constraints through 
the subjugation of nature.5 In The Consequences of Modernity, social theorist Anthony 
Giddens elaborates this point by discussing a process of “disembedding” during 
modernization. He writes, “By disembedding I mean the ‘lifting out’ of social relations 
from local contexts of interaction and their restructuring across indefinite spans of time-
space.”6 Extending this feature of modernization to the natural world, Giddens juxtaposes 
pre-modern lives that “were tied up with nature’s moods and vagaries” and modern ones: 
Modern industry, shaped by the alliance of science and technology, transforms the 
world of nature in ways unimaginable to earlier generations. In industrialised 
sectors of the globe—and, increasingly, elsewhere—human beings live in a 
created environment, an environment of action which is, of course, physical but 
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no longer just natural. Not just the built environment of urban areas but most 
other landscapes as well become subject to human coordination and control.7  
Though I have been arguing that this supposed escape from the natural and 
placement of landscapes under human control is fundamentally illusionary, such theories 
of modernity help us see the material manipulation of physical landscapes and social 
experience. This dissociation operated through several material, social, and cultural 
techniques. It most basically involved alterations of landscapes, by deforestation and 
reservoir creation for energy production. Through these intentional landscape changes, 
humans performed a type of control and dominance over the environment and allowed 
for socially experienced separation. Supplies of fuel and electricity from transformed 
landscapes allowed for increased distances between sources of energy and human 
settlements, enabling urban and industrial life on the Kola Peninsula. Modern industry 
and city dwelling helped produce experiences of isolation from nature by facilitating 
lifestyles less obviously in the natural world. Finally, the rhetoric that accompanied the 
regionally based projects of the Kola energy economy reinforced the notion that they 
separated nature through its subordination. 
In the twentieth century states throughout the world harvested increasing 
quantities of energy from organic materials, physical forces, and atomic bonds to enable 
modernization. The physical transformation of these substances and forces into work that 
created and maintained an industrialized and urbanized world modified human relations 
with the rest of the local nature. The acceleration of energy consumption in the twentieth 
century led to an episode of unprecedented environmental change. Along with human 
population and gross domestic product, global energy use rose with extraordinary 
rapidity. John McNeill estimates that humans have used more energy in the twentieth 
century than the entirety of the species’ previous existence. By one metric world energy 
use consisted of 250 million tons of oil equivalent in 1800, 800 in 1900, and 10,000 in 
2000.8 A single specific aggregate assessment of twentieth-century energy consumption 
for the Russian Empire, Soviet Union, and Russian Republic is difficult to obtain, but the 
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broad trend mirrored the global rise with the exception of a relative decrease during the 
economic collapse of the 1990s.9  
The energy economy of Kola Peninsula followed this pattern, relying on the 
utilization of a variety of sources—wood, peat, hydroelectricity, imported coal and oil, 
and nuclear power—to fuel industrial development. Wood supplied the earliest industrial 
endeavors in the region, such as the Murmansk railroad and initial construction in the 
Khibiny Mountains. Excavated peat and imported coal supplemented forest materials in 
this period as well. Beginning in the 1930s the region developed an expansive network of 
hydroelectric power stations that supplied the vast majority of industrial and municipal 
electricity until the 1970s. Coal-burning thermal power plants grew alongside the 
hydroelectric network and began to augment the coal with low-grade oil known as mazut 
in the 1960s. Finally, the Kola Peninsula commenced the use of nuclear power in the 
1960s and 1970s. Overall, the production of electricity in the region grew consistently 
since the first five-year plan, going from 290 million kilowatt hours in 1939 to 16,500 
million kilowatts hours in 1990.10 
The tremendous transformation of environments that resulted from this incredible 
scale of the energy economy does not mean that humans achieved transcendence over 
nature in the process. As numerous works of environmental studies and history show, 
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Change (Burlington: Ashgate, 2005) and Marshall I. Goldman, Petrostate: Putin, Power, and the New 
Russia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
10 “Vvodnyi ocherk,” in A. A. Kiselev, ed., Kol´skii entsiklopediia, vol. 1 (Saint 
Petersburg/Apatity: IS/ KNTs RAN, 2008), 90, 118. A similar trend is outlined for the main energy 
company “Kolenergo” by V. M. Palumbo and G. D. Dmitriev, “Sostoianie, problemy i perspektivy 
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Severa Rossii (Apatity: KNTs AN, 1999), 15-24; and Kolenergo, 1936-1996 (Murmashi, 1996), 18. 
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nature and society remain intimately intertwined in the modern world. For example, 
Maria Kaika describes such entanglement in her study of the role of water in the modern 
city. Modernization, she insists, involved “establishing intricate networks and flows of 
natural elements, social power relations and capital investment cycles, which, in fact, not 
only did not separate nature from the city, but instead wove them together more closely 
into a socio-spatial continuum.”11 Historian Liza Piper similarly points to how twentieth-
century industrialization in subarctic Canada “changed the cognitive and material links 
between our work and nature’s work but did not separate one from the other.”12 Finally, 
Bruno Latour insists the distinction between nature and society is a cultural conceit. 
During a process known as modernization, the things we call nature and society are 
constantly being separated and re-assembled into new and pervasive hybrid entities. 
Following the logic of this theory, Latour claims that in fact “we have never been 
modern.”13 Humans remain as entwined in their modified environments in ‘modernity’ as 
they ever have been.  
Entanglement, therefore, is as ubiquitous of a facet of economic modernization as 
dissociation, and occurs regardless of the political-economic system in a given country. 
The exploitation of organic, hydraulic, imported, and nuclear energy sources on the Kola 
Peninsula brought about new forms of human dependency on the natural world. While 
the mechanisms for re-establishing such bonds are numerous and multifaceted, I highlight 
three particular processes in the energy economy. Entanglement created intricate but 
inherently vulnerable webs of human-nature interaction, fostered reliance on muscle 
power in construction and operation, and masked connections to the natural world 
through secrecy and elusive uncertainty. In the following discussion I explain how 
importation, the use of bodies, and unacknowledged risk shaped several areas of the Kola 
energy sector.  
Organic Substances 
Trees and various forms of flora residue provided substantial amounts of heat and 
energy to the Kola Peninsula. Wood from forests and peat from marshes supplied 
                                                
11 Kaika, City of Flows, 5. 
12 Liza Piper, The Industrial Transformation of Subarctic Canada (Vancouver: University of 
British Columbia Press, 2009), 4. 
13 Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, trans. Catherine Porter (Cambridge MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1993). 
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industrial expansion throughout the first half of the twentieth century, intermittently but 
sometimes intensively. Coal and oil imported from other areas of the country and the 
world have provided a significant proportion of the region’s heat and electricity since the 
mid-1930s. The use of these organic energy sources substantially changed the physical 
environment of the Kola Peninsula, which simultaneously became home to an increasing 
number of people. The discussion here focuses on how the exploitation of local bio-fuels 
transformed the regional landscape and how the spillover effects of air pollution from 
imported fossil fuels influenced human habitats. These environmental changes detached 
humans from nature by demonstrating people’s capacity to manipulate it, by reducing the 
areas that could potentially be imagined as unaltered, and by making ecosystem 
restoration dependent on human decisions and actions. At the same time the 
incorporation of human bodies into the system of energy inputs and the formation of 
elaborate networks of extraction and exploitation of some of these organic materials 
reveals an abiding environmental entrenchment. 
Residents of the Kola Peninsula used firewood for centuries before 1900. While 
the contours of the resultant environmental change lie outside the scope of this study, 
suffice it to say that we should assume that this human activity shaped the ecosystem in 
significant ways and not, of course, that some sort of pristine pre-industrial environment 
existed. Several timber companies began operating on the southern coast of the peninsula 
in the early twentieth century. Their activities primarily involved the harvesting of wood 
for construction and operated by hiring seasonal laborers, the vast majority of whom 
worked inside the sawmills instead of outside collecting timber.14 Though employees 
took free wood for heating needs, the small scale and intermittent operation of these 
timber companies limited their impact on local vegetation.15  
The significant deforestation along the Murmansk Railroad occurred as part of an 
attempt to make this means of transportation serve the imperatives of militaristic 
modernization during World War I and the Russian Civil War. Clear-cutting for the track 
                                                
14 A. A. Zhilinskii, Krainii sever: evropeiskoi Rossii (Petrograd: Tipo-litografiia Severo-
zapadnogo okruga putei soobshcheniia, 1919), 232. 
15 I. F. Ushakov, Izbrannye proizvedeniia. Tom 1: Kol´skaia zemlia (Murmansk: Murmanskoe 
knizhnoe izdatel´stvo, 1997), 415-418, 503-531; D. L., “Ot Arkhangel´ska do Kandalaksha i obratno,” 
Izvestiia Arkhangel´skogo obshchestva izucheniia Russkogo Severa 8, no. l1 (November 15, 1916): 456; 
and K. V. Regel´, “‘Terskii bereg´ (Kratkoe fiziko-geograficheskoe i estestvenno-istoricheskoe opisanie),” 
Izvestiia Arkhangel´skogo obshchestva izucheniia Russkogo Severa 9, no. 3-4 (March-April 1919): 94-95. 
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and the frantic use of wood for locomotive fuel and warming workers and soldiers during 
war massively depleted this resource.16 A rough estimate indicates that the region lost 
over a quarter of its forest cover between 1905 and 1921.17 Soviet documents from 1920 
described “the catastrophic situation with fuel on the northern part of the Murmansk 
railroad” and urged “applying all strength and energy to the complete elimination 
(nedopushcheniiu) of the fuel crisis” by intensive collection of forest materials.18 The 
impact of this fuel crisis was felt in forests throughout the country.19 The whole purpose 
of the railroad was to allow for quick access to an unfrozen port in the north. In the 
context of wartime chaos insufficient supplies of fuel for the trains became one of several 
weak links in the potential for the road to fulfill its modernist function of compressing 
space and time.20 
Officials in charge of the railroad during the wars often relied on the energy 
produced by groups of coerced humans to gather local organic fuel. As discussed earlier 
in this dissertation, the pattern of sending unfree laborers to help economically modernize 
the north began during the construction of the Murmansk railroad. Their labor depended 
on metabolic conversions within their bodies to extract muscle power capable of fulfilling 
state directives. This involvement of human biology in landscape transformation occurred 
with the collection forest materials by POWs to help fuel locomotive engines.21 An 
                                                
16 A. A. Kiselev, Kol´skoi atomnoi—30: Stranitsy istorii (Murmansk: Izdatel´stvo “Reklamnaia 
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18 GAMO, f. R-483, op. 1, d. 100, ll. 26, 30. 
19 Brian Bonhomme, Forests, Peasants, and Revolutionaries: Forest Conservation and 
Organization in Soviet Russia, 1917-1929 (Boulder: East European Monographs, 2005), 147-156. 
20 On the space-time compression in modernity and the relevance of the railroad, see Giddens, The 
Consequences of Modernity, 17-21; Stephen Kern, The Culture of Time and Space, 1880-1918 (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1983); and Wolfgang Schivelbusch, The Railway Journey: The 
Industrialization of Time and Space in the 19th Century (Berkeley: University of California Press, [1977] 
1986). 
21 Reinhard Nachtigal, Die Murmanbahn 1915 bis 1919: Kriegsnotwendigkeit und 
Wirtschaftinteressen (Remshalden: BAG-Verlag, 2007); GAMO, f. I-72, op. 1, d. 1b, ll. 64-66; Bentley 
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(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1918), 25; and Bentley Historical Library, Polar Bear 
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American soldier involved in the Allied intervention described another instance of 
exploitative use of muscle power: “The fuel for the engines is all wood and is brought in 
to the wood stations by special wood trains. The loading is done by boys and girls. Some 
not more than twelve years of age.”22 After the Bolsheviks gained control of parts of the 
railroad during the Russian Civil War, the Office of Forest and Peat Development of the 
Murmansk railroad intensified these efforts to harvest as much wood and peat as possible, 
using hired workers and again POWs. According to official reports, the difficult natural 
conditions of the region necessitated that a large portion of railroad workers participate in 
wood collection simply to keep themselves from freezing.23  
The use of forest materials as a fuel source further transformed the Kola 
environment to accommodate a major influx of Homo sapiens in the first decades of the 
Soviet period. In the NEP era the Murmansk railroad employed a slightly more 
sustainable approach to timber harvesting, but since its entire business model depended 
on substituting natural resources on the land for state subsidies, the road still caused 
considerable depletion of Kola forests.24 Soviet industrialization of the 1930s and the 
reconstruction after World War II again relied on the rapid utilization of available forest 
material. In 1940 firewood made up approximately 14.3% of the materials used as fuels 
in the Soviet Union (i.e. not including hydroelectricity).25 During the preceding decade 
the Murmansk railroad, the Apatit combine, Severonikel´, a special department of the 
Kola Production Association of Energy and Electrification (Kolenergo), and small-scale 
forest collection enterprises in Umba and near Kandalaksha collected and bought wood 
for regional use as an industrial fuel.26 As we have seen, this bout of industrialization 
aimed at ascending socialist civilization over environmental constraints, both rhetorically 
                                                
22 Bentley Historical Library, Polar Bear Collection, Harry Duink Papers, 36-39. 
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 251 
and through state plans. The resultant de-forestation notably reduced the region’s forest 
cover from about 26.5% of the Murmansk okrug in 1934 to 22.7% of the Murmansk 
oblast´, which included the more heavily forested land to the southwest of Kandalaksha, 
in 1943.27  During this time, the forcefully extracted muscle power of dekulakized 
peasants greatly contributed to the country’s timber industry.28 Most of the special 
settlers on the Kola Peninsula worked in other economic branches, but some were 
involved in gathering firewood and peat.29 Additionally, several Gulag camps operating 
in the region in the early 1950s engaged in wood collection.30  
Decimation of the Kola forests to fuel industrial activity peaked during the 
Second World War and the postwar reconstruction and this trend then reversed course.31 
As the use of hydroelectricity and then nuclear power grew in the second half of the 
twentieth century, the wood harvesting on the Kola Peninsula decreased substantially. By 
1971 forest materials only made up about 5% of the fuel sources used in the region, a 
figure that likely decreased even further after the Kola AES went online.32 This reduction 
in timber use led to a significant increase in forest cover, even as sulfur dioxide pollution 
in the proximity of urban-industrial centers caused visible forest destruction. According 
to recent statistics, the expansion of forest cover reached 67.5% of the territory of the 
Murmansk region in 2008. A comparison of this figure to what was almost certainly a 
considerably low estimate from 1905—the Aleksandrovsk district (uezd) of the 
Arkhangel´sk province had 29.1% forest cover—suggests that the twentieth century was 
actually an era of considerable forest growth in the region.33 Though the uncertainty 
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32 I. I. Kobzikov, “Toplivnyi balans Murmanskoi oblasti i voprosy ego ratsionalizatsii,” in E. Ia. 
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around such data demands suspicion in such a conclusion, it points to how changes in 
types of fuels supplying the energy economy altered landscapes in less obvious ways.  
Another endeavor that modified the surface of the region to enable industrial 
activity was the collection, processing, and burning of peat. Peat is decayed vegetation 
matter often built up in marshes that can be turned into a moderately efficient fuel 
through drying and compression. Peat played a prominent role in the energy economy of 
the country in the early twentieth century and successfully served other regions with 
more organic material. It made up 5.7 % of fuel used in the Soviet Union in 1940, after 
which it declined sharply.34 Regional boosters in the late imperial and early Soviet era 
praised the possibilities of peat. For instance, Vladimir Voshchinin, an old colleague of 
Gennadii Chirkin in the imperial Resettlement Administration, wrote to Polar Pravda in 
1939, claiming that the Kola Peninsula was rich enough in peat that up to 40 million air-
dried tons of it could be collected near the railroad.35 Beginning with the Murmansk 
railroad during the Russian Civil War, enterprises in the region had excavated 
considerable supplies of peat.36 In the 1930s Apatit employed special settlers to gather 
peat, and the initial plans for the Severonikel´ combine ordered the extraction of up to 
200,000 tons of the fuel.37 Furthermore, the comparative proximity of peat sources 
figured prominently in evaluations of the various proposed locations for an alumina 
factory in the region.38 As with wood, the expansion of other energy resources 
diminished the use of this organic material. In contrast to the assessments of Voshchinin, 
Kolenergo determined that peat collection and processing made little economic sense at 
                                                                                                                                            
given restricted surveying abilities at the time; and the exclusion of forest health from this metric (land 
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38 GAMO, f. 773, op. 1, d. 6, l. 6. 
 253 
the end of the 1930s. The supplies of peat on the Kola Peninsula existed in small and 
isolated marshes, which prevented mechanized extraction and required large amounts of 
labor, and could only be accessed during the short summer season.39 By the 1970s the use 
of peat as a fuel in the Murmansk region had become negligible.40 
Finally, the importation of fossil fuels to produce electricity and heat 
municipalities connected the Kola Peninsula to distant landscapes and eventually led to 
pollution that deteriorated remote and local environments. Modern economies have 
frequently depended on shipments of materials across long distances. With decreasing 
transportation costs and increasing international trade in the late twentieth century, the 
complex geographies of production and consumption have given rise to ever more 
intricate webs connecting people with economically used and disturbed nature. Despite 
the autarkic and quasi-colonial development models that characterized the regional 
economy of the Kola Peninsula for most of the Soviet era, the territory required the 
importation of coal and oil to meet the energy needs of modernization. In one sense, the 
shipment of these fossil fuels to the region removed people residing on the Kola 
Peninsula from the natural contexts of their energy sources. However, the increasing 
reliance on the network for economic modernization maintained or strengthened this 
form of entwined relations between people and the environment, at least until the advent 
of nuclear power in the Murmansk region. 
From the beginning, modernization schemes for this section of the far north 
entailed plans to bring in energy sources from elsewhere. Regional boosters in the early 
twentieth century envisioned shipping coal mined on the Arctic island Spitsbergen of the 
Svalbard archipelago and in the Pechora basin to the Kola Peninsula.41 During parts of 
World War I and the Russian Civil War, some of the northern sections of the Murmansk 
railroad ran on coal imported from Britain, but with rapid industrialization of the 1930s 
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the country became an exporter of this fossil fuel.42 During this period the government 
operated coalmines on Norwegian Spitsbergen and developed the Pechora basin.43 A 
portion of this coal fueled Kola industries.44 Between 1930 and 1934 alone the regional 
demand for coal increased tenfold and this trend of rapidly rising fossil fuel consumption 
continued for decades.45 Domestic coal production in the Soviet Union as a whole more 
than doubled during the 1950s and then gradually began to be augmented with oil and 
gas.46 The Kola Peninsula imported coal from the Pechora basin throughout the second 
half of the twentieth century and mazut (unprocessed diesel) from refineries near Kirishi 
and Iaroslavl´ beginning in the 1960s.47 
The reliance on these fuels by residents of the Kola Peninsula, almost all of whom 
were first or second generation migrants, increased dramatically as the region became 
highly urbanized in the 1960s and 1970s. As energy became less expensive within the 
Soviet economy in the Brezhnev era, rising demand for it outstripped regional population 
growth. One source reported in 1971 that the amount of energy used per person in the 
Murmansk region between 1965 and 1970 increased almost 1.5 times and the heat 
demand doubled over this period. The author anticipated both trends continuing in this 
direction.48 Excluding industrial enterprises, 1,600,000 tons of mazut and 700 tons of coal 
were used annually to heat homes and municipal buildings in the region in the mid-
1990s.49 In the post-Soviet era residents also began to use gasoline to fuel automobiles at 
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record levels.50 In the late Soviet period and partially into the 1990s, cheaper energy 
prices and the support of state subsidies allowed northern regions to avoid the costs of 
operating large industrial centers in cold environments. Though the Gulf Stream and its 
European location left the Murmansk region less affected by the unacknowledged 
expenses of the Soviet development strategy, these features of state-socialist economic 
policy helped exacerbate the apparent distance between the urbanized north and the 
environment while keeping them deeply entrenched.51  
The consumption of imported fossil fuels had a significant environmental impact 
on the Kola Peninsula and at the sites of extraction. The emissions of smoke, carbon 
dioxide, and sulfur dioxide into the atmosphere from the thermal-electric power stations 
in Murmansk and the Kirovsk region caused standard ailments of air pollution: smog, 
climate change, and acid rain.52 The coal-powered Murmansk thermal electric station first 
went into operation in 1934, producing 20 million kilowatt hours of electricity in 1936, 
and expanded to heat generation at the end of the decade.53 The construction of a similar 
station that produced both electrical and thermal energy occurred near Kirovsk beginning 
in the late 1950s in connection with expansion of the Apatit combine and development of 
the city of Apatity.54 In addition, over one hundred boiler stations to heat the numerous 
concentrated urbanized settlements on the Kola Peninsula appeared during the twentieth 
century.55 In the 1970s specific Kola enterprises also consumed considerable amounts of 
imported fossil fuels. During the final three months of 1973, Severonikel´, 
Pechenganikel´, and the Lovozero Mining and Enrichment Combine (Lovozero GOK) 
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were projected to dwindle their combined reserves of coal and mazut by about half.56 In 
1990 mining operations at the main supplier of Kola coal, the Pechora basin, generated 
approximately 90,600 tons of harmful material, including 28,000 tons discharged into the 
atmosphere, and dumped some 33 million cubic meters of contaminated water into 
surface streams.57 Industrial production and everyday urban life on the modernized Kola 
Peninsula contributed to this pollution. 
In the 1970s heightened environmental concern emerged about industrial 
pollution from the coal-burning power plants in the Murmansk region. In response, 
regional officials undertook certain mitigation efforts by switching to other energy 
sources. One newspaper article from 1973 warned about deteriorating air quality in the 
region and noted that Murmansk now had sulfur dioxide levels comparable to the much 
larger city of Leningrad. It included some of the coal-based power plants in a list of 
enterprises that “emit a considerable amount of toxic and harmful substances into the air 
everyday.”58 Soon afterwards, the Murmansk Thermal Electric Station converted to 
primarily using low-grade oil called mazut.59 The station also built a new smokestack and 
environmental monitoring lab in the late 1970s.60 The switch to mazut saved 62,400 tons 
of coal from 1975 to 1984 and considerably reduced forms of air pollution in 
Murmansk.61 However, the Kirovsk (and now Apatite) Thermal Electric Station, which 
emitted 19.4 tons of ash and 110.3 tons of sulfur dioxide a day in the mid-1970s, 
continued to operate as a coal-based plant.62 Though the influence of organic energy 
sources on the physical environment through pollution and de-forestation was quite stark, 
the efforts to manipulate flowing water might have transformed the surface of the region 
more visibly. 
Renewable Resources 
From the 1930s through the 1960s, the utilization of the hydroelectric resources 
on the Kola Peninsula was a catalyst for its shift from an Arctic periphery to a highly 
urbanized and industrialized zone. Electricity production allowed for extraordinary 
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expansion of economic activities, which fostered an apparent detachment of human life 
from nature. The construction of hydroelectric power stations relocated people away from 
natural places both through forced migration and by enabling urbanization. The 
production of hydroelectricity, furthermore, altered the region’s hydrology by creating 
massive reservoirs and regulating the flow of rivers, both of which affected wildlife 
populations. This source of electrical energy more thoroughly fulfilled the expectations of 
modernization than the organic substances had. Hydroelectricity allowed Soviet citizens 
in the north to become separated from environmental contexts seen as natural and 
integrated into ones understood as modern. It only achieved this status, however, through 
an even more exhaustive application of the energy from the bodies of forced laborers in 
the construction of the dams. The transformative scope of hydroelectric modernity was 
entrenched in the natural processes of a mammalian species.  
For the Bolsheviks the project of building Soviet socialism required industrial 
development, which in turn necessitated using a large amount of energy. When Lenin 
famously remarked, “communism equals Soviet power plus electrification of the whole 
country,” he highlighted the dependency of the revolutionary project on the 
modernization of the energy economy. Communism, like capitalism, required high-
energy inputs to enable economic development and fulfill its promise of material 
abundance. The following State Electrification Plan of 1920 prompted initial research of 
energy resources throughout the country, including renewable sources such as rivers that 
could be used to produce hydroelectricity. On the Kola Peninsula investigators found few 
potential fuels that could adequately supply economic development. However, they did 
find plenty of electrical potential in “the powerful currents of rivers and waterfalls” or 
what they called “white coal.”63 A 1923 evaluation proposed that the Niva and Tuloma 
rivers, combined with a few less powerful waterways, could provide between 600,000 
and 700,000 horsepower (approximately 447,420 to 521,990 kilowatts) of electricity.64 In 
the late 1920s the Soviet state began several gigantic damming projects that carried major 
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symbolic significance for the modernizing country such as the Dnepr Hydroelectric 
Station, which had one of the largest dams in the world at the time. Hydroelectric power 
increased dramatically during the Stalinist era, climbing from generating 4% of Soviet 
electricity in 1928 to 8% by 1937 and 15.2% by 1950.65 It played an even more dominant 
role in the Kola electricity sector until the 1970s.66 
The production of hydroelectricity worldwide has had a number of common 
features. It involves the conversion of the kinetic energy of flowing water and potential 
energy of dammed upstream reservoirs into electricity. As a renewable energy source that 
does not require the combustion of fossil fuels or fission of atomic bonds, the use of 
hydroelectricity depends primarily on construction and maintenance of infrastructure that 
controls river flow, captures and stores energy from descending water, and transfers it to 
consumers. Often dams hold high reserves of water and regulate flow; turbines and 
generators convert passing water into electricity. The formation of this infrastructure 
alters environments in several general ways. It leads to the flooding of large areas of land, 
the fragmentation of river ecosystems, the depletion of certain aquatic species, and the 
disruption of riverbanks. In addition, millions of people were displaced for the sake of 
hydroelectric dams in the twentieth century.67 The Soviet development of a network of 
hydroelectric power stations on the Kola Peninsula fits within this common pattern of 
economic modernization, despite the region’s low levels of biomass and historically 
sparse human population. 
As we have already seen, the development of the Kola energy economy through 
the first half of the twentieth century employed an important form of this embroilment by 
relying en masse on the muscle power of coerced laborers. Metabolic energy conversions 
within the body have contributed to the survival and expansion of human societies for 
millions of years. People foraged on plants and animals and stored a percentage of the 
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biological and chemical energy of these species in their muscles. Draft animals such as 
horses, camels, and reindeer undertook similar processes that resulted in greater 
capacities of muscle power. These biological energy systems in humans epitomized the 
deeply entrenched connections with nature in earlier historical periods. Human slavery, in 
particular, functioned in a similar vein with powerful groups oppressing huge populations 
and using them as an energy source. Industrialization, of course, has largely been a story 
of finding fossil fuels, mechanical processes, and atomic bonds to do far more work, far 
more efficiently than humans ever could in the past.68 The other side of energy 
modernization, however, has been the massive human labor, and thus human muscle 
power, necessary to build, obtain, and operate these industrial technologies. More people 
did more work in the twentieth century to get more energy and the continual process of 
modernization engendered a greater reliance on this muscle power. This new type of 
dependency kept humans and nature entwined. On a comparative scale, the social and 
political tactics of regulating people into energy producers was a quite literal form of 
Foucauldian biopower, in which the internalization of personal discipline contributed to 
the bodily manifestation of energy to make more energy.69  In the case of the Soviet 
Union, the state chose to continue the use of slave labor to build hydroelectric dams 
during Stalinist modernization. It forcefully exploited humans for their muscle power, 
thereby employing oppression that maintained intimate connections with nature. 
The first major hydroelectric project on the Niva River of the Kola Peninsula 
greatly facilitated the industrial transformation of the environment and coercively utilized 
humans as energy sources. Economic planners hoped to turn the Niva River into a motor 
powering urban and industrial growth of the apatite works in the Khibiny Mountains. The 
river initially descended about 127 meters over approximately 34 kilometers as it flowed 
from Lake Imandra to the Kandalaksha Bay.70 Despite the disorder that characterized the 
first years of construction of Apatit, project leaders and initial laborers managed to get a 
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low capacity generator into operation in the summer of 1930.71 This first installation on 
the Niva River met the expected local energy needs for the next few years as work on a 
larger hydroelectric station commenced.72 The Niva-2 Hydroelectric Station (GES) came 
online in June 1934 and eventually reached a capacity of 60,000 kilowatts, almost ten 
times the amount of electricity as the first units.73 This unit enabled the partial 
electrification of the Murmansk railroad on the Kola Peninsula, helping increase Apatit’s 
productive capacities and Kirovsk’s population.74  In the mid-1930s, industrial planners 
also hoped the station would serve the projected chemical combine in Kandalaksha. 
Overall, this electrical energy supported the economic modernization of the Lake 
Imandra corridor for decades to come. 
The Niva-2 GES, like others built on the Kola Peninsula during the Stalinist era, 
relied on energy produced in the muscles of forced laborers.75 Approximately 7200 
special settlers, coming mostly from the middle and lower Volga regions, were forced to 
work on the installations of the Niva GES in the early 1930s.76 The free laborers who 
worked on the project frequently violated their contracts and left the region early. The 
head of the dam’s construction seriously pushed for hiring Finnish laborers whom he 
presumed would not be deterred by the climatic conditions of the Kola Peninsula.77 The 
harsh northern environment taxed these hired and forced laborers’ bodies; significantly 
more calories needed to be expended on just maintaining body temperature in this cold 
region and this energy was then unusable for labor. 
These hydroelectric stations transformed the surrounding ecosystem. Engineers 
reduced seasonal variation in river flow and used underground turbines to assure a 
                                                
71 GAMO, f. 773, op. 1, d. 6, l. 25; A. V. Barabanov and T. A. Kalinina, “Apatit”: vek iz veka 
(Apatity: Laplandia Minerals, 2004), 26; and E. F. Razin, Kandalaksha (Murmansk: Murmanskoe knizhnoe 
izdatel´stvo, 1991), 90-92. 
72 V. I. Kondrikov, “Sostoianie i perspektivy stroitel´stva v raione Khibinskikh razrabotok,” 
Karelo-Murmanskii krai, no. 5-6 (1931): 10. 
73 GAMO, f. 773, op. 1, d. 15, l. 225; RGASPI, f. 17, op. 120, d. 26, ll. 195-197; and Kaibysheva, 
Elektricheskoe siianie severa, 17. 
74 GAMO, f. 773, op. 1, d. 52, ll. 168-169 and GAMO, f. R-990, op. 1, d. 3, ll. 75-77. 
75 Important information about these hydroelectric projects involving forced labor appears in 
Baron, Soviet Karelia, 115-119, 150-178.  
76 V. Ia. Shashkov, Spetspereselentsy na Murmane: Rol´ spetspereselentsev v razvitii 
proizvoditel´nykh sil na Kol´skom poluostrove (1930-1936 gg.) (Murmansk: Izdatel´stvo MGPU, 1993), 53 
and GAMO, f. 773, op. 1, d. 15, l. 225. 
77 GAMO, f. 773, op. 1, d. 15, l. 225 and RGASPI, f. 17, op. 120, d. 26, ll. 195-197. 
 261 
comparatively stable year-round supply of energy.78 Until the 1930s, a large population 
of salmon (semga) existed in the Niva River but then disappeared because of this group 
of hydroelectric stations.79 In the 1920s small communities nearby caught a decent 
amount of fish from the river, which they traded and consumed themselves. In 1930 one 
observer described anthropogenic influences of the timber and electricity industries and 
foresaw the impending collapse of the salmon stock: 
Below Lake Plesozero the whole river was, it is said, strewn with logs that up 
until then clogged up the river at the spots of several small rapids and rose the 
level of the water. All this greatly hindered the salmon from freely ascending the 
river… The installation of a hydroelectric station on the Niva will totally shut off 
the passage up the river for salmon to their main spawning grounds and evidently 
will completely terminate their population here.80  
Unlike some other rivers, the Niva had Lake Imandra and its surrounding water bodies as 
a natural reservoir. Nevertheless, the gradual establishment of a cascade of the three 
hydroelectric stations on the river between 1930 and the early 1950s inundated more 
territory around the reservoirs at Lake Pirenga and Lake Plesozero.81 In the 1990s the 
Niva cascade had a 12,800 square kilometer catchment basin (vodosbor).82 
Stalinist-era modernization also inspired different renewable energy projects on 
the Kola Peninsula. In an enthusiastic report in September 1933, A. F. Gudlevskii noted 
that the Niva station was not going to provide enough energy to meet Apatit’s growing 
needs and proposed an alternative. We need a new source of energy, he claimed, “it has 
been found” in “the possibility of maximally using wind power.”83 This option excited 
Vasilii Kondrikov and Aleksandr Fersman—with the former calling it “the energy of the 
future”—and led to some preliminary planning work for a wind-powered electrical 
station. This project did not come to fruition.84 In later years Fersman continued to 
promote the possibility of capturing both wind and tidal energy on the Murman coast. He 
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included these two sources as examples of “a negative side of polar nature” that could be 
transformed into “productive forces.”85 In the late 1960s a small-scale tidal power station 
in the Kislaia Bay was installed and in the 1990s the option of wind energy found 
renewed interest.86 
As the Kola Peninsula industrialized further during the 1930s, state planners 
looked for additional options to supply electricity to Apatit, the new nickel works in the 
Monche tundra, the planned chemical combine in Kandalaksha, and the growing city of 
Murmansk. The main plan entailed turning the Tuloma River into a hydroelectric source 
and integrating it with the stations on the Niva. Before construction began in the mid-
1930s the Tuloma River traveled approximately 76 kilometers from Lake Notozero and 
then exited into the Kola Bay at the town of Kola. The river ranged from 400 to 900 
meters in width and declined about 50 meters over its length.87 Planners placed the Lower 
Tuloma GES near Kola at the new settlement of Murmashi. The initial designs included a 
stationary unit, which consisted of “a strong building with chutes and tail-races and 
connecting the left and right bank dams” and a “fish-pass.” The dam unit consisted of a 
“mixed-type non-overflow dam” that was 29 meters high.88 Official documents evoked 
the conquest of nature rhetoric and celebrated the Tuloma construction as prevailing over 
natural constraints. One source noted that it was “the northernmost hydro-station of 
regional significance in the world and was accomplished in a short period (1934-1936) in 
the difficult natural conditions of a Polar territory.”89 However, like much of the 
industrial construction on the Kola Peninsula, environmental factors created 
unanticipated difficulties and delayed completion of the Lower Tuloma GES. For 
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example, the thawing of solidly frozen land led to structural problems for the dam.90 
Nonetheless, by 1940 it contributed 67,400 kilowatt-hours to the Kola energy economy.91  
Again the energy of forced laborers facilitated the project. Like the Olen´ia-
Monchegorsk railroad line, the White Sea – Baltic Combine built the Lower Tuloma GES 
with Gulag prisoners.  Poor sanitation and difficult work conditions, of course, pervaded 
here. Numerous prisoners perished because of accidental explosions that occurred while 
constructing the dam.92 Though the Soviet state increasingly censored information about 
forced labor, the Tuloma project still received public praise as an instance of socialist re-
forging, in line with propaganda about the White Sea – Baltic Canal. The public 
discussions of prisoner labor touched on the new relationship between people and the 
environment, which indicated both the ascendance of humans and the dependence of this 
change on interaction with nature. “The people sent to solve complex technical tasks and 
at the same time rehabilitate an army of former criminals will grow at Tuloma in this 
way,” claimed one article. It continued, “Murmashi became unrecognizable. The rocks 
are moved aside and the shape of the shores of the mountainous Tuloma changes. But the 
people are transformed even more than nature.”93  
The flooding for the Lower Tuloma station physically altered the landscape and 
displaced people from their homes. Unsurprisingly, state agencies evaluated these 
disruptions primarily in economic terms: “The submersion and impounding from the 
head of the Lower Tuloma GES did not bring any sort of noticeable damage to the 
national economy because of the extremely insignificant population and the complete 
absence of industry in the high water area,” according to a government commission 
charged with overseeing the construction. It specified, “the overall area of the flooding of 
the shores is a region of 2735 hectares, on which 1691 hectares fall in the forested area 
and 712 in the marshes with undergrowth. In connection with these submersions three 
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collective farms, which include 30 households, were transferred to locations that had not 
been flooded.”94 The construction of the Upper Tuloma GES, first planned in the 1930s 
but actually built in the 1960s by the Finnish company Imatran Voima, flooded a much 
more significant area, raising the level of Lake Notozero by 32 meters for the reservoir.95 
Both of these stations impacted the aquatic fauna in the river ecosystem negatively, 
despite efforts to build fish passes. Some fish species, such as whitefish and perch, used 
the new water bodies in reproduction, but the adjustments in the water levels to assure 
supplies of hydroelectricity caused the eggs of the fish to freeze. As in the case of the 
Niva, the Tuloma hydroelectric stations harmed the salmon population.96 
The continual effort to harvest more energy in the region to fuel industrial and 
urban expansion—punctuated significantly by the evacuation of industry during the 
Second World War—included a move to coordinate the hydroelectric and thermal power 
plants. The managing firm, Kolenergo, was set up in 1936 during the construction of the 
Lower Tuloma GES. It immediately commenced connecting the Niva and Tuloma 
stations with high voltage transfer lines and substations. In later decades Kolenergo 
oversaw the expansion and integration of the regional energy network to include 
seventeen hydroelectric stations on six rivers.97 The high levels of electricity needed for 
nickel smelting provided an early impetus for the growth of this network. Kolenergo's 
total capacity shot up from 70,000 kilowatts in 1937 to 129,000 kilowatts in 1939, 
primarily to meet the Severonikel´ combine’s anticipated needs.98 By 1970 the entire 
electrical energy system, including thermal plants, contributed 7.9 billion kilowatt-hours 
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to the region. The energy production of the hydroelectric stations peaked in the 1990s at 
6.6 billion kilowatt-hours.99  
This large expansion of Kolenergo's network isolated humans from natural 
contexts in several ways. The growth in energy production allowed for a tremendous 
increase in the population of the Murmansk region. Nearly all of these new residents 
lived in urbanized settlements considerable distances from the hydroelectric dams.100 The 
spatial isolation of modern Soviet citizens in the north from the sources of energy upon 
which they depended contributed to their detachment from the environment, while of 
course retaining interconnectedness through electrical networks. Furthermore, harnessing 
and transferring the ability of local rivers to do work through the Kolenergo network 
reduced the reliance of heavy industries on immediately proximate energy inputs. The 
proliferation of hydroelectric stations also led to new displacements of rural communities. 
Reindeer herding villages on the Vorona and Ponoi rives faced relocation in the 1960s. 
The flooding of ancestral homelands of the Sami community for the Serebriansk 
hydroelectric stations forced residents to move to the urbanized agro-center of Lovozero. 
The displacement eliminated the community’s access to fishing grounds and separated 
them from a landscape with deep historical significance.101 
Nuclear Power 
The capture of the energy released during nuclear fission and the conversion of it 
into electrical power made the final period of Soviet modernization of the Kola Peninsula 
possible. Human campaigns to use the energy from atomic bonds have been clouded in 
suspicions since nuclear power, literally, exploded on to the public scene with the 
American bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of World War II. Both the fact 
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that destructive military uses of atomic energy occurred before economic ones and the 
continued prominence of nuclear arms in global security politics have shaped this sector 
of the energy economy since its inception. It is therefore unsurprising that the 
development of nuclear energy in the Soviet Union occurred under military auspices and 
with the great secrecy surrounding it. The scientific and popular elusiveness of the 
knowledge about the impact of radiation on human health additionally contributed to a 
widespread wariness about nuclear power. Thus, while nuclear power satisfied energy 
needs for continued industrialization and the maintenance and spread of urbanized forms 
of Soviet life, the secrecy and uncertain risks around it embroiled humans with nature in 
new ways.  
Nuclear energy has possessed key economic functions in the post-Stalinist Soviet 
Union and post-communist Russian Federation. The Soviet atomic energy program 
started with the experimental Obninsk reactor in 1954—the first plant in the world to use 
nuclear fission for energy production—and proliferated dramatically throughout the Cold 
War.102 Beginning with development of a fleet of nuclear powered submarines in the 
1950s and 1960s, the Kola Peninsula came to have the highest concentration of nuclear 
reactors of anywhere in the world.103 By the Brezhnev era few waterways in the region 
that could be converted into high capacity electric motors remained unused. The 
government responded to this new energy dearth by establishing the Kola Nuclear Power 
Plant on the southern shores of Lake Imandra in the new town of Poliarnye Zori in 1973. 
The first VVER-230 block of the Kola AES immediately contributed an additional 440 
megawatts to the region’s energy capacity. The plant added three more blocks (one 
VVER-230 and two updated VVER-213s) of equal capacity in 1974, 1981 and 1984, 
respectively, which wound up producing significantly more than the entire network of 
hydroelectric stations.104 This facility solved the civilian energy deficit in the region and 
fueled a renewed episode of expanding industrial production, which altered the 
environment in some of the ways discussed in the previous chapter. Fully meeting the 
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demand of local industry, the Kola AES also exported electricity to northern Finland, 
particularly in the 1990s.105 In the last decade the state nuclear energy corporation, 
Rosatom, has planned an additional expansion of the plant’s capacity.106 The desire to 
increase energy production has abided in communist and capitalist political systems.  
Press representations of the Kola AES in the 1970s highlighted the theme of 
modern control over the natural environment. An article in Polar Pravda celebrating the 
opening of the first block of the Kola plant in 1973 referenced the significance of the 
energy economy as an enabler of production by calling it the “bread of industry.” It also 
evoked routinized tropes about the modern ascendance of people over nature, referring to 
the event as “a triumph of people over nature.” It explained, “after all, this huge station 
arose from scratch in about five years, through the conquest of the harsh northern nature 
of the place.”107 The press also stressed nuclear energy as a technological solution to the 
environmental maladies of fossil fuels such as coal. It billed the Kola plant as part of the 
further transcendence over environmental limitations and a means of improving nature. 
Reporters posited nuclear power as “a ‘clean’ source of energy, which has not increased 
environmental pollution.”108  “On the contrary, atomic stations,” another pair of 
journalists assured readers, “stimulate nature.” They explained that the Kola station 
would increase the temperature of Lake Imandra and improve the fishing stock in this 
body of water.109 
The secrecy around nuclear power resulted largely because of its attachment to 
the security concerns of the Soviet military. The development of nuclear-powered ships 
overlapped with the large-scale militarization of the Kola Peninsula. Though the Northern 
Fleet of the Soviet Navy had been based out of the Murman coast since the mid-1930s, 
the massive Cold War era expansion of their activities was tied to the replacement of 
diesel engine submarines with nuclear ones that could travel faster and go up to a year 
without re-fueling. Given the similar technology involved in powering naval submarines 
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and civilian icebreakers, all these early uses of nuclear energy on the Kola Peninsula in 
the late 1950s and early 1960s fell under the restricted confines of military security.110 
Many of the leading scientists, such as Igor Kurchatov and Anatolii Aleksandrov, 
participated in all facets of nuclear energy from atomic weapons to electrical power 
stations and civilian vessels, a fact that further contributed to the often classified activities 
of this industry.111 The initial plans for the Kola AES in the 1960s reflected the 
atmosphere of high security by referring to the project vaguely as the Kola State Regional 
Electrical Station.112 
The growth of the atomic powered fleets of sea-faring vessels highly influenced 
the direction of development on the Kola Peninsula since that time. The military 
operations proliferated to include numerous air bases and naval facilities in the region, 
many specifically designed for the harboring and maintenance of nuclear submarines. 
The advent of nuclear power directly led to the Northern Fleet growing from the smallest 
sections of the Soviet Navy to the largest and most significant.113 In the forty-one years 
between the launch of the first nuclear submarine, Leninskii Komsomol, in 1959 and the 
end of the century, the fleet grew to include 228 military vessels; two thirds of these 
operated out of bases on the Kola Peninsula.114 An entire economic and municipal 
infrastructure developed around the military sector of the region, including an array of 
closed cities connected to the naval bases.  
The Murmansk region housed more closed cities than any other region in the 
country; their total population exceeded 150,000 inhabitants near the end of the twentieth 
century. These closed cites are concentrated along the western part of the Murman coast 
from the Zapadnaia Lista base (just east of the Rybachi Peninsula) to the Kola Bay. They 
include the headquarters of the Northern Fleet at Severomorsk, Polaryni in the former 
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Ekaterina Harbor (where the port town of Aleksandrovsk was established at the end of 
the nineteenth century), and Ostovnoi (where the Iokanga naval base was built by the 
Murmansk railroad during World War I). Closed cities emerged out of the Soviet 
military-industrial complex and often were connected to the nuclear sphere, but have 
continued to exist in this secretive status into the post-Soviet era. They housed military 
personnel, their families, and individuals employed in industries that directly served the 
Navy’s needs. Not only could outsiders not enter these highly urbanized spaces, but the 
residents of closed cities in the Soviet era also had limited connections with the outside 
world, including restricted access to telephones and newspapers and prohibitions on 
travel.115 This shadow modernization, comparable in terms of population growth to 
Stalinist industrialization of the 1930s, was enabled by the proliferation of nuclear energy 
in the region. It hid and isolated the new uses of the Kola landscape from the rest of the 
people living there. For inhabitants of the closed nuclear cities this development also 
increased the extent to which their lives relied on forces beyond their control.  
Confidentiality also affected purely civilian uses of nuclear energy. As Paul 
Josephson has demonstrated, applications of nuclear power ranging from irradiating meat 
as a preservative to portable atomic energy stations, fell outside the purview of the 
public.116 The lack of public oversight and knowledge about this industry exacerbated 
safety issues. Most closely connected to the military sector, the Murmansk Shipping 
Company operated a small fleet of nuclear-powered icebreakers and service ships from 
their Atomflot base just north of Murmansk. Many of these ships experienced repeated 
accidents, including the much celebrated Lenin nuclear icebreaker that had a reactor 
meltdown in 1966.117 At Apatit engineering specialists arranged for underground nuclear 
explosions to pulverize huge chunks of ore in the Khibiny Mountains in 1974 and 1984 
and in the process released harmful levels of radiation.118 Finally, the reactors at the Kola 
AES suffered from technical design flaws that rendered them below international safety 
standards. Although the VVER reactors at the Kola plant were superior to the graphite 
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moderated RBKM model used at Chernobyl and other facilities, these units, especially 
the older VVER-230 models, lacked adequate safety containment around the reactor core 
and had insufficient cooling systems. Until the mid-1980s none of these deficiencies were 
acknowledged publicly. A lax safety culture at this reactor, as within the Soviet nuclear 
industry generally, exacerbated these technical flaws.119 
The clandestine administration of the use of nuclear energy on the Kola Peninsula 
contributed most starkly to the re-entanglement of humans and nature through the 
handling of radioactive waste. Beginning in the late 1950s, the Northern Fleet and the 
Murmansk Shipping Company dumped massive amounts of radioactive waste and spent 
nuclear fuel into the Arctic Ocean (and the Barents Sea in particular), totaling about 
38,450 terabecquerel (38,450 trillion nuclei decaying per second).120 In addition to liquid 
waste, this dumping included sixteen retired nuclear reactors, several with spent nuclear 
fuel still in them. This practice remained hidden from the public until the early 1990s and 
even increased in the immediate post-Chernobyl years.121 Of the waste not poured into 
the ocean, authorities stored much of it in leaky facilities in the Murmansk region itself. 
These storage sites included a number of retired ships that remained docked in the Kola 
Bay, such as the refueling vessel Lepse that had about 30% of the amount of long-living 
isotopes released during Chernobyl on board, and land containers near the closed military 
cities, such as the dilapidated Andreeva Bay storage unit that had a radioactivity of over 
27 million curies (close to one billion terabecquerel) in the early 2000s.122 Finally, the 
Kola Nuclear Power Station kept much of its low and intermediate level wastes on site; it 
shipped some to the Mayak reprocessing facility in the South Urals. One estimate cited 
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that the plant would have on-site waste totaling 47,700 terabecquerel of radioactivity in 
2010.123 
The Chernobyl accident in April 1986 and the Soviet collapse shifted the practice 
of nuclear secrecy significantly, but not permanently. After the state unsuccessfully tried 
to keep the Chernobyl disaster quiet for a few weeks, the scale became known 
internationally. The reformist government of Mikhail Gorbachev invited cooperation of 
external agencies such as the International Atomic Energy Agency, which gave the clean 
up effort diplomatic legitimacy and fit with the character of the Soviet leader’s glasnost´ 
policy.124 Nevertheless, residents of the Kola Peninsula, like people living elsewhere in 
the country, reacted with heightened suspicion toward nuclear power.125 An article in the 
local press that appeared about two full years after the accident reported that people 
thought of the Kola AES as a dangerous neighbor. The author excoriated the previous 
public silence about the plant’s operations and tried to reassure readers of its safety.126 
This concern about radioactive pollution from Chernobyl apparently did not affect the 
reindeer herders in the region in the same way as it did in Scandinavia. Anxiety about 
fallout entering the food chain through lichen absorption, reindeer forging, and human 
venison consumption in those countries had political ramifications for the Sami. 
According to anthropologist Hugh Beach, both the authorities and herders on the Kola 
Peninsula seemed unconcerned with this issue.127 
Gorbachev, for his part, seized the opportunity presented by Chernobyl to try to 
end the arms race. Speaking in Murmansk in October 1987, he outlined an idea for a de-
militarized Arctic free of nuclear weapons and united in international cooperation on 
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development, science, and environmental protection.128 Many of these military initiatives 
failed to materialize, though the end of the Cold War altered the situation so radically that 
it is difficult to analyze any perestroika-era proposal concerning security for its long-term 
impact. The policy shift toward greater international cooperation on economic and 
environmental issues in northwest Russia, especially with Nordic countries, however, 
continued into the post-Soviet era.  A final straw in Soviet-era nuclear secrecy on the 
Kola Peninsula broke in the early 1990s when presidential advisor and leading Russian 
environmentalist Aleksei Iablokov released a report detailing dumping and unsafe storage 
of radioactive wastes in the Arctic.129 
Entwined connections of humans and nature have also existed because of the 
uncertainty and risk surrounding nuclear radiation. In the social scientific literature on 
science and technology there are two main approaches for making sense of nuclear risk. 
Spencer Weart, a historian of science, takes the alleged irrationality of nuclear fear as a 
point of departure in an examination of how popular imagination has produced such 
anxieties. His explanation stresses the role of deep-seated and atavistic tendencies toward 
apocalyptic thinking instead of the complex configuration of geopolitics and social 
change in the second half of the twentieth century. He maintains that in a world of 
accelerating economic modernization and technologies the risks associated with the 
nuclear industry deserve no special attention.130 In an exploration of the lives of 
individuals affected by the Chernobyl accident, medical anthropologist Adriana Petryna 
embraces an agnostic stance about physical impact of radiation and instead analyzes “the 
concrete understandings of particular worlds of knowledge, reason, and suffering, and the 
way they are mediated and shaped by local histories and political economies.”131 An 
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ethnography of radiation risk in a context of actual exposure helps reveal the social 
impact of uncertainty. Petryna explains: 
Given the array of scientific and medical uncertainties, old measures of suffering 
lose their meaning and validity. Into that void come new biological definitions, 
some by chance, others by design. Some individuals with certain symptoms are 
said to be sick, while others, with different symptoms, are said not to be sick. 
Statistics and the use of medical diagnostics become contested. As these 
governments grapple with creating zones of predictability and intelligibility where 
they can operate and increase welfare, citizens are faced with what seem like 
random instantiations of scientific measures, biomedical categories, and 
compensation criteria.132 
The social and cultural effects of radiation changed how people understood the 
relationship between their bodies and the natural world after Chernobyl. By influencing 
the experience of exposed individuals, uncertainty made many feel more embedded in 
contaminated environments. 
Especially in the aftermath of a Chernobyl-scale nuclear accident at the 
Fukushima plant in Japan in March 2011, Petryna’s approach to examining nuclear risk 
seems more appropriate than Weart’s. Beyond the history of particularly dangerous 
storage practices on the Kola Peninsula, atomic energy production everywhere creates 
highly radioactive wastes, some with significantly long half-lives. An unsolved issue for 
the use of nuclear energy remains the intractability of undertaking waste storage plans 
that require multi-century and even multi-millennia time scales. Through helping create 
“spaces of nonknowledge” about health and environmental risks, radioactive waste itself 
has already influenced society.133 Another way to put it is that radioactive waste reveals 
its status as a hybrid entity with particular potency. Zsuzsa Gille defines this hybridity of 
waste as a combination of its social features and “relatively independent material aspect,” 
which not only “resist[s] purely human or social intention,” but also “impacts what those 
intentions may be.”134 Soviet modernization produced materials that not only changed the 
natural but also shaped the social. 
Thus, while the total radioactivity of the Kola Peninsula at the end of the 
twentieth century did not exceed what would have been expected from the long-term 
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effects of atmospheric nuclear testing in the 1950s and 1960s and the release during 
Chernobyl, radiation still affected the connection of humans to their environment.135 
Leaks from the storage facilities at the Andreeva Bay increased the levels of the highly 
toxic cesium-137 and long lasting plutonium-239 in the surrounding land.136 However, 
human-nature entanglement has occurred more through uncertainty than a direct impact 
of the environment on people. This uncertainty has two forms: the risk of a radiological 
emergency occurring and the untraceable character of most of the health effects of 
radiation exposure. The emergency risk was heightened by the sheer number of operating 
reactors in the region (one fifth of the world total in the 1990s), structural vulnerabilities 
produced by the Arctic conditions, and the economic ruin of the 1990s. In one instance in 
1995, Kolenergo cut off electricity to naval bases with nuclear submarines because of 
unpaid bills and only turned it back on in response to armed soldiers being sent to the 
power plant. The cooling systems for the reactors on these decommissioned submarines 
could not be powered without this electricity. The possibility that a disaster may occur 
was something that Kola residents had to live with and about which they claimed to 
worry.137 
In the case of a radiological emergency on the Kola Peninsula the health effects 
would be elusive. Only those in extremely close proximity to the nuclear installation may 
experience deterministic effects in which a causal linear relationship exists between doses 
of radiation and impact on one’s health. Many more people may experience stochastic 
effects, which can only be assessed in terms of aggregate probabilities of harmful 
outcomes. Stochastic effects would be neither directly proportional nor clearly assignable 
in individual cases. After a nuclear accident, radioactive materials would migrate into 
food chains and water and enter human bodies through these means. Medical experts in 
the 1990s did not agree on the question of whether or not a lower threshold existed, 
beneath which this form of radiation exposure was harmless, or even on the precise 
character of the relationship between greater doses and increased probability. In such 
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circumstances no single individual would be able to clearly determine that radiation 
exposure caused a particular ailment such as thyroid cancer.138 Human bodies would 
become enmeshed with natural processes that on a certain level would be not just 
unknown but unknowable. Even in absence of a disaster the omnipresent potential for one 
to occur and the possibility that any such event would be hidden connected people with 
their surroundings in intricate ways. 
 A situation where this type of risk and uncertainty could exist was a product of 
twentieth-century economic modernization that emerged under communist auspices but 
continued during capitalism. During the 1990s, the Kola energy sector suffered like the 
rest of the country’s economy as the government imposed rapid privatization and the 
release of price controls on the citizens of the new Russian Federation. The Murmansk 
Shipping Company, Kolenergo, and the Kola AES all became part of open joint stock 
companies. The Russian navy, of course, remained in charge of its nuclear vessels. 
Privatization overlapped with an era of unprecedented openness about the operations of 
the nuclear facilities, but the diminished capacity of these installations to function with 
stability exacerbated the risks. In February 1993, for instance, the Kola AES had a near 
meltdown and in August 2000 one of the Navy’s nuclear submarines, the Kursk, 
tragically sank after an explosion during a practice exercise, killing the entire crew.139 In 
the meantime the Russian government attempted to use the need to improve nuclear 
safety as a bargaining chip for more international aid. Despite the mixed record of these 
efforts and considerable tensions, this process has led to the decommissioning of a large 
portion of the Northern Fleet’s nuclear submarines and a number of safety upgrades at the 
Kola AES.140  Nevertheless, by the mid-1990s the government began again to ramp up 
nuclear secrecy over the military’s waste storage sites on the Kola Peninsula.141 The 
trumped up, and eventually dismissed, prosecution of environmental activist Aleksandr 
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Nikitin was one noteworthy episode in this return to secrecy.142 The gradual expansion of 
the closed status of towns in the region despite the end of the Cold War also reflected this 
shift.143 Finally, in contrast to promises throughout the 1990s that the Kola AES would be 
shut down by 2004, its oldest and least safe reactors received fifteen-year operating 
extensions.144 
Conclusion 
Modernization on the Kola Peninsula drastically transformed people’s lives and 
the physical environment, but maintained wide-ranging interconnections between society 
and nature. If part of the promise of modernity is an escape from traditional bonds to the 
natural world, this supposed transcendence has proven fictive in tsarism, Soviet 
communism, and Russian capitalism. Throughout the twentieth century, the state and 
enterprises searched for new sources of power and energy to fuel the creation and 
expansion of an industrialized, urbanized, and militarized world north of the polar circle. 
The repetitive harvesting of various organic, hydraulic, and atomic sources reshaped the 
physical world and human connections to it. In all of these instances, however, new 
assemblages of the natural and the social remained, whether in the form of incorporated 
human bodies, networked ties to distant environments, the social life of uncertainty about 
the natural world, or some other mechanism of entanglement. 
This final chapter of my dissertation has treated a pervasive component of various 
forms of economic transformation (energy) in order to offer an overview of the 
influential and imaginary facets that emerge in an environmental history of Soviet 
modernization. Through an examination of both modernist knowledge production and the 
economic practices that go under the heading of modernization, I have argued that both 
disembeddedness and embeddedness arose simultaneously. I, therefore, have emphasized 
modernization’s materiality as a key facet for understanding its effect on power relations. 
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The efforts to develop the Kola energy sector transformed actual trees, rivers, and human 
organisms; it is important to try to understand these changes in material and not just 
discursive terms. As a political project that united communist and capitalist systems, 
modernization gained much of its environmental and social impact from the manipulation 
of physical entities. Illusions of a world with fewer constraints on the human species, 
nevertheless, helped inspire a consensus about the desirability of modernization among 
the powerful actors in many societies. 
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Conclusion: Communism and the Environment 
 
The economic remaking of the natural world during the twentieth century created 
profound changes in human livelihoods across the globe. This study has asked what 
characterized the relationship of Soviet communism with the environment during this 
rapidly unfolding process of economic modernization. Speaking to a reporter in 1967, the 
aging Nikolai Vorontsov, a former captain of industry in the Khibiny Mountains and the 
Monche tundra, expressed an abiding conservationist sentiment that he had first 
articulated at the beginning of Kola industrialization in the 1930s. “Monchegorsk is 
beautiful,” he told the journalist and later continued, “I am very happy that the tradition 
of our construction pioneers—to preserve the green resources of Monchegorsk—lives 
on.”1 Around this time Vorontsov’s son, also Nikolai, was furthering his own career in 
the environmental sciences. His advancement eventually led him to become the Minister 
of the Environment for the collapsing Soviet state and, indeed, one of the earliest writers 
of Russian environmental history.2 The elder Vorontsov’s desire to leave sections of the 
local environment without manipulation and his praise of the ostensible success of the 
Soviet Union in this area contrast sharply with later analyses of the ecocidal legacy of 
communism. At the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, what strikes me 
most about the father’s combined dedication to industrialization and conservation is not 
how out of touch this old Soviet dreamer was. It is instead how similar his desires and 
sentiments were to mainstream environmental policy today. 
This study investigated several industries in a region in the far north. There are 
five main conclusions that have hitherto weaved in and out of the various discussions of 
railroads, apatite, reindeer, nickel, and energy. First and foremost, I have shown that a 
general and deeply political process of economic modernization accounts for much of the 
trajectory of changing human/environment relations. This campaign to industrially 
transform the natural world in order to accrue greater economic value began with 
technocratic schemes devised in late imperial Russia, continued to define essential 
elements of the Soviet project of building socialism, and later shaped the sweeping 
                                                
1 L. Doronina, “I tundra pokorilas´,” Monchegorskii rabochii (September 23, 1967), 3. 
2 Nikolai Nikolaevich Vorontsov, “Nature Protection and Government in the USSR,” Journal of 
the History of Biology 25, no. 3 (Fall 1992): 369-383. 
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market reforms of the 1990s. The basic dynamics of ecosystem change, human life in 
shifting environments, and cultural representations of nature followed global patterns, 
including the rise of heavy industry and the forms of pollution it engendered, a shift from 
agrarian livelihoods to urban ones, and the coexistence of ideas of dominating nature and 
preserving it. The nuances of tsarist state capitalism, Soviet communism, and post-Soviet 
neoliberalism did not cause major deviations from these general patterns in the 
environmental history of economic modernization. 
Additionally, more chronologically bounded continuities united the different 
forms of capitalism with Soviet communism. The reliance on forced labor in brutal 
conditions as a means of industrialization, for instance, was innovated in the tsarist war 
economy and picked up with unfortunate vigor by the Stalinist state. Furthermore, 
environmental ideologies that emphasized maximally unleashing the productive forces 
harbored in natural resources for the benefit of the state became fully articulated in the 
late imperial era; attempts to enact them on the Kola Peninsula matured during Soviet 
industrialization. The drastic economic decline of the 1990s might risk obscuring 
connections between the late Soviet era and neoliberalism, since the first decade of post-
socialism was one of economic reform but not growth. However, as we have seen, a 
similar preference for technical fixes for environmental problems, a celebration of the 
alleged traditionalism of certain forms of nature use, and a continued orientation toward 
the natural world as primarily a potential economic asset united these two eras. Finally, 
throughout the entire century, the power to make decisions that affected the treatment of 
the environment belonged primarily to parties that desired its economic transformation. 
This political ecology was not inevitable or neutral. It is just that powerful actors in 
different political-economic systems shared common views about the desired 
arrangement of human relations with the environment.  
Second, during this process of economic modernization the physical world 
responded to manipulation and contributed to ideas and policies that shaped the treatment 
of it. The natural environment was not simply an abiding or immutable structure, a stage 
upon which human action occurred. Instead, it operated as an active and responsive 
participant in this history. As we saw, it functioned this way in a number of places in this 
dissertation. The recalcitrance of the environment to the hasty construction of the 
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Murmansk railroad helped inspire the rhetoric of conquering nature. The nepheline 
tailings from apatite production in the Khibiny Mountains failed to behave according to 
the schemes experts had devised for it and instead degraded the local ecosystem. The 
conscious behavior of domestic and wild reindeer led a variety of people interacting with 
these animals to rely on forms of knowledge outside of rationalist frameworks. The high 
levels of sulfur present in the nickel-copper ore that was shipped from Noril´sk to the 
smelters on the Kola Peninsula beginning in the 1970s increased the amount of 
atmospheric pollution emitted by these plants. One does not need to accept all of the 
claims advanced in theories that insist on the agency of nature in hybrid networks in 
order to see that the role of the environment in this history was more than just an object 
upon which people acted and less than a determinant structure that decisively shaped 
human experience. The interactions between nature and society during Soviet 
modernization occurred as a negotiated process of reciprocal influence. 
The next main conclusion involves the attitudes of the leaders of the Soviet state 
toward the natural environment. In contrast to scholarship that has emphasized a deep-
seated antagonism toward nature in Soviet ideology, I discovered that economic planners 
were concerned with creating harmony with nature even in the throes of Stalinism. This 
holistic inclination was invariably anthropocentric, but it did not embrace willful 
environmental destruction or curtail the pursuit of conservation. Not only did the Lapland 
nature reserve open at the same time as the industrialization of the Khibiny Mountains 
began, but urban planners, enterprise leaders, and scientists working for the Apatit trust 
sought to construct a city and plant in which socialist citizens would live peacefully in, 
and indeed enjoy, northern nature. Perhaps the most elaborate expression of this 
disposition toward the environment can be seen in Fersman’s concept of the complex 
utilization of natural resources. For the industrialists inspired by this model, the most 
exhaustive transformation of nature into items for human use would also lead to the 
minimization, if not the elimination, of pollution. This interest in harmony with nature 
abided throughout the Soviet era, but always remained subordinate to the prerogatives of 
production. Crucially, in the Stalinist period these aspirations for a stable and happy life 
in previously ominous natural conditions did not materialize. The abject failures of this 
holism were manifested in the reckless and hasty patterns of nature use during the 
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Stalinist revolution and the brutal and incoherent deprivations inflicted on the people sent 
to construct these new industrial sites. Nevertheless, the aggregate environmental legacy 
of Stalinism needs to be separated from the comparatively high levels of pollution that 
occurred in the late Soviet era. The former was typical of the level of industrial activity in 
any polity, whereas the later was indeed acute for the time. 
Fourth, the objectives of the military decisively shaped nature use on the Kola 
Peninsula throughout the twentieth century. The strategic significance of a warm water 
port on the Arctic Ocean attracted state attention to the region at least as much as the 
desire to make economic use of its natural resources. During Sergei Witte’s initial 
proposals for a port in the Kola Bay and an accompanying railroad connection at the end 
of the nineteenth century, military concerns for establishing a naval base that would be 
accessible year-round and resistant to blockades became enmeshed with schemes for 
economic modernization. These connections obviously grew tighter during the wartime 
construction of the Murmansk railroad in 1915 and 1916. The rapid industrialization of 
the 1930s coincided with the creation of the Northern Fleet of the Soviet Navy and the 
beginning of the expansion of military installations along the Murman coast and in the 
interior of the Kola Peninsula. The thirst for nickel to produce munitions oriented the 
battles of the Second World War in the region toward acquiring the deposits and factories 
of the Pechenga territory. During the Cold War, the Northern Fleet developed into the 
largest and best-funded branch of the navy that was supported by its own set of municipal 
infrastructure and closed cities. The presence of the navy on the Kola Peninsula not only 
contributed to increasing energy demands in the region, but also facilitated the 
proliferation of nuclear reactors to power atomic submarines and the resultant nuclear 
wastes. This militarization of the Kola Peninsula clearly affected the trajectory and scale 
of modernization and patterns of regional nature use in ways outside of the specific logics 
of communist or capitalist economic systems. 
Finally, as radical as the transformation of human relations with nature was 
during this period, modernization did not lead to a genuine transcendence of people from 
the environment. Instead, the process reconfigured interconnections and dependencies 
between humans and nature, which kept people embedded in natural contexts and 
attached environmental understandings to social experience. We saw this lack of 
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transcendence in the continual role of the material world in shaping thinking about the 
environment and in raising new problems and dilemmas for further development. 
Moreover, sentient forms of ecological knowledge influenced reformers of the reindeer 
economy who were committed to modernization. The entanglement of human bodies 
with energy production, the intricate networks joining distant landscapes and livelihoods, 
and the ways that life in the nuclear age became entrenched in new uncertainties about 
the behavior of natural elements reveal how Soviet modernization brought about new 
connections between nature and society instead of ascending the latter over the former. 
The significance of this point comes from its function as a counter-balance to the claims 
that modernization leads to increased human control over the world and to lasting 
solutions that overcome previous environmental limitations on society. Modernization 
changed environments and peoples, but modernity remained illusionary. 
This work has largely focused on exposing commonalities between the Soviet 
Union and other forms of political economy, but it is worth also addressing synthetically 
what this study tells us about what was unique about the environmental history of Soviet 
communism. For one thing, the revolutionary impulse of Stalinism brought the 
environmental and social effects of total war into peacetime. The application of forced 
labor and policies that, sometimes intentionally and sometime inadvertently, created 
extreme vulnerabilities to the natural hazards of the far north began in the imperial era 
when military exigency coalesced with industrial imperatives. The Stalinist state did not 
face a comparable situation when it chose to send former kulaks and Gulag prisoners to 
industrialize the Kola Peninsula. The historical context of initial industrialization, the 
distribution of natural resources within the country, a desire to solidify control over 
borderlands, and a conviction in the desirability of colonizing and developing peripheries 
also inspired a distinct geography of Soviet modernization. The scale of industrialization 
and city building in forbidding natural environments was indeed greater in the communist 
era, though much of Siberia remained undeveloped and Cold War geopolitics would 
likely have led any powerful government to build-up the Kola Peninsula.  
Central planning and the command economy did not adapt well to a shift in global 
economic conditions in the 1970s that caused service and finance to play a larger role in 
generating growth than production. The combination of accelerated production and 
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economic stagnation brought about even higher levels of unaddressed environmental 
pollution than capitalist industry at the same scale. Finally, on the ideological plane 
Soviet communism included an extreme confidence about the possibility that public 
policy could surmount any contradiction that emerged between economic activity and 
pollution generation. Similar convictions have existed in capitalist thinking, but they have 
often been subordinate to another fanciful belief that the market itself will optimally 
distribute environmental goods and bads. 
Ultimately, the lessons of the communist environmental experience for the 
twenty-first century rest less in a negative example of what went wrong than in a general 
warning about the difficulty of finding sustainable modes of land use in the context of 
continual economic growth. The Soviet experience helps us see how market capitalism is 
neither the exclusive cause of, nor a panacea for, modern environmental problems. 
Something beyond the distinctions of the political-economic systems has led to similar 
environmental trajectories: the impulse to modernize society and the natural world. As 
mass species extinction and global climate change promise to further remake our world in 
tumultuous ways, we may need to rethink the status of economic expansion as a non-
negotiable criterion in policy decisions. 
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